China, the U.S, and the Future of the Middle East – By Sam Farah

Sam Farah

China, the U.S., and the Future of the Middle East
By Sam Farah
for Syria Comment – May 1, 2017

Richard Fontain, and Michael Singh propose Chinese – US cooperation to stabilize the Middle East in a recent article:

The United States and China undeniably have overlapping interests in the region, providing a possible basis for competition, collaboration, or both. They also share a modest record of cooperation, including the Iran nuclear negotiations and on antipiracy operations…. Given the likelihood that the United States and China will remain at loggerheads in East Asia for the foreseeable future, the Middle East could represent an important arena through which to lower bilateral tensions and demonstrate that the otherwise highly competitive relationship need not be zero-sum.

Fontain and Singh are correct. The benefits of a cooperative relationship between the U.S. and China in the Middle East can have tangible benefits for both countries. A stable Middle East is at the heart of China’s new vision for its One Road One Belt project, a strategy that underlines China’s push to take a bigger role in global affairs.

The increased instability and radicalization in the Middle East poses a security threat to China’s mainland.  Thousands of Chinese jihadists from the western province of Xinjiang have come to Syria since the country’s civil war began in March 2011 to fight government forces. And in 2016 a suicide bomb attack on the Chinese embassy in the Kyrgyz capital was ordered by Uighur militants active in Syria.

At the same time, the Middle East has become a major source of energy for China.

And while the Middle East remains a security threat for the U.S. as a source of terrorism, it is less strategically important than it once was. The U.S. has become more energy self-sufficient, and is projected to significantly cut its reliance on oil from the Middle East.

In the same article, Fontain and Sing make a misguided proposal that the U.S. should reengage in the region the” traditional way”:

The best way for Washington to minimize the opportunities for further inroads by Beijing or Moscow—or at least to set the framework by which other external powers engage in the region—is to shore up key relationships with allies like Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf states.

This traditional engagement will polarize the Middle East further, and exacerbate the war in Syria.  U.S. officials know that these allies are arming and supplying the most radical terrorist organizations including ISIS and Al Qaeda in their bid for regional influence.

The traditional U.S.  peace-building effort in the Middle East has focused on individual conflicts and has yielded precious little despite intense effort by several American administrations. Neoconservatives, who argued that the promotion of liberal democracies is a precondition to peace in the Middle East, have pushed for regime change in many countries in the region, only to see violence, extremism and terrorism reach new heights, all at a huge cost to the American taxpayer.

The Chinese approach to the Middle East will be different. According to Yang Guang, the Chinese solution would pair a regional approach with economic development. This is a much different and likely a better approach to peace building in the Middle East. It is clear that the Syrian crisis is a regional war, and the Kurdish issue is a regional issue as is the Israeli – Palestinian issue. The Chinese would also have an easier time than the U.S. facilitating dialogue in the region. China won’t be viscerally rejected by the leftists in the region, and is less suspect than the Europeans whose colonial history in the Middle East has never been forgotten.

The current conflicts in the Middle East are not primordial. The same communities that are at war today have lived peacefully together for centuries. According to Philip Mansel’s book Levant; Splendor and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean, many of the cities in the Levant were multicultural, multilingual and mixed; mosques, churches and synagogues were built side by side. Trade bound its inhabitants, and their cities were at once Middle Eastern and Mediterranean. They were cosmopolitan then, as Singapore, London, and New York are today.

The descent of the Middle East into what seems today as perpetual war began with the rise of nationalism in the Middle East at the turn of the twentieth century.

When it comes to the Middle East today, all the major global powers are engaged in reactionary stopgap measures. What the region needs is a departure from nationalist and identity politics.  Creating the conditions and framework in which nationalistic and identity politics dissipate, allowing for communities to live peacefully side by side is the answer. That won’t happen at the bilateral level; it requires a regional approach.

A stable Middle East, neutralized political Islam (depoliticizing islam), and secure energy and trade routes are a win-win for Russia, China, and the U.S., not to mention Europe.

Neither China, the U.S. nor Russia can do it alone. It is also doubtful that any of these major powers want to “win” in the Middle East and be held solely responsible for the stability and security of the region.

Reconciliations: The Case of al-Sanamayn in North Deraa

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Photo from al-Sanamayn, April 2017.

It is often thought that the regime has a grand strategy for suppressing the rebellion in the western half of the country that constitutes the main conflict within the Syrian civil war. In reality though, there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and the question of how the regime deals with restive areas very much depends on area and circumstances. In some places, a Sunni-Alawite sectarian faultline has influenced the regime’s approach: thus we see a clear demographic shift in the city of Homs in favour of the Alawites, with the rebellious and predominantly Sunni neighbourhoods largely depopulated. Indeed it seems unlikely that the majority of the original inhabitants of those neighbourhoods will return for the foreseeable future. Some areas that are not tied to this sectarian faultline but proved to be a thorn in the regime’s side for years- such as Darayya, a suburb to the south of Damascus- will also likely remain depopulated for the time being. Indeed, as of the time of writing, Darayya remains a military zone that can only be visited with a special permit, even for Shi’i pilgrims who may want to see the largely ruined Sakina shrine in the area.

However, it would not be feasible for the regime to depopulate every restive area. It is in this context that the mechanism of ‘reconciliation’ (musalaha) exists, whereby an agreement is struck in order to bring an area officially back under regime authority. The exact terms of the reconciliation agreements have varied from place to place, perhaps reflecting some experimentation. This article will focus on the case of al-Sanamayn, a town in north Deraa province where a reconciliation agreement was struck at the end of December 2016. It is of course also important to give the context of the agreement, thus this article will first provide a general description of the town and its history during the Syrian civil war.

Unlike some other Deraa localities, al-Sanamayn has no Shi’i population. Rather it is entirely Sunni. The populations of Deraa localities can also normally be divided into the most important extended families/clans. In al-Sanamayn, these families are:

– al-Atmeh
– al-Nasar
– al-Falah
– al-Labad
– al-Dhiyab
– al-Haimid
– al-Shatar

In addition to the original population, the town also hosts a number of people internally displaced from nearby villages over the course of the Syrian civil war.

On account of its location, the town of al-Sanamayn has been regarded as an important strategic point. From the rebel perspective, capturing the town could have served as a ‘gateway’ to connect with the rebel-held areas in the Damascus countryside and suburbs and thus launch a serious fight to take Damascus from the regime. However, in light of the regime’s consolidation of control of much of the Damascus area since 2013-2014, and the constraints faced by the Southern Front (primarily consisting of local Free Syrian Army-banner units working with an operations room in Amman), any notions of taking Damascus from the regime can only be seen as fanciful at this stage. For the regime, the al-Sanamayn area is home to an important base for the Syrian army’s 9th division serving as a logistics point and a position to fire on rebel positions in the wider north Deraa area. The al-Sanamayn area also has a base for the 15th brigade affiliated with the 5th division. In addition, al-Sanamayn bears some industrial importance for the regime’s development plans in Deraa, as al-Sanamayn is supposed to feature an industrial area that was partly the subject of a recent conference attended by the artisans union and the Deraa provincial governor Muhammad Khalid al-Hanus. There are also some personal loyalist connections to al-Sanamayn: most importantly, the head of the Deraa province branch of the Ba’ath Party- Kamal al-Atmeh– is from al-Sanamayn.

Though there was never a major battle waged by rebels from outside the town to advance into al-Sanamayn and take control of it, the town saw the rise of a number of local rebel factions within its neighbourhoods. This development is hardly surprising considering that the town saw protests against the regime on multiple occasions in 2011, indicating the existence of considerable popular discontent. In late March 2011, a violent crackdown on protests in al-Sanamayn occurred, dubbed a massacre in pro-opposition media.

A protest on 6 November 2011 in al-Sanamayn. The banner in the name of “Revolutionaries of al-Sanamayn” reads: “We don’t love you.” The Syrian Arabic- Ma Manhibbak– is a play on the common slogan in support of Assad: Manhibbak (“We love you”).

The town of al-Sanamayn has never featured some of the more familiar names of the Syrian insurgency like Jabhat al-Nusra or Ahrar al-Sham, even as many rebels of al-Sanamayn origin have participated in fighting outside the area. Instead, the factions that emerged within al-Sanamayn derived from a strictly local basis. The first faction to arise in al-Sanamayn was Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn (“The al-Sanamayn Martyrs Battalion”) in late 2012, under the leadership of Abu Fadi al-Saydali (real name: Muhammad Jaber al-Atmeh), who worked as a service taxi driver between Damascus and al-Sanamayn before the uprising. Other local groups were then formed through the course of 2013 as rebel forces inside al-Sanamayn gained strength. Most notably, in May 2013 came the announcement of the group Katibat Nusrat al-Haq (“Supporting the Truth Battalion”), under the leadership of one Abd al-Latif al-Haimid, who studied at the Shari’i college in Damascus university and taught Islamic education, thus the use of the honorific title of sheikh in reference to him.

Soon after it was formed, Katibat Nusrat al-Haq came into conflict with Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn, which accused the group of engaging in criminal behaviour through taking money from civilians in the al-Sanamayn area under threat of arms, while falsely using Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn’s name and the pretext of buying weapons for the battalion. Notice the deriding of Abd al-Latif al-Haimid’s title of sheikh by Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn. The other side of the story is the claim that this dispute was rooted in al-Saydali’s perception that Katibat Nusrat al-Haq posed a threat to his influence over the rebel milieu in al-Sanamayn, as Abd al-Latif al-Haimid was supposedly not the sort of character who could have sanctioned criminal behaviour in light of his Islamic background. Abd al-Latif al-Haimid was found dead at the end of 2013 in rather murky circumstances while outside of al-Sanamayn, though accusations of kidnapping and assassination were directed at the Mujahideen of Hawran Battalion affiliated with the group Liwa Hamza Assad Allah, with which Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn also had links in 2013.

Like many other rebel environments, the al-Sanamayn area saw its share of faction merger initiatives. In February 2014 came the announcement of the formation of Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra (“Fire of the Revolution Brigade”), likely a homage to the title of Sha’alat al-Thawra that has become associated with al-Sanamayn. With a purview beyond the town of al-Sanamayn, the brigade was declared to be “operating in the northwest region of Deraa province.” The formation statement declared the leader to be Yahya al-Rifa’i, with one Maher al-Labad as his deputy, while al-Saydali would serve as the head of civil affairs for the group. Probably owing to tensions with al-Saydali, Katibat Nusrat al-Haq did not join the initiative. Later in July 2014, Maher al-Labad would also found his own contingent: Liwa Fajr al-Tahrir (“Dawn of Liberation Brigade”), though that did not necessarily amount to a defection from Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra. The names of both Liwa Fajr al-Tahrir and Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra are mentioned in conducting operations against regime forces in the months following the former’s formation. The links between the two are also illustrated by the fact that they have adopted the same subsequent affiliations, mostly recently being affiliated to the Southern Front’s 46th infantry division. The main difference now is that Liwa Fajr al-Tahrir maintains a presence inside al-Sanamayn city, whereas Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra does not. As for Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn, it had apparently gone its own way by 2015, as al-Saydali had allegedly sought to marginalise others like Maher al-Labad in Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra and claim the leadership for himself. There were also claims of criminal behaviour and imposition of extortion fees on civilians.

As the rebel presence inside al-Sanamayn town developed, a limited form of civil society embodied in local councils emerged. The first local council was announced on social media in August 2013. Another local council was announced in November 2013. The local council announced in November 2013 still exists to this day, is headed by one Yassin al-Atmeh (himself currently based in Jordan) and is affiliated with the Deraa provincial council tied to the Syrian interim government. This local council was also tied to the Union of Local Councils in Deraa Province (an initiative headed by one Ali Ahmad al-Rakab who is based in the Gulf region) but subsequently withdrew from it, and urged all aid organizations not to work with it for provision of any aid to al-Sanamayn. Its authority was most notably backed by Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra’s leadership in a statement in late October 2014. Meanwhile, the local council that had been declared on social media in August 2013 joined the Union of Local Councils in Deraa Province, and enjoyed backing from several of al-Sanamayn’s factions, including Katibat Nusrat al-Haq and Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed (about which more later). In the end though, over the course of 2015 the local council under Yassin al-Atmeh prevailed, likely because it had stronger support.

Even so, it should be noted that despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the offices announced for the local councils, most of the public services in al-Sanamayn have been provided throughout by the regime. The local council bodies have instead been limited to distribution of gifts and aid on particular occasions (cf. here and here). According to Yassin al-Atmeh, his local council, which on the ground in al-Sanamayn is presently headed by one al-Tayyib Abu al-Nur, continues some of these activities today, telling me: “The council still provides what it can to aid the orphans and the sons of those detained, along with aid from organizations and the people of benevolence, who have taken it upon themselves to pay sums for the orphans.” All that said, there are allegations that Yassin al-Atmeh has enriched himself, along with Muhammad Jaber al-Atmeh, through corruption and theft of local council money.

So how did the reconciliation come about? As mentioned above, rebel forces inside al-Sanamayn gained strength through 2013. While service provision by the regime remained, large parts of al-Sanamayn effectively fell outside of regime control. The main exceptions were the market road and the general road in al-Sanamayn. The rebels would target regime positions and bases with projectiles or engage in relatively small-scale clashes. Instances of kidnappings by one side would lead to tit-for-tat escalation. The worst such incident appears to have been a massacre conducted by regime forces in April 2013, reportedly killing more than 60 people in an assault that was focused on al-Sanamayn’s southern neighbourhoods. Civilians would sometimes be caught in the crossfire more generally. For instance, in November 2015, at least one civilian was killed and a number of others wounded as rebel mortar fire landed at the site of the bakery.

The regime’s main leverage over the rebel factions in al-Sanamayn was to impose a siege on the neighbourhoods in which the rebels had effective control, blocking access to commodities and goods. Thus in December 2015, the regime’s forces imposed a blockade on those neighbourhoods, reportedly in retaliation for the rebel factions targeting a car carrying an army officer and a number of personnel. The rebel factions in turn had reportedly carried out the attack in response to the arrest of a youth from al-Sanamayn at one of the regime checkpoints around the town. The blockade was lifted after negotiations between the rebel factions and the regime forces, on condition that the rebels do not attack regime positions or personnel. Another condition of this virtual ceasefire was that people in al-Sanamayn should be able to participate in the subsequent parliamentary elections, which took place in April 2016.

The regime would go on to impose a new siege on the rebel-held areas of al-Sanamayn in response to a perceived violation of the de facto truce, as a man called Imad al-Labad and his group- well known for criminality among the people of al-Sanamayn- had stolen a number of cars, including one belonging to one of the regime’s security apparatuses. The regime then used this opportunity to try to resolve the problems it faced in al-Sanamayn by pressing for a reconciliation agreement. Rebel opinion was divided at the time regarding how to respond to the new siege. Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed, based only inside of al-Sanamayn, rejected the idea put forward mostly by al-Sanamayn rebels based outside the town to target the regime’s military points inside the town, fearing the consequences for those already besieged inside the town. There does appear to have been some outside rebel firing on the town to target the regime, which killed at least one civilian.

The pressure created by the siege was a contributing factor to negotiations in December 2016 and the formal reconciliation agreement towards the end of that month. Key to the negotiation of this agreement on the regime side was Wafiq Nasir, head of the military intelligence in southern Syria. Wafiq Nasir is widely disliked among more third-way Druze in Deraa’s neighbouring province of Suwayda’ where his authority also applies. The other key figure on the regime side was the head of the Syrian army’s 9th division. Intermediaries in the reconciliation agreement were Jamal al-Asha, head of the reconciliation committee in al-Sanamayn, and one Antar al-Labad, who is accused of dealing in stolen cars, wider theft and of being close to Wafiq Nasir. He had set up his own very small armed group that was initially on the side of the rebels, but well before the reconciliation, he had established relations with the regime. During the siege of al-Sanamayn prior to the reconciliation, he was able to use his influence to bring about a lifting of the siege at the end of November 2016. Jamal al-Asha is apparently of the al-Labad family, with his son allegedly on the side of the rebels and based in Nawa. Both a Jamal al-Labad and an Antar al-Labad are named along with a number of other locals by pro-opposition outlet Zaman al-Wasl as those who had been pushing for a reconciliation agreement in al-Sanamayn to avoid a Darayya-style scenario. Observe that the family names of those named by Zaman al-Wasl indicate that they are mostly from al-Sanamayn’s biggest families.

The reconciliation agreement did not require a formal undertaking of the reconciliation process by every inhabitant of al-Sanamayn. Rather, the idea was that a certain number of people would undertake the process to represent the entire town. The pro-opposition outlet al-Modon says that the reconciliation was imposed on a clan basis: that is, that each clan/extended family should have a representation in the reconciliation agreement. For its part, the regime’s state media outlet SANA claimed on 25 December 2016 that 510 people in al-Sanamayn- among them 150 “armed men”- carried out taswiyat al-wad’ (“sorting out of affairs”) as part of the reconciliation, while handing over weapons to the security apparatuses. No one inside al-Sanamayn was compelled to leave for Idlib or other rebel-held areas.

Among those who formally reconciled, one important motive to undergo reconciliation would be to deal with the problem of being wanted for military service. In this case, taswiyat al-wad’ would grant a temporary formal respite. As for the rebel factions inside al-Sanamayn, it is clear that not every member or even leader of every faction formally reconciled and handed over weapons. Indeed, there was no requirement for them all to do so, and any formal reconciliation on the part of the rebels can be seen as symbolic. The most notable rebel faction leader who formally reconciled was Tha’ir al-Falah, leader of Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed. In contrast, Abu Fadi al-Saydali, leader of Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn, did not formally reconcile, though he did meet with Wafiq Nasir.

It must be emphasised that while not every rebel or rebel leader inside al-Sanamayn formally reconciled, all the rebel factions operating inside the town have agreed to abide by the state of affairs imposed by the reconciliation. This situation is not all that different from the agreement struck after the lifting of the siege in December 2015. Thus, as of now, the factions still exist inside of al-Sanamayn and have kept hold of many of their weapons, but they do not attack any regime positions or personnel. Meanwhile, the regime provides services as usual, maintains state institutions in the town, and allows regular flow of commodities and goods to all areas of the town. Also as will be recalled from above, the local council of Yassin al-Atmeh still exists at a very modest level as before. Furthermore, the regime’s army and security forces do not generally intervene in security and criminal incidents in the town, allowing the factions to deal with these matters, while legal affairs such as marriage are dealt with by the regime’s court system. Thus, the regime avoids arresting anyone inside al-Sanamayn. That said, the regime has helped to set up a new faction inside al-Sanamayn to try to help maintain security in the town, about which more below.

At present, the main factions inside al-Sanamayn are:

– Katibat Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn of Abu Fadi al-Saydali.
– Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed of Tha’ir al-Falah (aka Tha’ir al-Abbas).
– Liwa Fajr al-Tahrir of Maher al-Labad, though Maher al-Labad is not inside al-Sanamayn. By virtue of links to Liwa Sha’alat al-Thawra and the 46th infantry division, there is a presence for this group outside al-Sanamayn as well.
– Katibat Maghawir al-Haq, led by one Abu Zaher al-Labad (real name: Barhum Mahmoud al-Labad): a new group created after the release of Abu Zaher al-Labad from prison as per the reconciliation agreement requiring the release of sets of detainees. The group mostly contains people from the al-Labad family and was set up with help from the military intelligence.

In addition to these factions, there are some smaller armed groups, each of which does not have more than 10-15 people. These groups may constitute criminal gangs and/or partly reflect remnants of al-Sanamayn’s minor factions from earlier years. Muhammad Khalif, the leader of Katibat Dir’ al-Sanamayn (aka Liwa Dir’ al-Sanamayn), and a representative on his behalf, for instance, insisted to me that his group is still a real actor on the ground in al-Sanamayn (recall the group’s name among the signatories that backed the local council that lost out to Yassin al-Atmeh’s outfit). Yet a media activist in al-Sanamayn- Abu al-Awras al-Shami- insisted that the group does not have a presence on the ground and was dissolved some time ago. The reality is perhaps somewhere in between. It may be the case that Katibat Dir’ al-Sanamayn no longer exists as a meaningful name on the ground in the town, but perhaps Khalif can call on some armed supporters in times of trouble for him or his family.

Other factions of note and bearing the name of al-Sanamayn (e.g. Liwa Shuhada’ al-Sanamayn of the Tajammu’ Alwiyat al-Omari and Liwa Suqur al-Sanamayn of the First Army) do not have a presence inside al-Sanamayn at present, but are operating in other rebel-held areas in the south. Foreign militias supporting the regime like Hezbollah do not maintain a presence inside al-Sanamayn or try to recruit from the people of al-Sanamayn. With the at least temporary respite in conscription, the regime has opened an office in al-Sanamayn aiming to recruit people into the Fifth Legion, a formation strongly backed by Russia and intended to recruit people on a voluntary basis with substantial benefits, including those who have done taswiyat al-wad’.

al-Sanamayn, April 2017.

So on the whole, how is life in al-Sanamayn after the reconciliation? Commenting in general on the reconciliation, the media representative for Muhammad Khalif did not necessarily object to it, clarifying: “If these reconciliations prevent bloodshed, we all welcome them…The reconciliation happened through pressure from the people of al-Sanamayn town on the revolutionaries present inside, because all the revolutionaries of al-Sanamayn are from the people of the town.”

For many opposition/rebel supporters and activists, the reconciliation amounts to little more than cynical regime propaganda. “This reconciliation arose for media purposes for the regime’s interest only in order to promote reconciliations to the rest of the localities in Deraa province,” said Aboud al-Hawrani, an activist for the pro-opposition “Revolutionaries of al-Sanamayn” media office. He elaborated: “Even before the reconciliation, al-Sanamayn was in a state of ceasefire with the regime [referring to the agreement in December 2015]  and the problems that arose with the regime arose on an individual basis only: i.e. if the regime arrested one of someone’s relatives, that person would cause problems with the regime like kidnapping military personnel and firing on a military zone…This state of affairs remains the case even after the reconciliation. This reconciliation is a media movement only for the regime on the basis that al-Sanamayn has come under complete control.”

Other people in al-Sanamayn with whom I spoke agreed with the basic point that the current situation is little different from the previous status quo (i.e. the one prior to the siege imposed just before the reconciliation). In this state of affairs, the existence of multiple armed factions and gangs without a real central intervening authority poses an important problem for those who just want greater stability, order and rule-of-law. Indeed, Ala’ al-Din al-Labad, one of the individuals named by Zaman al-Wasl as being behind the efforts to push for a reconciliation, seemed gloomy about the current situation. He was never a supporter of the opposition but not necessarily an ideological loyalist of the regime. Rather, his primary desires are stability and security. “The situation is like the silence before the storm,” he said. He went on to explain: “When arms spread in the hands of the ignorant, there is much killing, as well as treachery, extortion and theft. This is our state of affairs now.” He also pointed out the poor state of services provision, affirming that “there is one hour of very weak and intermittent electricity for every four hours it is cut off. Water is available for 4 hours a week. Insufficient.” The provision of national grid electricity (Arabic: kahraba’ wataniya) by a ratio of around 1-1.5 hours for every 4-5 hours it is cut off was corroborated by others residing in al-Sanamayn.

At this stage, the main factions inside al-Sanamayn primarily amount to clan-interest groups. As Tha’ir al-Falah explained, “We no longer have [political] factions in al-Sanamayn, they have become clan factions: every armed person affiliated with his family.” Thus, his group- Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed- mostly consists of members of the al-Falah clan that primarily inhabits the northeastern part of the town. Abu al-Awras al-Shami, himself from the al-Haimid family, offered a similar assessment: “In the recent time, the armed factions in al-Sanamayn have become clan factions: that is, every family has armed men from its sons, whose aim is to protect the family from any attack.”

When this point is taken into account along with the existence of criminal gangs, Ala’ al-Din al-Labad’s concerns about lack of security are hardly surprising. As Abu al-Awras al-Shami also explained, “There are many security problems in the town from theft, kidnapping and assault on the people by force of arms, and no one can put a stop to these criminals.” One example of these problems is an incident that received some opposition media attention around a month ago, as it involved the new Katibat Maghawir al-Haq. The event- a clash that killed at least one person and wounded a number of people- was portrayed in the pro-opposition media outlet All4Syria as a clash along loyalist-rebel lines (Katibat Maghawir al-Haq vs. “the battalions of the revolutionaries”). In fact, this portrayal is quite off-base. Fundamentally, the incident involved clashes between members of the al-Dhiyab family and members of the al-Labad family. The roots of the issue lie in an attempt by at least two people from the al-Dhiyab family- apparently members of a notorious criminal gang led by one Nadim al-Dhiyab- to impose an extortion fee on a shop, allegedly demanding 500,000 Syrian pounds and threatening to burn the shop if the owner did not pay the extortion fee. This threat was rejected by the shop owner, who then contacted Barhum al-Labad to intervene. Barhum al-Labad then came with one Abu Abdo al-Shatar and someone else from the al-Labad family, and tried to get the gang members to leave. When they refused, one of them was shot in the leg. Barhum then sent men to members of the al-Dhiyab family to try to prevent a wider clash. Despite an apparent initial agreement from the wider al-Dhiyab family, there was then an assault by members of the al-Dhiyab family on the Harat al-Labad (the part of the town where the al-Labad family is found in large numbers).

Also of note with regards to All4Syria’s coverage of the incident is the claim that Katibat Maghawir al-Haq is affiliated with the Fifth Legion. An interesting follow-up item was posted on All4Syria, in which Katibat Maghawir al-Haq ostensibly denied this affiliation in a statement, which is reproduced below.

The statement at first sight has all the trappings of a typical Deraa rebel faction, using the monikers of  “the Free Syrian Army” and “the Southern Front.” The statement includes revolutionary affirmations like the following: “Our complete readiness…to defend our land against the Assadist criminal gangs.” It concludes with the declaration: “Victory to our blessed revolution.” The interesting thing about this statement though is that it may not have been written by Abu Zaher al-Labad at all, but rather Maher al-Labad, who was angered by All4Syria’s claim about Katibat Maghawir al-Haq and told Abu al-Awras al-Shami that he intended for an apology statement from All4Syria, as he considered that All4Syria’s article would be harmful to the al-Labad family.

In any case, the conflict involving Katibat Maghawir al-Haq required intervention from Wafiq Nasir. According to Tha’ir al-Falah, Wafiq Nasir has formally distanced himself and the military intelligence from the faction in statements to the people of al-Sanamayn. Tha’ir al-Falah attributes this distancing to the problem of this clash, adding that “Maghawir al-Haq is a faction that does not have popular support in al-Sanamayn. The town has agreed on this point.” A more sympathetic view of the faction was offered by Ala’ al-Din al-Labad, portraying it as a group dedicated to cracking down on criminal behaviour. Family affiliation biases are likely at play here.

Tha’ir al-Falah’s own faction was involved in a minor clash this month, after a member of an armed gang demanded that a doctor provide him with free treatment, threatening him with his weapons. When the doctor refused, the member of the armed gang attacked him and opened fire on his clinic, prompting an intervention from Tha’ir al-Falah, resulting in a clash that lasted no more than a matter of minutes. Afterwards the armed gang came to Liwa Ummat al-Tawheed’s base and apologised to the doctor, resolving the case.

It would be a mistake to presume that all conflicts inside al-Sanamayn are between members of different families, just as not all conflicts within Iraq and Syria more generally take place along ethno-religious sectarian lines. A recent case that culminated in a trial and execution of the accused by qisas ruling involved people from the same clan: al-Atmeh. In particular, a young man called Ismail Yahya al-Atmeh, a member of Abu Fadi al-Saydali’s faction, killed a father and son (also of the al-Atmeh clan) in a quarrel. After much pressure from people in al-Sanamayn on Abu Fadi al-Saydali, Ismail al-Atmeh was arrested, and he then acknowledged his crime. Interestingly, in keeping with the regime’s general non-interference in security and criminal matters in al-Sanamayn, the case was referred to the Dar al-‘Adl (“Abode of Justice”), the main rebel judicial authority in southern Syria. To be sure, the Dar al-‘Adl does not have a base in al-Sanamayn: rather the connection was done remotely. Ismail al-Atmeh fled from his imprisonment but was recaptured. He was then executed in accordance with the qisas ruling at dawn on 18 April.

The security problems in al-Sanamayn are recognised to a degree by the leadership of the main factions, thus on the night of 14-15 April there was a meeting involving the faction leaders and town notables. The principal outcome of this meeting was that the majority agreed on the need to form a security force that has joint participation from all the factions and families. The meeting also pointed to the wider lack of popular support for Katibat Maghawir al-Haq, with the consensus view being that its members do not adhere to good conduct or values, and town notables opined that it should not be entrusted to deal with security problems alone. That said, it remains to be seen how exactly the joint security force will be constituted, and whether it will lead to something that endures practically on the ground.

al-Sanamayn, April 2017.

The situation in al-Sanamayn bears a number of analytical implications for wider analysis of how the regime will deal with restive areas. It is clear that al-Sanamayn is considered by the regime to be a model for how it should eventually deal with the wider rebel-held south. Facing wider manpower shortages, it would not be feasible for the regime to retake every Deraa province town by sheer force and depopulation, which would also risk further large-scale displacements towards Jordan and likely upset the Jordanian government’s less hostile stance (in comparison with some other regional players) towards the regime. Instead, some kind of accommodation with what are largely local, more malleable factions- granting them autonomy in security affairs within ‘reconciled’ localities- is the most realistic option for the regime, even as al-Sanamayn is not a wholly identical situation because it never fell entirely out of regime control and arguably has more strategic importance than an entirely rebel-held town like Nawa. For the rebel factions, a possible additional motive to ‘reconcile’ is the risk of feeling trapped in a pincer between the regime’s forces and its allies on one side and the Islamic State-linked Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed on the other, which exploited rebel weaknesses to secure some advances earlier this year. Civilian pressure on account of war weariness may also be a motive to settle with reconciliation agreements.

At the same time, it is clear that this model does not come without its problems: namely, an atmosphere of lawlessness created by the large number of armed factions and gangs. This phenomenon exists elsewhere in regime-held territory on account of reliance on auxiliary militias, even as the regime continues to provide services and government jobs in those areas. The difference in al-Sanamayn from those other regime-held areas is that the factions occupy a curious limbo position, whereby they do not attack any regime positions or personnel and the Syrian state institutions function in their place, but they are appealing to a rebel/opposition judicial authority (Dar al-‘Adl) to resolve at least some criminal cases. Within areas controlled by Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, it is clear from some civilian residents that one perceived advantage of the group’s rule is that it is rule by one faction, and thus brings a sense of order. This issue might make the group’s rule more attractive than continued formal rebel control or a reconciliation agreement on the model of al-Sanamayn.

Could the al-Sanamayn reconciliation framework be applied elsewhere in Syria, especially in Idlib province that is the last epicentre for the insurgency’s conflict with the regime? It seems more doubtful on account of the dominance of far more irreconcilable and ideologically hardline elements, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham. To be sure, both of these factions were important inside the Damascus countryside towns of Madaya and Zabadani on the border with Lebanon that were the subject of recent mutual evacuation agreements, but the negotiations took place and were exceptional in nature most notably because there was leverage over Iran in besieging the two Idlib Shi’i towns of al-Fu’a and Kafariya. For Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib more generally, there is no further leverage in trying to resist a forthcoming push by the regime and its allies into Idlib. It is more likely in the endgame to go with al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s advice to move away from the idea of controlling territory and instead focus on guerrilla tactics.

Revisiting the Malki Affair – By Christopher Solomon

Revisiting the Malki Affair
By Christopher Solomon @Solomon_Chris
For Syria Comment – April 23, 2017

On April 22, 1955, a charismatic young Syrian army officer was gunned down on a football field. The assassination of Adnan al-Malki brought about the one of the first political crackdowns in Syria’s history. The Malki Affairs and its aftermath shed light on one of the country’s earliest shifts towards authoritarianism along a sharp turn towards anti-western sentiment.

The first sign that Pax Syriana was coming to an end was the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. Demonstrations against Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution and the West were held in defiance in Damascus. State-organized rallies across the capital illustrated the regime’s discontent with the political blowback that followed the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Part of this discontent was exhibited through the widespread display among the crowds of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party’s (SSNP) flags along Adnan al-Malki Boulevard. The black flags emblazoned with the red hurricane device signaled the official return of Pan-Syrian nationalism in the country where it was banned since the 1955 assassination of the boulevard’s namesake, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff in the Syrian army and a rising star in Syrian politics.

Malki’s assassination rocked Syria and brought about a harsh crack down on the SSNP that ultimately eradicated them from Syrian politics for fifty years. It was also a major political spectacle that marked a turning point in the country’s brief return to democracy back to a long era of authoritarianism under the Baath.

Today, the SSNP has not only been rehabilitated in Syria’s political sphere but the movement is now fighting on the side of the regime against opposition forces on multiple fronts. The party’s militia, the Eagles of the Whirlwind, has fought in Homs, took part in the siege of Aleppo, and the recently recaptured desert town of Palmyra from the Islamic State (IS). The dramatic turnaround for the once outlawed movement, officially legalized in 2005, is striking. Prior to the start of the current civil war the details surrounding the so-called “Malki Affair” was one of Syria’s greatest mysteries. Who ordered his killing and why continue to be debated. The story of the assassination and ensuing purge are essential to understanding Syria’s history and the SSNP’s eventual reconciliation with the Baath and perhaps their future in Syria.

Adnan al-Malki’s background and political activities

Colonel Adnan al-Malki came from a dominant Sunni family in Damascus made his career in the Syrian army and like much of the country’s officer corps, was a graduate of the Homs Military Academy. Despite never being an official member of Michel Aflaq’s Baath Party, he was strongly affiliated with the movement and was well-known as a firm support of Nasser and Pan Arab nationalism. His brother Riad al-Malki was a staunch Baathist and later become an MP in the Syrian parliament. The renowned historian Patrick Seale described him as having a “strikingly European” appearance.

Malki’s first major political intrigue came when he became a central player in the plot to overthrow Shishakli, organizing with former President Atassi and the influential Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash. He worked closely with the leftist nationalist Akram al-Hawrani and encouraged him to unite his Arab Socialist Party with the Baath movement, which Shishakli had outlawed. In 1953, Malki famously confronted Shishakli on the airport runway after the President had returned from a visit to Egypt. The young officer handed over a list of demands which included allowing political pluralism, freedom of press, and for Shishakli to abolish his Arab Liberation Movement party and relinquish power. The strongman accepted the list from him and consequently rounded up the document’s signatories to throw them in jail, Malki included.

A 1946 photo shows al-Malki marching as an army cadet during Syria’s first Independence Day.

After the fall of Adib al-Shishakli’s regime in 1954, Malki endured an intense spell of popularity, even overshadowed his army superior. Politically astute, hardworking, and willing to risk his life for the Palestinian cause and his ideals and justice, he was widely admired and had a large following in the army. By all accounts, Malki appeared destined to become a powerful political leader in Syria’s post-Shishakli era.

Malki was restored to his position in the army, becoming deputy Chief of Staff. The army’s Chief of Staff, Shawkat Shuqayer, was a Lebanese Druze and was always regarded by many Syrians as a foreigner. In fact, Shishakli had tapped him for the role, specifically because of sect, he was considered politically vulnerable and therefore a safe bet in coup-prone Syria. Shishakli even once said, “Shuqayer has no past and no future!” Though Shuqayer retained his position, his background brought much of the public support and from within the army to Malki.

Malki continued his foray in politics and was instrumental in corralling his fellow army officers to support the efforts to achieve a political and military unification with Egypt. There was even speculation that Malki would’ve launched a coup if Prime Minister Faris al-Khury not abandoned his attempts to move Syria towards the western sphere of influence. He regularly represented the official position of the government and the army in the press. For example, in February 1955, Malki spoke to the Syrian newspaper, al-Jihad for an interview, in which he downplayed the prospects of a Turkish military incursion along the Syrian border.

The Baath Party, during this time, had been in a fierce competition with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. George Abd Messih had just taken command of the SSNP after the execution of Antun Saadeh in 1949 and was struggling to implement his control over the party’s factions. Malki was soon engaged in a public spat with Abd Messih, who accused him of using Arab nationalism to secure power for Syria’s Sunnis. Malki, in turn, tried to intimidate the SSNP leader by promising to hand him over to Lebanon, where he had been sentenced to death in absentia for the July 1951 murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Sohl.

Colonel al-Malki in his army office in 1954

The fierce competition between the two parties played on within the army. Another opponent of Malki was a fellow army officer, Ghassan Jadid, who, through his friendship with Shishakli, became the head of the Homs Military Academy. Jadid was an Alawite and a leading figure in the SSNP. He used his position at the academy to recruit officers to the party, a move which riled Malki. Jadid also rivaled Malki in his charisma and Ghassan’s brother Salah was a member of the Baath who helped retained a level of contact between the two parties. Salah later became a leading architect in the establishment of the United Arab Republic and essential for aligning Syria with the Soviet Union.

The political rivalry extended outside of the military all the way through Syria’s educational institutions, polarizing a generation of youth. A young Hafez al-Assad recalled how during his school years, when asked your religion, you were either a Baathi or Qawmi (the latter meaning nationalist, taken from the party’s name in Arabic, al-Ḥizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-‘Ijtima’i).

The Assassination and political motives

On April 22 1955, Malki was attending a football match between the Syrian army’s team and an Egyptian team at the Damascus Municipal Stadium. A gunman approached and fired two shots, killing the colonel instantly. The gunman identified as Yusuf ‘Abd al-Rahim, a military policeman and an Alawite member of the SSNP who killed himself on the spot. Two other party members, Badi Makhlouf and Abdul Munim Dubussy were in attendance at the match and were arrested as accomplices.

Malki’s killer, Yusuf ‘Abd al-Rahim, an Alawi military policeman and SSNP member

The main theory is that Rahim was selected by George Abd Messih since the former had been denied entrance to the military academy due to his sect. Another potential motive seldom discussed was put forward by the US State Department, which claimed that Malki had crossed Rahim by fathering the child of his teenage sister, who was employed as a domestic aid in his household. Patrick Seale reported that thousands of Alawite women worked in homes across the capital as servants, often in dismal conditions. Though this story was never proven, the status of Syria’s religious minorities would have political implications for both the SSNP and the Baath during the subsequent crackdown and well into Syria’s future. 

Ghassan Jadid, army officer and SSNP leader

The most dominant story is that assassination was ordered by George Abd Messih due to his personal feud with Malki. Ghassan Jadid stated during his trial that this was the case since the assassination occurred without the knowledge of the party’s leadership. Another view was that the assassination was actually perpetrated by Egyptian intelligence in order to galvanize support for Arab nationalism and secure a free reign to eliminate the threat of the SSNP. Though Arab nationalism was already immensely popular in Syria, the country still had a slew of political parties across the ideological spectrum. Furthermore, anti-western sentiment wasn’t completely present at all levels of Syrian society, a trend that would change dramatically after the purge commenced.

The purge

A military court that held the show trials for SSNP members. The leftist army officer Afif al-Bizri, seated in the middle, later became the army’s Chief of Staff.

The show trials that followed the assassination have often been compared to the trials carried out by Joseph Stalin in the 1930’s. This period marked a turning point where the Baath now had the opportunity to finally isolate and eliminate their primary competitor. The Baath and Communist orchestrated a full scale purge of the SSNP. First, the Arab nationalists and leftist factions urged parliament to implement a state of martial law. Other parties resisted but eventually a compromised was reached. A military tribunal would be carried out with full power to investigate and arrest anyone suspected of being connected to the assassination, which quickly had morphed into a larger anti-government conspiracy.

The SSNP’s official party organ, al-Bina’ was burned to the ground. The SSNP’s members were accused of purposely destroying their own offices and documents to cover up evidence of their conspiracy against the Syrian government. The SSNP, shut out of the press, was reduced to facilitating their meetings and activities in secret. To offer a counter narrative, they handed out pamphlets and flyers in which they claimed they were the victims of a Zionist plot facilitated by the Communists and Baathists. Some of these materials took on an anti-Semitic tone with complaints of Jewish “exploitation and fraud.”

“Accused of the crime of the assassination of Adnan al-Malki.” Issam al-Mahayri and Juliette El-Mir Saadeh, Antun Saadeh’s widow on the far left.

Thousands of the party’s members were rounded up and paraded through the military tribunals for a certain verdict of a lengthy jail sentence. Issam al-Mahayri, the SSNP’s leader in Syria, was arrested and forced to testify against his fellow party members. Once a leading journalist and co-owner of the Daily Press Corporation, Mahayri was publically ridiculed by the courts and his influence greatly diminished and he became ostracized from Syria’s political sphere. He was eventually sentenced to a long spell in Damascus’ Mezzeh Prison.

The crackdown on press freedoms trickled across the political spectrum. Even non-SSNP outlets fell victim to the Baathist-Communist witch hunt. Husni al-Barazi, who owned the al-Nas (the people), an anti-communist outlet, was forced to close after an editorial discussed the allege torture of SSNP suspects and connected the mistreatment to the Baathist Speaker of the Parliament Akram al-Hawrani. Other newspapers and outlets quickly learned to adhere to the official government line concerning the Malki Affair and the military tribunals.

Army Chief of Staff Shuqayer suggested that the party was dominated by sectarian minorities, such as Alawites and Christians, and therefore sought to isolate Syria from the rest of the Arab world through their plan to eventually establish a Pan-Syrian state as stipulated by the party’s ideology. Many Alawites who were not members of the SSNP fled to Lebanon since they feared the growing extent of the purge.

Badi Makhlouf

The emergence of Syria as a mukhabarat state during this period is well known. Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, who had been appointment as head of intelligence in March 1955, a month prior to the assassination, was tasked with investigating and implementing the purge of the SSNP. Imprisonment and torture were tools used by his Deuxieme Bureau. Badi Makhlouf, Abdul Munim Dubussy and Fu’ad Jadid protested at their trial that their confessionals had been extracted under torture, describing secret interrogation sessions involving severe beatings and electric shocks.

Makhlouf, a first cousin of Anisa Makhlouf (the wife of Hafez al-Assad), said the torture was not even comparable to what the early Christians had suffered from under the Romans. Despite his defense, Dubussy and Makhlouf were executed by hanging and Fu’ad Jadid was sentenced to life imprisonment. Fu’ad Jadid reportedly had his death sentence reduced since his brother Ghassan had been killed in Beirut outside the SSNP party headquarters by agents of Sarraj.

Another component of the show trials was the allegation that the SSNP was working in concert with the Americans and western intelligence. A memo by the U.S. State Department from July 1955 lamented the prevailing views of the Syrian political establishment that the U.S. government was using the anti-communist SSNP in order to undermine Syria’s sovereignty. This was manifested prominently in the “Sharabi letters,” an alleged correspondence between Issam Mahayri and Georgetown professor Hisham Sharabi. Dr. Sharabi was an early member of the SSNP and had served as an editor for their magazine, called al-Jil al-Jadid (The New Generation) before seeking refuge in the United States. The letters supposedly revealed that Dr. Sharabi had helped Mahayri obtain a visa to travel to the U.S. with the goal of organizing an anti-leftist movement in Syria to counter the Soviet’s presence in the Middle East. This evidence allowed Sarraj to claim that Syria had been able to defeat an imperialist conspiracy which was being facilitated by “indigenous anti-communist elements.”

SSNP leader Issam al-Mahayri (second from the right) in Mezzeh Prison in Damascus in 1957 following the purge of the party in the wake of the assassination.

The Malki Affair’s Legacy

Malki’s funeral on April 23, 1955.

The assassination propelled Malki to a level of veneration and praise that was unprecedented in Syria. The sculptor Fathi Kabawah was commissioned to design Malki’s statue. Riad al-Malki also authored a biography of his brother. Malki, as a martyr, became the embodiment of Pan-Arab nationalism that cemented the Baath into Syria’s political and social fabric for a generation and fixed the country onto its course for an eventual union with Egypt. Sultan Pasha al-Atrash wrote a memorial for his fallen comrade in al-Jundi (The Soldier) magazine in the summer of 1955:

There is no civilization that had more victims and martyrs

like our beloved Arab civilization.

If peoples’ lives ended with death

the martyr’s life begins with death.


That was the fate of the immortal

Adnan al-Maliki, who lived two generous lives,

a short life hard lived until his last breath,

and another long lived in the peoples’ consciousness.


Therefore, Adnan did not die

and here he is personified in the leader

Col. Shawkat Shuqayer and in every

comrade of his fellow free officers,

but also in every Syrian citizen,

because in every one of those

Adnan, in his beliefs and values,

Adnan in his determination for liberation and development.

Adnan in his keenness for Arab unity.


There is no harm on us and this situation, if

we lost Adnan yesterday – although it was a huge loss – and no

harm in sacrificing more like Adnan tomorrow. Because they are eternal in

the consciousness of the nation forever.

Adnan al-Malki Square in Damascus in the 1960’s.

The show trials and systematic purge in the wake of the Malki Affair was not the last. Others included the November 1970 Corrective Movement, the fallout after Damascus Spring of 2000 and most recently the regimes attempts to maintain control at the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the civil war. Whether or not the Assad regime can fully reconstruct the police state that existed before 2011 is yet to be seen.

The SSNP is now heading the reconciliation efforts on behalf of the regime under the leadership of Ali Haidar. An SSNP member relayed to me how negotiating with local rebels is a delicate process that takes time and has to carefully distinguish between Syrians and foreign fighters. Many Sunnis that have fled to neighboring countries (often characterized as an ethnic cleansing campaign orchestrated by the regime, will ultimately face the choice of either staying abroad or returning home after the conflict. This sectarian crisis is also playing out against the backdrop of an internal “demographic engineering,” most recently facilitated by the four towns agreement. The prospect of a post-war purge indeed hangs over all sides involved in the conflict.

The Malki Affair and the purge forced the SSNP underground where they reemerged in Lebanon. The incident also expedited Nasser’s domination over Syria. It solidified the Baath’s hold on the army and created the foundations for the Assad family’s power. Today, Arab nationalism, weakened and long since tainted by the years of the Baath’s authoritarian rule, once again competes with the old but familiar ideology of Pan-Syrianism. The SSNP and their fierce red hurricane, both surrounded by the darkness of the past, have returned to Syria at the behest of the Baath, but for how long?

* Christopher Solomon is an analyst with Global Risk Insights. Chris traveled to Lebanon and Syria in 2004 with the CONNECT program at the University of Balamand. He earned his MA from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Pittsburgh. He also interned at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter @Solomon_Chris

Paradise Lost: The Rise and Fall of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by Tam Hussein

By @tamhussein

I entered Najiyeh, a small town of no consequence, without their permission. The town claimed to be an ISIS principality. The claim seemed ridiculous but as we drove in to the town it seemed less so. They had fixed the prices, the markets were bustling, even the gold shops were open. It was a stark contrast to what I had heard about their ‘state’. I understood why the people accepted their rule; order is key in conflict especially in one as brutal as this. Even non-ISIS people in the surrounding countryside told me good things about them. “You could bring your case to their courts”, they would say, “and it would be resolved with out fear or favour”. Their entry reminded me of the Taliban being welcomed with loud cheering and flowers in Kabul but they left with the inhabitants shaving off their beards and smoking cigarettes even if they had never touched one before.

A few months later I met Abu ‘Ali in Tarsus, Turkey. The young commander from Ansar al-Sham looked like a young St. Paul, dark black beard with long hair that was slightly thinning on top. He was recovering from a leg injury that if miracles weren’t real, should mean him being minus one leg. The wound was horror personified. Abu ‘Ali informed me that the people alongside the local battalions had kicked ISIS out of Najiyeh.
“Why?” I asked.
“They were harsh people” he replied, I noticed disappointment in his face, it was as if they had betrayed the Syrians. The Revolution, if you will, had made these insignificant men into Mujahideen, warriors of God. Some of these men had been eking out their existence as smugglers, farmers or hiding from the authorities. The Revolution had made them. Now the likes of Abu ‘Ali who had emerged from the mosques calling for the removal of Assad, facing live bullets after Friday prayers were lectured to by Abu so-and-so al-Britani who, only six months ago, was checking out some winding girl’s batty rider in some funked up club. Here came Abu so-and-so to the land of Muslim scholarship and lectured the people on the intricacies of kufr, taghut, tawheed and the incompatibility of Islamic theology with democracy. Syrians didn’t need lessons in creed. They wanted to stop the barrel bombs from killing their children.

A few years later in Saraqeb, whilst filming with Jund al-Aqsa, I was told that the local leader of Ahrar al-Sham had shot the local ISIS emir in the back. The ISIS emir, a native of the city, considered it sacrilege to turn his gun against his co-religionists. However, the leader of Ahrar had no compulsion in dispatching him to eternity. The people had liked the ISIS emir but these same people had also defaced the testimony of faith in the Islamic State’s court house. They wrote sarcastic comments over it. ISIS would no doubt consider it apostasy, still none of the locals had renounced Islam but they too, like the Kabulis had shaved off their beards, increased their smoking even though they readily admitted that smoking was ‘forbidden’ in Islam. More recently, incredulously, I heard an Iraqi man preferring the Iranian backed Shi’te militia, the Popular Mobilisation Group in Mosul instead of ISIS. Moslawis had few issues in raising the Iraqi flag and lowering the ISIS flag, even though everyone knew that the former banner was born in the gentlemen’s clubs in London and the latter in Abbasid Baghdad. And yet without any sense of irony, Moslawis had preferred the latter. Why when everyone professed to be Muslims, did the ISIS come to this? Why did al-Baghdadi’s nascent project fail?

Anthony Quinn plays Hamza the uncle of the Prophet and Omar Mokhtar

Arguably, ISIS did not lose because of a determined opponent, for they are not short of courage and military experts attest to their mastery of asymmetric warfare. ISIS lost because the local populace stopped believing in them. So much so that the people reviled them more than they reviled Assad. People hate Assad because he killed their children but they hate ISIS for stabbing them in the back whilst they were trying to overthrow former. Assad never claimed to be ‘Islamic’ and in a way, nothing was expected from him. He could do what he wanted, he was after all from a long tradition of Middle Eastern tyrants who crushed uprisings whether they be Muslim Brotherhood, Iraqi marsh Arabs or Shi’ites. Brutal cruelty was expected. Even though the deaths inflicted by ISIS remain minuscule compared to the former, when ISIS claimed to be ‘Islamic’ and acted with such wanton cruelty, it provoked disgust and revulsion from even the most dissolute of Muslims. Even that hard drinking, stripper ogling Muslim who puts his head down on the carpet once a year if that, knows that the bar has been raised. He knows that it is unbefitting for a ‘holy warrior’ to behave thus.

Whatever Graeme Wood argues about ISIS and its level of ‘Islamicness’, what Ahmed on the street recognises instinctively is that al-Baghdadi and his group are far from ‘Islamic’; no Fatwa needed. Muslims are inculcated with a conception of what a Mujahid or ‘holy warrior’ is meant to be. The stories of the Companions of the Prophet, Hamza the lion of God or Omar Mokhtar the lion of the desert, both usually in the guise of Anthony Quinn are found in their mothers’ milk. Sons are named Mujahid, Ghazi, Faris and Shaheed in the hope that they epitomise that exceptional person who perfects his moral and martial virtues in a situation where bestial brutality is permissible and yet he manages to retain his humanity. The nobility of man is truly tested in war.

A eulogy of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. This is a classical genre in Arabic literature.

It is here that al-Baghdadi and his men have failed so miserably. His heroes who populate the telegram channels make Muslims recoil. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, his deputy, is certainly eloquent and no doubt courageous but ordinary in his brutality and harshness, no matter how many texts his eulogist claims he has studied. Jihadi John too is ordinary in his inhumanity. Go to the local halal butcher on Harrow Road, London and he will tell you that Islamic rites dictate that an animal should be given its final sip of water and slaughtered away from the gaze of another animal to lessen its distress and that of the other animals. Yet, here stands Jihadi John slaughtering innocent men in front of the whole world so brazenly. There is no sense of shame, even Cain felt ashamed after he killed Abel.

There seems to be something thoroughly modern about Jihadi John’s actions as he points that knife at you. Arguably, Jihadi John’s actions have roots in the London of the Nineties, when Jihadi snuff tapes were sold openly outside mosques. These videos showed in graphic detail the exploits of the Chechen mujahideen against Russian aggression in Chechnya. One of the Imam’s who used to teach in Lisson Green youth club, where Mohammed Emwazi used to attend, recalls that soon those tapes:

“…became dark there was a Russian beheaded by some Chechens, and whenever I saw the brothers, some of them would creep up from behind and greet you by cutting you in the neck.”

Perhaps the mood music for Mohammed Emwazi’s deeds had been set up then. The Imam continues:

“I remember, even at the time that this is not how you greet each other, and I always reminded the brothers that the point of Jihad is not to be blood thirsty and I used to quote the hadith of the Prophet: “Don’t look forward to meeting your enemy, but if you meet him remain steadfast.”

Jihadi John is unrecognisable as a mujahid by your average Muslim, but take Jihadi John to the cold harsh streets of West London and any road man who listens to Stormzy recognises his deed to be pure gangsta.

The mujahid of now is very different from the mujahid of then. Let us demonstrate this with a tangible example, let us use a paragon of a holy warrior of the 19th century, Abdel Kader al-Jaza’iri. He was also known as the Commander of the Faithful although, admittedly, under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Morocco. Abdel Kader, like al-Baghdadi, tried to build a state by uniting the various tribes in Algeria and was harsh to those who collaborated with the French. Like al-Baghdadi, he was a scholar, a jurist and descended from prophetic lineage. He fought the French invaders and was described by his foes and friends alike as a fearless military genius and as illusive as al-Baghdadi. William Thackeray wrote of him:

Nor less quick to slay in battle than in peace to spare and save,
Of brave men wisest councillor, of wise councillors most brave;
How the eye that flashed destruction could beam gentleness and love,
How lion in thee mated lamb, how eagle mated dove!

And yet the gulf between al-Jaza’iri and al-Baghdadi, as Thackeray’s poem shows is vast. Whilst war is harsh and brutal, the former was known for his chivalry and treated his prisoners humanely; so much so that these prisoners of war petitioned France to release him when he found himself in the same predicament. Some even offered to be his guard of honour on account of the kindness he had shown them. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi showed no quarter. He burns and drowns his prisoners alive. Abdel Kader condemned his brother in law for massacring prisoners, the latter revels in it and encourages it. The sadism is so creative that one wonders whether there is a whole unit in Raqqah whose sole job is to come up with creative and cruel ways to execute people. Al-Baghdadi, this product of the Iraq war, has embraced terror wholeheartedly.

Abd el-Kader al-Jaza’iri

Abdel Kader is careful not to harm civilians. When sectarian riots broke out in the Christian quarter of Damascus he saves countless number of Christians. Al-Baghdadi sends a suicide bomber on Palm Sunday to a Coptic church in Tanta and murders countless. The former honoured men of religion; priests were allowed to minister to the French POWs and act as go-betweens. The latter kidnaps the Jesuit priest Father Paolo Dall’Oglio. The fate of the man committed to building bridges between faiths, remains unknown. Abdel Kader stops the practice of beheading prisoners, the latter puts their heads on social media. The former releases those who renounce their faith to escape, al-Baghdadi doesn’t care if they have converted or not. If they do not accept the Caliphate he’ll send one of his soldiers to ram an explosive laden car into a busy market or get one of his soldiers to line up in rows and offer the evening prayer and then detonate his explosives belt.
As one former ISIS fighter told me, “Dawla [Islamic State] isn’t all that it’s made out to be you know.”
You think? One can’t help but ask how many lives he had to take to come to that conclusion?
“Don’t worry” he reassures me, “they were apostates anyway.”
Fantastic. Lessons have been learnt then, no nightmares when he goes to sleep.

On a final note, Abdel Kader realised that noble ends have noble means. He surrendered because he realised that his battle with the French would be too hard on the surrounding tribes and submitted to Providence. For as the old Islamic adage goes, victory lay in His hands. And yet History wrote this loser to become the victor. Abdel Kader gained universal admiration. His enemies who once reviled him honoured him. The ultimate proof of his moral character comes from the people of Bordeaux who voted to get his name on to the ballot paper for the French presidential elections. As the Progres d’Indre et Loire notes:

“We have learned that certain voters of Bordeaux were so impressed by the manners, the character and royal air of Abd el-Kader, they put his name on the ballot for president of the Republic. If this idea spreads it will hurt Louis-Napoleon. To be a good president one must have a reputation of courage, wisdom and talent. Of the two, would not Abd el-Kader better meet those conditions?”

ISIS and The Challenge of Modernity

Saïd Kouachi’s grave- photo Tam Hussein

In Reims, the nameless flowerless grave of Saïd Kouachi, the Charlie Hebdo attacker, is slightly apart from the other dead souls. It is as if he would offend the repose of the interred Muslim souls. In this solitary place one of the sons of the dead asked me what I was doing taking photographs of this newly dug grave. I couldn’t deceive the man and told him whose grave it was. The Franco-Algerian spat on Kouachi’s grave and cursed him. The man, no doubt loved the Prophet just as much as Saïd Kouachi did and yet he shouted: “How is my father going to have peace next to this dog!”

Kouachi didn’t belong to ISIS, but Kouachi and indeed Ahmed Coulibaly one of his companions had the same father. I pitied Saïd Kouachi, few Muslims will ever raise their hands in prayers for this man’s soul. His children would be ashamed to acknowledge him and they will feel strongly the shame of Oedipus Rex himself. I would wager that if I had asked that French Algerian visitor to his father’s grave whether Kouachi was a Mujahid, I would know what that reply would be. He may have understood Kouachi’s anger, he may have experienced the deep racism of French society towards its Muslim population, but I know what his reply would be. I have asked similar questions in all the major terror attacks in the European mainland, Paris, Brussels, London, Stockholm and the average Muslim knows that these men are far from Abdel Kader or Hadji Murat. Kouachi lies in a nameless grave remembered by none. Abdel Kader has a city named Elkader no less than in Iowa and Hadji Murat has a novella written in his honour by an old foe of his, Leo Tolstoy. Both Abdel Kader and Murat lost, and yet Providence in spite of the victor writing history, has preserved their names. They inspire universal admiration. They were ‘holy warriors’ if you will, where as Saïd Kouachi at best was just a ‘warrior’ and at worst a butcher- and a very modern butcher at that.

Let us use General Petraeus’ playbook, Jean Lartéguy’s, The Centurions, to demonstrate the last assertion. Ostensibly, The Centurions follows the journey of several French paratroop officers from defeat at the hands of the Communists in Indo-China to a victory of sorts in Algiers. But in the process of defeating the F.L.N in Algiers they lose something of themselves. Whilst the novel is blind to the century of oppression that Algerians tasted, it is nevertheless a deep rumination on modern warfare and based on Lartéguy’s own experiences as a paratrooper and war correspondent. Lartéguy realises very quickly that the F.L.N used Jihad as a rallying cry for independence, but what it produced was something thoroughly different: it created an Ersatz France. This is why the novel is useful for this essay. Arguably, ISIS too has done the same and produced something that appears to be a bastardised version of what a caliphate is ‘meant’ to look like in their very modern mindsets.

In some ways what Abbas and Mohammed expected of these very ordinary fighters who called themselves mujahideen were exceptional standards in virtue. What they got instead were merely the usual fare. They were like everyone else, they looted, they robbed, they killed and behaved just like every other militia in the world. There was a banality in them and an absence of holiness. Al-Baghdadi was just like Saddam Hussein, ordinary. He was part of the fabric of rulers and tyrants in the region’s bloody history from Saffah to Sisi who massacred men for worldly authority. There was very little difference between a mujahid, a warrior and a terrorist. It is as an F.L.N leader opines in The Centurions:

“what difference do you see in the pilot who drops cans of napalm on a Mechta from the safety of his aircraft and a terrorist who places a bomb in the Souq- the terrorist requires far more courage.”

But the F.L.N leader forgets that what was expected from the Mujahid was not just the courage to step into a truck laden with explosives. The modern mujahid might be a master of asymmetric warfare but he was not meant to be stuffing explosive booby traps into dolls and toys such as those found in Mosul. For whilst the Prophet has said “war is trickery” would he sanction such an act? Does the Muslim martial tradition not abhor such things? Otherwise surely the ‘holiness’ of the warrior has been lost to the banal ordinariness of all warriors. Is he merely an ‘atheist’ mujahid like Mahmoudi in The Centurions, who prays but does not believe in God? Is he then the sort of Mujahid who has to suppress his moral conscience for the sake of victory? The modern Jihadi seems to have sent paradise to hell, and is simply not too bothered if children, the elderly, women, monks, fruit trees or the enemy’s flock are destroyed, even if his religious tradition forbids him from touching them. This Jihadi seems to revel in it. Mohammed Rezgui, for instance, filmed himself elated before gunning down innocent British tourists in Sousse, Tunisia. But the post mortem autopsy seems to suggest that the drugs found in Rezgui’s body created:

“The feeling of exhaustion, aggression and extreme anger that leads to murders being committed. Another effect of these drugs is that they enhance physical and mental performance.”

Why would a holy warrior need to take an amphetamine type drug in order to commit a ‘virtuous’ act? What exactly was he suppressing? Was he like those French paratroopers who were suppressing that feeling of guilt that the intangible soul within knows is committing something morally reprehensible?

In some ways then, the Jihadi is so thoroughly modern that the average Muslim on the streets turns around and says: hang on, this isn’t what we were told by our mothers and fathers. We weren’t reared on Osama bin Laden or Zawahiri but on Hamza, the Lion of God. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had become just like the French Paratroopers and F.L.N leaders in The Centurions: in order to win they had to loose their souls.

Come, let us be generous, and afford al-Baghdadi some empathy as we do with the protagonists in The Centurions. We are generous towards Esclavier even as he slits the throats of all the men in an Algerian village. Perhaps the reason why al-Baghdadi joined Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda franchise was for similar reasons outlined by the head of French intelligence in Algeria, Jean Vajour who noted the heavy handed tactics of the French:

“To send in tank units, to destroy villages, to bombard certain zones, this is no longer a fine comb, it is using a sledgehammer to kill fleas. And what is much more serious, it is to encourage the young- and sometimes the less young to go into the Maquis [rural guerrilla fighters]”

Perhaps the heavy handed tactics used by US army in Fallujah led the not so young al-Baghdadi, to join the insurgents. Maybe at one point this Abu Bakr was just an ordinary man, a devout man who to all accounts lead prayers at his mosque, played around with the kids, listened quietly to the complaints of the locals and advised them on Islamic law since he possessed a doctorate. On Fridays he played football on the dusty streets of North Samarra, a suburb of Baghdad. Maybe this is how his life would have continued till the end of his days. But war has a way of twisting men’s souls, and just like the French paratroopers in The Centurions who spent several years in the camps of the Communists, Abu Bakr too ended up in Camp Bucca. His captors taught this Dr. Ibrahim Awad or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi a thing or to. Like officer Mirendelle in The Centurions, he too learnt how to mediate, how to win alliances and how the Americans behaved. Perhaps just like the French Paratroopers who learnt much from the Communists and applied the lessons with deadly effect in Algeria, Abu Bakr too learnt things in Camp Bucca and applied it to deadly affect. He certainly learnt how to put people in orange jump suits. When he emerged, he experienced the intensity of asymmetric warfare, he learnt that stuffing bombs inside corpses and dogs were effective, how to create grey zones by dividing Sunnis from Shi’ites, how to sit completely still when a drone flew ahead and the art of illusiveness. He learnt all such things over the years without rest or respite- constantly hunted with a price on his head. Perhaps, by the time the Syrian uprising began, he became that amoral man in The Centurions, Captain Julien Boisfeuras, an expert in unconventional and political warfare, who like the real life monster captain Paul Aussaresses tortured, waterboarded, raped, electrocuted a man in the balls, if only to achieve victory. Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, in the light of modern warfare, fitted in with that landscape. In fact perhaps, all of us given the circumstances, could become just like him. Consider Youssef Ben Khedda, a pharmacist, whose hands according to Alistair Horne’s masterful A Savage War of Peace, were clean. Horne writes:

“He wrote a joint letter to Alger Républicain complaining about the blind arrests. Two days later he too was in prison, followed shortly by his fellow signatories; immediately he was released, five months later, he joined the F.L.N”

Could this story of ‘radicalisation’ not apply to al-Baghdadi or even us? Isn’t that human nature? When the Nazis invaded France what tactics did the Free French use against them? Billion dollar armies can afford to have rules, resistance movements have to make conscious choices to have them or not. It even begs the question whether the likes of Abdel Kader could even be allowed to flourish in the murky ethical terrain of modern warfare.

And yet it is perhaps what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had become that the Muslim guy and gal on the street recoils at. “That’s precisely it” says one worshipper in Norbury mosque, “we can all be like him but that’s not what a mujahid is meant to be! He’s meant to be like Imam Ali when the Arab spits at him as he is about to kill him, he leaves him”. The anger is visible in his face, Abu Bakr doesn’t deserve the title of mujahid. Perhaps the political philosopher John Gray is spot on when he says that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State:

“…shares more with the modern revolutionary tradition than any ancient form of Islamic rule. Though they’d hate to hear it, these violent jihadists owe the way they organise themselves and their utopian goals to the modern West”

And everything he does seem to support Gray’s view. Al-Baghdadi, calling on terror attacks on the West, is following Abu Bakr Naji’s tactics outlined in his tract, The Management of Savagery. The intention is to create grey zones that divide the population into an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ scenario. These tactics, these very modern tactics were advocated by the Brazilian guerrilla leader Carlos Marighela, and also used by the F.L.N as one of Lartéguy’s protagonists observes:

“…a bomb exploded….at the cafeteria some medical orderlies laid a child screaming with pain, on a stretcher- another bomb exploded in 5 October in Algiers killing nine Moslem passengers. Horror reigned in Algiers- horror was succeeded by fear and hatred- Moslems began to be beaten up without rhyme or reason. Europeans got rid of their old Arab servants and Fatmahs who had been part of the family for twenty years. Within a few days Bab al-Oued witnessed a distinct rift between the Moslems on one hand and the Jews and Europeans on the other. This was exactly what the F.L.N wanted to divide that ill-defined zone and split up its inhabitants who tended to resemble one another more and more. For they had so many things in common, certain nonchalance, love of gossip, contempt for women, jealousy, irresponsibility and inclination to day dream.” [pp.452-453]

French atrocities in Algeria bolstered support for the F.L.N

ISIS realised what the French paratroop officers understood in fighting the F.L.N; in order to win they had to get on an equal footing with the native population. They had to get “as covered with mud and blood as they are. Then one shall be able to fight them, and in the process we’ll lose our souls, if we really have souls.” And so the paratroopers extended the ill treatment of native Algerians and did things irrespective of legality; they massacred, tortured and raped. They took the local women away, treated them like queens as they ironed and washed for them and then returned them to their men. The French thought they were freeing the Algerian woman from Arab patriarchy and emasculating them by showing how little control they had over them. But when they met a troublesome one, they simply raped her. As one of the Paratroop officers recognised:

“…the ghastly law of the new type of war. But he had to get accustomed to it, to harden himself and shed all those deeply in-grained, out-of-date notions which make for the greatness of Western man but at the same time prevent himself from protecting himself”- [p490]

And the truth was these French paratroopers as Lartéguy says, fought an enemy very much like themselves. Some of the F.L.N leaders were former officers, some were university educated metropolitans treated with disdain in Paris cafes like many French of North African descent are treated to this day. They were thoroughly modern creatures and so employed the same tactics as the paratroopers. They massacred Pieds Noirs civilians in Philippeville, they liquidated their own members, gouged out the eyes of collaborators and believed that the end justified the means. Arguably, ISIS mirrors what the F.L.N did in Lartéguy’s novel. But where as the F.L.N in Lartéguy’s model understood that they were moderns somewhere along the line, Abu Bakr and friends did not understand the fact that they were too.

For al-Baghdadi is in a sort of denial. He has failed to deal with modernity itself and in it lie the seeds of his defeat. It is this reason that made the people of Najiyeh boot ISIS out, the commander of Ahrar shoot the ISIS emir and the locals scrawl sarcastic comments on their Shariah court. This inability to grasp modernity, to understand that a process has occurred between their ‘Islamic State’ and the past. The Muslim world has experienced a traumatic rupture, not just defeat, humiliation and loss but colonisation, industrialisation and societal changes which have fundamentally altered the times we live in. In the past, life was organised and configured differently, the same rules which applied to the pre-modern world cannot be applied anymore. The Islamic State is like a car crash victim who, after recovering, thinks he can just go back to living the same way when in reality his limbs do not function in the same way. He can’t come to terms with his accident and so disasters ensue. Since he can not remember what the past looks like before the crash, he conjures it up just like the F.L.N leader does in The Centurions:

“There’s only one word for me Istiqlal, independence. Its a deep fine-sounding word and rings in the ears of the poor fellahin [farmers] more loudly than poverty, social security or free medical assistance. We Algerians steeped as we are in Islam are in greater need of dreams and dignity than practical care. And you? What word have you got to offer? If its better than mine you’ve won.”

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi came up with ‘Khilafa ‘ala minhaj an-Nubuwwa’-‘the Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology’, and the Muslim world looked up for a second, with a sense of hope and nostalgia; for this was their historical past, just as the British looks to their Empire, their Raj and the Battle of Britain nostalgically, not quite coming to terms with the fact that they are no longer a great power. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi tried to realise the word ‘Khilafa’. But what did the word ‘Khilafa’ mean in the context of modernity and the post-colonial world? In the Pre-Modern Islamicate, people were divided into millets or religious communities because that was the reality on the ground. Now we had the concept of citizenship, this is the new reality. ISIS denied this new reality and sought to extract the Jizyah, the poll tax from Syrian Christians thinking that it was more merciful on them than paying higher taxes. These Christians who had lived on that land for millennia would be paying this Jizyah to Abu Marwan or Luqman from Ghafsa, Tunisia. ISIS failed to comprehend that even if the Jizyah was lower, and the Christian is protected by the Muslim armies, in the modern context it is simply put, humiliation. We are all sons of egalité now, whether we like it or not. The Syrian Christian has for generations grown up with the concept of equality. In fact, he may be like the ancient Northern Syrian tribe of Ghassasina who preferred to pay a higher tax rate to the second Caliph, Umar, than accept the status of second class and pay the Jizyah. In the past, the French made Arabs in Algiers wear the necklace akin to the Star of David to signify that they had ‘submitted’ to French laws. Arabs accepted it in the 19th century. Jews wore different colours in the Middle East during the Medieval period. Modern man cannot accept any of these things, even if it is deemed for their own ‘good’. ISIS couldn’t come to terms with this.

In fact, al-Baghdadi creates what Benedict Anderson calls “an imagined community” through the use of powerful propaganda, tapping into the emotions of many Muslims. This isn’t just a cynical attempt, Graeme Wood is right here, ISIS are True Believers-zealots. They may have been former secular officers who were thrown into Abu Ghraib but, just like the F.L.N commander in The Centurions, they had rediscovered their religion, their reality had been shaken with the fall of the modern Iraqi state. These highly trained officers couldn’t just return to the coffee shops to smoke a fat Zaghloul and drink bitter coffee, lamenting the presence of US marines on their streets. That jarred with their sense of honour, no, they would return to Fallujah and Mosul where their families were and fight. These officers did what an Algerian officer in The Centurion did, they gave their failed country “a history and a personality.” They grabbed the black ‘Abbasid’ flag and made it synonymous with Islamicate. Heavily reliant on ‘salvation history’, they created a vision that the banner of Islam spread from East to West. They ignored historical reality where at one point there were three caliphates that vied for power with each other, and that even after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, no caliph existed at all for several years. ISIS did what Lartéguy says happened in Algeria, they created a history based on the cemeteries of the dead not based on historical reality. It was Fake News caliphated. As one F.L.N leader says, congratulating a French paratroop officer on his country’s contribution to the creation of modern Algeria:

“The Algerian people have been scarred by war, their existence has been too disturbed to turn the clock back at this stage. You yourselves are creating Algeria through this war, by uniting all the races, Berbers, Arabs, Kabyles and Chaouias. The rebels should be almost grateful to you for the violent measures of repression you have taken.” [p473]

And so the invasion and the sectarianism within Iraq and lately Syria helped to create this ‘nation’ if you will. When ISIS broke through the Sykes-Picot border, it was seen as restoring parity between the oppressed and the oppressor. It was like Horne says of France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh in 1954:

“Suddenly this unbelievable defeat deprived the French army of its baraka, [blessing] making it look curiously mortal for the first time.”

ISIS’ ‘yes we can’ moment

The breaching of the Sykes-Picot line was the biggest paradigm shift since Ben Ali fell in the Middle East. It showed the world and indeed Muslims that the status quo can be changed, that the West’s grip on the Muslim world was not supreme. This was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s ‘Yes we can’ moment and perhaps his legacy even as we begin to write his obituary. In post-colonial theory at least, he had done what Franz Fanon believed was essential between coloniser and colonised. He had restored parity, not through the coloniser granting him his freedom which instilled an inferiority complex in the manumitted. Rather, he took it by giving the coloniser a bloody nose. When ISIS broke through Sykes-Picot, they had restored a sense of honour for many in the Middle East. Similarly, when the Islamic State reintroduced concubinage and traditional female roles, they reasserted this injured manhood. And yet at the same time, they displayed their inability to accept that modernity had changed us so fundamentally that Jefferson could own slaves and still be considered a ‘good’ and ‘virtuous’ man then. But today, should he practise the same thing, he’d be considered a monster.

ISIS may have signalled its independence by purporting to ‘mint’ gold coins and arbitrarily declaring ‘provinces’ all over the Muslim world and yet, just like the Algerian officer Mahmoudi in The Centurions, who knew that Algeria could not exist without France, the Islamic State also demonstrated that it could not exist outside of the modern world. The creation of uniform ISIS courts were in reality the importing of Western law courts, which made the Rule of Law the basis of the state. Partly, ISIS knew that it had to compete with that model and partly because it didn’t know anything else. On one hand, it was proof of their ingenuity at state building, but also an admission that the paradigm to beat was still the Western model. According to Wael Hallaq’s Impossible State, Islamic history didn’t have uniform law courts as we see them in modern nation states. Far from it, they were extremely organic and functional affairs tailored to the needs of the local community. The historical Islamicate had never made the Rule of Law, king. Now it did. Similarly, when ISIS introduced ISHS, Islamic State Health Services, it based itself on the British National Health Services, NHS, rather than the hospitals of Medieval Andalusia. ISIS then, could not exist outside of time, theirs was a modern project however much it tried to deny it. ISIS’ predicament was like that of the Jihadist who blew up the ancient Buddha statues or the temples in Palmyra for being an expression of infidelity and irreligion but did not realise that his Nike trainers were paying homage to a Greek deity.

In al-Baghdadi’s denial of modernity therein lies his demise. His group failed because the Mohammed and Ayesha in Raqqah and Mosul instinctively realised that they were un-Islamic in spite of the long beard, ankle swingers and tooth stick. It is likely that there will be other groups who will want to emulate ISIS, but for them to be successful they will have to come to terms with modernity. One suspects that they too will fail. Sometimes an old timer can grasp the un-tangible better than many learned men. These ancient looking men don’t know many religious texts but have an earthy piety and remain a reliquary of wisdom that sees things plainly.
“Now these youngsters,” says wispy bearded uncle Forid sitting in Brick Lane mosque waiting to meet his Maker, “are running around killing this and committing God knows what sin thinking that they are doing the Prophet’s work! Idiots! They are so far from him! When the Mehdi comes everything going to be fine.” Uncle Forid is resigned to the arrival of the Mehdi, the messianic saviour who will come at the end of time in Muslim apocalyptic narratives. Uncle Forid knows that the youth are too impatient, they want paradise now. They don’t want to lose. The youth forget that what goes on in the world is often a reflection of a sick heart.  They forget that the Muslim pantheon contains plenty of winners but also plenty of losers; Abdel Kader, Hadji Murat, Imam Shamil, Omar Mokhtar but history honoured them because they remained true to their martial tradition and moral code. To eternity, it seems, winning isn’t everything. An anecdote of Omar Mokhtar told to me by a Tunisian activist is pertinent here: one of Omar Mokhtar’s Mujahideen demanded that two Italian POWs be given no quarter just like the Italians did to them. Omar Mokhtar replied: ‘They are not our teachers’. Whoever comes after the fall of Mosul will need to convince a sceptical Muslim population, tired of the killing and the blood, that they match up to mujahids like Omar Mokhtar.


Katibat Dir’ al-Watan: New Sub-Unit of the Fifth Legion

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Emblem of Katibat Dir’ al-Watan. On top: Dir’ al-Watan. On bottom: “The Special Force.” Note the Russian and Syrian flags in the emblem’s centre. Note also the cedar of Lebanon on the bottom of the emblem.

When the Fifth Legion (V Corps) was announced in November 2016, it was debatable how far this new formation would emerge as a real fighting force. Indeed, recruitment efforts in Latakia province and apparent annoyance at the constant messages urging people to sign up gave a hint that the initiative was floundering. However, subsequent developments have shown that the Fifth Legion is indeed a serious formation, becoming a fighting force on multiple fronts like Palmyra and the north Hama countryside. Moreover, the suggestions of the Fifth Legion as a formation intended to bring together personnel from different groups have also been borne out. For example, Kata’ib al-Ba’ath (The Ba’ath Battalions), one of the larger and older auxiliary forces for the regime, has worked with the Fifth Legion to set up Liwa al-Ba’ath (The Ba’ath Brigade). Katibat Dir’ al-Watan (The Homeland Shield Battalion), the subject of this piece, is the latest Fifth Legion sub-unit to be created.

What is particularly interesting about this new unit is the incorporation of Lebanese fighters into this unit from the northern Beqaa/Homs countryside border areas with Russian support. The pro-Hezbollah and pro-regime outlet Lebanon Debate writes in an article about Katibat Dir’ al-Watan:

“The peoples of the border villages of the Beqaa have taken on their shoulders the protection of their security from the takfiri expansion. This area, of tribal nature, present on the shoulder of Syrian Qusayr, constituted in 2013 the tributary for the advance of Hezbollah from the Lebanese side in the operation through which the armed groups were removed from the borders of Lebanon. After four years, the area is being penetrated again from its wide doors.

According to estimates, 30,000 Lebanese live in 12 Syrian villages on the borders of Lebanon. The difference is that these people are Lebanese citizens who have fulfilled their obligations [of citizenship] and have chosen to live on the Syrian side as there are no geographic barriers separating the two sides, but rather it is a natural extension for the families and tribes of the Hermel. In the beginning of the events, these families and tribes were able through coordinating with Hezbollah and the Syrian and Lebanese armies to protect these villages through youth sharpened to raise arms, making their villages logistical rear bases securing the resistance’s back firstly, creating an aperture for it secondly, and eliminating the force of takfir thirdly.

The role that the area played in the Qusayr battles, in addition to its adhesion to the Syrian depth that is located on the line of the armed presence as well as its geographic and family value, pushed those interested in the military matter to specify for it a real role. Hezbollah worked to incorporate dozens of youth under its banner, and likewise the Syrian army that designated for them a sideline role within the National Defence Forces played a role, in addition to groups that remained within the families but were supported by the concerned parties: the development has been such that with the Russian entry into the Syrian battleground, they have worked to connect the bridges, as the Russians understood the extent of the importance of this region on the Lebanese hip first and the hip of Homs second.

A while ago, a senior Russian general visited the 12 villages that Lebanese dwell in, and he met Lebanese family and tribal groups, of whom the most prominent face was al-Hajj Muhammad Ja’afar, whose name has circulated widely in the past time from the understanding that he is one of the notables of the Hermel region and has wide links, and secondly from the understanding that his son is ‘Hadi’ who was killed at a checkpoint of the Lebanese army, and the revenge operation that followed from that.

The visit, which occurred far removed from the media, revealed the existence of a Russian intention to work with the sons of the area, in accordance with Moscow’s plans in Syria. According to what the sources of ‘Lebanon Debate’ affirm, multiple meetings occurred, resulting in a general conception, military and developmental.

‘Lebanon Debate’ has learnt that through coordination, Russia has reached an agreement with the sons of the area, stipulating support for the establishment of a local military faction comprising civilians whose objective is to protect their areas first and aid in fighting the terrorist movemets second, and aiding the region developmentally speaking third. The direction has thus translated into an announcement in the past few days of the birth of a faction bearing the name Dir’ al-Watan. According to the sources of ‘Lebanon Debate’, the faction is composed of 400 Syrian and Lebanese fighters under the leadership of al-Hajj Muhammad Ja’afar, obtaining complete Russian support. And this is confirmed by its emblem that uses the Russian flag alongside the Syrian flag and includes the Lebanese cedar as the link component between the two.

A source close to Dir’ al-Watan told ‘Lebanon Debate’ that “the aim of the establishment of this group is to reinforce the protection of the Lebanese villages beginning from their Syrian neighbouring villages in which Lebanese people dwell,” affirming the existence of “high-level coordination with Damascus and Hezbollah.” But what is striking is “the widespread enthusiasm to join this faction” without the refusal of the public Russian support, as the source affirmed that a “second visit by the Russian general to the area took place in the past days, and he reviewed the preparations and the elements that have been put in place to deal with arms.”

The source considered that “this movement is a local auxiliary force working to defeat and eradicate terrorism and according with the beliefs of the peoples of the area,” pointing out that “the most prominent factors of confidence that have given rise to this situation is the presence of al-Hajj Muhammad Ja’afar well-known for his activities on the line of reconciliations and deterring fitna in the Qusayr area shortly before the events of 2013.”

According to a source close to Dir’ al-Watan, the movement “will not limit its activities in Syria but will also work to secure permission to allow it to work inside Lebanon as a political party movement to represent the struggle against terrorism” while its military activities will be limited within Syrian lands.”

Alongside the details of that Lebanon Debate article, it should also be pointed out that the Fifth Legion affiliation of Katibat Dir’ al-Watan provides additional confirmation of the Russian role in the creation of this new group. Russia is particularly invested in the Fifth Legion through provision of the latest military gear in a bid to make the Fifth Legion an effective force.

So what are the implications of the creation of this new force? First, the renewed talk about hoping to split Russia somehow from the Assad regime in light of the fallout from the Khan Sheikhoun chemical attacks is divorced from reality. While there may be Russian annoyance with the regime for what has happened and past incidents in which the regime has managed to drag Russia into initiatives that some Russian officials may not have been so keen on, the Russian government remains heavily invested in the regime’s survival. The continued Russian efforts in bolstering existing forces and creating new units like this Katibat Dir’ al-Watan demonstrate that investment playing out on the ground.

Second, it is wrong to presume that only Iran and Hezbollah are interested in Syria’s border areas with Lebanon as part of a supposed demographic change masterplan to clear out Sunnis and have a Sunni-free land route stretching all the way from Iran to Lebanon in order to create an uninterrupted Iranian-client Shi’i militia axis. In the case of the Qusayr-Hermel border areas (in which Hezbollah also maintains a heavy presence), Lebanese Shi’a in particular have inhabited the Syrian side of the borders since long before the Syrian civil war (see here also for a list of villages) with important familial and clan ties connecting the Qusayr-Hermel border areas. There are real concerns about security. In helping to set up Katibat Dir’ al-Watan, there is no doubt that the Russians, like Hezbollah, are playing on those concerns to build a client base.

Thus, the Qusayr-Hermel border areas do not reflect a case study of the aforementioned demographic change masterplan. Rather, the case of the Qusayr-Hermel border areas shows that there are specific localised border areas that have their own dynamics that may be of interest to one or more of the regime’s foreign backers. Such cases may then lead to results of real demographic change on the ground, regardless of the original intentions. Other border areas, such as the Qalamoun towns like Nabk, Rankous and Yabroud as well as the areas near Mt. Hermon, reflect much more the workings of the regime’s own designs in those places: in these cases, creating viable local holding forces and auxiliary militia allies (thus Quwat Dir’ al-Qalamoun and Fawj al-Hermon respectively). Yet in Homs city, it is hard to argue that the Sunni-Alawite demographic shift that has occurred was not supported by the regime. As always, the need for nuance and detailed consideration is paramount.

Russia’s Escalation in Syria: Making It Tougher to Fight ISIS? – By Nicholas A. Heras

Russia’s Escalation in Syria: Making It Tougher to Fight ISIS?
By Nicholas A. Heras – Bacevich Fellow, Center for a New American Security @NicholasAHeras
For Syria Comment: April 8, 2017

On Thursday, the Trump administration decided to fire 59 cruise missiles from U.S. naval vessels in the Mediterranean at the Al-Shayrat airbase, an important Syrian military airbase in central-western Syria. President Trump ordered this strikes as a firm response to the Assad regime’s reported recent use of chemical weapons against civilians in the country’s northwestern Idlib province, an event that seems to have deeply impacted the President. More important than the American strike’s impact on Bashar al-Assad’s military is that the Al-Shayrat base was also host to Russian forces working with Assad’s forces.

Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the Assad regime in September 2015 has been the most significant event in the conflict. Not only does Russia provide great power support for Bashar al-Assad, it also forces the United States to engage with Russia on most all matters concerning Syria, including the U.S.-led Coalition’s current campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the wake of the strike on the al-Shayrat airbase, the Russians denounced the Trump administration’s decision, threatening to escalate their force presence in support of the Assad regime, and closing the direct “de-confliction channel,” between the U.S and Russian militaries. Assad referred to the U.S. airstrikes as “arrogant aggression,” hinting that his forces would seek to respond to the American attack.

Keeping the Russian Connection Going

There were no Russian casualties at the al-Shayrat airbase because the Russians were warned beforehand through the de-confliction channel. This channel is a basic mechanism of direct military-to-military communication between U.S. and Russia that was established to prevent American and Russian and Assad’s warplanes from striking each other, or each side’s local partners.

Preserving this de-confliction channel was a major concern of the Obama administration, which wanted to focus on conducting a “light footprint” counter-ISIS campaign that featured U.S. Special Forces supporting local, Syrian partners without being distracted by Russia or Assad. Through the de-confliction channel with the Russians, U.S.-led Coalition warplanes could conduct raids against ISIS without being harassed or targeted by Assad’s anti-air defense systems, often-times operated with Russian support and guidance.

U.S. close air support is a vital component of the counter-ISIS campaign in Syria, and it allows the Coalition to take the fight to ISIS working, by, with, and through local Syrian partners, which are basically militias that are coordinated into an effective fighting force under U.S. guidance. Two local partner forces, the U.S.-backed, multiethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its attached force the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC), have with American-led Coalition air strikes, steadily more and more territory from ISIS in eastern Syria. Working carefully and closely with the SDF/SAC, the United States has only had to commit around 1,000 troops on the ground inside of Syria, and in the coming weeks, these local Syrian partner forces are set to begin the operation to seize ISIS’ “capital,” the central-eastern city of Raqqa.

However, as successful as the American strategy against ISIS in Syria has been up to this point, a reality that is not widely noted is that this success is the product of the general freedom of action that is enjoyed by the U.S.-led Coalition as result of Assad and Russia’s apathy. Preoccupied with the civil war raging in western Syria, where the chemical weapons attacks occurred, the Assad regime and its partners have allowed the U.S. to focus on ISIS, which is more of a long-term threat to the rule of Bashar al-Assad. However, the threat that Assad and Russia would turn their attention to the growing American military presence in eastern Syria and decide to undermine the U.S. counter-ISIS campaign, was a major concern for the Obama administration. It continues to loom over the American military effort against ISIS in Syria

A Proxy for a Proxy

President Trump is generally following the same counter-ISIS strategy is Syria as his predecessor, which means that the Trump administration is relying on local proxy forces to reduce total number of U.S. forces required to be inside of Syria. This strategy aligns with Trump’s campaign pledge to destroy ISIS and to keep the United States out of another costly occupation of a Middle Eastern country. Yet, this strategy is only as effective as the local partners that the U.S. must work with, and the freedom of action that American aircraft have to provide the vital air support that these partners need to overcome ISIS’ fierce resistance.

Assad and Russia do not need to attack U.S. forces inside of Syria, or shoot down American warplanes, which could start a chain of escalation that could result in a larger, regional or global conflict. Simply put, Bashar al-Assad and his allies can instead turn their fire on America’s partners on the ground inside of Syria, which would be a major setback, perhaps even a mortal blow, to the restrained but effective strategy the U.S. has been pursuing against ISIS.

There is already a model for how Assad and Russia could respond like this: both have conducted airstrikes either “accidentally,” or purposely, on America’s local, Syrian partner forces over the last year. In three incidents, in June 2016, August 2016, and last month, Assad and Russia have directly attacked counter-ISIS, Syrian partners, prompted a U.S. air force response to warn off further attacks. Without a reliable de-confliction channel, these one-off strikes by the regime and Russia could become part of a systematic campaign against the best Syrian counter-terrorism partners the U.S. military has fought and shed blood next to.

And this strategy of aggressive escalation against America’s best friends in Syria would likely force a response from the Trump administration, to protect local partner and to send the message that the United States will not be deterred in its mission to defeat ISIS. These responses could range from a show of force such as the deployment of U.S. Army Rangers that were sent to the northern Syrian town of Manbij to support the SDF from the Turkish military all the way to American forces returning fire to protect Syrian partners. However, these responses would be fraught with risk, the counter-ISIS campaign would be ground to a halt, and American soldiers could be killed in the escalation.

The current situation in Syria is fraught with the risk of escalation. The Syrian president has recently called American forces conducting the counter-ISIS campaign in Syria “invaders.” Bashar al-Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies have long been uneasy with the American military’s expanding presence and zone of control in eastern Syria. Now, directly attacked by the U.S. “invaders”, the Assad and his friends can try to ruin the American counter-ISIS strategy, and frustrate President Trump’s ambitions to knock the hell out of ISIS in Syria.

Century Foundation Roundtable on Syria

by Aron Lund

A lot of Syria writing tends to be focused on current events, veering toward the very small, the very recent, and the very local. We’re all breathlessly racing to keep up with the latest developments in a stunningly complicated conflict, and only rarely do journalists and researchers get a chance to step back and look at the bigger picture.

Instead, we find ourselves debating questions we won’t even remember a week later. Did that rebel group just split from this rebel group or was it the other way around? Did the army retake three cow sheds in rural Hama today, or four? It’s hard to put the daily minutiae in context if you do not step back to look at the longer-term trends every now and then.

Just over a year ago, I wrote an unpardonably long Syria Comment post on the ten most important developments in 2015 and what I felt was important to watch for in 2016. Whether that particular text was any good is not for me to judge, but what struck me was the number of people who told me they’d been looking for that type of long-form, big-picture analysis. They included several diplomats and others who work on Syria for a living in positions of some influence, but who, apparently, do not have time to discuss anything that didn’t happen yesterday. So I’ve come to the conclusion that there’s actually a real need for that stuff.

The esteemed readers of Syria Comment may therefore be interested to know that The Century Foundation just released a long four-author roundtable on the evolution of the conflict, with contributions from Thanassis Cambanis, Sam Heller, Michael Wahid Hanna, and myself. It’s basically a long series of shorter texts or comments, where we all respond to each other as we go, with Mr. Cambanis gently shepherding the rest of us toward intelligible conclusions. In the process of doing that, we seek to expand on what seems like relevant or interesting subtopics, collectively fleshing-out our sometimes-diverging views on the conflict. We did the same thing last summer, about what we felt was important back then, so this is a kind of second chapter, but it can certainly be read on its own.  You can access both texts here:

In the new 2017 edition, we look at things like the consequences of Bashar al-Assad taking East Aleppo and Donald Trump taking the White House. The question we ask ourselves is: has Assad won a strategic victory? And our answer is: yes, it looks like he has. All things can change, but most probably, this one won’t. For those still in doubt, I refer you to U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s comments in Ankara the other day, when he said Assad’s future “will be decided by the Syrian people,” which is diplospeak for “████ it, he can stay.”

But if the original war for control over the central government in Syria is fading into the background, what does that mean for the conflict? Because, rest assured, there will be more conflict—and that’s also something we tried to talk about. How much of the country can Assad ultimately control, using what means? What happens with the Syrian Kurds and the Islamic State? How do you approach the thorny issues of post-conflict reconstruction if there’s not going to be a post-conflict situation?

If you’re the kind of person who enjoys thinking about these issues, that’s kind of sad, but the roundtable should be perfect for you. And if it isn’t enough to satisfy your cravings for in-the-weeds Syriana, here’s a few other articles I’ve written recently, because I don’t want leave you with the impression that this post was about anything other than pure self-promotion:

Revenge Being Meted Out on ISIS linked Sunni Tribes of Iraq – FrontLine “Iraq Uncovered”

This Front Line documentary — “Iraq Uncovered‘ — on Iraqi Sunni tribes & the revenge that is being meted out on them by Shia militias that follow behind US and Iraqi regular military is a cautionary tail for Syria. The same thing is likely to take place in Syria at the hands of both the YPG (Kurds) and Syrian Arab Army. For all that the US claims to be trying to contain Iran, it is clear that the US military strategy in Iraq is works in tandem, even if only tacitly, with Iran. Iran and the Shia militias are playing clean up and extending their influence in the region thanks to superior US military might and spending. The US may have little choice in doing this because it has prioritized the destruction of ISIS. Allowing Shiite sectarian troops is the quickest way to fight Sunni extremism. I cannot help but believe that this is the “Great Sorting Out” unfolding in all its horribleness.

Why the U.S. Should Team Up with the Kurds & Not Turkey to Take Raqqa and Destroy the Islamic State

Why the U.S. Should Team Up with the Kurds & Not Turkey to Take Raqqa and Destroy the Islamic State
By Joshua Landis
For Syria Comment – March 18, 2017

The problem with letting the Turks take Raqqa and presumably the entire Euphrates Valley that is now held by ISIS is that the Turks are endeavoring to hem in the Kurds. To do this, Turkey hopes to establish its Arab proxies in a new “Euphrates state” in eastern Syria. This would partition Syria into three states: a western Asad-ruled state; an eastern Turkish and Sunni Arab rebel-ruled state, and a northern Kurdish state.

Asad’s army has already taken a large swath of territory east of Aleppo, which cuts off Turkey’s access to Raqqa from al-Bab. Turkey has proposed taking Raqqa from the north at Tel Abyad. This approach would penetrate the Kurdish region at its middle and cut it in two. This objective of splitting the autonomous Kurdish region in two is the main reason Turkey offered to take Raqqa.

If the United States helps or allows Turkey to attack the Kurds at Tel Abyad, it will have no Kurdish allies to attack Raqqa or any other part of ISIS territory.

Why are the Kurds willing to take Raqqa even though they do not have territorial interests in and around Raqqa? They are investing in their relationship with the United States. They assume that it will serve them well over the long run when it comes to their political aspirations. They will get a lot of good training; they will get a dollop of heavy weaponry from the United States, which I doubt it can reclaim after the fight; they are building a command and control network for their force.  By the time this operation is over, one can guess that the Kurds of Syria will have four reasonably well trained, well organized, and well armed brigades that they did not have before.  One also suspects that there will be some military loot in Raqqa, which will fall their way.*

The second problem with having Turkey take this region is that its Arab rebel allies include Ahrar al-Sham (a deeply Salafist force, think the Taliban, which adamantly opposed to the US), the dominant militia in its panoply of Arab militias. Ahrar recently split in two, one half joining al-Qaida in Idlib and the other half joining the Turkish coalition of rebel groups, where it is dominant. If Turkey-Ahrar establish rebel rule over the Euphrates, it will become a haven for Salafists and possibly al-Qaida and the coalition of rebel forces now dominating Idlib province; the US has been bombing the al-Qaida leaders there. Turkey has worked with al-Qaida’s forces in Syria throughout the last five years. It allowed them to mass inside Turkey in 2013 when they spearheaded an invasion from Turkish territory into Kassab, north of Latakia. This region is known for its Armenian villages, the last traditional Armenian villages that were not ethnically cleansed by Turkey during WWI. All the Armenians of these villages fled in front of the rebel militias led by Nusra (al-Qaida’s wing in Syria). The churches were ransacked, old frescoes defaced, and crosses destroyed. Turkey does not mind Salafists being part of its Arab forces. Turkey is using these forces as proxies to thwart Kurdish ambitions.

The Turks are pitching their interest in liberating ISIS territory as a “local-Arabs-must-rule” campaign, but the Arabs whom it will be marshaling for its force are largely from Idlib and Aleppo provinces. These are agricultural regions quite different from the desert and tribal Euphrates. The accent and customs of both are different. It is not certain that Raqqans will embrace these new rulers as being among “their own” or as an exercise in self-rule. Of course, they are all Sunni Arabs. In all likelihood, they will risk being dominated by anti-American Salafist elements that will assert themselves and reintegrate al-Qaida members and possibly ISIS defectors back into their state. After all, much of the Euphrates valley was ruled by al-Qaida’s Nusra militia before ISIS split off from it and kicked out Nusra. These elements emerged from the local people. They will reemerge if Turkey tries to administer the region with a light touch, allowing local Arab proxies to take power. If Turkey were to decide to use “extreme vetting” of its Arab proxies to eliminate Salafists, it could do so, but the US should not count on it. Turkey has refused to do this in the past. Salafists are the best fighters and most organized and disciplined of the militias.

These, I believe, are the reasons that American generals do not want to work with Turkey. They don’t trust it, both because it wants to attack our Kurdish allies and because it is soft on al-Qaida-like rebel groups.

What is more, Iran, Russia, Asad, Iraq, and the Kurds will escalate against it. They will not allow the United States to sponsor a Sunni rebel enclave in the middle of their new “sphere of influence.” They will view it as an irredentist provocation bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and America to fire up Sunni resistance to Asad rule in Syria, Abadi’s rule in Iraq, and Kurdish rule in Rojava. The US would be expected to side with Turkey and the Sunni rebels in a long and escalating war against the Shiites. I think this is a swamp waiting to suck the United States into its malodorous depths.

Russia and Iran want to divide ISIS territory between the Kurds and the Syrian government that is led by Asad. The United States should allow this to happen if it wants an exit strategy. Such a strategy, of course, delivers the Euphrates basin back to Asad’s dictatorial rule and into the hands of authoritarian Kurdish rule. It will not be democratic. Asad will seek vengeance against those who rose up against him. This strategy does not promote the sort of representative democracy or human rights outcome the US is pledged to support. All the same, it will be the fastest way to bring stability, restore government services, and rebuild the region. The Syrian government will police against ISIS and Nusra as the Iraqi government does in Iraq. This is the best way to defeat ISIS and deny its territory to some Salafist redux.

To get Turkey to accept the Russian/American plan, Turkey will have to be reassured that Syrian Kurdistan will not be used as a staging ground for PKK forces to attack Turkey. Erdogan will need guarantees that Turkey’s Kurds will not be incited to break away and take eastern Anatolia with them. Restraining Syria’s Kurds is in the interest of the US, Russia, and Asad. If Syrian Kurds can be persuaded to limit their ambitions, as Iraqi Kurds have been, Turkey’s national integrity will not be threatened. This strategy is a gamble, but gambling on the Kurds to limit their ambitions to Rojava (Western Kurdistan) is less risky than gambling on Turkey to spearhead an invasion of Syria through Kurdistan and build a well-governed and peaceable Sunni state that limits its ambitions to the Euphrates valley.

This is why the United States should team up with the Kurds to destroy the Islamic State.

*I would like to thank Barry Posen and Charlie Kupchan for sharpening some of these arguments.

Three Points Regarding Syrian Refugees and President Trump’s Travel Ban – By Sam Farah

Sam Farah

Three Points Regarding Syrian Refugees and President Trump’s Travel Ban
By Sam Farah
For Syria Comment – March 16, 2017

  1. The Travel Ban of Syrian Refugees Fleeing the War in Syria is Inhumane

The situation in Syria is “the biggest humanitarian emergency of our era.” That’s according to António Guterres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Syrian civilians are caught in a regional and geopolitical war involving super powers including Russia, the U.S., China, France, and Britain, as well as regional countries including Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, all of whom support different rebel and military factions fighting in Syria; many have military personnel directly involved in the war.  According to the World Food Program, before the conflict, Syria was a middle-income country; today 4/5 of Syrians live in poverty and struggle to put food on the table. Millions have fled the conflict and become refugees in search of safety shelter and food.

  1. The Ban on Syrian Refugees Does not Help Protect America from Terrorism
  1. None of the terrorists implicated in the September 11 attack in NYC were from Syria and not one Syrian has been implicated or involved in any terrorist attacks in the U.S. or in Europe since then.
  2. Almost 30,000 foreign fighters are believed to be in Syria and Iraq, according to the head of the United Nation’s counter terrorism committee. Around 3,000 are from Europe including places like France, Belgium, England, Germany and Sweden, and another 10,000 from Arab Countries like Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. The foreign fighters joining the terrorist groups fighting in Syria are from at least 86 countries  including sereval thousands Uighurs from the province of  Xinjiang in China. None of those terrorists carry a Syrian Passport and none will be subject to President Trump’s travel ban.
  1. Syrian Americans are Part of the American Fabric

Syrians have been emigrating to the U.S. since the late 1800s. Steve Job’s father was a Syrian immigrant, as was Jerry Seinfeld’s maternal grandmother. They are actors like Terri Hatcher, and F Murray Abraham, professional athletes like Johnny Manziel, and presidents of universities such as Mitch Daniels, the current president of Purdue University. Lower Manhattan was home to Little Syria, a vibrant neighborhood that was established in the late 1800s and was finally erased to make room to build the Holland tunnel. According to Wikipedia: “Syrian Americans, including the earliest immigrants, have always placed a high premium on education. Like many other Americans, Syrian Americans view education as a necessity. Generally, Syrian and other Arab Americans are more highly educated than the average American. In the 2000 census it was reported that the proportion of Syrian Americans to achieve a bachelor’s degree or higher is one and a half times that of the total American population.”