The Expulsion of Mosul’s Christians, part 1: The Account of the Kidnapped Nuns

The Expulsion of Mosul’s Christians, part 1:

The Account of the Kidnapped Nuns

 

Parts 2 & 3 Forthcoming

 

Matthew Barber 3by Matthew Barber

The release of two nuns and three orphans who were kidnapped and held without explanation by ISIS/IS for 17 days in Mosul has been briefly mentioned in a few news outlets. However, I thought it might prove useful to provide here the full account given to me by the nuns, with whom I met last Monday (Jul. 28, 2014), along with two of the three children that had been kidnapped with them.

This account doesn’t contain any ground-shaking revelations, but the details will be interesting for those interested in what happened. The two nuns were well-known for their many years of work among Mosul’s needy. Though they were not harmed while being held, their unexplained disappearance was unnerving for the Christian population, and added to the number of factors that terrorized Christians before their final mass departure on Jul. 17.

Sister Miskinta al-Dosaky Myko and her superior, Sister Atur Joseph had initially fled to Kurdistan province when ISIS took over Mosul, as had many other Christians. And as many others had also done, they ventured back into Mosul after ISIS offered pledges of safety to minorities.

On June 27, the two nuns, along with three orphans in their care, drove from Kurdistan Province to Mosul, to check on the orphanage that they were in charge of, and to check on a number of poor families to whom they frequently gave assistance. In their car they carried food and money that they planned to deliver to needy families. The children were brought along to gather their things from the orphanage, as they were going to relocate to Kurdistan.

They were apprehended by ISIS fighters while in one of the neighborhoods where they often distributed food. Two jihadists spoke to them, a Syrian and an Iraqi. The nuns had the impression that the Iraqi was reluctant to give the nuns a hard time, but the Syrian pulled rank somehow and said that they had to come with them, “to answer questions.” He demanded their keys, saying he would drive their car, but the nuns refused, whereupon the jihadists allowed them to drive, and escorted their vehicle with their own vehicles.

Older photo of the two nuns: source unknown

Older photo of the two nuns: source unknown

They were taken to a house in the Danadan neighborhood. The house had apparently belonged to an official. The nuns and children (two girls, one boy) were held in a library inside the home. They were kept in this room for 5 days. The nuns already wore habits, but the girls—though merely adolescents—were made to wear hijabs by the fighters, who didn’t want to see them uncovered during the moments when they were escorted out of the library to make visits to the bathroom.

Beginning on the first day, a Tunisian fighter began visiting them and pressuring them about religion. He tried to make the nuns change out of their distinctly Christian religious habits and wear common clothes instead. They resisted this demand. He repeatedly attacked their religion, telling them that their beliefs were wrong, and the nuns were frequently drawn into arguments with him. He told them that they didn’t know God, called them kufaar, and would shout “Don’t show me your crosses! I don’t want to see your crosses!” (They wore crosses around their necks.)

Despite the harassment of the Tunisian jihadist, the same Iraqi that had participated in their abduction came, and in what must be one of the “funniest-jihad-moments-ever,” comforted them, saying, “Don’t worry about this guy; he’s a suicide bomber and he’ll be gone soon anyway.”

The Tunisian seemed to have had no experience with or understanding of Christians; the Iraqi, on the other hand, understood what nuns were and wasn’t so bewildered by this “perplexing other.” The Tunisian just wasn’t able to come to terms with an actual encounter with someone who would believe that Jesus was the son of God and regularly hassled them about it.

After 5 days like this, they were moved to another location where they were held for 12 more days. A fighter further up the chain of command visited them and assured them that they wouldn’t be harmed, saying “Didn’t you see what happened with the nuns in Ma’loula? We’ll let you go just like them.” The ranking nun protested, telling him it was already an act of harm to be held without cause in this way.

The fighters themselves seemed confused as to why they were keeping the nuns, and why they had taken them in the first place. Initially, the nuns’ habits seemed to scream “foreign agent” in the minds of the abductors, yet the nuns had no authority, political activity, or even dealings with leading bishops. That merely wearing garb that was unusual to the jihadists would make them appear as some kind of external political agents highlighted the complete ignorance of the fighters. At one point, they pressured the nuns about the War in Iraq. They said, “We’re the Dawla Islamiyyah and we’re against the U.S., Israel, China, Korea, [etc.] What about Bush’s crusader war that he conducted in Iraq! Why don’t you tell them not to do these things!?” It was as though the fighters believed that being Christian meant that the nuns were “agents of America” who had the president’s ear.

The abductors were not rogue opportunists acting alone (the nuns’ eventual release occurred without ransom); they were regularly in contact with ISIS leadership and would tell the nuns things like “You have to stay here until we hear from the emir.” The declaration of caliphate (and corresponding shift from ISIS to IS) occurred while the nuns were in captivity.

The children regularly cried throughout the ordeal. The head nun told me that despite the injustice of their arbitrary captivity, and the fear that they all felt, she reminded herself that “I must not hate them, but rather I should love them; they are the ones who are sick and need healing.” She said that she spent a lot of their empty time praying for her captors.

They were always provided with food and water, though the nuns claimed they were very selective about what food they accepted, not impressed with the cleanliness of the environment. (“We didn’t trust the dolma…”) They described the conditions of the houses as very dirty; the fighters supposedly never cleaned it and would leave food and trash on the floors.

Two days before their release, a man “in Saudi clothing” came and tried to convert them to Islam, which they declined to do.

They were then asked, “Have you been mistreated in any way while you have been kept here?” They replied that they hadn’t, but that it was wrong that they had been imprisoned in the first place. The jihadists replied, “Look, we’re Muslims, we don’t want to hurt anyone or make anyone afraid.” The nuns responded, “Then why did you destroy the statue of the Virgin Mary that was outside our church?” The fighters replied, “Well, we didn’t go inside the church!” (In fact, a number of churches in Mosul were entered and occupied by armed jihadists, an issue that will be taken up in part 3.)

(I am aware that these snippets of dialogue seem odd, puzzling, even comical, but I am relaying the entirety of this account as I received it from the nuns. What adds interest to this jihadi-nun encounter, despite the fact that it produces more questions than it answers, is that it is so uncommon to have narrated instances of conversational exchange between perpetrators of jihadist violence and members of minorities who are victimized by it. I was struck that of a plethora of grievances the nuns could have referenced in this exchange, they chose to bring up the destruction of this statue.)

Finally, they were told that they would be released. The fighters seemed unable to decide what to do with them, again confused about why they had nabbed them in the first place. At some point they came to see the nuns as a means of communication with the wider Christian community through which they could make an announcement—another absurdity—and decided to use them in this way before letting them go.

The night before their release, their phones were brought to them and they were told “Call somebody we can talk to.” (This is all demonstrative of ISIS’ very poor performance in engaging with the Christian community.) The nuns called a priest who was in charge of overseeing orphanage work. The jihadists then spoke to the priest and gave him options for Christians that he was to convey to the Christian community. This was the evening of July 13, four days before the IS ultimatum issued to Christians on Thursday the 17th, and the options given over the phone differed from those issued later. The instructions given to the priest were that Christians must become Muslim or pay jizya and accept the “Shurut al-‘Umariyyah,” a set of strictures for Christian behavior, attributed to an early agreement between conquered Christians and the Caliph Omar, that involve markers of subservience to Muslims and the abstention of any public display of Christian religious practice.

In trying to have the nuns convey this message to the larger Christian community by simply having them call a random priest who wasn’t even a leading figure of the local Christian community (which is made up of multiple denominations), the jihadists gave the impression that they didn’t know who to deal with in the Christian community. This is one piece of a larger picture in which IS entirely reneged on their self-declared responsibilities as the “new, approachable law and government,” and failed to engage the Christian community.

The nuns were released on July 14th. Their car, and the money that was in it, were never given back to them.

Upon release, they were told they had to be accompanied by fighters “to protect you from terrorists who might kidnap you for ransom.” The nuns rejected this, but the fighters wouldn’t budge, nor would they give them back the keys to their orphanage, which the nuns said they wanted to return to.

The fighters took the nuns and the 3 children to the orphanage. When they arrived, the neighbors, who knew the nuns well (and after 17 days missing everyone was fearful for them), came out and started crying, demanding that the fighters explain what they were doing. One fighter had just handed the orphanage keys to the ranking nun who hadn’t yet opened the door. As the neighbors expressed concern and outrage, the nun said loudly to them, “Look what they’re doing to us!” This annoyed the fighter who quickly took back the keys. The fighters again took the nuns and children, without letting them enter and retrieve any belongings, put them in a taxi, and told the driver to take them to Dohuk (in Kurdistan). (The orphanage was apparently later plundered by the fighters.)

That was the last time they saw Mosul.

The Factions of Raqqa Province

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Much has been noted of the presence of the Islamic State in Raqqa province, where the group controls all major urban localities (Raqqa city, Tabqa, Ma’adan, and Tel Abyad), as well as the Kurdish militias just west of Tel Abyad, from which town they were expelled back in August 2013 on account of cooperation between the Islamic State, Ahrar ash-Sham and other local rebels who have since been subdued by the Islamic State. What then of other groups? Broadly, we can distinguish two kinds: pro-regime forces, and a small rebel insurgency fighting against the Islamic State. They are detailed below. Note that I exclude Jabhat al-Nusra as a separate group here because the history of the group’s presence has been sufficiently well documented before.

Regime

National Defense Force (NDF)- Raqqa

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NDF Raqqa Emblem

The NDF is officially a ‘counter-insurgency’ force trained with the help of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp and Hezbollah to deal with the problem of lack of regime manpower in the regular armed forces as opposed to the wider insurgency. The NDF has become a meaningful force in the regime’s arsenal but it is not of the same nature everywhere in Syria. Out in Raqqa province, where the regime presence has been reduced to little more than isolated military bases, the NDF is more of a banner for underground remnant loyalists operating covertly in the province (in so far as it is a meaningful entity within Raqqa province itself), though NDF Raqqa has also claimed under its banner operations on the Raqqa-Salamiya/Raqqa-Athariya roads stretching into the Hama countryside to the southwest.

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Mundhar Sharif al-Mousa and Fadi Sheikhan, identified with NDF Raqqa and said to have been killed in an ambush on the Athariya road.
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Funeral for the two men.

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A photo said to have been taken “with the lens of the NDF lions in eastern Raqqa countryside: photo of the Shari’a court in al-Karama.” This would seem to corroborate the idea of NDF Raqqa as a banner for the regime loyalist underground.

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Pro-regime graffiti in Raqqa in February 2014: “National Defense to liberate Raqqa.”

NDF Raqqa’s other main function has been reporting the latest news on the clashes between the Islamic State and regime forces in the Division 17 military base area. Division 17 has been the subject of some contention on the question of the relationship between the Islamic State and the regime. Some critics argue that the Islamic State has not (at least until now) attacked Division 17 or that any signs of fighting were merely for show rather like the naval battles on the Tiber of the days of the early Principate.

Neither of these assertions stands up to scrutiny, though it is certainly fair to argue that the Islamic State did not devote as much manpower and resources to taking the base as it is doing now on account of infighting with other rebels elsewhere in Syria. In any case, the clashes that did take place were meaningful and happened on multiple occasions, corroborated by reporting on all sides (Islamic State provincial news feeds, Raqqa pro-regime news networks, and local activists like Abu Ibrahim al-Raqqawi; cf. video footage shared by non-Islamic State sources), resulting in casualties.

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Qasi Fu’ad Azzam, a Druze soldier killed in clashes in the Division 17 area with the Islamic State on 16 March 2014.

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Abu Aamer al-Ansari, an Islamic State fighter killed in Division 17 clashes. Death announced in March.

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Non-Islamic State source on “violent clashes” in March 2014 between the regime and the Islamic State in Division 17 area, such that they could be heard from Raqqa city.

The most recent fighting, as I noted above, has been more intense, as reporting from both sides makes clear.

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Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi poses with heads of decapitated regime soldiers from Division 17 base.

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Ahmad Ali Ibrahim, killed in the latest Islamic State assault on Division 17.

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Brigadier General Hasham al-Sha’arani, a Druze army officer killed in the latest round of Division 17 clashes. Cf. List of those wounded subsequently taken to Latakia hospital.

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Muhannad Sari’ Suleiman, originally from Jobat Burghal (Latakia province), killed in Division 17 clashes.

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Majid Ahmad al-Hassan, originally from the Alawite quarter of Zahara’ in Homs, also killed in the Division 17 clashes.

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Suleiman Ibrahim, originally from Tartous area, killed in Division 17 clashes.

Saraya Ansar al-Jaysh al-Arabi al-Suri

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Statement by Saraya Ansar al-Jaysh al-Arabi al-Suri in Raqqa.

This purported group- translating to “Brigades of Supporters of the Syrian Arab Army”- is like the NDF Raqqa a banner for underground regime loyalists in Raqqa. In fact, the group’s Facebook page now simply uses the NDF Raqqa banner, indicating no real difference between these banners. The video statement above is merely of interest for echoing of regime rhetoric talking points, decrying the overrunning of Raqqa by foreign fighters from the Islamic State (not exactly divorced from reality, though), affirming that “Islam” has nothing to do with the Islamic State’s actions, that true jihad comes in the path of liberating Palestine, and attacking the “petro-dollar” sheikhs of the Gulf. The statement recalls one issued by underground loyalists in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Raqqa city, in which there was a vow to wage “true jihad” in the fight against the rebels who had taken over the city.

 

Rebels

Liwa Thuwar Raqqa

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Emblem of Liwa Thuwar Raqqa

Liwa Thuwar Raqqa- translating to “The Revolutionaries of Raqqa Brigade”- is an FSA-banner group in origin that became affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra- as did many other similar rebel groups following Jabhat al-Nusra’s announcement of its “return” to Raqqa city in September 2013- in a bid last year to protect itself from the growing influence of the Islamic State in Raqqa. Led by one “Abu Eisa,” the group, according to Abu Ibrahim al-Raqqawi, became independent from Jabhat al-Nusra at the beginning of this year with the outbreak of infighting between the Islamic State and other rebels within Raqqa city. However, it should be noted that only much later this year (April) did Jabhat al-Nusra issue an official statement on the separation of Liwa Thuwar Raqqa:

“More than 6 months ago Liwa Thuwar Raqqa joined us in the city of Raqqa, and they had shown their readiness to submit to Shari’a sessions and discipline with precepts approved by Jabhat al-Nusra.

But there was deficiency on the part of both sides in the implementation of this agreement. From the side of Jabhat al-Nusra: the deficiency was in the holding of Shari’a sessions as regards quantity and manner.

From the side of Liwa Thuwar Raqqa: the deficiency was in the lack of embrace of the precepts approved by Jabhat al-Nusra. And after the attacks of the group of the state [Islamic State] on the factions waging jihad and the beginning of the infighting, the Liwa withdrew from Raqqa to some of the neighboring areas, and the organizational link was cut off from that day. Thus, Jabhat al-Nusra announces the dissolution of any organizational connection between us and Liwa Thuwar Raqqa…16 April 2014.”

This issue regarding Liwa Thuwar Raqqa and its relationship with Jabhat al-Nusra has some implications and lessons. The first of these is that integration into Jabhat al-Nusra is no light matter: on the contrary, assimilation of the ideology is expected in the end, and all the more so now with the establishment of the Islamic Emirate project.

Second, there is a degree of spin in the Jabhat al-Nusra statement here: Liwa Thuwar Raqqa and other FSA-banner origin battalions that pledged allegiance in a bid to protect themselves from the Islamic State. In January, a statement emerged purportedly in Jabhat al-Nusra’s name declaring operations against the Islamic State in Raqqa.

This statement was then disavowed by Jabhat al-Nusra’s central leadership; it had emerged from a Facebook page calling itself kamātu l-Raqqa, which featured local rebels who had joined Jabhat al-Nusra following the ‘return’ to Raqqa city. In this context we should deem Liwa Thuwar Raqqa and allies of similar disposition as likely responsible for the psy-ops statement in Jabhat al-Nusra’s name.

One should also note that the Jabhat al-Nusra’s statement partly came in response to a narrative promoted by Islamic State supporters that because Liwa Thuwar Raqqa has been coordinating with the Kurdish YPG (in the form of the Jabhat al-Akrad front group) in the remnant northern Raqqa countryside insurgency against the Islamic State (primarily west of Tel Abyad), therefore Jabhat al-Nusra was supposedly in an alliance with the “PKK apostates” and therefore guilty of apostasy itself.

This parallels the Islamic State supporters’ narrative indicting Jabhat al-Nusra as apostates (and note, in practice this takfir approach was adopted on the ground) on account of alleged coordination with the SMC in Deir az-Zor province. To date, while there have indeed been local ceasefires between Jabhat al-Nusra and the YPG, nothing suggests a vindication of the pro-Islamic State claims of an actual military alliance.

As of now, Liwa Thuwar Raqqa continues to exist but has been unable to score any significant victories against the Islamic State, only capturing some small villages west of Tel Abyad of no great importance and liable to change hands. The group appointed a new official spokesman in June but there are little signs of meaningful progress.

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Four al-Jazrawis (foreign fighters from the Arabian Peninsula, normally Saudi Arabia) of the Islamic State killed by Liwa Thuwar Raqqa in May 2014.

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Abu Dhiyab, a Liwa Thuwar Raqqa commander killed by the Islamic State. Note the banner behind him echoes the Islamic State’s “Banner of Tawhid” (more recently in the group’s messaging, the “Banner of Khilafa”). Since the flag’s symbols of the first half of the shahada followed by the Prophet’s seal are not automatically associated with the Islamic State, some of the group’s rivals have taken up the banner in an attempt to ‘reclaim’ it from the Islamic State. A similar example in Raqqa province was the independent Liwa Owais al-Qarni that was based in Tabqa and refused to fight the Islamic State, thus reducing itself to subordination to the latter. Following an apparent prison break of regime-aligned prisoners in March, the Islamic State forcibly disbanded Liwa Owais al-Qarni.

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Corollary to the above: a Northern Storm fighter (now deceased) and an activist who was detained by the Islamic State in Azaz last year hold up a ‘banner of Tawheed’ with “Northern Storm Brigade” inscribed on it. Some of the Azaz Facebook activist pages had this banner too (minus the Northern Storm inscription). Though I had been skeptical at the time of the idea that featuring such a banner did not mean not supporting the Islamic State, this image made me rethink what was at play. Presently, Northern Storm identifies with the Islamic Front, despite tensions with Liwa al-Tawheed over the Bab al-Salama border area and even as many ex-members remain with the Islamic State.

Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah

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Emblem of Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah.

This group, translating to “Jihad in the Path of God Brigade” is an FSA-banner formation that works closely with Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, though unlike Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, it explicitly acknowledges the opposition-in-exile government and the Hay’at al-Arkan (SMC), at least according to a recent interview with the group’s official spokesman. The evidence for the close alliance and ground coordination is as follows: firstly, the group has issued a joint statement with Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, and secondly, areas of operation coincide. Though both groups primarily operate in Raqqa province countryside, they have also clashed with the Islamic State in the rural hinterlands of eastern Aleppo province, such as in the Manbij area.

This also includes coordination with the wider Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front I have mentioned previously- a coalition now severely decimated by the conflict with the Islamic State- and an assortment of other minor FSA-banner underground insurgent groups operating against the Islamic State in eastern Aleppo province.

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An example of one of the underground FSA-banner insurgent groups in eastern Aleppo area working with Liwa Thuwar Raqqa and Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah: “Group of Battalions Jarabulus and its Countryside.” The presence of the Turkish flag is noteworthy, as many of the supporters of these groups coordinating media activities and arranging for financial support are currently in Turkey. Further, Ankara, in fear of an Islamic State attack on its own territory, is likely supporting these groups in the hope of rolling back the Islamic State. At the beginning of July, this group, Liwa Thuwar Raqqa, Liwa al-Jihad and others appealed to the opposition-in-exile and Hay’at al-Arkan for reinforcements.

What kind of underground insurgent attacks take place? Besides armed clashes and mortar strikes, there are also IED bombings. Very rare inside the Islamic State’s urban centers in Raqqa province, they occur occasionally in the hinterlands. There is too little to demonstrate that these attacks are significantly damaging the Islamic State administrative and security apparatus in Raqqa province.

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Purported leader of Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah (Abu Wael) with some members in Ayn Issa countryside, Raqqa province.

Ahrar ash-Sham [defunct]

I mention Ahrar ash-Sham for the sake of completeness, despite the fact that it is defunct in Raqqa province. For example, though media reports last autumn gave the impression that Raqqa city had become solely controlled by the Islamic State, the fact is that there were still Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar ash-Sham in the city, the latter of which had been a major participant in the original fall of the urban center in March 2013.

It would be fair though to liken Raqqa city by autumn 2013 to a triumvirate, in which the Islamic State was the strongest actor and ever growing in power. Ahrar ash-Sham was also present in other Raqqa province localities, most notably controlling the Tel Abyad border gates until being expelled by the Islamic State in January 2014.

A key strategic error- in my view- on the part of Ahrar ash-Sham as regards its relations with the Islamic State in Raqqa province was its willingness to work with the Islamic State or stand aside as other actors viewed as real or potential rivals were fought or expelled by the Islamic State: namely, the Kurdish militias and Ahfad al-Rasul respectively.

The latter was expelled from Raqqa city in August by the Islamic State, while Ahrar ash-Sham did nothing. Kurdish militias suffered some heavy losses on account of coordination between Ahrar ash-Sham and the Islamic State, most notably being expelled from Tel Abyad city in August 2013 as I mentioned in the preface. Indeed, Ahrar ash-Sham issued multiple statements on coordination with other factions in Raqqa province against Kurdish forces, all of which had followed on from wider infighting that broke out after the YPG had expelled the Islamic State from Ras al-Ayn. Thus, other rebel groups had essentially thrown in their lot with the Islamic State.

One final point of interest as regards the former Ahrar ash-Sham presence in Raqqa is the group’s da’wah outreach activities, which, like the Islamic State, encompassed local children. Note the two images below for comparison.

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Ahrar ash-Sham Raqqa da’wah outreach: October 2013.

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Islamic State advertising a slide for children: May 2014.

Though parts of the slides are obscured in both images, the two look uncannily similar. It is certainly possible that the Islamic State seized the slide and other outreach assets for children from Ahrar ash-Sham following the latter’s expulsion from Raqqa city in January 2014. In any event, like the Islamic State, Ahrar ash-Sham da’wah outreach in Raqqa also involved Qur’an learning and memorization circles.

Conclusion

Raqqa province as a whole offers a fairly bleak picture for those who might hope for the Islamic State’s rivals in the province to pose a real challenge to the group’s monopoly on control, foremost because the Islamic State’s rivals lack manpower to carry out sustainable offensives, which would be so even if the regime and rebels in the province decided to partner up (highly unlikely, of course). Regime forces south of Tabqa had tried to exploit an opening in May while the Islamic State was dealing with localized gains by Liwa Thuwar Raqqa and other rebels in the northern countryside, but little ultimately materialized of it. Short of an outside actor carrying out an actual ground military intervention (perhaps by Turkey as the most viable actor?), one can only hope for dissension within the Islamic State’s ranks and collapse from internecine strife both now and the foreseeable future.

 

Minority Dynamics in Syria

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

With the Syrian civil war well into its fourth year, it is apparent that political and militia dynamics that have developed with Syria’s main minorities (in this analysis, excluding the Kurds)- namely, Alawites, Druze and Christians- have largely remained unchanged and if anything have only solidified. With the Alawites and Druze, political and military dynamics are still largely slanted towards the Assad regime, whose perceived protector status has only been enhanced with the large-scale territorial gains of the Islamic State across eastern Syria. For the Christians, the geographic splits that I documented previously have similarly remained in place.

Alawites

For Alawites, beyond the regular Syrian Arab Army, two of the other main outlets for enlisting in the fight against the rebels are the National Defense Force (NDF) and the Muqawama Suriya, the latter of which I previously profiled here. The NDF has engaged in superficial cross-sectarian messaging, as was most apparent in a funeral video for an NDF commander in the Aleppo area released last year in which those praying over the coffin can be observed to be doing so in a variety of ways: at least superficially, in both the Shi’a and Sunni manner.

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Prayer scene for deceased NDF commander Hassan Khashir. Video released in November 2013.

Of course, multiple dynamics could be at work here: for example the impact of the Assad dynasty’s “Sunnification” policies on Alawites, that some Alawites identified themselves more closely with regular Twelver Shi’ism, and the fact that some Sunnis from the Aleppo area have indeed been recruited to regime forces out of dislike and disillusionment with the rebels. Regardless, the attempt at cross-sectarian appeal is there, but overall the NDF remains a predominantly Alawite force, as reporting by Sam Dagher on the ground has noted. Not everywhere is the NDF an organized ‘counter-insurgency’ force: in Raqqa province for example NDF is more of a banner for remnant regime loyalists, despite lacking meaningful manpower to launch a serious ground offensive to retake IS-held territory.

Meanwhile, the Muqawama Suriya has somewhat expanded its role beyond mere defense of Alawite and Twelver Shi’a areas (the latter most notably including Nubl and Zahara’, as I reported last year), above all in Aleppo province, where it is known to have a presence in the Safira area in the countryside and has also participated in the fighting within Aleppo city, claiming a “martyr” in early March with one Muhammad Sakhr al-Khozai’e, said to have been part of the “Badr Organization” affiliated with the Muqawama Suriya in the Aleppo area.

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Muqawama Suriya claims its fighters posing with corpses of dead rebels in the al-Safira area of Aleppo province. Photo released in May.

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Muhammad Sakhr al-Khozaie pictured with the Muqawama Suriya’s Aleppo contingent “Badr Organization.”

It might seem at first that this “Badr Organization’s” name is based on Iraq’s Badr Organization that has deployed fighters to Syria (which I initially thought), but firstly we should note the difference in Arabic wording: majmua Badr for the Muqawama Suriya’s wing as opposed to Iraq’s manẓama Badr, and secondly, it turns out Badr is merely the name of the local contingent’s leader’s new-born son. The Muqawama Suriya publicized Khozai’e’s funeral within Aleppo city. In the video of Khozaie’s funeral, it is affirmed by one of the speakers that the Muqawama Suriya is “defending the land and the homeland from Latakia to Homs and Damascus and now in Aleppo.” As ever, the Muqawama Suriya video invokes typical rhetoric about fighting a “Zionist” enemy/agent.

It will be of interest to continue to watch how the Muqawama Suriya’s role develops, if at all, given the centrality of the battle of Aleppo in the struggle between the regime and non-IS rebels.

The data do not mean that there is no Alawite resentment against the regime- for example, the perception that the regime has brought the community as a whole into a terrible predicament- but there is too little evidence to suggest a real, substantial turn against the regime just yet.

Druze

What I wrote in November 2013- namely, that the majority of Druze who have taken up arms have done so on the side of the regime- remains true today despite the superficial outreach to the isolated Druze communities in Idlib by Jamal Ma’aruf of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front. The main difference now is the evolution of local NDF branches in Druze areas where “popular/people’s committees” had existed. An example is the Druze village of Haḍr in Jabal al-Sheikh, which in recent months erected a small mural dedicated to those who have died fighting for the army and NDF.

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Locals gather in the Druze village of Haḍr to commemorate those depicted on the tree mural who have died fighting for the army and NDF.

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Mural in the Suwayda village of al-Raha dedicated to those who have died fighting for the regime or were killed by rebels/in crossfire.

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Druze militiaman keeps guard, supposedly in Arna, Jabal al-Sheikh. Arna has featured recruits to regime forces, and there should be no illusions of a Druze autonomist trend here rejecting the regime yet. Druze militiamen go under a variety of banners- such as “Forces of Abu Ibrahim” or “Jaysh al-Muwahhideen” but nothing suggests these militias are independent of regime organization.

Advertisements for “martyrdoms” of Druze soldiers from Suwayda governorate and the Damascus locality of Jaramana continue unabated, illustrating that there still appears to be little resistance to conscription or taking up arms with the regime. I emphasize that I have indeed documented the exceptions, but they remain exceptions, and instances of other sources claiming a substantial Druze presence among the rebels- such as social media activist “Jad Bantha” who is not actually based in Syria- remain unreliable.

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Shadi Hamid Abu Ismail, killed on 7 July in Wadi al-Deif, Idlib province.

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Mu’nis al-Halabi, a Druze soldier from al-Khalidiya (Suwayda province) killed in al-Mleha on 7 June.

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Rawad Sharf al-Din, from the Jabal al-Sheikh village of Rime killed in the fight for Deraa prison.

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Druze sheikhs mourn for Adham al-Safdi, killed fighting for the Syrian army in Deraa on 23 May 2014.

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Aamer Fayez al-Basha, an NDF fighter from the Suwayda village of Sumayd killed on 28May in al-Mleha, East Ghouta.

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Ahad Azzam from the Suwayda village of Ta’arah who died fighting in Idlib on 3 June. 

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Fadi Hamza Hamsho from the village of Lahitha in Suwayda province, killed in al-Mleha in early June.

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Some Druze sheikhs in Suwayda paid a visit to the provincial governor’s house in late June in an attempt to show Druze support for the regime. There were some earlier hints of tension among the sheikhs in the city but nothing so as to cause a major upheaval. In short, the Druze community in general still looks to the Assad regime as the best guarantor of its interests

Christians

The Christians still remain the most complex group of the Syrian minorities documented here. Out in the west of the country, the army and NDF still have Christian recruits, but a more interesting dynamic is the attraction for some Christians of the fascist Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which appears to have developed its own militias in Homs governorate that have clashed with the NDF. As I showed in my November 2013 article on the Druze, membership of the SSNP and the regular armed forces is not mutually exclusive, but these localized dynamics in Homs governorate illustrate the wider problem I pointed to in my profile of the Muqawama Suriya of the regime’s inability in the long-run to be able to rein in irregular forces.

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Support for the SSNP in the town of al-Hwash in Wadi al-Nasara, Homs province, along with commemoration of Christian fighters who have died fighting the rebels.

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Locals in al-Hwash show support for the SSNP.

In keeping with this local Christian support for the SSNP, the SSNP has also been keen to put out solidarity messaging with Christians, illustrated most recently by a visit to the town of Kasab that was taken in a jihadi-spearheaded offensive in March. Kasab was recaptured by a variety of pro-regime forces in mid-June, such as the Muqawama Suriya, the NDF, the Ba’ath Brigades, and Suqur al-Sahara (which I first profiled here).

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“On the road to Kasab: the first photos from inside the town of Kasab, 16 June.” Visit featuring SSNP supporters.

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SSNP members and supporters visit a damaged and desecrated church in Kasab. The proof is not 100% that this was necessarily the work of the rebels who were in the town, and much of the debate about how the churches would be treated was subject to the controversy on social media surrounding Kim Kardashian’s tweets, which certainly went too far in calling a ‘genocide’ against Christians. However, the pattern of rebels’ desecrating churches with the ruins discovered post-withdrawal fits a pattern observed in Yabroud and other locations. In any case, the situation was not helped by those cheering for the rebel offensive on Kasab despite the fact it was spearheaded by foreign jihadis.

Out towards the east (specifically Hasakah province), there is still the main division between supporters of the Syriac Union Party (SUP) and its “Sutoro” forces that have formally joined the PYD’s autonomous administration and its Asayish (‘police’) branch respectively as opposed to the Qamishli-based Sootoro, which despite its claims to neutrality is actually aligned with the regime. This was made clear in a statement congratulating Bashar al-Assad on his re-election as president:

“The administration and members of the Sootoro protection office congratulate Mr. President Bashar Hafez al-Assad on winning the presidential elections, asking the Almighty Lord that this presidential period be a period of security, peace and blossoming for Syria and all Syrians…”

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Qamishli Sootoro graphic: “We have vowed resistance and defense of the people and the homeland,” featuring the flag of the Assad regime and echoing the regime’s rhetoric.

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The Qamishli Sootoro advertises a message from “President Assad: Salutations to the SAA and the People’s Defense Organizations and all bearing weapons to defend the dignity of their homeland…and the greatest salutation is to this people…and we do not forget those who have died from the sons of the Lebanese resistance.”

More recently, there were signs in late June of conflict between the Qamishli Sootoro and the SUP’s Sutoro, as illustrated by a statement from the former accusing the SUP of heavy-handed behavior against villagers in the Qahtaniya area- foremost regarding levy of agricultural produce- leading to incidents that required intervention from, among other local actors, the Qamishli Sootoro and the YPG (though note that the SUP’s other front-group- the Syriac Military Council- is formally part of the YPG). Though too lengthy to translate in full for our purposes here, I highlight the Qamishli Sootoro’s conclusion:

“Here we would like to inform you that these repeated acts of behavior by members of the SUP are indicative of childish conduct that has begun having a great influence on the presence of the sons of our people in their historical areas and the latest of these acts- the taking a 10% slice of agricultural crops and the following method of distortion of principles by their media- has had a great influence on the migration of the sons of our people and the abandonment of their lands.

We conclude by indicating our total rejection of these acts of behavior…[but despite this] we insist on the prevention of infighting between brothers that we had agreed on recently under the supervision of Christian Civil Peace Committee in Qamishli (also despite the repeated acts of abuse by Sutoro-Asayish).”

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SUP Sutoro in al-Malikiya, Hasakah province.

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SUP Sutoro member mans a checkpoint.

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SUP Sutoro vehicle. Note “Asayish” is also on the vehicle, indicating the integration of the SUP’s forces into the PYD’s security apparatus.

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Syriac Military Council and Sutoro members share food.

The Christian Civil Peace Committee- also known as the Syriac-Orthodox Civil Peace Committee in Qamishli- is a nominally neutral organization to which the Qamishli Sootoro is affiliated but is in fact linked with the regime. The use of the general moniker “Christian” here in the Qamishli Sootoro statement to refer to the committee indicates one messaging strategy used by the group since December 2013, when Qamishli Sootoro indicated intentions to open up new branches and expand, whereby no distinctions would be made among Christian church affiliations within the Syriac-language liturgy as regards provision of protection.

The insistence on an anti-infighting stance is also noteworthy because this image has been the official presentation in Qamishli since at least the start of this year: namely, despite the political split, all those working under the name of Sutoro/Sootoro should at least strive to work together for the common cause of protecting Christians. Like many ‘brotherology’ images, this should of course be taken with a pinch of salt.

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Qamishli Sootoro center.

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Syriac Orthodox Civil Peace Committee in Qamishli, Western Quarter branch.

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Graphic shared by the Syriac Orthodox Civil Peace Committee in Qamishli: “Syria is our eternal motherland and we know no homeland besides it. Our love for it and our loyalty to it is in our hearts and souls.”

The question now arises of who is winning in the competition between the two brands for the leading status of protector of Syria’s northeast Christians. The evidence would seem to suggest that the SUP Sutoro has the upper hand. This is due to the fact that the PYD’s power has steadily grown over the past year at the expense of the regime’s influence, and the SUP has essentially backed the winning horse in the wider competition for power in the northeast. Indeed, lacking manpower more generally, Assad regime-aligned forces in wider eastern Syria have already shown themselves inept at dealing with the Islamic State’s onslaughts.

Meanwhile, little points to any meaningful fulfillment of the Qamishli Sootoro’s plans from the end of last year to expand beyond Qamishli, at least partly on account of financial difficulties. The Qamishli Sootoro on more than one occasion has appealed or expressed thanks to donors living abroad for providing necessary resources for outreach or protection programs. The main factor that appears to persuade some Christians in the northeast of siding with the regime is fear of a “Kurdization” project by the PYD.

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Qamishli Sootoro gifts distribution package for locals on Mother’s Day in March 2014: “Sootoro Protection Office in cooperation with the Syriac family in Stockholm (Toni and Fadi) as regards Mother’s Day.”

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Sootoro truck ready to distribute gifts on Mother’s Day in Qamishli.

Conclusion

It can be seen that the trends among Syria’s main minorities on the ground have yet to show any meaningful shift to the armed opposition, whatever minority members there may be in the opposition-in-exile, reflecting the level of detachment. The future points to the continuation of this general situation. The most important reason is the rise of the Islamic State, which has most notably imposed the second-class dhimmi pact on Christians in its areas of control.

The Islamic State now controls the majority of eastern Syria and is increasingly threatening whatever remains of rebel-held parts of the country’s northwest, which in turn has witnessed the other jihadi factions declare their own state or proto-state projects (essentially, a fight to grab what remains), specifically in reference to the “emirate” announced by Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani that has seen his group seize several Idlib localities from the U.S.-backed Harakat Hazm and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) that is backed by Turkey as a hoped for counterweight to the Islamic State

Besides the Jabhat al-Nusra emirate, there is also the “Jabhat Ansar al-Din” coalition announced by four jihadi factions- the Green Battalion, Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, Harakat Sham al-Islam and Harakat Fajr al-Sham. Of these groups, the first is an independent faction in origin that simply did not wish to take sides in the Islamic State-al-Qa’ida dispute; the second is aligned with the Caucasus Emirate project; the third was founded as a virtual al-Qa’ida-front project by ex-Guantánamo detainee Ibrahim bin Shakaran but likely on account of his death in the Latakia offensive in the spring the group’s direction has somewhat shifted away from that (in contrast to Suqur al-Izz, which has simply subsumed itself under Jabhat al-Nusra as I predicted and called out for months); and the fourth is a pro-Caliphate group primarily operating in Aleppo province.

The situation is all particularly problematic for Alawites, in an environment where the disparaging word “Nusayri” has become quite normal in the insurgency, even among comparatively ‘moderate’ (as in, those groups with a clear national framework attitude) rebel coalitions like the Authenticity and Development Front.

None of these developments can be seen as encouraging by minorities, and sadly indicate the continuation and aggravation of ethno-sectarian division in Syria for the foreseeable future.

“Can the Islamic State Survive? What Can the US Do?” by Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen

Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen“Can the Islamic State Survive? What Can the US Do?”
by Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen –
@matthias1981
July 22, 2014

Islamic state: a lion and a fox?

The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) emerged out of the ashes of two conflicts. It was born as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then used the power vacuum created by the civil war in Syria to create a base out of which it could create the foundations for an emerging state. However, how likely are they to succeed in their goal of establishing a functioning state? In answering this question, it is crucial to understand their strategy: do they only operate based on ideological fervor, or does their strategy contain elements of realism? Machiavelli taught us that a successful prince should learn to be both a fox and a lion, does IS have the ability to act as both?

Machiavelli’s recommendations for Princes

The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves. Machiavelli, The Prince.

What did Machiavelli mean in his masterpiece, which for long has been essential reading on the reading list for all first year political science students? In the animal kingdom, a lion is the symbol of ultimate strength. It is the most powerful mammal on land that is feared by all other animals. However, the lion has a weakness, it is not intelligent enough to recognize the danger of traps.

A fox is also a predator, living off preying on other animals. However, the fox is cunning and calculating. It recognizes dangers when it feels uncomfortable in a new setting. A fox does not necessarily attack if it judges that it could result in it being in danger.

A temporary alliance of convenience

Evidence from the ground in Syria shows that there is a common understanding between the Assad regime and IS that their inaction towards each other is of mutual benefit. There is enough proof for one to state that Assad is not targeting the areas controlled by ISIS, but chooses to hit more moderate opposition held areas instead. The immediate enemy of Assad and IS are the same, as Frederic C. Hof puts it “Whatever Bashar al-Assad and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may think of one another personally, their top tactical priority in Syria is identical: destroy the Syrian nationalist opposition to the Assad regime.“

In the meantime, the Islamic State is pushing further and further into the areas held by the anti-Assad. IS has shown itself to be a shrewd opportunist. It has developed a strategy of reaping the ripe fruits sown by other militant groups. They largely go into areas already weakened by fighting between the SA and the various groups making up the more moderate opposition. Currently in Aleppo, the Syrian Army is trying to use its most effective strategy: set up a siege around the areas held by the opposition, and starve them both materially and physically. In the meantime, IS is operating closer and closer to the suburbs of the city and the opposition fears that the two forces together might eventually lead to complete control by IS and the Syrian army.

What explains this mutual understanding? Assad’s calculation is that he is likely to win more easily against IS if he emerges as the victor against the more nationalistic opposition within the country. In many ways, he has paved the way for the more radical elements of the opposition to become empowered. In his view, IS would be an easier enemy to defeat, and the further they expand their control, the more likely it becomes that the west supports Assad. (Also read this in the NYTimes, and this in the Guardian.)

Undoubtedly, this unholy alliance is a temporary one. In the long term, if we see the more nationalist elements even further weakened, we are likely to see a permanent war between IS and the Syrian army. This week we saw evidence of this, when IS attacked and beat the Syrian Army in the most significant battle yet, leading to IS taking control of one of the most important gas production facility. This points to IS being able to operate with an understanding of realism. It acts like a fox when needed, and a lion when conditions allow for it. It has formed a quasi alliance with Assad, and this might be one its most important strategical assets, largely overlooked by observers.

IS the Lion

Overwhelmingly, IS has used brute force towards anyone who acts against it. Late last year the brutality, combined with IS’ reluctance to fight Assad, lead to a formidable coalition of anti Assad groups attacking IS, and quickly it was on the retreat in Eastern Syria.

However as the spoils of war came in from the conquests in western Iraq, the IS has reallocated vital supplies, including American made Humvees, to the Syrian front-lines. The augmented moral, combined with the new supplies largely explain IS’ recent advances in Syria.

Its strategy has also developed. As Hassan Hassan noted in a recent article, their forces increasingly use diplomacy to take over villages. As long as the inhabitants lay down their weapons and pledge allegiance to IS, the village is spared attack. This new more benevolent strategy should be seen in light of the vast territory it now controls. IS does not have the manpower to impose its strict rules in all the territory under its possession. Currently, it is therefore utilizing a policy of accommodation with the populace. Over time, and as its military conscripts increase, it is more likely to become more forceful.

This strategy is likely to become very effective. As its geopolitical achievements, coupled with its military arsenal and funds grow day by day, it will be more likely to attract public support from Syrians and Iraqis who make up the vast majority of its fighters. These young men are not necessarily believers in grandiose ideas of creating an Islamic state. But they will be much more comfortable fighting with a force that is well equipped and that wins battles. For a young Syrian, it is undoubtedly more fulfilling to ride on the back of a Humvee conquering gas fields and villages than to be bogged down in never ending skirmishes in largely destroyed buildings in Aleppo.

IS the Fox

On many occasions, the IS has shown military prowess a skillful maneuvering on the terrain. For a long time, it fought skirmishes with the US troops and its Iraqi allies. Rather than confronting their enemy head on, as they did in Fallujah, they employed hit and run operations and sieges. All very familiar to those who have read Mao’s military tactics (for more information about the theoretical links between Maoism and other secular theorists impact on radical Islamic military doctrine, see Michael Ryan: Decoding the Al-Qaeda Strategy). Contrary to popular belief, Mosul did not fall over night. The take over by IS and its allies, was the culmination of months of strangulation by cutting off the supply routes between Baghdad and the city. The take over was only a culmination of years of insurgent attacks on the city and in fact the city has for long been one of the main sources of revenue as a result of extortion of its business owners.

The geopolitical puzzle

IS is a result of the turmoil in the region. No state actor wants it to succeed in establishing a state. However, states are using it to advance their geopolitical interests. Saudi Arabia sees the benefit of an IS in order to avoid a long feared Shia Crescent forming from Lebanon to Iran. At the same time, they fear them since the group is a real threat to their own stability. If IS is able to navigate between these fears, and gain temporary allies by recognizing its limits, it is more likely to succeed in its short term mission of holding on to some territory. Here we find a paradox and also a weakness. It mobilizes ideologically on the basis of being uncompromising in its reach. However were it to challenge Jordan, Saudi Arabia and countries beyond, it is likely to quickly be confronted from all sides.

The longer the regional crisis continues, the more entrenched the new state will become. If IS develops political callous in the midst of the chaos, and evidence shows that it has, it is likely to become an increasingly formidable foe. One which could possibly become a permanent feature in the region.

Its likelihood to hold on and expand its currently held territory lies in how capable it is in operating on a foreign policy based on realism – acting as Machiavelli’s fox – rather than only utilizing brute force. There is evidence to suggest that its leaders understand this and will use the knowledge to become a significant power. All the same, like so many revolutionary movements before it, IS is propelled by its universal ambitions which will make it difficult to stop its expansion. Its leaders have dazzled their supporters through maximal goals, minimal dithering, and lightning conquests. Reining in the expectations of its fighters will be difficult.

IS has conquered vast amounts of territory, sufficient in terms of resources to create a functioning state. However its permanence rests on its ability to restrain itself and appease its followers who believe and fight for its universal reach to become a reality here and now. If it restrains itself it is likely to lose supporters, including foreign fighters, if it does not, it will be challenged by forces that are likely to put it to an end.

IS feeds on the instability, and as long as the region remains tumultuous, the more likely they are to remain. A grand bargain is often used in foreign policy debates, but that is exactly what is needed in order to avoid the strengthening of IS. The group can not be seen as being an isolated result of the mess in Iraq and Syria. In some states’ views, it operates as a balance to counter Iranian hegemony. But its success impacts negatively on everyone. Only the United States has the power and influence to create the conditions necessary for a grand bargain between Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf States, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

Ultimately, the stability of the region is of primary concern for all states. If Iraq and Syria break apart, it will undoubtedly have effects on the cohesiveness of the main regional actors: Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The US should utilize a three track policy. The first two are aimed at solving localized conflicts, and should be aimed at reassuring disaffected Sunni’s that the US has not realigned its foreign policy to appease Iran:

  • Train and equip the more nationalistic rebels in Syria so that they are powerful enough to serve as a military counterweight to Assad. They should not be able to win, but they should be strong enough to be seen as a threat to the current regime in Damascus. If they are not a balance to Assad, no viable dialog can take place between the warring factions. A negotiated settlement should be the aim.
  • Reach out to the disaffected Sunni community in Iraq including old enemies such as the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order. They, combined with the Military Council of the Tribes of Iraq, are powerful and secular forces currently allied with ISIS.
  • Thirdly, the US should act on a regional level:
  • Engage regional states, including Iran, in negotiations about the need for military disengagement from the conflicts. This will be anything but easy, however a redrawing of Middle Eastern borders is in no ones interest. Should IS establish itself borders will be redrawn.

Furthermore, the region is vulnerable to several actors becoming entangled in uncomfortable alliances with IS:

  • The Iraqi Kurds: if the central Iraqi government starts to battle the Kurdish regional Authority for control over Kirkuk, there could be a potential of a tacit alliance between them and IS.
  • The more nationalist Syrian rebels: if the Syrian army pushes ahead, and that the low level war between the SA and IS increases, they could become temporary allies.
  • Jordan: although Jordan fears IS (especially in light of growing support for them in the Ma’an and other parts of the country) it is for now a less of a foe than if Iraq and Syria fall completely under the control of Iranian aligned regimes.
  • Saudi Arabia: similar concerns as Jordan.

For any decision maker in Washington, it is of paramount importance that these regional weaknesses and alliances are understood and monitored. If they are not, the IS is likely to use them to their advantage.

*Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen worked for the Danish Red Cross in Syria before and during the conflict. He earned his MSc from the University of London and is the producer of www.syrianactivists.org. He is based in Boston.

The Six Words You Need to Know to Be a Successful Jihadi and Establish Your Own Caliphate

by Mohammad D for Syria Comment

 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly minted caliph of the “Islamic State,” chose the first Friday of Ramadan to make his first public appearance—ever. Until now he has worked outside the limelight, and the almost complete absence of his image in public media had generated a sense of mystique around his persona. Now, he has given a public sermon and led prayers at an impressive mosque in Mosul, available in the below video:

Shortly prior, the Islamic State (formerly ISIS, now simply IS), had declared through its spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani that it was establishing a khilafa (“caliphate”) in the land it controls in Syrian and Iraqi territory, over which the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was to be the khalifa (خليفة الله في الأرض, “caliph”). Muslims have now been asked to swear allegiance to this new khilafa.

This comes at the chagrin of many other jihadis who had hoped to beat him to it, who had previously tried and failed, or who had a more “right” approach to doing so. No matter: now that we all know it’s doable, perhaps you’d also like to try your hand at the caliphate game? Here’s a handy manual of the primary words to keep ever upon your tongue as you move through the stages of establishing your own caliphate…

Every jihadi speech contains key words that sum up their purpose and express their objectives.  The concepts behind these terms constitute the building blocks for the establishment of khilafa and can help explain the recent rise of ISIS/IS and al-Baghdadi.

The following 6 terms correspond to consecutive stages integral to actualizing the jihadi goal and reveal much about the beliefs that motivate jihadis.

 

1 al-Taqwa التقوى

Al-taqwa simply means performing what Allah has ordered of you.  It is to obey Allah’s wishes as well as to fear him.  “Ittaqi Allah,” a widely used phrase, means fear Allah and obey his wishes.  This readiness to follow Allah’s will is an important stage of being that you must reach before embarking on your mission.  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in almost all of his speeches, asks the Muslims to be muttaqiin and to yattaqu Allah, both of which mean to do what Allah has set forth in the Qur’an.

In his speech, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first quoted from the Qur’an’s sura “‘Umran,” verse 102:

يَاأَيُّهَاالَّذِينَآمَنُوااتَّقُوااللَّهَحَقَّتُقَاتِهِوَلَاتَمُوتُنَّإِلَّاوَأَنْتُمْمُسْلِمُونَ

“O you who have believed, fear Allah as He should be feared and do not die except as Muslims [in submission to Him].”

Al-Baghdadi then quotes the sura “al-Ahzab” verses 70-71:

يَاأَيُّهَاالَّذِينَآَمَنُوااتَّقُوااللَّهَوَقُولُواقَوْلًاسَدِيدًايُصْلِحْلَكُمْأَعْمَالَكُمْوَيَغْفِرْلَكُمْذُنُوبَكُمْوَمَنْيُطِعِاللَّهَوَرَسُولَهُفَقَدْفَازَفَوْزًاعَظِيمًا

“O you who have believed, fear Allah and speak words of appropriate justice. He will [then] amend for you your deeds and forgive you your sins. And whoever obeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly attained a great attainment.”

In the second part of his speech, al-Baghdadi told his audience that to yataqqu Allah and begin jihad for his sake is necessary whether they want security, work, or an honorable living.

 

2 al-Nafeer  النفير

Al-nafeer means, in the jihadi context, mobilization to join the battle.  It is the initial step: the switch from life as a civilian citizen of a certain nation-state to the role of a mujahid who obeys a new set of specific rules.  The term is drawn from many Qur’anic verses that mention al-nafeer.  Anytime a jihadi wants to recruit someone, he invokes al-nafeer and, of course, the related verses in the Qur’an.  Also, it is used anytime someone wants to collect money for Jihad.

Al-Nafeer connotes having left everything, making the decision to join the fight, ready to die.  The derived verb is nafara نفر(past tense) or yanfuru ينفر(present tense).  When someone Yanfur ila Sahat al-Ma’raka (ينفرإلى ساحة المعركة), it means he is ready to die, and is expecting to die with a “guarantee” for a better existence in the afterlife. When a person decides to yanfur (join the fight), jihadists say that he is allowed to disobey his parents and the authorities and is no longer beholden to any laws but those of Islam (and, of course, his sect’s interpretation of Islam).  The governments that are fighting the mobilization of their kids for jihad raise this issue frequently, featuring the arguments of religious scholars who oppose the jihadist interpretation.

Of Qur’anic verses mentioning al-nafeer, three are most significant. These verses are loaded with interpretive meaning, and much has been written about them. It is common to hear them referred to in speeches, tweets, sermons, and so forth.

a) إنفِرُواْ خِفَافًا وَثِقَالاً وَجَاهِدُواْ بِأَمْوَالِكُمْ وَأَنفُسِكُمْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ ذَلِكُمْ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْ إِن كُنتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ

Translation: “Go forth, whether light or heavy, and perform jihad with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah. That is better for you, if you only knew” (Qur’an 9:41).

In this verse Allah is ordering the Muslims to conduct al-nafeer, light or heavy.  “Light” means you leave your home with nothing.  “Heavy” means you leave your country for the land of jihad with money, equipment, etc.  The verse then issues the command to join al-jihad with your money and yourself.  Here, in common interpretations, those who cannot go make jihad physically are charged to fundraise on behalf of those who can.  The belief is that if you prepare a person for jihad (i.e. finance his preparedness for battle), you will be considered as though you have gone to wage jihad yourself.

b) يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ مَا لَكُمْ إِذَا قِيلَ لَكُمُ انفِرُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ اثَّاقَلْتُمْ إِلَى الأَرْضِ أَرَضِيتُم بِالْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا مِنَ الآخِرَةِ فَمَا مَتَاعُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا فِي الآخِرَةِ إِلاَّ قَلِيلٌ

Translation: “O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go forth [derived imperative of nafeer] in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth? Are you satisfied with the life of this world rather than the hereafter? But what is the enjoyment of worldly life compared to the hereafter except a [very] little” (Qur’an 9:38).

This verse is used to admonish those considered lazy, who prefer the contentment of their normal lives over making jihad, neglecting to appreciate the magnitude of the afterlife.  (Of course, the afterlife of he who joins jihad is Paradise.)

c) إِلاَّ تَنفِرُواْ يُعَذِّبْكُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا وَيَسْتَبْدِلْ قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ وَلاَ تَضُرُّوهُ شَيْئًا وَاللَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ

Translation:  “If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment and will replace you with another people, and you will not harm Him at all. And Allah is over all things competent” (Qur’an 9:39).

In this verse Allah says that if you do not do mobilize (derived verbal form from nafeer) you are going to be tortured severely, and you and your people are going to be substituted by others by Allah, the one able to do anything.

In his speech, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi underscored the importance of joining Jihad, because, according to him, Allah had ordered it so that Islam could be established.

Here is a link to a video in which a Tunisian fighter explains the importance of nafeer and calls people to do nafeer “light” or “heavy:”

 

3 – al-Ribaat الرباط

For jihadis, al-Ribaat refers to the time spent at the battlefront.  Ard al-Ribaat أرض الرباط means the land where the battle occurs or is about to take place, against the enemy.  The verb raabata رابط (past tense) or yuraabitu يرابط (present tense) means to spend time in the trenches.  The concept is highly revered among Muslims, especially by jihadis.  The frontlines are also sometimes referred to as al-thughur الثغور.  Keep in mind that all of these words are rarely used in everyday language and have vastly different meanings when used in the modern era.

Al-Ribaat is mentioned in the Qur’an:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اصْبِرُوا وَصَابِرُوا وَرَابِطُوا وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

Translation: “O you who have believed, persevere and endure and remain stationed and fear Allah that you may be successful” (Qur’an 3:200).

And in the hadith we find emphasis on rewards for those who observe ribaat:

a) رباط يوم في سبيل الله خير من الدنيا وما عليها

Translation: “Observing ribaat for a single day is far better than the world and all that it contains.”

b) رباط يوم وليلة خير من صيام شهر وقيامه، وإن مات فيه جرى عليه عمله الذي كان يعمل وأجري عليه رزقه وأمن من الفتان

Translation:  “Observing ribaat in the way of Allah is far better than fasting in the month of Ramadan and all the nighttime worship activities that are associated with that month.  And, if one dies while observing ribaat he will go on receiving his reward for his meritorious deeds perpetually and he will be saved from calamities.”

c) رباطيوم في سبيل الله خير من ألف يوم فيما سواه من المنازل

Translation: “Observing a day of ribaat for the sake of Allah is better than a thousand days in any other place.”

d)كل ميت يختم على عمله إلا المرابط في سبيل الله فإنه ينمي له عمله إلى يوم القيامة، ويؤمن من فتنة القبر

In this Hadith we see that whoever does ribaat for the sake of Allah is exempted from the calamities that happen between death and judgment day (special “tortures of the grave” exacted by Allah on the sinful while still in their graves, prior to the judgment).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi regularly speaks of ribaat, though in his speech he only alluded to it without using the word. In the following video, a missionary of jihad mentions more hadith about al-Ribaat:

 

4 – al-Thabaat  الثبات

Al-thabaat means steadfastness, or to be able to hold your lines in the fight.  It also means to stick to your beliefs, and in this case, your decision to fight.  It is the ability to stay put in the face of adversity in the “arenas of jihad.”  In their speeches, many jihadis call for the strength to stay true to the goal.  Many historical references are made in conjunction with this term, most importantly to events from the days of the Prophet Mohammad, such as the battle of Uhud.  Frequent references to Qur’anic verses mentioning the term are made.

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا لَقِيتُمْ فِئَةً فَاثْبُتُوا وَاذْكُرُوا اللَّهَ كَثِيرًا لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

Translation: “O you who have believed, when you encounter a company [from the enemy forces], stand firm and remember Allah much that you may be successful” (Qur’an 8:45).

This above verse is used by jihadis on a regular basis.  It asks the believers to hold their position and pray to Allah when faced with adversaries in battle.  It is therefore very important to every jihadi to read the Qur’an and hadith and to mention Allah whenever he is in battle.  The word “Allah” and the adjectives normally attached to it are abundant in jihadi rhetoric, sprinkled within almost every sentence any jihadi utters.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdai mentioned al-thabaat in the second part of his speech.  He beseeched Allah to “yuthabet” (hold firm) the feet of the mujahideen. The Qur’anic references for al-Baghdadi are these verses:

ولمابرزوالجالوتوجنودهقالواربناأفرغعليناصبراوثبتأقدامناوانصرناعلىالقومالكافرين

Translation: “And when they went forth to [face] Goliath and his soldiers, they said, ‘Our Lord, pour upon us patience and plant firmly our feet and give us victory over the disbelieving people’” (Qur’an 2:250)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَيُثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَكُمْ

Translation: “O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support you and plant firmly your feet” (Qur’an 47:7).

Al-thabaat also has a lot to do with courage.  It is very common to hear every jihadi and suicide bomber include the word thabaat in their speeches—even Chechens and other non-Arabic-speakers use this word prolifically.  A very common phrase is to ask Allah for al-thabaat: “…نسأل من الله الثبات”

 

5 – al-Tamkeen التمكين

Al-tamkeen means simply to be able to control what you have taken and establish yourself within it.  The Qur’an provides the basis for the concept of tamkeen as something done over a piece of land.  At this stage the group must create the infrastructure of a state. Islamic scholars have, of course, written volumes about it, but the basic idea is conveyed by the following Qur’anic verse:

وَنُرِيدُ أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضْعِفُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ   وَنُمَكِّنَ لَهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنُرِيَ فِرْعَوْنَ وَهَامَانَ وَجُنُودَهُمَا مِنْهُمْ مَا كَانُوا يَحْذَرُونَ

Translation: “And We wanted to confer favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and make them leaders and make them inheritors, and establish them in the land” (Qur’an 28:5-6).

الَّذِينَ إِنْ مَكَّنَّاهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتَوُا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَنَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ ۗ وَلِلَّهِ عَاقِبَةُ الْأُمُور

Translation: “Those who, if We give them authority in the land, establish prayer and give zakah and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. And to Allah belongs the outcome of [all] matters” (Qur’an 22:41).

وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ وَلَيُمَكِّنَنَّ لَهُمْ دِينَهُمُ الَّذِي ارْتَضَىٰ لَهُمْ وَلَيُبَدِّلَنَّهُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ خَوْفِهِمْ أَمْنًا ۚ يَعْبُدُونَنِي لَا يُشْرِكُونَ بِي شَيْئًا ۚ وَمَنْ كَفَرَ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ

وَأَقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتُوا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ

Translation: “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them and that He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them and that He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, [for] they worship Me, not associating anything with Me. But whoever disbelieves after that – then those are the defiantly disobedient.  And establish prayer and give zakah and obey the Messenger – that you may receive mercy” (Qur’an 24:55-56).

In his speech, al-Baghdadi stressed this concept.  He said that having the might to do tamkeen is part of observing Islam correctly (being able to force others to do what you believe is right), and quoted this verse:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ ۖ وَأَنْزَلْنَا الْحَدِيدَ فِيهِ بَأْسٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَنَافِعُ لِلنَّاسِ وَلِيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَنْصُرُهُ وَرُسُلَهُ بِالْغَيْبِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ

“We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidences and sent down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice. And We sent down iron, wherein is great military might and benefits for the people, and so that Allah may make evident those who support Him and His messengers unseen. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might” (Qur’an 57:25).

After using this Qur’anic text, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi shouted a slogan of ISIS (the “foundation of religion” phrase from Ibn Taymiyah which is very important for jihadis), which is as follows: “The foundation of the religion is a book that leads and a sword that supports it” (قوام الدين كتاب يهدي وسيف ينصر).

The concept of tamkeen can explain why jihadis make the call for prayer every time they overrun a post.  In their creed, the power to raise your voice in the call to prayer is a sign of tamkeen—that you have control over the place.  The verbal form of this word is also used when ISIS soldiers are leading prisoners of war or after they behead someone, in such phrases as: “We thank Allah who made us control their necks” (نشكر الله الذي مكننا من أعناقهم).

 

6 – al-Istikhlaf   الإستخلاف

Al-istikhlaf is derived from the same root as the word khilafa (caliphate). This is when you, as a jihadi, get to kick it into the net: now that you’ve followed the rules, carried out Allah’s will, fought for the land, implemented control after being granted the land by Allah, it is now time for the final step—the establishment of a khilafa, i.e. a state that follows shari’at Allah, the laws of Allah.  Just remember that for your caliphate to be a legitimate one—not just a crazed delusion proclaimed by some fanatical wanabees—you must follow all the right steps, as outlined here, leading up to this one.

Al-Baghdadi spoke extensively on the concept of istikhlaaf in his speech, saying that after his group was able to exercise control it became their Islamic duty to declare a khilafa—the duty that Muslims had “lost for centuries.”  He stressed that “Muslims should always try to establish it [khilafa].”

Al-istikhlaf is based on several Qur’anic verses and hadiths:

قَالَ عَسَى رَبُّكُمْ أَنْ يُهْلِكَ عَدُوَّكُمْ وَيَسْتَخْلِفَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ

Translation: “He said ‘Perhaps your Lord will destroy your enemy and grant you succession in the land and see how you will do” (Qur’an 7:129).

وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُم فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِم

Translation: “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them…” (Qur’an 24:55).

The Qur’an mentions in many verses that the believers will inherit the earth.  It also states that Allah owns the land and that he will give it to his favorite followers.

 

Conclusion – Ready to Establish Your Own Caliphate, Baghdadi Style

If you’ve taken notes on the necessary stages of the jihadi project, you’re better prepared to follow al-Baghdadi’s example and pursue the establishment of your own caliphate (provided you purify your heart and all that). If you’re lucky, the loyal men you’ve surrounded yourself with (who don’t dare express dissent since they know death will be the penalty) will ‘elect’ you as the caliph!

In his first-ever public appearance, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to demonstrate his control and prove that the time to remain hidden has passed.  As khalifa, he can now choose his whereabouts and act as a public figure.  Far from featuring Ramadan as the spiritual journey it is understood to be by most Muslims, al-Baghdadi turned it into a jihad-fest.  In the first sermon of Ramadan, he called Muslims to join the jihad and build khilafa.  He came dressed in black and walked with a limp, conveying that he had been wounded in the jihad.

Al-Baghdadi performed the duties of a khalifa: giving a sermon and leading the people in prayer.  He brandished his linguistic skills and some admirers praised him for having improvised his speech.  But don’t let this intimidate you regarding your own aspirations: if you really follow the speech of jihadis, you’ll find that they repeat a very finite number of limited concepts, encapsulated within the same few-dozen cookie-cutter sentences.