Posted by Joshua on Thursday, March 1st, 2012
Formation of SNC military council causes uproar among fighters in Syria and Turkey
The Homs Revolutionary Council has announced that it will “not coordinate with Burhan Ghalioun in the affairs of the Military Office and its principles” because it doesn’t agree with its goals. It had a 15 minute phone call with Ghalioun. It wants “action not words.” It will retain authority over its own military strategy, “which is to bring down the regime and free Syria from the ruling gang.”
SNC Statement on the Formation of Military Bureau
….the Syrian National Council (SNC) has established a Military Bureau composed of military and civilian personnel. The Military Bureau will track the armed opposition groups, organize and unify their ranks under one central command, defining their defense missions while placing them under the political supervision of the SNC, and coordinating their activities in accordance with the overall strategy of the Revolution. The SNC will work on providing the FSA with all the support it needs to completely fulfill its defense responsibilities, including securing necessary protection for civilians, and tending to the Revolutionaries defending Syrians against the criminal regime. Bureau members will seek assistance from appropriate sources, including experts.
Free Syrian Army (FSA) chief Colonel Riad al-Asaad said that he has not been involved in the formation of a military council. “I don’t know about the objectives of this body,” said Asaad, a figurehead for the collection of army deserters and civilians who have taken up arms. (Reuters)
Ghalioun aide Ausama Monajed told reporters the military body would bring all the factions fighting the Syrian government under one umbrella, evaluate their military needs and try to match them with offers of aid from abroad.
Monajed said several countries, including Saudi Arabia, have offered to provide weapons to the rebels.
“Arms are already being smuggled whether we like it or not, so our role is to organize the process and make sure weapons don’t fall into the wrong hands on the ground,” he said.
The Syrian Revolution 2011 الثورة السورية ضد بشار الاسد
حمص 1 آذار 2012
مجلس الثورة في محافظة حمص
-انسحبت كتيبة الفاروق من باباعمرو وهذا الانسحاب تكتيكي ، الحرب كر وفر ونحن انسحبنا حفاظا على أرواح الأهالي بعد هجمة النظام الشرسة .
– النظام يقوم بعملية تمشيط واسعة بعد انسحاب كتيبة الفاروق ونأمل من الله ألا تزداد الضحايا لأنه يتبع سياسة القتل الممنهج .
– معركتنا مفتوحة مع نظام بشار الأسد حتى إسقاطه بإذن الله .
- لم ننسق مع برهـــــــان غليون بشـــأن المكتب العسكري والموقف المبدئي من هذا المكتب بأننا لانتعامـــــــل معه لأننا لم نطلع على أهدافـــــــه ..
نريد أفعالا ولانريد أقوال !
– اتصلت بالأمس بالسيد برهان غليون وتحدثنا لأكثر من ربع ساعة وكانت وجهــــــات النظر مختلفـــــــــــة تمـــــــامـــاً ولم نصل لاتفـــــاق .
– نحن قبلنا بأن يكون المجلس الوطني واجهة سياسية ، لكن الشأن العسكري خاص بنــــــــــــــا ونحن نضع استراتيجيتنا العسكرية
استراتيجيتنا العسكرية هي إسقـــــاط النظام وتحرير سوريا من العصبة الحاكمـــــــة
“it is time to raise the status of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the formal Syrian opposition. It must increasingly be seen as the recognized successor to the Assad regime — or at least the vehicle for managing the transition to a new and inclusive leadership.
Withholding recognition of the council as the alternative to Assad made sense as a way to encourage its leaders to overcome petty rivalries and develop a coherent, non-sectarian plan for shaping the future of Syria. Last week, when the “Friends of Syria” — a group that includes the U.S., Britain, France, Turkey and a number of Arab countries — met in Tunis, international leaders treated the SNC as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Though a step in the right direction, more will need to be done to create an aura of inevitability about the SNC as the alternative to Assad.
Post-Asad Syria: Opportunity or Quagmire?
By Patrick Clawson – WINEP – Strategic Forum, February 2012
Perception of the Power of the United States and Its Allies A strong argument can be made that U.S. prestige and influence around the world suffer if the United States issues a call for Asad’s overthrow and yet he stays in power. The United States has a compelling interest in ensuring that any time the President of the United States says something must happen, then it does happen. Indeed, a serious argument for the U.S. military commitment in Libya was that President Obama had said publicly that Qaddafi must go. Talk is not cheap; staking out a position without being willing to act undermines the credibility of every U.S…..
The U.S. call for Asad’s overthrow may provide an opportunity for Washington to claim credit for something that is going to happen anyway; in geopolitics, it is always good to be credited for making the sun rise in the east.
Were Asad to muddle through, Washington would face some difficult quandaries. So long as Asad is in power, it will be hard to walk back the sanctions imposed on Syria, yet it will be difficult to sustain economic and political isolation of the Asad regime if that government looks like it will be in power for the foreseeable future. If that isolation lessens, then the United States and its allies will look like they lost a confrontation with Asad, which would reduce their perceived clout. Asad’s overthrow is by no means assured, and U.S. instruments to advance that objective are limited. The U.S. Government decision to call for his overthrow presumably rested on a judgment that the prospects for success were good and the payoff, if successful, would be high….
Impact on Israel
It is difficult to see how Asad’s overthrow would make Syrian-Israeli peace less likely….