“What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change?” by Khudr

Two Alawis at the beginning of the 20th century

The following article was first published on Syria Comment in August 2006. It is written by a Syrian Alawi friend who wrote under the pseudonym, Khudr. He authored  it in response to President Bush’s pressure on Syria following the invasion of Iraq and killing of Rafiq Hariri. At the time, the US administration was casting about for a Syrian who could replace President Bashar al-Assad. Washington hoped to end Syrian influence in Lebanon, gain Syrian support for its occupation of Iraq, and extend its agenda for “Reform of the Greater Middle East.”

In particular, Bush policy makers were looking for an Alawi general who could overthrow Bashar al-Assad and replace the Assad family, while maintaining stability.

Today, Syrian opposition leaders believe a key to bringing down the regime is to divide the Alawi community. Bassma Kodmani has suggested that “Alawite leaders have sought to establish contacts with Sunni imams to seek guarantees for the community in return for abandoning the Assad regime. This, rather than defections in the army, could herald the unraveling of the regime’s powers of suppression.”

Mohja Kahf has similarly written that “four of seven major Alawite clans (Nuwaliya, Kalbiya, Haddadiya, Khayyatiya), issued statements dissociating themselves from the Assads.” (See my response to this: “Did Four Alawi Clans Dissociate themselves from the Assads, as the Opposition Claims? Not likely.”)

What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change?
by Khudr
for Syria Comment
August 30, 2006

….. Radical change in Syria can be achieved only with the help of the Alawis themselves. Excluding a full-fledged mass uprising or a foreign invasion, Alawi rule can be terminated only if it is approved by Alawi Syrians or if they stand aside.

Why don’t Alawi Syrians terminate Assad’s rule?

It is no exaggeration to say that many Alawis are not happy, to say the least, with the present regime. The reasons that are usually given for this discontent are the following:

    1. Many Alawis live in poverty, such as those eking out an existence in the slums surrounding Damascus or the poor villages scattered about the coastal area, where unemployment and underemployment is so high.
    2. Political imprisonment awaits Alawis who dare to challenge the regime, such as befell the followers of Salah Jdeed and the Communist Workers Party in the past or Aaref Dalilah today.

        There are also other important reasons that are rarely spoken of:

        1. Most of us have not lived the unjust circumstances that our fathers and grand-fathers were subjected to by the Sunnis. Thus, we do not have the same appreciation for the Alawi rule that the late president Hafiz Assad brought.
        2. Hafiz made huge improvements to our rural areas after centuries of utter neglect by successive Syrian governments, whether Ottoman or Syrian. (A negligence that the Assad regime is sadly repeating in the Jazeera and the north-eastern parts of Syria). However, these improvements, made by the Baath during its early days, have long since come to a halt. Actually, the condition of Alawis has been sliding backwards and not forwards for more than a generation.

          In our fathers’ youth, cities at the foot of the Coastal Mountains, such as Tartous, Banias, Jabla, Latakia, were transformed from purely Sunni communities with some Christian inhabitants to organized multi-sectarian modern cities (of course relatively speaking). During our generation these nice cities have become run down and dirty places due to corruption, bad-planning, and patronage. We have watched them become a playground for the cowboys of the present generation, the Assad clan in Kurdaha, sometimes called the Shabbiha.

          3. Our fathers’ support for Hafiz al-Assad was driven largely by their resentment against the wealthy bourgeoisie of Syria. The Baath Party claimed to oppose this wealthy class which seemed to monopolize trade and land. Most Syrians believed that they had acquired their advantages and wealth through nefarious and often violent means under the Ottomans. The Baathist movement won much of its legitimacy among the rural poor because it claimed to stand up for the little guy against the feudalists. The followers of Rifa`at al-Assad used to recount to us in the seventies how they admired him because he would pick up a dirty, used tuna can from the floor and drink tea from it.

          Not any more. I wonder what those people would say about him now that he eats his foie gras with golden utensils in his multi-million dollar villas in France and Spain? An earlier generation of Alawis honestly admired the Alawis who took power.  I still have not met a single person who has the slightest admiration for Rami Makhlouf or Asaf Shawkat, for example. Unfortunately, in our day, the Alawi rulers and their children are becoming the epitome of the bourgeoisie that we were taught to despise.

          4. It is a fact that Alawis still control the important positions in the security systems in Syria. However, it is also a fact that this control serves only a small circle at the top of the pyramid and is becoming less and less beneficial or responsive to the poor members at the base.

          5. Seeing that most of the leading members of the Assad regime have made full-fledged alliances with Sunni families. Many have done this through marriage, such as the president himself or Muhammad Nassif’s daughters; others have done it through monopoly enterprises, such as Maher al-Assad, Bahjat Suleiman, Asaf Shawkat, and many others. The regime has lost its claim to representing the Alawi sect or to defending its rights. The claims that Hafiz and his generation have used to gain our fathers’ support and admiration are largely gone.

          6. The direction Syria is now heading in does not look good. The last thing Alawis want or need is to have a group of people leading Syria to catastrophe in their name, while they get so little advancement out of it.  All of Syria accuses the Alawi sect of being responsible for the lamentable state of affairs.

          So why then don’t Alawis do anything about the situation? Why are we silent? Why doesn’t an Alawi Army General carry out a coup?

          Reasons general to all Syrian citizens:

          1. The culture of fear has been deeply planted in every Syrian person regardless of their sect or race.

          2. We have been deeply conditioned to mistrust and be suspicious of everyone, making it extremely hard for any two Syrians to work together, not to mention organize in a group. To see how deep this problem has become, look at how much the Syrians in the Diaspora are fragmented even when they are away from the regime and its influence. No two Syrian expatriates are able to organize a cultural gathering, not to mention a political party. No sooner does a new party emerge than its members, who are from the same sect and race and background, start to split apart into uncountable factions.

          3. The external animosity of the United States paralyzes internal movements, organized to act against the regime, no matter how well intentioned they are. No one wants to risk a serious move against the regime while there is an enemy at the door. The United States has not shown any signs that it is interested in improving Syria’s internal situation or helping Syria. What the U.S. is asking for clearly and loudly are changes in external policies, period. Most of those policies are not attractive to the Syrian opposition. The regime is popular on most of these issues, such as the occupation of Palestine, the Golan, or Iraq.

          A coup-d’etat at this moment risks being labeled “made in America” even if it does not have the slightest connection to America.

          The present sentiment in the Syrian street is anti-American. This means that any opposition that seeks support from the Syrian street will be anti-American and will be spurned by the West, as happened with Hamas. Any opposition that seeks external support will lose the street, as is the case with Khaddam. We are in a tricky situation; the regime understands this well and has exploited with skill.

          4. The organization of the Army and security forces was masterminded by the late president Hafiz Assad to prevent coups similar to those that rocked Syria during the three decades after Syrian independence. The Syrian forces capable of carry out a coup-d’etat – the Army, Special Forces, Police Force, and Security Apparatuses – are all burdened with a complex command structure, purposefully designed to frustrate plotters.

          Lateral communication is absolutely forbidden between units; all communications between units must travel through a cumbersome vee, first ascending up the command structure to the top level of one unit before descending down again through the ranks of the other unit. Most importantly, the many units and departments have an interlocking command structure so that no entity is autonomous. They cannot act without several other departments knowing about it. For example, any air force unit is under the influence of aerial-security (Mukhabarat Jawiyyah), army-security (Mukhabarat Askariyyah), the morale-guidance headquarters (Idarat el Tawjih al-manawi), military police, air force headquarters, army general headquarters, the Republican Guards, and the Palace. Officers with loyalties to theses various branches of security are sprinkled liberally throughout the security forces. This command structure makes the military practically useless against foreign enemies but extremely effective at guaranteeing internal stability. Any attempt to rebel is quickly thwarted by the stultifying array of conflicting loyaltiesand can be dealt with on the spot.

          5. Most Syrians, as unhappy as they are with the present regime, see no point in changing the regime without a solid alternative. The opposition has yet to present a clear vision for the future that would inspire people to risk the few joys of Syrian life that they have, security being at the top of the list. Vague and generalized talk about democracy and a better life are the only promises made by present regime-change advocates. They aren’t reassuring.

          6. We have to admit that corruption has insinuated itself deep into the souls of almost every Syrian. It is highly questionable that any form of regime-change is going to achieve real economic or social change, without being preceded by a long process of grass roots reform and cultural revival.

          We do have a corrupt leadership, but even an honest leadership would find it impossible to overcome the pervasive culture of bribery, disrespect for hard work, and indifference to public interest that is shared by state, and indeed, private sector employees. Most Syrians’ sense of virtue has become so crooked that fooling a customer is defined as cleverness, “shatara.”

          Can change really be enforced from the top down? The regime changers avoid this thorny question, but it must be aired and debated. Are we willing to act, think, and work differently when the regime is changed?

          Reasons specific to Alawi Syrian citizens:

          The main reason that prevents Alawis from being active in supporting any regime change plans is their fear of the “other.” Those who propose regime change without explaining to us what the end of Alawi rule will mean for thousands of ordinary Alawis will get no where.

          There are two sorts of “others” in Syria:
          a. First are the Sunni religious and Kurdish opposition leaders who say bluntly and clearly: “We want to end the Alawi rule”.

          b. Second is everyone else, who says shyly and elliptically: “The monopoly over top army and security posts by one sect should end.”

          Not a single Syrian intellectual, political leader, or plain good-will writer, has ever dealt with the following fundamental question:

          What exactly are your plans for the Alawis after we give up power?

          Why do answers to this question have to be vague and general? What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work in the army and other security apparatuses? What are your plans for the republican guard and the special forces that are staffed primarily by Alawis? Are you going to pay them pensions if you decide to disband their forces? Or will they be fired and dumped on the streets, humiliated, and ostracized as were the Sunnis and Baathists of Iraq were following the American invasion? Do you have any idea of the impact on security such dismissals would engender? Will you be satisfied with a scenario by which these forces remain in their positions in exchange for their giving up political power?

          What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work as government employees in many non-functional establishments? Are you going to close these establishments? Do you have any idea of the social impact of such closures? Are you going to stop improvement projects in the coastal area as all past Sunni governments have done since independence?

          Are you going to reverse confiscation laws to return land taken from Sunni landlords and distributed among tens of thousands of farmers?

          Are you going to demand that security officials stand trial for their actions during the last 35 years? What is the highest rank that you are going to hold responsible? Are you going to ask for trials for past deeds? How about the present leading elite? Who exactly are the people you want to hold responsible? And If you do bring them to trial, are you going to hold the Sunni elite to the same standard? Will Sunni families who have benefited from the regime through monopolies and sweet-heart deals, such as the Nahhas family in Damascus and the Jood family in Latakia, be treated as Alawis are?

          These questions should be answered not only by opposition intellectuals, but also by every non-Alawi Syrian. What do you want to do with us if we give you back political power? Are you really willing to live side by side with us, to cherish Syria’s diversity, and consider the past 40 years merely another failed episode in our long history of failed revolutions.

          A change for the better must include all sectors of Syrian society, including Alawi Syrians. Because Alawis control all the main security forces of the state, regime change will not happen without assuring them that they too will have a place in Syria’s new future. Without such assurances, there will be no Alawi Musharif, nor will any other army General carry out a coup d’etat that will bring anything other than chaos to Syria.

          Syrians refuse to speak openly and honestly about our most important challenges; so much is kept in the dark. But this is no time for “shatara” or dissembling. We must confront and discuss religious and communal issues directly and honestly. If Sunnis really want regime change, then they have to address the Alawi issue head on. Unless the answers to these questions are cleared up by all concerned, Alawis, no matter how dissatisfied and disappointed with the present leadership, will not entertain the idea of regime change; they will not relinquish the ramparts of power.

          Comments (210)

          Pages: « 1 2 3 4 [5] Show All

          201. John Smith (actually Aboud) said:

          @196 Jad is upset his generic-name-fake-westerner post went unnoticed. Here, I can play the same game.

          POST BY John Edward Jones Smith, the third.

          Sitting here from my vantage point in North Virginia, I’d like to put forward my professional and totally unbiased opinions;

          1- I must humbly say that Bashar is the most brilliant leader in the history of history, and all the protestors are a bunch of ingrates for not appreciating how much of a great leader he is. MENHIBAAAAAK!!!!!!

          2- Syria’s enemies will be crushed like rats; all of them. The Zionists, the Turks, the Salafis, Harriri, Bandar, Qatar, the USA, Europe. Doesn’t matter the great Assad family never managed to liberate the Golan, that was just a cunning plan to lull our enemies into a false sense of superiority. It worked, no one thinks the Syrian armed forces are worth crap.

          3- Bashar will defeat the evil plot to turn Syria into an Islamic fundamentalist country, with the help of those two stalwart Islamic fundamentalists, Hizbollah and Iran.

          4- Bashar isn’t hiding from view, he’s playing hard to get.

          Therefore, just like my fellow Baathists-living-in-the-west on this forum, I think that western style democracy and free societies are a scam, and such societies should be condemned to the lowest levels of hell. Now, excuse me while I go pick up my unemployment cheque.

          Thumb up 1 Thumb down 1

          June 19th, 2011, 6:14 pm


          202. N.Z. said:

          Those who call their country Syria, are Syrians. But those who call their country Souria alassad are the opportunist , brain washed, fictious Syrians. They are the ones who condone a family at the expense of a nation. They are the ones who are choosing to turn a blind eye on torturers and killers.

          Thumb up 1 Thumb down 0

          June 19th, 2011, 6:19 pm


          203. vlad-the-syrian said:



          a complementary 20th point of my own :

          due to the wisdom of the syrian direction and the syrian people :

          the bloodbath has been avoided. It could have been much worse. I think that the direction and the people have done their best to act wiseley and curb the violence.

          Of course the pro-zombies will disagree.

          May God protect Syria (although i’m anti-monotheist)

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          June 19th, 2011, 6:26 pm


          204. jad said:

          Regarding the refugee, I think If someone had an issue with the regime (being related to an armed person), unemployed, eating three meals a day for free with his family and friends, getting free and plenty of hot water, play grounds for his kids and feeling safe he will stay there until the end of the summer vacation especially when he knows that things are not settle back in Syria.
          I don’t expect the refugee to get back home until the end of the summer unless Turkey decided to force them back.

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          June 19th, 2011, 6:36 pm


          205. Syrian Commando said:

          You can’t spell Erdogan without using dog:


          They want to cut the water? LOL. Such a brazen act will at will put pressure on Assad indeed — to attack Turkey with missiles. It’s going to be a lot more than a casus belli, we’ll start the war ourselves.

          They want to invade? Again, this will put pressure to counter attack and attack with missiles. Due to mutual-defense pacts, this will trigger off a wider and wider conflict. I am convinced this is the the strategy Turkey has been ordered to do within the coming weeks. It will prove to be fatal to the region, and if my information is correct, the world.

          Don’t forget, we’ve used to have just as man long-range launchers targeting Turkey as we had Israel. These are being redistributed as we speak along with a reconfiguration of the air defense system. We were planning to attack their dam but backed off upon advise not to. Now in this circumstance, with the majority of people backing the government and a foreign government “intervening” — this will absolutely kill the “revolution”. The figure will change from >95% to 98%, i.e. all but the die hard MB retards.

          In the scheme of creating internal conflict, a Turkish intervention would be CURRENTLY counter-productive. So they’re backing off for now, but they have their eye on our land in the North. They’re vastly underestimating what we’re capable of. We can end Turkey forever if our existence came under threat.

          The militant Kurds are always known to back the wrong horse, it’s a shame they’ll never get to see their aspirations now. As the picture becomes clear, they will see their assumptions were all incorrect.

          If Israel is smart, it will back off and not provoke Lebanon as not to be a party to the conflict just yet. Israel has the most to gain out of wider war as long as it doesn’t get involved. That said, the leadership is absolutely retarded so no doubt they’ll get arrogant and think they can gain something by attacking.

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          June 19th, 2011, 6:59 pm


          206. jad said:

          أنقرة نصحت أكراد العراق بإقناع أكراد سوريا بالتهدئة
          أردوغان ودمشق: هل لعب بالأوراق الملعونة أم لا؟

          خليل حرب
          اسطنبول :
          للحديث مع الصحافيين والمحللين نكهته الخاصة. يبوح هؤلاء بما لا يقوله عادة السياسيون او المسؤولون في حكومة. واذا كان الحديث يتناول سوريا، والحكومة هي تركية، يصير الكلام أكثر تشويقا.
          لا يقول لك السياسي التركي مثلا ما يشفي رغبة المعرفة بخلفيات التركيبة الديموغرافية لمحاولة تفسير سياسة رجب طيب اردوغان من الاحداث الجارية في سوريا.
          ولا يكشف لك السياسي التركي عن موقف انقرة من اكراد سوريا ولا هواجسها المذهبية مما يجري، ولا يفضل التطرق الى احتمال تأثير الجذور الاسلامية لحزب العدالة والتنمية على النظرة الى دمشق، ولا عن موقف انقرة من مسألة دعم او تسليح معارضين سوريين.
          يأتي الصحافي جانكيز تشاندار، المحلل في صحيفة «راديكال»، للقاء مرتب على عجل بالقرب من «شارع تقسيم» في اسطنبول. في مقهي يطل على احد اشهر مناطق اسطنبول، يقترب منك بهدوء ويتعرف عليك، وانت الغريب عنه، وسط ضجيج رواد المقهى المكتظ. تلمع عيناه ذكاء عندما يتأكد انه تعرف عليك من دون معرفة مسبقة، ويعاجلك بالسؤال: من اين من لبنان؟ ويتبعه بسؤال اكثر تفصيلا عن القرية التي أنت منها. صديق الشيخ راغب حرب، قال مزهوا بنفسه وبعلاقاته اللبنانية. ثم يعدد اسماء القرى التي زارها في لبنان.
          قريب هو من اوساط القرار في تركيا. ولهذا فانه مهما اخرج من جعبته من معلومات، يظل بمظهر البخيل.. واذا ما اعطى معلومة، حرص على الا يسترسل فيها، ويقدمها بإيجاز حنكة المتمرس… اقله حتى لا يساء فهمها.
          «اردوغان لا يلعب اللعبة السنية في سوريا»، يقول مشددا على رفض فكرة الخلفيات المذهبية لمواقف اردوغان من الاحداث السورية، واحتمال تلاعبه على استقطاب شرائح اسلامية اكثر تشددا، لتصوت له في الانتخابات البرلمانية التي جرت قبل اسبوع.
          يقول تشاندار «تركيا لم تمزق ورقة بشار الاسد اصلا». ويتابع «هذا (اردوغان) رجل حساس ازاء المسائل المذهبية.. هل تذكر عندما زار العراق قبل شهور قليلة، حرص على الذهاب الى مقام الامام الكاظم اولا قبل الذهاب الى مرقد الامام ابو حنيفة، بالاضافة الى مقام الامام علي… وكانت رسالته التي ابلغها الى السيد علي السيستاني بأنه يجب الا نسمح بانقسام المسلمين دينيا حتى لا يتلاعب بنا الغرب».
          «مواقفه لا يمكن ان تكون مذهبية»، يجزم تشاندار، لكنه يقر بان وجود العلويين في تركيا، ربما جعل اردوغان يأخذ هذا الامر بالاعتبار خلال خوضه الحملة الانتخابية، لكن ان يلعب الورقة السنية، فهو ما لا يتصوره هذا الصحافي التركي المخضرم. لكنه لا يجد مناصا من الاقرار بأن «هذا بلد سني بغالبيته، وهذا زعيم يتمتع بالشعبية ومواقفه نابعة من الناس او معبرة عنهم، ولا يمكنه تجاهل المشاهد في سوريا… الاتراك استرجعوا من ذاكرتهم مشاهد حماه!».
          ويستدرك تشاندار، عندما يقول ان الانتخابات اثرت بالتأكيد على موقف اردوغان السوري، لكنه يقول انها ليست كافية وحدها لتفسير المواقف التي اتخذتها أنقرة.
          العامل الانتخابي تأثيره «جزئي» على مواقف اردوغان، كما يقول الصحافي مصطفى اوزجان، المحلل في صحيفة «ملي غزته» التابعة لحزب السعادة الاسلامي الذي خرج حزب العدالة والتنمية من رحمه.
          لكن اوزجان يسترسل في هذه «الجزئية» قائلا ان الناخبين العرب الاتراك، يؤيدون عموما الاحزاب الاسلامية وحتى القومية، لان علاقتهم بالاكراد يشوبها التنافس، خصوصا في مناطق جنوب تركيا على الرغم من وجود حالات اختلاط اجتماعي كبير بينهم.
          يستعيد أوزجان المبادرة التي اطلقها اردوغان قبل عامين للانفتاح على الاكراد والتي انتهت بفشل بحسب رأيه حيث صعد الاكراد من مطالبهم من السلطة في انقرة وزادت حدة انتقاداتهم له، ما جعله يصعد لهجته تجاههم وهو ما لم يساعده في كسب الولاء الكردي قبل الانتخابات، وصار تركيزه منصبا على كسب الشرائح الانتخابية الاخرى.
          يستدل أوزجان على ذلك بالتذكير بالهجمات التي شنها اردوغان على حزب السلام والديموقراطية الكردي واتهامه له بان مواقفه من الخلافات الدينية في مناطق الاكراد، لا علاقة لها بالاسلام، كانت محاولة منه لاستفزاز الشارع الكردي، الذي هو عموما محافظ ومتدين، ضد حزب السلام والديموقراطية.
          وبالاجمال، هناك اكثر من مليوني ناخب عربي الاصل، يشعرون بالانتماء الى تركيا اكثر من الاكراد، كما يشير اوزجان، ومن مصلحة اردوغان استقطابهم كشريحة ناخبة له.
          والانقسام ايضا قائم بين صحافيي تركيا حول الاحداث السورية. بعضهم من اليسار والبعض الاخر من اليمين، متعاطفون مع القيادة السورية، ويؤمنون بوجود مخطط اميركي لاضعاف دمشق، ويحذرون من تداعيات ذلك على تركيا نفسها.
          يشير أوزجان الى انقسام بين اسلاميي تركيا ايضا حول سوريا، مضيفا ان هناك اسلاميين متأثرون بالخط الايراني وموقف طهران مما يجري في سوريا، وهم يشكلون شريحة كبيرة، وتؤيد القيادة السورية.
          «تركيا اللاعب الاول بعد ايران في سوريا، لكن البعد المتعلق بالقرب الجغرافي، يجعلها اللاعب الاول.. تركيا نقطة ارتكاز ازاء ما يحصل وما سيحصل مستقبلا، وهدفها تحقيق توازن اقليمي»، يقول أوزجان موضحا ان «تركيا تحاول ان تستوعب ايران في اطار سياسة رفض المحاور التي توتر المنطقة ولا تخدم الرفاهية الاقتصادية، وهي اولوية تركية».
          يستحضر تشاندار الجانب الايراني مجددا، ويقول «هناك نموذجان امام العرب ليختارا بينهما: ايران وتركيا». ويضيف «كحكومة تتمتع بالشعبية، كان على حكومة اردوغان ان تتحرك ازاء ما يحصل في سوريا، اقله من اجل مصداقيتها كبلد يقدم من جانب العالم، على انه نموذج».
          يكشف تشاندار ان الحكومة التركية هي التي نصحت القيادة الكردية في مدينة اربيل العراقية، باقناع الاكراد في سوريا بعدم النزول الى الشوارع للتظاهر.
          تتلاقى معلومات تشاندار مع معلومات اخرى من مصادر دبلوماسية مطلعة، بأن القيادة الايرانية ارسلت رسائل مشابهة الى القيادات الكردية في اقليم كردستان العراقي، تنصحهم فيها بالتواصل مع القيادات الكردية في سوريا، لاقناعهم بعدم التحرك ضد دمشق.
          واذا كانت طهران حريصة على استقرار الوضع السوري، فان لتركيا هواجس مشابهة، حيث يقول تشاندار ان أنقرة كانت قلقة من ان تحرك اكراد سوريا قد يولد صراعا عربيا ـ كرديا في سوريا، وبالتالي يؤجج الصراع الكردي المسلح داخل تركيا نفسها.
          ويعتبر المحلل التركي ان خيار القيادات الكردية بالهدوء يعكس احساسا بالمسؤولية، فالاكراد يفضلون الآن تجنب المخاطرة، وان يكونوا في «الجانب الآمن»، لا مع الخاسر ولا مع الرابح في ما يجري في سوريا وتداعياته الاقليمية المحتملة.
          حول التقارير التي تشير الى وصول اسلحة الى مسلحين سوريين في منطقة جسر الشغور الحدودية، يقول تشاندار «هذه ليست لعبة تركية… انقرة لا تمد اطرافا بالسلاح من اراضيها.. هذه يمكن ان تكون لعبة سعودية او عراقية لكنها ليست تركية.. تركيا يمكن ان تمارس ألعابا كهذه في قضايا مثل نزاع ارمينيا ـ اذربيجان او قبرص، لكن ليس مع سوريا».
          الحرب الخارجية مستبعدة
          أما جوست ليجينديك، وهو مستشار لمركز اسطنبول للسياسات، وعضو سابق في البرلمان الاوروبي، ومتخصص في الشؤون التركية، فلا يعتبر ان السياسة السورية لاردوغان، استندت على «انتهازية انتخابية»، مذكرا بأن رئيس الوزراء التركي حث الاسد مرارا على وقف استخدام العنف وبدء الاصلاحات، مشيرا الى ان «الاستياء الكبير في انقرة، مرده ان الاسد لم يستمع الى النصيحة التركية».
          وتوقع ليجينديك ان انقرة ستتابع عن كثب الخطوات والسياسات التي تتداولها الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الاوروبي بما في ذلك اقتراحات العقوبات المحتملة، لكنه استبعد لجوء الولايات المتحدة او الاتحاد الاوروبي الى القوة ضد دمشق، مؤكدا ان «التدخل في ليبيا، يستهلك كل الطاقة والاهتمام للدول الاعضاء في الاتحاد الاوروبي، بينما تراجع الدور الاميركي هناك».
          وخلص الخبير الاوروبي الى القول ان «التحدي الحقيقي للحكومة التركية الجديدة، هو كيفية تعديل سياستها الاقليمية، آخذة بالاعتبار ان الشعارات الجميلة والتحليل الاكاديمي الجيد، لا تكفي وحدها».
          اختبرت العلاقات التركية ـ السورية المرحلة الاكثر سخونة منذ تهديدات المواجهة العسكرية في اواخر تسعينات القرن الماضي. قبل اسبوع، انتهت الانتخابات البرلمانية الى ما انتهت اليه. الشأن السياسي عاد ليكون هما داخليا لاردوغان وحزبه، اما الشأن السوري، فسيختبر مرحلة جديدة اليوم، بعد خطاب الاسد، والذي يبدو ان الاتراك يتوقعون ان يكون مفصليا في تحديد مسارات الامور، لا يقتصر على الشأن السوري وحده، وانما كما يقر كثيرون الان، بعد هدوء المعارك الانتخابية التركية، على صميم الشؤون الداخلية لتركيا نفسها.
          واذا صدق المحللون، فان الرؤوس الحامية في انقرة، اذا كان الخطاب الرئاسي السوري على قدر التحديات، ستهدأ قليلا، ومؤشرات الفتنة الملعونة، في تصريحات وهمسات المسؤولين، ستبقى مجرد لعبة مورست، لبرهة، وستظل نائمة.


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          June 19th, 2011, 7:15 pm


          207. 5 dancing shlomos said:

          28. 873 said:

          “The khazars need return back where they came from…”

          hell doesnt want them back.

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          June 20th, 2011, 12:04 pm


          208. Husam said:

          As a syrian I hope for democracy but I am afraid. I am Alawi and I do not know what a new regime will bring to us. How do they guarantee that allwis will not be killed and they will have the same rights as other. historically we suffered a lot.
          also most christian are with the “silent opposition” some consider them on our side. not true. only a few opporunistics.

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          June 20th, 2011, 1:22 pm


          209. Akbar Palace said:

          Dear 5 dancing ahmads,

          The “khazars” aren’t killing Arabs, it is your unelected despots.

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          June 23rd, 2011, 1:01 pm


          210. Wael Tlass said:

          Why should Alawis be afraid of a Sunni majority Government democratically elected ? We will guarantee reserved seats in Parliament for all religious and ethnic minorities. ‘Alawi military officers can continue in their present posts, but those who have reached long past retirement age but yet are on “extension” will have to be retired.

          Alas, but those low-ranking soldiers and Mukhabarat officials, whether Alawis or Sunnis or Shi’is or Christians, will have to answer for their cruel deeds in the past 4 months. Cases of torture, rape, unjustified killing by individual soldiers will have to be punished. It is a fact that many killngs and beatings were not orderd by the high copmmand, but committed out of individual sectarian hatred and fear. And Republican Guard and 4th Division cannot be disbanded, but there should be lateral-entry program so that Sunni officers and soldiers from other units and regimets can enter these elite forces.

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          July 9th, 2011, 12:00 pm


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