"The Syrian Opposition Gather in the US," by Joe Pace

Joe Pace attended the meeting of the Syrian Opposition across the Potomac in Northern Virginia at the Crystal City Marriott this weekend. It was organized by the Syrian National Council in the US, in cooperation with the Ahrar Movement and the Syrian National Council in Canada. I believe Joe was the only non-Syrian American to attend. He wrote this exclusive report for "Syria Comment." Thank you Joe, our intrepid man on the spot.

"Syria Opposition Meeting In Washington DC, January 29-30"
By Joe Pace
For "Syria Comment"
January 31, 2006

The conference, organized by the Syrian National Council and the Syrian Democratic Assembly of Canada, kicked off Saturday morning with speeches from prominent opposition figures who couldn’t attend, including Haythem al-Maleh (founder of the Human Rights Association of Syria), Najati Tayar (one of the founders of the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society) and Kamal al-Labwani (head of the Liberal Democratic Union who was arrested after returning from DC in November).

The conversation topics were human and women’s rights in Syria; coordination between the internal and external opposition for democratic change; strengthening dialogue with other Arab nations.

The most important moment came on the second day when the five recently release Damascus Spring prisoners and Suhar al-Attasi (head of the al-Attasi forum) made a conference call from Syria to address the Washington attendees. Former MP Riad Seif said referring to Syrian expatriates, “those outside of Syria are part of the Syrian people and there must be as much cooperation between us as possible.” Another former MP Mamum al-Homsi said “we need you to build Syria and to save the country.” The endorsement of coordination with expatriate groups by such prominent voices is going to weaken the contingent of the Syrian opposition that opposes any assistance from the West. An oft-repeated message throughout the conference was that expatriates need to make use of their proximity to elected officials and lobby for their respective governments to support human rights.

By most accounts, the conference was a success. The internal opposition figures came largely to scout out the opposition-in-exile since many activists in Syria remain skeptical about its agenda. I witnessed a pleasant surprise among all of them; one remarked that the most conservative Muslims at the conference were more enlightened and committed to democracy than many moderate Muslims in Syria. Others said that this meeting enhanced their faith in the Syrian opposition in North American and that they were convinced that further cooperation was crucial to pushing reform in Syria.

Six people from Syria participated: Samir Nashar who heads a liberal party in Aleppo; Jihad Masuti who is on the administrative committee for the Jamal al-Atassi forum; George Katan…..; Amar Qurabi who is the press spokesman for the Arab Organization for Human Rights; and Baheya Maradini who is a correspondent from al-Elaph (the website which is blocked in Syria because its main beat is the opposition). None of them wore fake nametags as reportedly happened at the Paris conference and none shied away from the cameras.

Opposition gatherings have a reputation of being hijacked by petty disagreements, clashing egos, and recriminations, but several participants expressed their pleasure at the cordiality and productiveness of this conference. “When I was in Germany for a meeting of intellectuals, nothing got accomplished because we couldn’t even bring people to sit down at the same table and talk to one another,” said one participant from Syria.

In fact, the only mudslinging came from a non-participant, Farid Ghadry, the president of the Reform Party of Syria who split off from the Syrian National Council last September, accusing the executive committee of being “Islamists loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood.” According to a story by the New York Sun, he impugned the Council’s credibility by pointing out that the father of one of its members, Husam ad-Dairi, was a Ba’thist and ambassador under Saddam Hussein. He also accused Husam of associating with Saddam’s two sons during his youth.

I had the following conversation with Husam ad-Dairi to clear up the accusations. (I requested an interview from Farid, but he declined.

Husam: Ghadry did not split off from the group because we are Baathists or Islamists. He split off because he was not willing to be part of the group; he only wanted to be a leader. He wanted to start a Syrian government in exile with 19 people in Washington DC. Who does that represent? So we opposed it. We said that we would not accept any attacks on religion. Many of us want a separation of religion and politics, but the Syrian National Council is a neutral assembly—it’s supposed to be a gathering of groups where everyone can discuss their viewpoint. We will not attack another opposition group, even if it has a religious orientation. It’s funny though that he should accuse us of being Islamists. I, for example, represent a liberal, democratic part.

Pace: What was your father’s relationship with the Iraqi Ba’ath party and your relationship with Saddam’s sons?

Husam: I left Iraq for the last time in 1988. For the last year and a half, I was not aloud to exist in the same vicinity as the sons because I had a personal conflict with Udday Hussein. This was an order by Saddam Hussein himself. As for my father, he was the Ambassador to Switzerland and he resigned in 1991 because he opposed the invasion of Kuwait. He never returned to Iraq.

Abdu ad-Dairi’s [the father] history is an open book. He stood against the Ba’ath party as it was under Saddam. If we want to talk about fathers, how about we open the book on Farid’s father? I’d like an open conversation about that. [he is referring to the fact that Farid’s father still has connections with the Syrian regime]

Of course, Mr. Ghadry, who heads the Reform Party of Syria is no novice at mudslinging. According to Riad at-Turk, Mr. Ghadry tried to secure his support but Riad refused. A month after an interview was published in which Riad called Ghadry’s analysis of the opposition “nonsense” and said that he had “absolutely no support” in Syria, Ghadry published an op-ed in the Washington Times calling Riad—one of the most liberal, vocal advocates for democracy in Syria—a “Stalinist.”
[end]

On the opposition:
Ammar Abdul Hamid, who participated in the conference wrote this summary on "Amarji."

Concern Mounts on Syria As Opposition Gathers - January 27, 2006 - NY Newspaper... The conference, to be held this Saturday and Sunday across the Potomac in Northern Virginia at the Crystal City Marriott, will gather about 100 activists against the dictatorship of Bashar Assad, drawing opposition leaders from America, Canada, France, Germany, and inside Syria. According to organizers, the summit - sponsored by an umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council - is meant to address, among its principal topics: cooperating with the West in order to bring about a peaceful democratic transition; highlighting and ending the human rights abuses of the Assad regime, and prompting the various parties of opposition operating in exile to "get together and get to know each other."

In phone interviews yesterday, Messrs. Aljbaili and Ghadry expressed concern and disappointment about their non-participation and the divide in the reform movement, tracing it to their opposition to a Baathist or Islamist Syria.

See this interview with Riad Said.: An Nahar Exclusive: Interview with released former Syrian MP Riad Saif (An Nahar) -1/2006. It has been translated, and is one of the three free translated articles offered by MidEastwire.com each day. This is an important new service. Check it out.

Why Lebanon Should Repair Relations with Syria

“Why Lebanon should accept Saudi mediation to end its cabinet crisis and repair relations with Syria”
By Joshua Landis
January 28, 2006

Many in Lebanon found my last post: “Hariri in US: What will he Get?" objectionable. Kais, who writes at “From Beirut to the Beltway,” said this:

I found Joshua Landis's commentary on Saad Hariri's visit to the US rather insulting. Joshua continues to interpret events through the Syrian regime's prism, which is unfortunate. This particular piece contained many presumptions and factual errors.

According to Landis, "Hariri wants to go back to Beirut. He will need Bush's help to do it, unless he is to accept the Jeddah formula and make peace with Bashar al-Asad and Hizbullah, which seems to be off the table for now. Junblat undercut that move quickly, but it looked as if Saad Hariri was ready to sign onto the Saudi deal and bow to Hizbullah."

Of course Joshua is conflating two separate things: the Saudi proposal to end the "crisis" between Lebanon and Syria and the Jeddah agreement to settle the cabinet crisis, which has to do with Hizbullah's status in the country. Saad may have backed out on the second after giving what could best be described as a conditional approval, but he never agreed to the Saudi proposal, which would have given Syria control of Lebanon all over again.

I appreciate Kais’ refusal to see the Jeddah agreement to settle the cabinet crisis in Lebanon and the Saudi attempt to broker a modus vivendi between Syria and Lebanon as being of a piece; nevertheless, I believe that the two are intimately related; one cannot be achieved without the other. Clearly Saudi Arabia sees them as two cars pulled by the same engine, meant to pull us out of the Lebanon crisis. Hizbullah does as well. So, undoubtedly, does Hariri.

To make peace with Hizbullah means accepting two conditions. First, Hizbullah demands that its "resistance" to Israel and its military status be recognized by the Lebanese government as legitimate national policy. Second, it “rejects agitation in Lebanon for any war against Syria,” referring to calls for regime change in Damascus.

These demands are also Syrian demands for they would have the result of undercutting UN resolutions 1559 and 1663, which target Syria. Resolution 1559 targets Syria, despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, because it calls for the disarming of Hizbullah (see Bolton's most recent demand that “Syria disarm Hizbullah” in compliance with 1559). 1663 targets Syria because it demands compliance with the Hariri murder investigation under threat of economic or military punishment. Hizbullah withdrew its members from the government in protest over Siniora’s demand to broaden 1663 to include all the recent assassinations as well as to establish an international court to convict the guilty. In order to end the cabinet crises and get Hizbullah to return its ministers, the March 14 alliance and Hariri are being asked to go easy on Syria. Syria’s main foreign policy goal is to get out from under these two UN resolutions, which could result in further economic or military harm to it.

It will be very difficult for Hariri to end the present cabinet crisis without consenting to these two Hizb demands (and also Syrian demands), both of which will put him at odds with the US, with his own followers, and with his conscience. I fully appreciate the difficult spot he is in.

I also do not believe that General Aoun is pro-Syria in the sense that he welcomes Syrian occupation. We all know of his long, and yes, honorable stand for Lebanese independence. On the other hand, his actions make it clear that he distinguishes between independence and accommodating Syrian interests. Now that Syrian troops are out of the country, he is looking for an accommodation. This is aided by his desire to become President, for which Shiite votes are crucial, being that he does not have the backing of either the Future Current or the US. In this sense, Aoun is seen to have become pro-Syrian by American authorities because he is proposing a "temporary" accommodation with Hizb, which puts him at odds with both Hariri’s and US policy. Syria appreciates Aoun’s position; the US does not. Hariri is the odd man out in this combination, hence the pressure on Hariri to come to an accommodation with Hizb and thereby push Aoun aside. Both Aoun and Hariri need to woo Hizb, Syria's ally, which brings us back to the connection between Saudi's two related attempts to patch up a truce between Hariri and Hizb and Hariri and Syria. Saudi wants its Lebanese ally, Hariri, to win by going back to Lebanon and dominating politics there. It wants Lebanon to prosper. We should not forget that Saudi Arabia is the country that will be footing the bill for Lebanon’s debt renegotiation and not the US.

Syria will not let Hariri return to Lebanon and dominate politics there unless Hariri separates himself from the two UN resolutions which target Syria.

Here we get back to Saad Hariri's dilemma. He has two choices. He can go back to Beirut if Asad is overthrown or placed in prison, or he can go back to Beirut if he accommodates Syrian and Hizb demands. In the first instance, he will have complete justice for his father's murder, in the second, he will not.

Now we must consider the likelihood of both outcomes. Will Resolution 1663 and the UN investigation of his father's murder result in Asad's downfall or imprisonment, which would be 100 percent justice? The probability is very small. Moreover, it is not clear that Washington is actually interested in Asad's downfall or imprisonment. Most analysts suggest Washington hopes only to weakening Asad, which - let us say - is equivalent to 70 percent justice. (By weakening, we would have to mean ensuring that Syria was not strong enough to threaten Saad on his return to Beirut and could not prevent the disarming of Hizbullah - both highly unlikely outcomes.)

What do the Saudis offer Hariri if he patches up relations with Hizb on the one hand and Syria on the other? They are offering him 50 percent justice. The UN investigation will go forward and continue to isolate, embarrass, and discomfort Syria, but President Asad will not be asked to testify and presumably he and his family members will avoid conviction, and Syria will avoid UN sanctions. This is what most Middle East states seem to be pushing for and what is most likely to be the outcome of the investigation. Let us suppose that Syrian security chieftains, such as Ghazale and Juma Juma, will be convicted. Hizbullah will also be allowed to keep its arms into the immediate future, and Hariri will have to write off the remaining articles of Resolution 1559. He will also have to soften his demand for an international court even though Western leaders believe, Mehlis has stated, and most Lebanese aver that Asad ordered his father’s death.

This may seem like scant justice to many Lebanese for Rafiq Bey’s murder, and they will argue that it is not equivalent to 50 percent justice. But we should also take into account that Rafiq was killed because he supported resolution 1559, which called for the complete withdrawal of Syrian troops and the disarming of Hizbullah and an end to resistance against Israel. Syrian troops are out of Lebanon and the country is no longer occupied, which is a lot. Rafiq’s death had a great deal to do with Syria’s withdrawal. It mobilized the Lebanese against Syria. Many see him as a martyr who gave his life for Lebanese independence, which in many respects he did. Syria paid a large price for Hariri’s death; it was not in vain.

Of course, some will argue that gaining independence from Syrian occupation is not sufficient. Why? Because Hizbullah remains armed, the resistance against Israel continues, and Syria retains residual influence over Lebanese politics through its Lebanese allies. Thus, Hariri’s goals were not fulfilled, they will argue.

The only response to this is that Hariri was never opposed to Syrian influence, as such; rather, he was opposed to Syria hindering Lebanon’s development and prosperity. That is why he worked closely with Syria during the 1980s, when Syria offered Lebanon a security umbrella and assisted its resurrection from civil war, and why he began to fall out with Syria during the 1990s, when Syria’s occupation became stifling.

It is clear where I am going with this argument, and we needn’t argue about percentages, no matter how distasteful they are in discussing justice. I don’t believe Lebanon will get 100% justice. I don’t believe it will get the 70% justice that some believe the US can deliver. I don’t think the US has a plan for getting Saad back to Beirut or for unseating Asad. I believe Bashar al-Asad is in a fairly strong position and will be ruling Syria for some time to come. One Lebanese said to me: “Washington is willing to fight Syria to the last Lebanese.” This is a glib summation, but it contains an element of truth. Some of the reasons the US is trying to weaken Asad have nothing to do with Lebanon or its present interests. The US did a tremendous favor to Lebanon by helping to push Syrian troops from its soil. It is not doing Lebanon a favor by pursuing the conflict with Syria ad-infinitum.

I think Saad Hariri should accept the 50% justice that Saudi Arabia believes it can attain. This will mean a big compromise on Hariri’s part, but it is one, I think, his father would have approved of. First, it will bring Saad back to Beirut where he is needed. Only the Sunnis can lead Lebanon now, but they must come to an accommodation with the Shiites. To do this, Saad must also find a way out of his war with Asad, which the Shiites insist he do. This will be the hardest part, but it can be done because Syria needs Hariri if it wants to get out from under the intense pressure of the UN, the threat of sanctions, and US cross hairs. Syria may have Hariri boxed out of Lebanon, but Hariri has Syria boxed out of world affairs. An accommodation does not have to be surrender. Syria will never control Lebanon as it did when its troops occupied the country. Hariri has bargaining power.

What is more, only Saad’s return and an end to the cabinet crisis will mean progress and prosperity for Lebanon, two things that Rafiq held higher than even his own welfare and safety. Those are the goals that Saad should be willing to sacrifice a hundred percent justice for. In the end, they are achievable and they are the ultimate recompense for his father’s death. The welfare of Lebanon is justice. That was Rafiq Bey’s goal and wish.

Some commentators have claimed that my suggestion that Saad Hariri compromise with Hizbullah and Syria is motivated either by a perverse love of Asad or hatred for Bush and American policy. It is neither. I do think that US policy is misguided because it is unrealizable. I believe that by pursuing confrontation and demanding 100% achievement of American goals, the US will attain much less, than the 50% it could get if it were willing to bend and compromise. Force is sometimes necessary. I don’t dispute that. But in this instance, it will fail.

By creating the sharp dichotomies between good and evil and by constantly relegating whole nations to catagories like the “axis of evil,” the United States has lost chances to reach accommodations that are acceptable. It has made perfection the enemy of the good. This was the case in Iraq with the disbanding of the army and demonization of Baathists. This uncompromising policy caused needless bloodshed and the likelihood of failure because it radicalized so many and created more enemies than America can defeat. Recent elections in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt have demonstrated that the extremists have multiplied, not decreased. American militancy has provoked greater extremism. In all likelihood, Washington and Tel Aviv are now making the decision to cut crucial subsidies and funding to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, which will starve Palestinian society further. This will make a mockery of democracy. It will incite more radicalism. It will strengthen support for Hizbullah and Damascus and make them more certain of their success.

Sometimes, it is better to accept half a loaf than to insist on a whole one. Unilateralism cannot always work. That is why I believe the deal Saudi Arabia and Egypt are trying to obtain for the Lebanese and Syria is worth pursuing. I think the Lebanese who shoot it down are being unrealistic. They will not topple Bashar or disarm Hizbullah by fiat. Setting such goals is to court failure. Saad Hariri, I think, understands this. His supporters need to give him the maneuvering room to make a deal, come home, and continue his father’s legacy and vindicate his death by fixing an independent Lebanon.

Hariri in US: What will he Get?

Here is a tough condemnation of Syria by Bill Frist, (copied below) the Senate majority leader. He wants more action from Europe to force Syrian influence from Lebanon.

Part of the reason for Frist’s tough words is that Saad Hariri has been in Washington to meet President Bush. Yesterday he spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington DC. I couldn't make his talk as I was speaking at the Middle East Institute in DC at the time and then at Georgetown University with many other Syrianists, in what turned out to be an interesting series of panels organized by Michael Hudson and the Arab Studies Center.

One reporter told me that Hariri had asked George Bush for weapons and equipment to build up the Lebanese military. (A Daily Star article says he may get it.) Hariri spoke about Democracy and how important it was for Washington to support him and the Future Movement if it hoped to make any progress with its Reform of the Greater Middle East project. Hariri wants to go back to Beirut. He will need Bush's help to do it, unless he is to accept the Jeddah formula and make peace with Bashar al-Asad and Hizbullah, which seems to be off the table for now. Junblat undercut that move quickly, but it looked as if Saad Hariri was ready to sign onto the Saudi deal and bow to Hizbullah.

So Hariri came to Washington after Junblat and Dick Cheney scuttled the Saudi attempt to broker a truce between Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon. Saad wants to know what George can do for him. He gets Frist's article for his troubles. And a nice statement by Rice -- see this: Rice vows to keep pressure on Syria. Rice said: "We will continue to make sure there is no intimidation of the Lebanese people."

Frist blames the Europeans for going soft on terror. He is asking the Europeans to get tough on Syria and Hizbullah. I guess America feels it has done about as much as it can in the way of unilateral sanctions, although I am sure it will find a few more measures to add to the long list it has already come up with to squeeze Syria and Hizbullah. Maybe Washington will give Hariri more arms so he can fight Hizbullah? What else can US authorities do other to send Hariri back empty handed. I guess it can ask Europe to get with the sanctions train. Good luck. A sad day for Saad. Saudi and Egypt have been running interference for Syria with the UN and the Hariri investigation.

There seems to be a consensus in the Middle East that Syria should be forced to pay a price - such as cutting loose a few security chieftains such as Ghazale - but that it shouldn't be destabilized by having the Asad family targeted, which Asad has made clear would lead to a direct confrontation with the international community. Europe has not declared Hizbullah a terrorist organization, which Frist is quick to point out in his finger-wagging article.

The fact that regional sentiment is blowing in Asad's direction was made clear by the Saudi attempt to broker a sulha between Syria and Lebanon. It was confirmed by General Aoun's recent statement that "his Free Patriotic Movement's closest ally in Lebanon was Hizbullah, as the two held similar views with regards to reform and other internal issues."

This statement by the most powerful Christian in Lebanon drove supporters of the Future Movement crazy. See Michael Young's recent op-ed in the Daily Star, in which he lambastes Aoun for all sorts of sins. It is a good example of the ire Aoun has stirred up. Aoun's biggest sin is clearly that he believes that the international community is going to hang the anti-Syrian Lebanese out to dry. I guess Aoun has some experience with the fickleness of the international community when it comes to supporting Lebanon against Syria. Aoun wants to be president of Lebanon, not to join Saad in exile. I guess Aoun is saying to himself - "Been there. Done that. Hariri, you take the high road this time and I will take the low road. Your dad was PM for over a decade. It is my turn before I join him in the great Baabda in the sky.

Aoun confirmed his stand on Thursday when he said the government should resign if it was unable to end a political crisis that has paralysed decision-making. Here is Reuters quoting Aoun:

"The government crisis ... is building up and we do not feel it is being remedied in a way that can bring results," Aoun said in an interview at his home in the hills above Beirut.

"What does a government do in this situation? If you ask me what I would do, I would resign."

Lebanon's government, dominated by anti-Syrian politicians who won a majority in parliament in elections last year, has been in crisis since five Shi'ite Muslim ministers began boycotting sessions last month. The boycott began after the cabinet voted for an international trial for suspects in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri last February.

You can be sure that Bashar is enjoying the Lebanese mud fight. He is also enjoying the Hamas victory in Palestine even if it means one more secular nationalist movement loses to Islamists. Like Mubarak, Asad will be smirking at US discomfiture as Washington sees its desire for democracy fulfilled. But Asad better not smirk too long, for the Hamas win also underscores what will happen to him should real elections be allowed in Syria.

Rice, speaking of a possible Hamas win, said last week, "there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and disarm." Now Washington will have to add the PA on its growing list of governments to sanction and call evil.

So what did Saad Hariri get from Washington that may permit him to return to Beirut? It doesn't seem like much besides words - and perhaps some arms. My guess is that Washington will have to start sending arms to show that it is willing to support Hariri with more than words. He has to be able to deliver something to his supporters to prove that Washington hasn't abandoned him. What will Washington do about Hizbullah if it won't let Hariri compromise with the militia backed party? Building up the Lebanese army is a risky strategy, but one that will have to be undertaken if Washington is going to fight "terror."

Economy

Meanwhile, Asad is making a number of smart economic moves. Syria has recently announced a few new large development contracts meant to boost tourism and investment.

Investors from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria received Wednesday an official approval to build a resort in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo with a total cost of $140 million. According to Kuna, the resort which includes three, four and five star hotels containing 900 beds. Recently, the largest tourism project in Syria was launched by Kuwaiti’s Mohammad Abdul-Mohsen Al-Kharafi Company and Syria’s InterContinental Hotel with a total cost of $236 million.

Dardari opened the Audi Bank main Branch in Syria. He also announced that several new Islamic banks would be opening shortly.

Syrian authorities also announced that the economy grew by %4.5 in 2005, which was slightly faster than expected and pulls Syria out of its recession, but isn't near the %7 figure needed to begin reducing its widespread unemployment.

Syria's three main ports in Banyas, Tartus and Latakia have seen increases in tonnage on the order of 25% this year. Tartus and Latakia are the big winners. The overland trade to Iraq is driving it. In 2004, Syria transported half of all the grain imported into Iraq though the Tartus port. A special WFP program managed by my brother-in-law, Mohamed el-Kouhene, was responsible for that.

The big economic news this past week, however, is that gas and cement prices were dramatically increased.

Syria raised the price of gasoline 24 percent on Thursday, largely to counter smuggling to neighboring states, the official Syrian Arab News Agency reported.

SANA said the price of a liter rose from 24.35 Syrian pounds (48 US cents) to 30 pounds (60 US cents). However, at 60 US cents a liter, Syrian gasoline is still relatively cheap. In Lebanon a liter costs 70 cents and in Turkey US$1.72. In Jordan a liter sells for 61 cents, almost the same as in Syria.

This hike in basic commodity prices has caused an uproar by Syrians. See the blogs and comment section of Syria-news. Readers of Syria Comment have been reporting on this in the comment section. But raising prices of gas and cement are necessary, if painful, adjustments Syria must make if it wants to balance its books, slow smuggling, and rationalize its economy. It is a sign that Asad is finding some political courage on the economic issues. These price hikes will certainly increase the gap between rich and poor and will spark some inflation in the short run. But in the long run, they should help reduce government expenditures and promote growth. They are long overdue.

Syria's new five year economic plan was officially launched this week. World Bank people that I have spoken to, who were involved in its gestation process, say it is a good plan if it is implemented. We will see.

Here is the Frist article:

Moving Toward Democracy

Washington DC, January 26, 2006/The New York Sun -
By Bill Frist, Majority leader of the US Senate

A year ago this month, a car bomb killed the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafic Hariri. An ongoing U.N. investigation has implicated the Syrian government in the murder. The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, may have played a personal role. Several additional high-profile bombings have occurred in the last several months.

Enough is enough: Syria's actions in Lebanon have proven that it has no desire to play by the rules of civilized nations. Now, the United States and its partners need to ramp up the pressure on Damascus. We need to push Syria away from its homegrown brand of Arab fascism and toward democracy, peace, and an authentic end to its interference with Lebanon's affairs. We should start by increasing and expanding our funding for prodemocracy groups in Lebanon and Syria. In the coming Congress, I plan to support legislation that will do just that.
During my travels in Lebanon last year, I visit the late prime minister's grave and met with many of the political opposition leaders who rallied to end the overt Syrian occupation of Lebanon. These leaders have the support of the Lebanese people and at least some Syrians. Now, they need assistance from the international community.

Those who favor Syrian democracy have a difficult task. Since it invaded Lebanon in 1976, the government in Damascus has earned a place for itself on the roll call of the world's most dangerous regimes. The Assad regime funds terrorists, supports groups seeking to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, seeks weapons of mass destruction, and maintains a domestic police state based on the same fascist Baath ideology that animated Saddam Hussein's regime. Along with its ally in Iran, Syria funds Hezbollah bases in Southern Lebanon that the terrorist group uses to launch rocket attacks against Israel. Syria has also allowed Al Qaeda fighters to enter Iraq through its territory.

Despite the withdrawal of its regular military forces last year, Syrian intelligence agencies remain deeply involved with Lebanon's government, banks, and commercial enterprises. Prime Minister Hariri worked hard to end this interference in his nation's affairs. Like many others, he paid for these efforts with his life.

To honor his memory and restore full Lebanese sovereignty, the U.S. has to broaden its efforts in Syria. Since 2003, we have maintained a tough set of sanctions and restrictions on Syria that have helped isolate the nation. Increased funding for pro-democracy groups isn't enough by itself, however, and sanctions work best when they involve more than one country. To begin with, we need to redouble our efforts to force Syrian cooperation with U.N. investigators and bring Hariri's murderers to justice. And if Syria fails to respond and won't comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, we need to press our allies to also place tough sanctions on Damascus.

Our allies in Europe have a stake in this effort, and the Bush administration should look for ways to strengthen our partnership with them. The European Union remains Syria's largest trade partner, sends foreign aid to Syria, and has yet to label Hezbollah a terrorist group. The Assad regime interprets this sort of half-hearted diplomacy as a sign of weakness: It's unlikely to modify its behavior as a result.

In the long term, I am convinced that the Syrian and Lebanese population will move their own nations toward democracy if given the chance. Without strong international backing, it may take decades for real change to happen. With support from the international community, however, we can compel Syria to disentangle itself from Lebanon's affairs, move toward democracy, and eventually take its rightful place in the community of nations.

Dr. Frist is majority leader of the United States Senate.
[end]

"Islamism in Syria" by Ibrahim Hamidi

Ibrahim Hamidi has the best articles on the spread of Islamism in Syria. See these articles from the January 4 issue of al-Hayat

4/01/2006 London-based paper argues Syria moving towards "Islamism"
Syrian society is moving increasingly towards Islamism, Ibrahim Hamidi has argued in an article published by London-based Arabic paper Al-Hayat. He said that there had been doubts about reported operations against militant cells by Syrian forces, noting that the timing often coincided with international pressure on Syria. But he went on to argue that these incidents and others point to a developing trend in which Syria is departing from a secular socialist past and witnessing increasing signs of an Islamist future. The following is the text of part one of a two-part report headlined: "Islamist streams on the march in Syria. The authorities launch 'pre-emptive strikes' against takfiri dens", published by London-based newspaper Al-Hayat website on 4 January; subheadings inserted editorially unless otherwise indicated:

The Syrian government's announcement that it recently uncovered and broke up several "takfiri cells" [Muslim trend that considers other Muslims as apostates] raises numerous questions. The first question pertains to the level of the Islamist threat to this country, whose "secular" political system has relied on a pan-Arab socialist-leftist ideology for many years. The ultimate question is how successfully the Syrian authorities can keep the Islamist genie in the bottle.

For the first time since the end of the violent clashes between the authorities and the Islamists in the mid-1980s the government announced at the end of April 2004 that it had foiled a "saboteur group's" attempt to attack a building formerly used as a UN office in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood in south Damascus. A few days later Syrian state television broadcast interviews with two of the culprits, during which they said that their motive was to "lift the injustice imposed on the Muslims". Official sources declared that three of the group's four members had gone to Iraq to fight after Saddam Husayn's regime collapsed in the spring of 2003. Among the group members was a man called Ayman Shlash who had run as a ruling Ba'th party candidate in the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2003.

The Al-Mazzah incident was a warning bell about the potential danger of the "Iraqi Arabs" like the "Afghan Arabs" before them, who had returned to their various Arab countries after their "jihad" experiment against the Soviets.


"Locally manufactured"
Several Western governments and some diplomats in Damascus cast doubt on the possibility that Syria was really in danger of "an Islamist terrorist threat". One US spokesman said that the operation had been "locally manufactured" to enable the Syrian government to claim that, rather than being a sponsor of terrorism as according to US terminology, it stood in the same trench as the rest of the world in combating terrorism.

These questions continued to occupy journalists and diplomats whenever an armed clash occurred between extremist groups and the Syrian "anti-terrorist squads" in the second half of 2005. There were reasons for these questions, namely, that all of the terrorist attacks were forestalled and foiled by the security forces and because the names of the "terrorists" who were captured or killed were generally the names of obscure individuals. Political timing was another factor for doubting the official Syrian accounts, for the announcements about these terrorist operations frequently coincided with mounting foreign political pressure on the country.


Jund al-Sham
The first operation, which was attributed to the "Jund al-Sham Organization for Unity and Jihad" occurred in mid-2005 when the security forces besieged a "terrorist cell" in Damascus' Daff al-Shawk neighbourhood. It was the first time that this group's name appeared in the official Syrian media.

In mid-June 2005 the state-owned newspaper Al-Thawrah and Syrian state television transmitted confessions by persons who were said to be members of the "cell". What was striking, however, was that the television station for the first time showed "Jund al-Sham" pamphlets that indicated that the organization embraces an ideological, political and military "project" against Greater Syria's political regimes and man-made laws. They also said that the group advocated violent means to establish an "Islamic emirate" or "caliphate" in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq], currently under "Crusader" occupation. This was the substance of the pamphlets that Syrian government sources spoke of.

Ever since then Syrian official media has begun to make periodic announcements about "storming operations" to "break up" takfiri cells in Damascus, then Hamah, then Aleppo, and finally in Idlib at the beginning of December 2005. These were the cities that were the scenes of the most violent clashes between government forces and the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


Reporting operations
The common denominator among all these operations is that the authorities have confined themselves to a terse official announcement broadcast by the Syrian News Agency, SANA, while television showed a few pictures of stores containing weapons, ammunition and explosive belts. Because it was difficult or impossible to "verify" these reports and exactly when each operation occurred, other media had to rely on the accounts given by official sources especially as eyewitnesses hesitated to tell their stories.

A striking point is that the official announcements altered their description of the extremist groups from "saboteur groups" to "terrorist cells" belonging to "Jund al-Sham". After the most recent incidents, official reports started calling them "takfiri cells" that had been planning to carry out "terrorist operations". The background behind this official change of terminology from "sabotage" to "takfiri" and "terrorism" remained obscure.

Arab experts who specialize in studying extremist Islamist groups believe that the "Jund al-Sham" organization was founded by Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian individuals in Afghanistan in the 1990s and that it is linked to Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qa'idah of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers".

It is hard to know whether there is any connection between "Jund al-Sham" and other organizations that carry similar names. A group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham" claimed responsibility for a suicide operation in a British school in Doha in March 2005.

In 2004 a statement was released in Ayn al-Hulwah camp in Lebanon by a group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham". In April 2005 a group calling itself the "Group of Succour and Jihad in Greater Syria" claimed responsibility for Prime Minister Al-Hariri's assassination. It was not taken seriously by Lebanese, Arab and international circles.


A "takfiri" farm and the philosopher of doubt [subheading as published]
According to official sources, a recent operation occurred on a farm in Al-Hamidiyah village, close to the city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, hometown of the famous Arab sceptic philosopher Abu-al-Ala al-Ma'arri in Idlib Governorate. It was very violent because it involved a "major headquarters of the fundamentalist groups". Eight died, three of whom blew themselves up with explosive belts in the same way used by Iraqi terrorists and the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous bombings in three Jordanian hotels in November 2005.

Informed sources said that the Syrian security forces arrived at dawn at the farm located on the side of the Damascus-Aleppo highway. The forces surrounded the place and asked all those who were inside the location to surrender. They refused. The security forces requested reinforcements and a helicopter arrived to show the fundamentalists that the government forces were serious. They were asked a second time to surrender but again they refused and indeed began to loudly denounce the security forces and call them infidels.



"Positive message" on Iraq
It is widely believed that the storming of this hideout came in the context of the official Syrian efforts to "combat the jihadists" who wish to go and fight the Americans in Iraq. Damascus, it is said, wished to send a positive message to the Americans and the British that it was "breaking up" networks that wished to back the insurgency in Iraq. This happened at a time when it was coming under international pressure regarding the investigation into Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination.

A Western diplomat said that he believes that "this hideout was used to smuggle weapons to Iraq". Official sources, however, said that the discovery of this hideout, "which belonged to an Arab fundamentalist organization," came as a result of confessions made by two persons who sustained serious wounds during a security raid that occurred in Aleppo's Al-Naqqarin neighbourhood two days before this operation. That raid, the official sources said, led to the discovery of an explosives factory in that region, which links northern Syria to central Iraq. SANA declared that the Aleppo group had been planning attacks on Syrian officials and government offices.


Al-Khaznawi assassination
In addition to these announced operations, it is believed that other operations occurred about which no announcements were made for security reasons. These operations undoubtedly indicate that Islamist communities in secular-pan-Arab Syria have started to breed certain fanatical groups. One should note at this point that in June 2005 an enlightened cleric, Shaykh Ma'shuq al-Khaznawi, was assassinated two weeks after he was abducted from a Damascus street.

Islamist parliament member Muhammad Habash attributed Al-Khaznawi's assassination to the wish of Salafi Muslims and extremists to dictate their own agenda both to their narrow conservative Islamist circles and also to the wider non-conservative Muslim community. Habash added that he received a death threat on his cellular telephone a few days prior to Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping because of the "enlightened and anti-fanatical ideas" that he embraces and advocates in his writings, the pamphlets published by the Islamic Studies Centres that he directs, and the Friday sermons that he delivers at Al-Zahra Mosque in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood.

Habash said that the uncovering of the "Jund al-Sham" organization and Al-Khaznawi's assassination come under the same heading of "religious fanaticism".

Meanwhile in June 2005 some Western newspapers including the Christian Science Monitor accused certain security circles in Syria of kidnapping and assassinating Al-Khaznawi because he held a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood's leader in Brussels in February 2005. The brotherhood is a banned group in Syria in accordance with Law 49 of 1980.

Western diplomatic sources have explained the killing of Al-Khaznawi as the "meeting point" of three factors: the growing Islamism in the country, a political "opposition" that lacks broad popularity, and the Syrian Kurds who are organized in around 13 unlicensed political parties, which now enjoy regional status as a result of their political gains in Iraq and the international popular support they get in Europe. The Syrian government has denied this and asserted that Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping from Damascus followed by his torture and murder was merely a criminal action according to the confessions made by the abductors even before his body was found buried in a grave in Dayr al-Zur in northeastern Syria.



Towards Islamism
Parliamentary deputy Habash, who founded the Islamic Studies Centre, is one of the people who are following the movement of Syrian society towards Islamism in a country that has long been regarded as secular and that has long struggled to maintain a pan-Arab, progressive, and secularist character.

Habash formerly told Al-Hayat that he believes that around 80 per cent of the Syrian people are conservative and 20 per cent are reformist and that only one per cent of them are fanatical. He warned, however, that the "80 per cent have no political project and whenever they think of politics, they search for a leader or a cleric who might either be a reformist or a hardliner."

One official expert said: "Not all the conservatives are searching for a leader or a shaykh because the stream that is demanding pluralism and democracy is widespread among conservatives and reformists alike."

Others believe that the Syrians are conservative by nature and that pan-Arab ideology arose in the country at the end of the 19th century when "the sick man of Europe, that is, Ottoman Turkey" grew feeble and the Ottoman Empire, which Islamist ideologues now regard as a 400-year extension of the Islamic Caliphate, began to collapse.

Symbolic signs [subheading as published]
An observation of the apparent changes in the country and its population makes it seem probable that the secular-pan-Arab Syria is becoming increasingly Islamist. This can be seen through symbolic signs like wearing the veil and the proliferation in bookshops of Islamic books instead of communist writings and "Soviet novels". Indeed the large bookshop that lies opposite the Russian Cultural Centre in Damascus's 29 May Street has become one of the largest distributors of religious books and an advanced centre of disseminating religious culture. Formerly the bookshops on this street were full of Marxist books and were frequented by customers who had freed themselves of many local social restrictions.

Coinciding with the increasingly familiar scene of bearded young Syrian men wearing short jallabah as a sign of "Islamic Salafism" most of the restaurants on the Barada River and the Ayn al-Khadra and Al-Fayja neighbourhood on the outskirts of Damascus have stopped offering alcoholic beverages on their menus and have set aside separate sections for families in compliance with conservative social traditions. Indeed these restaurants are now vying with each other to hang the portraits of famous clerics on the walls.

During this year's month of Ramadan Damascus inhabitants in rich neighbourhood started to hang pictures with Islamic themes from their balconies. During last year's Ramadan one citizen in the township of Jurmana, which has a Christian community, was jailed because he "behaved in a way contrary to public morality" by smoking in public while others were fasting.

These Islamist signs become increasingly clear the further we get away from Damascus and into rural Syria. It is precisely such rural areas that were in the past scenes of violent clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the authorities.

Al-Hayat previously noted that the red colours of the slogan "We will crush the Muslim Brotherhood gang, the puppet of imperialism and Zionism," which had been daubed on a wall, had started to fade. New slogans written in bright green are starting to appear on the highway between the capital and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. They state: "Do not forget to mention God," and "Pray for the prophet." These slogans have replaced earlier mottos that spoke of secularism, communism and Arab nationalism, for example "No life in this country except for progressiveness and socialism."

In addition to these new slogans green domes are increasing in number in several Syrian villages and towns, with the best specimens rising alongside the highways.

Furthermore, Akram al-Jundi, an inhabitant of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and the first Syrian citizen to obtain a licence to operate a private television station, which he did in the early 1960s, insists on broadcasting religious programmes on his channel, which has a capital of 12m dollars which he gathered during his work in the Gulf.

When you visit villages and rural neighbourhood, you can hear stories that explain what is happening. In the village of Urum al-Jawz, located in rough mountainous terrain that had once been a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold and a scene of armed clashes, the young man Muhammad al-Nuri could in the past declare openly that he was a communist, for example, or defy local social traditions in the way he dressed and behaved. Fasting was not compulsory in those days and young women rarely wore the Islamic veil. Today, however, the rebellious young man has become a shaykh or at least a conservative man who clings to social traditions. He believes that "Islam is the alternative solution" to communist ideology, which he learnt in a Soviet university and from paperbacks that were given as gifts to Syrian young men.



Story of a generation
The story of Muhammad, who is now in his fifties, tells the story of an entire Syrian generation. Muhammad studied in Moscow in the 1980s and returned as a learned and rebellious man to educate the villagers in "secularism". Two decades later he had surrendered to the power of society and traditions. Indeed Muhammad is now more religiously committed than Ahmad Yusuf, who calls himself the young men's friend, who returned to the village after 10 years in Saudi Arabia, bringing with him conservative Islamist slogans mixed with some Salafi ideas and many Gulf customs in dress and daily behaviour.

In the past the competition between the two "rebellious" young men focused on digging away at the foundations of the strong wall of traditions and social customs because their enthusiasm was strong and their dreams of change were bigger than the village's few scattered houses. Today the competition is focused in reverse and tends to bolster the wall of traditions and attain a greater level of stringent religious commitment. To the local society today, a "virtuous" young man is someone who spends a greater part of his time at the large mosque that was built a few years ago next to the highway so that travellers between Aleppo and the coastal city of Latakia could see it. It replaced the old mosque that was located in a remote corner of the village. In this way the mosque would tell the millions passing along the road in their cars: Look and see how committed we are to our religion.

Hajj Ahmad, as he came to be called after returning from his expatriate years in the Gulf, was at the forefront of the effort to collect donations to build the "Al-Iman" [faith] Mosque on a hill in Urum al-Jawz. Shaykh Muhammad now sends his four children to this mosque to study religion. Formerly he dreamed of building a cultural centre or a large clinic on one of the village hills. His two boys fast in Ramadan and the two girls started wearing the veil before reaching the age of 10. Just as a reminder, this "shaykh" planned in his youth to marry a Soviet woman and have unveiled liberal daughters, just as several thousand other Syrians who studied in the Eastern Bloc used to dream.

Simply put, the experiences of these two men in the past two decades are a specimen of the transformation in the ranks of a generation whose government made ardent efforts to turn society into a modern civil society. The efforts failed and brought about contrary results.

Source: Al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 4 Jan 06

"Islamism in Syria" by Ibrahim Hamidi

Ibrahim Hamidi has the best articles on the spread of Islamism in Syria. See these articles from the January 4 issue of al-Hayat

4/01/2006 London-based paper argues Syria moving towards "Islamism"
Syrian society is moving increasingly towards Islamism, Ibrahim Hamidi has argued in an article published by London-based Arabic paper Al-Hayat. He said that there had been doubts about reported operations against militant cells by Syrian forces, noting that the timing often coincided with international pressure on Syria. But he went on to argue that these incidents and others point to a developing trend in which Syria is departing from a secular socialist past and witnessing increasing signs of an Islamist future. The following is the text of part one of a two-part report headlined: "Islamist streams on the march in Syria. The authorities launch 'pre-emptive strikes' against takfiri dens", published by London-based newspaper Al-Hayat website on 4 January; subheadings inserted editorially unless otherwise indicated:

The Syrian government's announcement that it recently uncovered and broke up several "takfiri cells" [Muslim trend that considers other Muslims as apostates] raises numerous questions. The first question pertains to the level of the Islamist threat to this country, whose "secular" political system has relied on a pan-Arab socialist-leftist ideology for many years. The ultimate question is how successfully the Syrian authorities can keep the Islamist genie in the bottle.

For the first time since the end of the violent clashes between the authorities and the Islamists in the mid-1980s the government announced at the end of April 2004 that it had foiled a "saboteur group's" attempt to attack a building formerly used as a UN office in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood in south Damascus. A few days later Syrian state television broadcast interviews with two of the culprits, during which they said that their motive was to "lift the injustice imposed on the Muslims". Official sources declared that three of the group's four members had gone to Iraq to fight after Saddam Husayn's regime collapsed in the spring of 2003. Among the group members was a man called Ayman Shlash who had run as a ruling Ba'th party candidate in the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2003.

The Al-Mazzah incident was a warning bell about the potential danger of the "Iraqi Arabs" like the "Afghan Arabs" before them, who had returned to their various Arab countries after their "jihad" experiment against the Soviets.


"Locally manufactured"
Several Western governments and some diplomats in Damascus cast doubt on the possibility that Syria was really in danger of "an Islamist terrorist threat". One US spokesman said that the operation had been "locally manufactured" to enable the Syrian government to claim that, rather than being a sponsor of terrorism as according to US terminology, it stood in the same trench as the rest of the world in combating terrorism.

These questions continued to occupy journalists and diplomats whenever an armed clash occurred between extremist groups and the Syrian "anti-terrorist squads" in the second half of 2005. There were reasons for these questions, namely, that all of the terrorist attacks were forestalled and foiled by the security forces and because the names of the "terrorists" who were captured or killed were generally the names of obscure individuals. Political timing was another factor for doubting the official Syrian accounts, for the announcements about these terrorist operations frequently coincided with mounting foreign political pressure on the country.


Jund al-Sham
The first operation, which was attributed to the "Jund al-Sham Organization for Unity and Jihad" occurred in mid-2005 when the security forces besieged a "terrorist cell" in Damascus' Daff al-Shawk neighbourhood. It was the first time that this group's name appeared in the official Syrian media.

In mid-June 2005 the state-owned newspaper Al-Thawrah and Syrian state television transmitted confessions by persons who were said to be members of the "cell". What was striking, however, was that the television station for the first time showed "Jund al-Sham" pamphlets that indicated that the organization embraces an ideological, political and military "project" against Greater Syria's political regimes and man-made laws. They also said that the group advocated violent means to establish an "Islamic emirate" or "caliphate" in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq], currently under "Crusader" occupation. This was the substance of the pamphlets that Syrian government sources spoke of.

Ever since then Syrian official media has begun to make periodic announcements about "storming operations" to "break up" takfiri cells in Damascus, then Hamah, then Aleppo, and finally in Idlib at the beginning of December 2005. These were the cities that were the scenes of the most violent clashes between government forces and the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


Reporting operations
The common denominator among all these operations is that the authorities have confined themselves to a terse official announcement broadcast by the Syrian News Agency, SANA, while television showed a few pictures of stores containing weapons, ammunition and explosive belts. Because it was difficult or impossible to "verify" these reports and exactly when each operation occurred, other media had to rely on the accounts given by official sources especially as eyewitnesses hesitated to tell their stories.

A striking point is that the official announcements altered their description of the extremist groups from "saboteur groups" to "terrorist cells" belonging to "Jund al-Sham". After the most recent incidents, official reports started calling them "takfiri cells" that had been planning to carry out "terrorist operations". The background behind this official change of terminology from "sabotage" to "takfiri" and "terrorism" remained obscure.

Arab experts who specialize in studying extremist Islamist groups believe that the "Jund al-Sham" organization was founded by Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian individuals in Afghanistan in the 1990s and that it is linked to Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qa'idah of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers".

It is hard to know whether there is any connection between "Jund al-Sham" and other organizations that carry similar names. A group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham" claimed responsibility for a suicide operation in a British school in Doha in March 2005.

In 2004 a statement was released in Ayn al-Hulwah camp in Lebanon by a group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham". In April 2005 a group calling itself the "Group of Succour and Jihad in Greater Syria" claimed responsibility for Prime Minister Al-Hariri's assassination. It was not taken seriously by Lebanese, Arab and international circles.


A "takfiri" farm and the philosopher of doubt [subheading as published]
According to official sources, a recent operation occurred on a farm in Al-Hamidiyah village, close to the city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, hometown of the famous Arab sceptic philosopher Abu-al-Ala al-Ma'arri in Idlib Governorate. It was very violent because it involved a "major headquarters of the fundamentalist groups". Eight died, three of whom blew themselves up with explosive belts in the same way used by Iraqi terrorists and the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous bombings in three Jordanian hotels in November 2005.

Informed sources said that the Syrian security forces arrived at dawn at the farm located on the side of the Damascus-Aleppo highway. The forces surrounded the place and asked all those who were inside the location to surrender. They refused. The security forces requested reinforcements and a helicopter arrived to show the fundamentalists that the government forces were serious. They were asked a second time to surrender but again they refused and indeed began to loudly denounce the security forces and call them infidels.



"Positive message" on Iraq
It is widely believed that the storming of this hideout came in the context of the official Syrian efforts to "combat the jihadists" who wish to go and fight the Americans in Iraq. Damascus, it is said, wished to send a positive message to the Americans and the British that it was "breaking up" networks that wished to back the insurgency in Iraq. This happened at a time when it was coming under international pressure regarding the investigation into Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination.

A Western diplomat said that he believes that "this hideout was used to smuggle weapons to Iraq". Official sources, however, said that the discovery of this hideout, "which belonged to an Arab fundamentalist organization," came as a result of confessions made by two persons who sustained serious wounds during a security raid that occurred in Aleppo's Al-Naqqarin neighbourhood two days before this operation. That raid, the official sources said, led to the discovery of an explosives factory in that region, which links northern Syria to central Iraq. SANA declared that the Aleppo group had been planning attacks on Syrian officials and government offices.


Al-Khaznawi assassination
In addition to these announced operations, it is believed that other operations occurred about which no announcements were made for security reasons. These operations undoubtedly indicate that Islamist communities in secular-pan-Arab Syria have started to breed certain fanatical groups. One should note at this point that in June 2005 an enlightened cleric, Shaykh Ma'shuq al-Khaznawi, was assassinated two weeks after he was abducted from a Damascus street.

Islamist parliament member Muhammad Habash attributed Al-Khaznawi's assassination to the wish of Salafi Muslims and extremists to dictate their own agenda both to their narrow conservative Islamist circles and also to the wider non-conservative Muslim community. Habash added that he received a death threat on his cellular telephone a few days prior to Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping because of the "enlightened and anti-fanatical ideas" that he embraces and advocates in his writings, the pamphlets published by the Islamic Studies Centres that he directs, and the Friday sermons that he delivers at Al-Zahra Mosque in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood.

Habash said that the uncovering of the "Jund al-Sham" organization and Al-Khaznawi's assassination come under the same heading of "religious fanaticism".

Meanwhile in June 2005 some Western newspapers including the Christian Science Monitor accused certain security circles in Syria of kidnapping and assassinating Al-Khaznawi because he held a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood's leader in Brussels in February 2005. The brotherhood is a banned group in Syria in accordance with Law 49 of 1980.

Western diplomatic sources have explained the killing of Al-Khaznawi as the "meeting point" of three factors: the growing Islamism in the country, a political "opposition" that lacks broad popularity, and the Syrian Kurds who are organized in around 13 unlicensed political parties, which now enjoy regional status as a result of their political gains in Iraq and the international popular support they get in Europe. The Syrian government has denied this and asserted that Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping from Damascus followed by his torture and murder was merely a criminal action according to the confessions made by the abductors even before his body was found buried in a grave in Dayr al-Zur in northeastern Syria.



Towards Islamism
Parliamentary deputy Habash, who founded the Islamic Studies Centre, is one of the people who are following the movement of Syrian society towards Islamism in a country that has long been regarded as secular and that has long struggled to maintain a pan-Arab, progressive, and secularist character.

Habash formerly told Al-Hayat that he believes that around 80 per cent of the Syrian people are conservative and 20 per cent are reformist and that only one per cent of them are fanatical. He warned, however, that the "80 per cent have no political project and whenever they think of politics, they search for a leader or a cleric who might either be a reformist or a hardliner."

One official expert said: "Not all the conservatives are searching for a leader or a shaykh because the stream that is demanding pluralism and democracy is widespread among conservatives and reformists alike."

Others believe that the Syrians are conservative by nature and that pan-Arab ideology arose in the country at the end of the 19th century when "the sick man of Europe, that is, Ottoman Turkey" grew feeble and the Ottoman Empire, which Islamist ideologues now regard as a 400-year extension of the Islamic Caliphate, began to collapse.

Symbolic signs [subheading as published]
An observation of the apparent changes in the country and its population makes it seem probable that the secular-pan-Arab Syria is becoming increasingly Islamist. This can be seen through symbolic signs like wearing the veil and the proliferation in bookshops of Islamic books instead of communist writings and "Soviet novels". Indeed the large bookshop that lies opposite the Russian Cultural Centre in Damascus's 29 May Street has become one of the largest distributors of religious books and an advanced centre of disseminating religious culture. Formerly the bookshops on this street were full of Marxist books and were frequented by customers who had freed themselves of many local social restrictions.

Coinciding with the increasingly familiar scene of bearded young Syrian men wearing short jallabah as a sign of "Islamic Salafism" most of the restaurants on the Barada River and the Ayn al-Khadra and Al-Fayja neighbourhood on the outskirts of Damascus have stopped offering alcoholic beverages on their menus and have set aside separate sections for families in compliance with conservative social traditions. Indeed these restaurants are now vying with each other to hang the portraits of famous clerics on the walls.

During this year's month of Ramadan Damascus inhabitants in rich neighbourhood started to hang pictures with Islamic themes from their balconies. During last year's Ramadan one citizen in the township of Jurmana, which has a Christian community, was jailed because he "behaved in a way contrary to public morality" by smoking in public while others were fasting.

These Islamist signs become increasingly clear the further we get away from Damascus and into rural Syria. It is precisely such rural areas that were in the past scenes of violent clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the authorities.

Al-Hayat previously noted that the red colours of the slogan "We will crush the Muslim Brotherhood gang, the puppet of imperialism and Zionism," which had been daubed on a wall, had started to fade. New slogans written in bright green are starting to appear on the highway between the capital and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. They state: "Do not forget to mention God," and "Pray for the prophet." These slogans have replaced earlier mottos that spoke of secularism, communism and Arab nationalism, for example "No life in this country except for progressiveness and socialism."

In addition to these new slogans green domes are increasing in number in several Syrian villages and towns, with the best specimens rising alongside the highways.

Furthermore, Akram al-Jundi, an inhabitant of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and the first Syrian citizen to obtain a licence to operate a private television station, which he did in the early 1960s, insists on broadcasting religious programmes on his channel, which has a capital of 12m dollars which he gathered during his work in the Gulf.

When you visit villages and rural neighbourhood, you can hear stories that explain what is happening. In the village of Urum al-Jawz, located in rough mountainous terrain that had once been a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold and a scene of armed clashes, the young man Muhammad al-Nuri could in the past declare openly that he was a communist, for example, or defy local social traditions in the way he dressed and behaved. Fasting was not compulsory in those days and young women rarely wore the Islamic veil. Today, however, the rebellious young man has become a shaykh or at least a conservative man who clings to social traditions. He believes that "Islam is the alternative solution" to communist ideology, which he learnt in a Soviet university and from paperbacks that were given as gifts to Syrian young men.



Story of a generation
The story of Muhammad, who is now in his fifties, tells the story of an entire Syrian generation. Muhammad studied in Moscow in the 1980s and returned as a learned and rebellious man to educate the villagers in "secularism". Two decades later he had surrendered to the power of society and traditions. Indeed Muhammad is now more religiously committed than Ahmad Yusuf, who calls himself the young men's friend, who returned to the village after 10 years in Saudi Arabia, bringing with him conservative Islamist slogans mixed with some Salafi ideas and many Gulf customs in dress and daily behaviour.

In the past the competition between the two "rebellious" young men focused on digging away at the foundations of the strong wall of traditions and social customs because their enthusiasm was strong and their dreams of change were bigger than the village's few scattered houses. Today the competition is focused in reverse and tends to bolster the wall of traditions and attain a greater level of stringent religious commitment. To the local society today, a "virtuous" young man is someone who spends a greater part of his time at the large mosque that was built a few years ago next to the highway so that travellers between Aleppo and the coastal city of Latakia could see it. It replaced the old mosque that was located in a remote corner of the village. In this way the mosque would tell the millions passing along the road in their cars: Look and see how committed we are to our religion.

Hajj Ahmad, as he came to be called after returning from his expatriate years in the Gulf, was at the forefront of the effort to collect donations to build the "Al-Iman" [faith] Mosque on a hill in Urum al-Jawz. Shaykh Muhammad now sends his four children to this mosque to study religion. Formerly he dreamed of building a cultural centre or a large clinic on one of the village hills. His two boys fast in Ramadan and the two girls started wearing the veil before reaching the age of 10. Just as a reminder, this "shaykh" planned in his youth to marry a Soviet woman and have unveiled liberal daughters, just as several thousand other Syrians who studied in the Eastern Bloc used to dream.

Simply put, the experiences of these two men in the past two decades are a specimen of the transformation in the ranks of a generation whose government made ardent efforts to turn society into a modern civil society. The efforts failed and brought about contrary results.

Source: Al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 4 Jan 06

Who Killed Hariri? The "Pushed Against the Wall" Thesis" as elaborated by Nasrallah and Asad

Who killed Hariri? This is the question that runs through Hassan Nasrallah's interview with al-Hayat. Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, absolves Syria of responsibility, but he also tries to explain the context which led to Hariri's murder. He blames Walid Jumblatt's intransigent refusal to reconcile with the Syrians in December 2004 and join a Hariri government under Lahoud for leading to Hariri's death. It is in this context that Hariri's murder, according to Nasrallah, becomes understandable. In his explanation of the context, Nasrallah elaborates the "Syria Pushed to the Wall" thesis.

The complete Nasrallah interview with al-Hayat is now available in English at (Dar Al-Hayat). T_desco, who has been following the Lebanon wrangle closely, underlines the importance of this interview, because Nasrallah is quite frank about his reading of Syrian-Lebanese relations and their history.

Nasrallah claims that Bashar al-Asad does not want to return to Lebanon to control its affairs as it did in the past. "When I said in an interview that Syria did not want to return to Lebanon in the way that prevailed in the past, I meant it, and I know this," Nasrallah says. All the same Nasrallah is outspoken about his belief that Syria will always have a role in Lebanon. He argues that the present forces who oppose Syria are bad for Lebanese interests because they are determined to overturn the Syrian government, which will only provoke war between the two countries. More importantly, he claims they will lose. Here are his words:

Today, I'm not working to re-introduce Syrian forces in Lebanon, or re-introducing Syrian intelligence here, or Syrian influence. By the way, whether or not we like it, or whether or not others like it, Syria has influence in Lebanon that no one can eliminate, due to what is said about common factors of history and geography, and a network of interests, and the intersection of family and social relations.

There's another goal that we're working for. We reject fighting Syria from Lebanon. We reject seeing Lebanese involved in any project to bring down the Syrian regime. This is dangerous for Syria and Lebanon. Due to Lebanese, national reasons, we believe that any war, in terms of politics, security or the media, not to speak of a military war that some of them want to drag Lebanon into, represents something that is against Lebanese national interests, regardless of the pan-Arab issue, or Israel, or the strategic situation in the region, because it is a losing war, based on all criteria and balances of power. What we're saying today is that in Lebanon, there are those who want to bring down the regime in Syria.

Nasrallah claims his fight is with Junblat and others, less vocal, who want to overturn the Syrian regime with US support. He regrets that an understanding with Syria has been torpedoed. He says:

The final attempt, in Jeddah, between King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz and President Bashar al-Assad was an attempt to arrange things between Lebanon and Syria, in a way that puts Lebanon at ease, and puts Syria at ease as well, providing an opportunity for the investigation to be concluded. Before anyone knew what happened during this meeting, the attacks began from Lebanon, of course using
language that was less (harsh) than what the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, was subject to. I have the feeling that in Lebanon there are those who don't want any kind of understanding to be reached with Syria, under any consideration, and some of those are the most fearful about revealing the truth about the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri.

Nasrallah argues that Hizbullah did not benefit politically from Syria's presence in Lebanon as others parties did.

al Hayat: There are those who say that Hizbullah has a program to see Syrian influence return to Lebanon.

Sayyed Nasrallah (Laughs): First of all, this is a charge that has no evidence behind it. Second, if we take Hizbullah, how has it benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? I'm not talking about the last 30 years, since Hizbullah didn't exist prior to 1982. From 1982 until the present, when Syrian forces exited Lebanon, how has Hizbullah benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? How has Junblatt benefited? Or the many, many others?

Let's talk about the period of Syria's presence in Lebanon. First of all, our presence in state administrations: we don't have any presence. On the contrary, the doors have been closed to us when it comes to the bureaucracy. As for the regions in which we are active, and in which we enjoy a moral and popular influence, deprivation and poverty have increased. We haven't benefited in terms of state positions, or projects, or development, or official political power, or in any domain where others have benefited. Therefore, we have no problem with whoever wants to judge this period; in fact we are comfortable about the topic because we were "outside" (the equation).

Of course, the Syrian presence in Lebanon concerned us in two respects. First, the principal factor involved securing domestic stability, due to the fragility of the situation. Second, this presence constituted a protective shield for the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Therefore, my position on Syria is subject to national and strategic considerations, and not personal calculations, or party-based calculations, or short-term interests. I didn't support Syria in Lebanon because I would receive positions in state administrations, or because it would secure projects for me, or give me a budget to work with, or ministers, or MPs in Parliament. That's how they work. On the contrary, the Syrian committee that used to manage Lebanese affairs up to 2000 would purposely ignore Hizbullah when it came to the Lebanese domestic (political) formula.

Sayyed Nasrallah: There are many such people, including Walid Jumblatt, who call for US troops to occupy Syria and eliminate the regime, like they did in Iraq. This is clear. He has called on the Syrian opposition to receive assistance from outside the country. Walid Jumblatt is distinguished by the fact that he says what he wants. There are others who do things and don't say anything. Don't ask me who these people are; when they say so, I'll tell you. In our opinion, this is dangerous for Lebanon. Today, our problem is that some of them want us to be part of their open war against Syria, and we reject this. The problem isn't that they don't want Syrian influence in Lebanon, while we do. This is not true.

Who is responsible for the deterioration of Lebanese-Syrian relations on the eve of Hariri's assassination on February 14, 2005? Nasrallah blames Junblatt and claims that Asad was trying to reconcile with Junblatt. Of course, this is a highly self-interested version because of the recent hostile exchange between Nassrallah and Junblatt, in which the Druze warlord stepped up his campaign against the Shiite warlord, claiming his party's allegiance to Iran and Syria overshadowed its loyalty to Lebanon.

Also, it must be remembered that at the time Nasrallah's attempted reconciliation between Asad and Jumblatt Syria had just extended Lahoud's presidency in contravention to the Lebanese constitution and was trying to impose its will on Hariri and Jumblatt. Hamadeh, Jumblatt's ally, had just been almost killed in an effort to intimidate Junblatt. Here are Nasrallah's words about the atmosphere during the week before Hariri's murder:

I realized that Walid Jumblatt had no serious intention of reconciling with the Syrians, even prior to PM Hariri's assassination, and that Walid Jumblatt had taken the decision to enter into a conflict with this regime. Even so, I believe that what he said at the Bristol was hurtful to me personally, as a mediator, and to Prime Minister al-Hariri, who was enthusiastic about the mediation, and to the Syrians themselves. It was clear, and I can attest to the fact that this was the climate prior to PM Hariri's assassination.

President al-Assad demonstrated the required positive reaction to overcome the problem with Walid Jumblatt, but Walid Jumblatt insisted on clashing with the regime in Syria. After al-Hariri's assassination, things became more difficult. It was no longer possible to talk about mediation.

Nasrallah even obliquely accuses Jumblatt’s refusal to reconcile with Asad for creating the atmosphere of confrontation with Syria which led to Hariri's death. According to Nasrallah, Rafik al-Hariri was ready to make up with the Syrians after the September 2004 Lahoud extension (which Hariri begrudgingly facilitated). Hariri told Nasrallah in December 2004 that he was prepared to form a government, but only if it included Walid Jumblatt. (Hamadeh was almost killed in October, well before this December effort to bring him back into the Syrian game.) Nasrallah explains:

We even worked with our Syrian brethren to clarify that the circumstances, and the country's interest, after [Lahoud's] extension, required that Prime Minister al-Hariri form the new government. However, al-Hariri said to me, "I have a problem with forming a government without Walid Jumblatt. In light of the difficult climate between Jumblatt and the Syrians, it will be hard to form a Cabinet. I want you to help me regarding Jumblatt, and his relationship with
the Syrians.

Jumblatt refused to reconcile, having already committed himself to UN Resolution 1559 and the Franco-American effort to yank Lebanon out of Syria's sphere of influence and into their own. According to Nasrallah, this is the key to the context of Hariri's assassination.

The logic of Nasrallah's history and explanation could also be used to explain why Syria killed Hariri, even though Nasrallah insists on pointing the finger variously at Israel, al-Qa'ida, or other obscure anti-Syrian and anti-"resistance" forces. Here is my reading: Syria believed that Lahoud is the key to its grip on Lebanon and its interests there so Bashar extended Lahoud's presidency, despite US and French admonitions not to. Hariri was willing to re-enter the circle of Syrian domination, despite his humiliation at the hands of Bashar over the Lahoud affaire, but only if Jumblatt would also reconcile with Syria and join his government. Jumblatt refused, going over to the dark side. Hariri begins to go over to the dark side with Junblatt. Syria takes him out. In Nasrallah's "resistance" logic, this is not really Syria's fault, but Jumblatt’s. Syria, which, in Nasrallah's view, still stands for "pan-Arab" interests, has been pushed to the wall by the West. Anyone who joins this pressure becomes a "traitor" and plays with fire. Thus, it is not Syria (even if it pulled the trigger) but the forces alligned against Syria who are the real assassins.

Bashar al-Asad has tried to bolster this line of reasoning. In an interview last October 7 with Jihad El Khazen, Asad claimed that France and the US had already made the decision to gin up a Security Council Resolution against Syria's presence in Lebanon as early as June 2004. Thus Lahoud's extension was a defensive move to fortify Syria's team in Lebanon and not an aggressive initiation of the tit for tat war that resulted in Hariri's murder. Here is how al-Khazen summarized his two-hour interview with Bashar al-Asad:

President al-Assad links the extension of President Emile Lahoud's mandate to the battle in which France and the US joined forces against Syria, each for its own reasons. The White House is pressuring to rein in the Syrian position regarding the US military presence in Iraq and the confrontation with Israel. France found itself in a big political dispute with the US and decided to offer Syria as a price for reducing the harshness of Washington's position against Paris.

*The agreement over Syria between President George Bush and President Jacques Chirac began in Normandy in June 2004, when the extension hadn't yet been raised. When the Syrians heard in roughly August that the two countries were preparing a Security Council Resolution against Damascus and its interests, extension became possible.

This is the "pushed to the wall" thesis that both Bashar and Nasrallah elaborate. The death of Hariri becomes "objectively" not Syria's fault because Syria was defending itself along with higher Arab interests against a plot by the Israeli oriented West and their minions in Lebanon. This is the logic that Asad is selling to Syrians. This explains why Asad accuses the Israelis of murdering Hariri and may actually believe it at some metaphysical level. More importantly, it is why so many Middle Easterners accept the logic. They believe it at some deeper psychological level, which helps them avow Asad's technical innocence.

The Manichean struggle between Israel and the Arab World, in which both sides claim to be "existentially" threatened, has unraveled ordinary morality. Murder gets swept into a larger allegorical reading of light and darkness. As the cosmic logic of good and evil takes over, murder becomes "collateral damage" and we enter into the twilight zone of myth in which human actions lose their meaning in the face of contending Gods. The ends justify the means. Higher principles, such as Arabism/, Islam or democracy/ freedom trump smaller ones, such as murder.

Unfortunately, Arab leaders and their followers are not the only ones to do this.

"COURT IN THE MIDDLE" from Syria Today

COURT IN THE MIDDLE
Syria Today
December 2005

Islamic laws applied in Syria too often do little or nothing to protect the rights of women. As Dalia Haidar reports, activists are now calling for widescale reforms.

One month after her wedding, Loubna al-Sharif was beaten by her husband several times. They had scarcely finished their honeymoon, Loubna said, and she could not understand what had led to her new husband’s sudden, harsh treatment.

A few months later, she became pregnant. She was still only 19 years old, and she wanted to keep the baby, but her husband forced her to have an abortion. He continued to beat and verbally abuse her until she finally fled to her parents’ house and filed for divorce.

But the process of divorcing her husband only prolonged Loubna’s agony.

“I became depressed by the judicial system here,” said Loubna, who is now 24 years old and works a translator for a private magazine. “It took me two and a half years to get a divorce and, in the process, my file was lost three times in the justice palace.”

But according to Loubna, her real problem wasn’t the delays, but a whole system of laws unfairly skewed in favour of men.

“Even the judge had a masculine mentality, and the lawyers were pushing me to solve it peacefully without asking for my rights,” said Loubna, who finally obtained her divorce in a Syrian court which operates under a code of so-called ‘personal status laws’ which are mainly derived from Islamic law. “They kept repeating sayings of the prophet in order to convince me to end my case.”

According to Da’ad Mousa, a prominent Damascus lawyer and women’s rights advocate, Syrian women enjoy many privileges in the public sphere that their counterparts in other parts of the Arab world are denied. They have relatively high rates of employment, political involvement and access to higher education. Fifteen percent of Syria’s lawyers are female, and in Syria’s parliament, 12% of the seats are held by women.

And yet, said Mousa, Syrian women continue to face discrimination in the personal sphere, particularly when it comes to issues of marriage and divorce.

“Women in Syria suffer from discrimination in their private lives, and it is not just related to tradition; it is also a legal discrimination,” said Mousa. A whole host of laws related to family life and women’s status should be completely rewritten, she suggested.

In Syria, there is no one court that specialises in family law. Rather, family issues are handled in three separate courts, for Muslims, Christians, and Jews, according to a range of personal status laws.

For Muslims, marriage, divorce and child custody issues are managed in the Islamic courts, located in each of Syria’s major cities. There are separate courts, known as the Spiritual Court, for both Jews and Christians, functioning, in the case of the Christians, according to the rules of each Christian sect. The Jewish courts are rarely used, although they have not been closed down.

All the courts function according to Syria’s code of personal status laws, which deal with issues related to inheritance and child custody. The personal status laws were first issued in 1953 and reformed by the People’s Assembly in 1975 and in 2003.

The latest reforms allowed divorced mothers four years extra custody over their children, up to the age of 15 for girls and 13 for boys, before the right to custody passes to the father. At 18 years old the child is deemed to be an adult and can choose to live wherever he or she pleases.

Lawyers and human rights activists say the laws are still badly in need of reform.

“The family law, which is called the personal status law, should be reviewed from the first article to the last one,” said Da'ad Mousa.

According to Syria’s personal status laws, for example, Syrian women do not have the right to pass along Syrian nationality to their children. Interfaith marriages and civil marriages are banned in Syria; even if a Syrian couple has a civil wedding abroad, their marriage will be considered illegal when they return home.

Syrian law is particularly harsh to women when it comes to divorce, say women who have been through divorce in Syrian courts. Men, according to the law, can divorce their wives directly and quickly, without a legal case, simply by telling the wife, “You are divorced,” three times.

On the other hand, women who want to divorce their husbands must navigate a multitude of legal hurdles, even though Islam theoretically gives women the right to divorce their husbands in the event of domestic violence or if the husband has a sexual problem. Women must file for separation, which generally takes about two years in Syria’s Islamic courts. If she wins the separation case, she is free to marry again.

According to Mohammed Ismaiel, a Damascus lawyer, Islam is the force that protected women’s rights to property, employment and education after generations of slavery and unfairness. The problem, he said, lies not with the laws themselves but in their implementation.

“The law is good, but the process of implementing it is really wrong,” Ismaiel said. “Prolonging the case is the main problem. We need to increase the numbers of Islamic courts and judges, and shorten the period between the trials,” he added.


Activists are currently working to change many aspects of Syria’s personal status laws. For example, an article in the personal status law gives men alone the right to pass along Syrian citizenship to their children. This poses problems for Syrian women who have short-lived marriages to foreigners; many young mothers find themselves abandoned by their foreign husbands, raising children in Syria who are not recognized by their fathers and who are denied Syrian nationality.

Not all of the legal issues that arise in families are handled in Syria’s separate religious courts. Some types of familial financial disagreements are handled in Syria’s civil courts, and issues of physical and sexual abuse in families, as well as the so-called ‘honour crimes,’ are handled in Syria’s criminal courts, the laws of which date from the French mandate era of the early 1920s.

Honour crimes typically occur when a man suspects a female relative of an illicit sexual affair, and then kills her, believing that doing so will restore his family’s ‘honour.’ Syrian lawyers and activists say that honour crimes are among the most common issues discussed in Syria’s criminal courts, and that men involved in such cases often go unpunished.

According to Da’ad Mousa, the lawyer, Syrian law actually takes into account the fact that such men would consider their female relatives’ actions a reflection on their ‘honour,’ and become incensed at the mere suspicion of an infraction. Though such cases are greatly underreported, Mousa said, more than 100 cases of honor killings were reported in Syrian newspapers between 2000 and 2003.

A group of Syrian women’s rights activists have recently launched a campaign called ‘Stop the Honour Killing,’ lobbying Syria’s parliament and Ministry of Justice to change the articles in the criminal law code (namely nos. 242, 241, 240, 239, and 548) which make it easier for men to escape punishment in the event of an honour killing. In September, a young Druze bride was killed by her brother because she had married outside her religion. Her death triggered a public outcry.

The organisers of the campaign have already collected 7,700 signatures in an online petition, and plan to send the petition to the president of Syria and the parliament, requesting changes to these articles.

Meanwhile, changes to these articles are being actively discussed in government.

“We are asking for changes to some articles in the personal status law because we feel that the current situation demands it,” said Mohammad Habash, an Islamist parliamentarian and head of the Islamic Studies Centre in Damascus. “I have personally asked for the removal of the articles in the criminal law code that permits honour killing because it directly contradicts Islam.”

Another group of women’s rights activists, the Etana Press, recently hosted a conference on the intersection of law and tradition in Syria and their effect on women’s rights. According to the conference’s organisers, their aim was to improve Syrian women’s legal status by creating dialogue between the Syrian government and local NGOs.

“This conference is trying to open a dialogue between the government and the activists, in addition to connecting between the people and the different organisations in Syria,” said Ma'an Abdelsalam, a human rights activist and the director of Etana press.

The conference, which was attended by delegations of women from all over the Middle East and Europeended by creating a list of sixteen recommendations to be presented to the Syrian government. The recommendations urged the government to review the articles of the criminal law code which make it easier for honour killings to take place, to reform the personal status law so that all Syrians are treated equally, regardless of religion or sect, to create a special civil family court for the resolution of legal issues related to the family, and to encourage religious figures to support the principle of equality between men and women.

For Loubna al Sahrif, though her experience of the Islamic law that drives the workings of Syria’s family courts was a painful one, she argues that it is the understanding of Islam that needs reform, rather than the faith itself.

“Even though for a long time time I felt like a social outcast, I am happy I did not give up and that I pursued my rights. We need to understand the way we understand and practise Islamic law.”


Courts dealing in family issues in Syria

The Islamic Court: Rules on personal issues, such as marriage, divorce and child custody, for all Syrian Muslims. The court works from the ‘personal status law’ which was issued in 1953 and was reformed by the People’s Assembly after a presidential decree in 1975 and 2003. This law is based on Islamic, or sharia’a law.

Spiritual Courts: For both Christians and Jewish from all sects.
The Christian court functions according to the particular laws of each Christian sect with regards to marriage divorce and personal issues. The court follows the ‘personal status law’ in solving other issues like inheritance and child custody.

Confessional Court: A court for the Druze, an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam, which functions according to Druze law.

Panel Court: Works from the criminal law that was issued on June 22, 1949, three years after Syria’s independence from France, and specialises in family crimes issues such as aggressiveness, family planning, abortion, rape, sexual abuse and so-called ‘honour crimes.’

Civil Court: Specialised in financial and estate disagreement between families and functions according to the Syrian civil law which was issued on May 18, 1949.

Asad's Speech to Lawyers Union Jan.

In his much-anticipated speech today Bashar al- Assad refused to submit to UN's interview request in Hariri's probe. The President's tone was less hostile to the US and Lebanon than it was during his speech of November 10, 2005 at the University of Damascus, though he blamed Lebanese officials for the failure of a Saudi Arabian initiative to defuse tensions between the two countries. All in all, there was not much new and Asad hewed to the message he has been refining for months. Reuters called Asad, "down beat."

President Bashar Assad, invoking Syria's national sovereignty, indicated Saturday he would not submit to an interview request from the U.N. investigation into Rafik Hariri's assassination. In a speech to the Arab Lawyers Union, Assad pledged, however, to continue cooperation with the international probe the former Lebanese premier's assassination.

The U.N. investigation has said Syria has not been sufficiently forthcoming and the Security Council demanded full cooperation.

"The issue of national sovereignty is paramount, not the (U.N.) Security Council decision, or others," Assad said. The Syrian leader did not specifically address the request by the U.N. investigation for an interview with him and his foreign minister about threats Assad allegedly made against Hariri months before the Feb. 14 assassination. That left open the possibility that he might later agree to meet with U.N. investigators, rather than submit to an interview.

"We should not give up our national sovereignty even if the circumstance requires that we fight for our country. We must be prepared for that.”

In a swipe at the Syrian opposition he said: "Anyone who accepts ... something to be above his national sovereignty in any country or place in the world, should swap his nationality and sacrifice it and take in its place an international one from the United Nations." He called the UN panel "a condemnation committee, not an investigation committee.”

Kofi Annan tried to softened the international reaction to Asad's speech by stating on Friday that Syria will facilitate the UN probe, which suggests he will accept Asad's refusal to testify on grounds of national sovereignty as legitimate.

Asad returned to his indirect accusations that Israel was behind the Hariri murder by accusing Israel of murdering Yasser Arafat when he said, "Of the many assassinations that Israel carried out in a methodical and organized way, the most dangerous thing that Israel did was the assassination of President Yasser Arafat."

On Reform, Asad let down Syrians who may still be expecting something dramatic. He said very little other than that he would not be pushed into things by the West. "Reform begins with our domestic needs and we totally reject any reform imposed from outside under any slogan or pretext," he said.

"We are still at the beginning of a long road, but we will not let it be said that we have achieved nothing. Maybe the (pace) is slow ... but we are speeding as much as possible.”

Asad referred in a general way to moving ahead with the new party law that was recommended at last June's Baath Party meeting, as well as to the anti-corruption campaign that he has talked about since coming to power, and developing an independent judiciary. He said:

We are undertaking several projects that will boost public participation and help enrich democratic life, whether it be linked to the parties’ law or to election and local government laws."

"We are also working on strengthening institutions, the rule of law and judicial independence to activate political life, enrich our national activities and remedy some negative symptoms it is facing.”

Sana has published these paragraphs from the speech

In his address at the Arab Bar Association Conference, President Bashar al-Assad has stressed that the Iraqi issue is a political, pan-Arab and moral earthquake to the Arab Nation and has created a new reality in the Middle East, the tragic feature of which have begun to surface on the structure of its societies, and to shake the conventions and national and pan-Arab affiliation.

“ Phenomenon of terrorism has begun to expand threatening to sabotage the national and social texture of the countries in the region due to wrong international and regional pre-mediated stances regarding the Arab Nation,” al-Assad said, pointing out that terrorism phenomenon is being used as a tool by some forces that allege combating terrorism to terrorize the others…

President al-Assad indicated in his address at the Arab Bar Association Conference that all roads have been blocked before the Middle East peace process not only because the Israeli governments rejection to respond to peace requirements and continuous denial of the Arab rights, but the current international situation and influential forces are not ready also to push the peace process forward, in addition to non commitment of the international community to meet its requirements regarding the peace process and stability in the region…

The current events and circumstances have been the results of the past decades but have intensified in recent years and the Arab nation in paying high price for strange projects and settling the debts of others on its land from the blood of its sons and their stability, " Al-Assad stressed in his address.

In his address at the Arab Bar Association which is being held in Damascus President al-Assad stresses that the stage through which the Arab nation is passing requires high sense of affiliation and readiness for giving and honest work in addition to clarity of vision and direction…

President Bashar al-Assad expressed high appreciation Saturday over the sincere efforts of the Arab lawyers in advocating the right and defending the Arab nation’s causes.

He lauded the Arab lawyers’ solidarity with Syria in the face of dangers surrounding her.

SANA

Yesterday's news was the Syria and Iran – Joint Statement that came at the end of the President of Iran's visit to Damascus.

Syria and Iran have agreed to launch joint projects in oil and land and air transport, the official Syria Times newspaper reported

Israeli Defense Ministers Shaul Mofaz blamed Iran and Syria for financing and ordering the Tel Aviv bombing. The defense establishment has "decisive proof that the attack in Tel Aviv was a direct result of the Axis of Terror that operates between Iran and Syria," said Mofaz. "Iran supplied the money, and [Islamic] Jihad's headquarters in Damascus directed the organization's operatives in Nablus, giving operational orders and instructions."

Syria denies it was involved in the Tel Aviv bombing

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in Damascus Jan. 20 at a meeting with the leaders of 10 Palestinian movements. Among the leaders present were Islamic Jihad head Abdullah Ramadan Shala, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-GC leader Ahmed Jibril. The Palestinian leaders pledged to continue their armed struggle and expressed solidarity with Syria as well as Iran and its right to nuclear technology.

"Defining Post-Syria Lebanon" by Michael Young

Riad Seif, the imprisoned member of parliament, who was freed yesterday after almost five years in jail said on al-Jazeera TV that he believes that the Assad regime cannot be reformed and that regime change is the only option available to Syrians.

Here is a fine article by Michael Young summing up the "two visions" of Lebanon that are dividing Shiite from Sunni, and indeed the rest of Lebanon.

PolicyWatch #1070
A Tale of Two Countries: Defining Post-Syria Lebanon

By Michael Young
January 20, 2006

When Shiite ministers recently “suspended” their participation in the Lebanese cabinet, though without resigning, it highlighted an increasingly apparent reality in post-Syria Lebanon: Two powerful camps coexist today. One, led by Hizballah, in alliance with the Amal movement, sits atop a Shiite community generally, though not unanimously, supporting their positions. The other reflects a cross-communal parliamentary majority, the cornerstone of which is the Sunni-led Future Movement of Saad Hariri, son of the murdered former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
This dichotomy is imperfect. Beyond sectarian affiliation, other fault lines divide the political actors, most importantly their attitude toward Syria. However, since the Syrian military withdrawal in April 2005, it would be fair to say that Lebanon is being buffeted by two broad visions for the future, and that the sectarian backdrop to this contest is mainly Sunni-Shiite, not Muslim-Christian, which was the main divide before Lebanon’s civil war began in 1975.

Two Visions for Post-Syria Lebanon

The Hariri vision is based on the classic urban merchant ideal, in which Lebanon is to be transformed into a liberal investment hub pursuing unhindered transactions with the West and the Arab world. Muslims and Christians must coexist in friendship, though the conservatism pervading this approach means the dictates of sectarianism are respected. Relations with Israel are to be governed by the 1949 Armistice Agreement, but no permanent agreement can be signed before all the Arab states accept peace. Proponents of this vision want the truth about who killed Rafiq Hariri, believe the Syrian regime was responsible, and have few qualms about seeing Damascus punished, whatever that means for regional stability. This vision is not strictly a Sunni one, but Sunnis are its main proponents and believe it embodies the values of the late prime minister.

The downside, and a potentially serious one, is that very different Sunni groups coexist under the Hariri “big tent.” Rafiq Hariri always highlighted the urbane moderation of his vision, but he could never completely conceal that, as a strong Sunni leader, he also appealed to radical Sunni Islamists and a Sunni underclass, both more likely to think in harsher sectarian terms than the pragmatists Hariri preferred to advertise.

Against this stands another vision, associated with the two Shiite parties—Hizballah and, far more ambiguously, the depleted Amal movement. This outlook is characterized by mistrust of the West, particularly the United States, and a desire to pursue the armed struggle against Israel, both in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. Proponents of this vision emphasize that Shiites have always staunchly defended Lebanese nationalism, have never cut deals with the outside, and proved their bona fides by expelling the Israelis in 2000. They refuse to regard Syria as an enemy, and recall that it was under the Syrians that Shiites were first given a prominent role in Lebanese political life. Economically, the parties oppose deep privatization of public utilities. Shiite employment in state institutions has been the paramount instrument of communal promotion in recent years. For poor Shiites, Hariri’s “merchant republic” offered few inducements. Even spatially, the community is concentrated in areas far from the rebuilt city center—the jewel in the crown of Hariri’s reconstruction of Beirut.

Many Shiites embrace this outlook, and specifically back Hizballah because, for the first time after decades of marginalization, the community is respected. No more ideological than others, Shiites nonetheless regard Hizballah’s militancy a badge of honor, and a legitimate lever with which to demand more in intersectarian bargaining. That is why they feel that UN efforts to disarm Hizballah will merely weaken their community once again. This dovetails with Hizballah’s own fear that, without weapons, it would be just another sectarian organization, forced to abandon its towering ambition to be a regional vanguard in the struggle against Israel and the United States. Arms also allow Hizballah to fulfill an implicit contract with Iran, whereby its threat to Israel from southern Lebanon can help deter an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. Neither the party nor its supporters sees a contradiction between Hizballah’s claim to be a guardian of Lebanese sovereignty and its alliances with Iran and Syria.

Goodbye Syria; Hello What?

Even before Syrian soldiers began pulling out of Lebanon, that prestidigitator of Lebanese minority politics, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, had grasped that the aftermath would be shaped by the struggle between the Hariri camp and Hizballah—between Sunnis and Shiites. That is why he sought to mediate between the two, hoping to enhance his own authority. The practical impact of this was Jumblatt’s engineering of a consensus around a controversial law governing parliamentary elections in summer 2005. The law gerrymandered districts so that Hizballah and Amal could maintain large blocs in the 128-seat parliament, despite the Syrian departure, while Jumblatt and Hariri expanded their sway.

The initial losers were the Christians, whose most powerful politician, Michel Aoun, was left out of the deal. However, the angry backlash in the Christian community was such that Aoun, who had just returned from exile, swept all seats in the Christian heartland, establishing his own substantial bloc. Aoun has tried to remain nonaligned in the Hariri-Hizballah faceoff, but his electors deeply mistrust Hizballah’s relationship with Syria, compelling him to strengthen his ties with the Hariri-Jumblatt alliance.

After the elections, Jumblatt’s strategy was to continue collaborating with the Shiites in a new government. The Druze leader induced the inexperienced Hariri to approve the re-election of Amal leader Nabih Birri as speaker of parliament, though Birri had been a main prop of Syrian hegemony. And when Hariri’s associate, Fouad Siniora, formed a government, he made sure Hizballah and Amal received key portfolios—the first time Hizballah entered the cabinet. However, this was an unnatural marriage. Soon, the compromise between the Hariri-Jumblatt camp and Hizballah and Amal turned into a virtual divorce.

The professed reason was passage, by a cabinet majority vote led by Hariri’s and Jumblatt’s ministers, of a decision asking the UN to form a tribunal “with an international coloring” to try those responsible for Rafiq Hariri’s murder. Hizballah and Amal, at least publicly, declined to sanction the decision and suspended their participation in cabinet sessions. In fact, the dispute went deeper, capping a period of palpable tension as Hizballah and Amal refused to adopt positions that might harm Syria. Damascus fears an international or mixed tribunal because it would have the power to convict Syrians, without the Syrian regime’s being able to control the outcome. The Shiite ministers were also displeased with Siniora’s running of cabinet sessions, where he often outmaneuvered them. He understood they could not resign, since Hizballah views its participation in the government as institutional cover to resist surrendering its arms.

Deadlock prevails to this day, with no clear sign when a solution might be forthcoming. Hizballah sought to make Hariri back an agreement that would have traded a Shiite return to the cabinet for Hariri’s approval of a resolution defending against the party’s disarmament. Hariri, rejected this, spurred on by the versatile Jumblatt, who, after failing to break Hizballah away from Syria, became the party’s most vociferous critic.

No consensus exists on a vision for Lebanon. Hizballah’s strategic alliances with Syria and, more significantly, Iran make improbable a serious dialogue on disarmament, which the party’s leaders consider an existential threat. Nor does Hizballah feel an urge to compromise, since it retains support among Shiites. The Hariri-Jumblatt tandem, in turn, controls a slight majority in parliament, but suffers from the physical absence of Saad Hariri, who lives outside Lebanon, fearing assassination. Moreover, Hariri is said to be under pressure from the Saudis to be more conciliatory with Syria, since Riyadh does not want events in Lebanon to destabilize the Syrian regime. The sectarian contours of the Hariri-Hizballah rivalry are sharpening, and while violence remains unlikely, the fight for Lebanon’s soul will continue for some time to come.

Michael Young is opinion editor of Lebanon’s Daily Star newspaper and a contributing editor at Reason magazine.

Dalila - apologies

Yes, I did fall into BP's trap. (You got me.) I apologize for suggesting that Arif Dalilah is sectarian minded and not a total Syrian, which caused a firestorm of complain and recrimination in my comment section. My fault. In haste, I copied a short bio of Dalilah sent by one of my readers which said that "he called for the Alawite sect not to follow the Assad family in their sectarian policies. He believed that this will cause the demise of the Alawite people."

I am a bit surprised that JAM, of all SC readers, would get so exercised by this statement as it is the line that he has been preaching. All the same, I have no knowledge that Dalilah thinks about Alawites as a community or would suggest a political strategy to them. Here is the information about Dalila that JAM suggests we read for the truth.

Also, I did not suggest he had been freed. My post began: "Unfortunately, Dr Kamal al-Labwani and Professor Aref Dalilah remain incarcerated."

News Round UP (January 18, 2006)

The big news today is that Syria freed some of the Damascus Spring prisoners: Riad Seif, Mamoun al Homsi, Fawaz Tello, Walid al-Bunni and Habib Isa were released today. Unforturnately, Dr Kamal al-Labwani and Professor Aref Dalilah remain incarcerated.

Here is BBC: Syria frees opposition activists

Syria has released two prominent opposition activists, who were jailed for five years in 2002, their lawyer has said.
Anwar al-Bunni said former independent MPs Riyad Sayf and Mamun al-Himsi had been released in Damascus.

The two were arrested in September 2001 after the authorities restricted open discussion by civil society groups.

Last June, opposition figures and intellectuals signed a letter urging the release of political prisoners.

They also called for the abolition of Syria's 42-year-old emergency law, which activists say permits arbitrary arrests and trials.

"The judiciary has decided to release them," Mr Bunni told the AFP news agency.

The two men were convicted in April 2002 for attempting to change the constitution by force and forming an illegal organization.

In November, Syria freed 190 political prisoners, including two prominent human rights activists, Mohammed Raadoun and Ali Abdullah.

Readers have sent in short bios of the Damascus Spring prisoners (thanks)
Dr. Aref Dalilah:

He studied economics at the universities of Damascus and Aleppo and became the Dean of Economics at the University of Aleppo in 1998. He used his posts in academia to call for freedom of expression, liberal economics policies, and the strengthening of civic societies, which got him in trouble with the government. A renowned publisher of papers and thesis in economic sciences, he was harassed constantly by the Syrian intelligence for his views that he expressed openly.

He was sentenced to a 10-year prison term on September 20, 2000, during Baschar al-Assad’s first 5 months of rule, after he called for the Alawite sect not to follow the Assad family in their sectarian policies. He believed that this will cause the demise of the Alawite people.

Dr. Dalilah is not known for any enmity towards the United States or its allies. His release will enhance the image of the US in Syria.

Riad Seif:

As a Member of the Parliament, he engaged fully in the “Spring of Damascus” by opening his home to intellectuals and academics for open democracy forums.

He was imprisoned on September 6, 2001 for five years for his public criticism of the Makhlouf family (cousins to the Assads) and a book he wrote on corruption in the bidding of the Syrian cellular license, which incidentally was granted to the Makhloufs thus exposing corruption within the Assad family. It is believed that even when his prison term expires, he will not be released because of his charisma and popularity.

Mr. Seif is a Sunni Muslim, liberal in his views, and is not known to have been critical of the United States or its allies. His daughter has visited Germany in the hope that the German government can support his freedom, which they did but to no avail. His release will be a big blow for Ba’athism and will enhance the image of the US in Syria.

Here is a short blurb I sent to Sami Moubayed about the releases:

Everyone is trying to assess the importance of the release of the Damascus Spring prisoners. The optimists, who have been saying all along that Bashar al-Asad is a frustrated reformer, will take heart. They will point to the release as the first major sign that their president is finally ready to move ahead with domestic reform. What had stopped him in the past? The "old guard." With the ouster of ex-Vice President, Abdul Halim Khaddam, the consummate "old guard" infighter and nemesis of the President, the optimists argue, Bashar al-Asad can precede with his stalled reform program.

The pessimists will see this as a political stunt. Long ago they dismissed their president as a Baathist ideologue, who is incapable of real reform. Some even argue that the old guard was smarter than the new.

Syria has many reforms sitting on the shelf. We will have to see if they are dusted off and given real life in the political process. Hemmed in by an international investigation and facing recriminations from all sides, Syrians are desperate for some good news. Many Syrians will be willing to forgive Asad for his foreign policy blunders if he can grow the economy and convince them that he will not drive the country toward poverty.

Bashar al-Assad will make an important speech on Saturday, announcing internal reforms.

The other big news is the Cheney visit to the region. He is trying to push a Saudi deal that will bring Syria to justice, without destabilizing the region. Here is a bit of an article:

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney on Tuesday held talks with Saudi, Egyptian and Lebanese leaders in a bid to resolve a stand-off between Syria and the United Nations over the assassination of a former Lebanese premier.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two Arab heavyweights who are key U.S. allies in the region, are trying to defuse tension over the killing of ex-Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, and Saudi officials have talked of a Saudi mediation effort.

Analysts say Egypt and Saudi Arabia are worried that the crisis between Syria and the U.N. could escalate and detract attention from other problems destabilizing the region.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal told Britain's Financial Times in an interview published on Tuesday that the kingdom had made proposals for an agreement, but was waiting for a response from Beirut and Damascus.

Prince Saud said Saudi Arabia had urged Syria to co-operate with the UN probe “without reservations”.

Arab press reports have cited a seven-point plan, worked out by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that includes putting an end to media campaigns, ceasing provocative statements from politicians, exchanging diplomatic representation and co-ordinating foreign policy.

Trish Schuh, the author of the recently quoted article that accused Farid Ghadry's Syria Reform Party of being linked to Abramoff, sends this note:

Dear Mr. Landis,

I am the original author of the comment/article on Syria that Mr. Farid Ghadry denied (concerning his relationship w/ Jack Abramoff).

As per Reform Party of Syria not using "shared office space" with Jack Abramoff: I personally checked with different sources- including the building maintenance crew on duty concerning the RPS, because RPS is not listed in the building's lobby directory- and none of the staff knew of it and the doorman claimed they'd never gotten mail under that name. Nor did the receptionist/secretary on duty know of the RPS. This is not how a legitimate organization usually runs.

I returned to Abramoff's office (2 or 3 times total) and finally insisted they look through Abramoff's client roster. Then the secretary on duty at "Middle Gate Ventures" found RPS listed in her files. She even gave me RPS's number to call- which accurately matched the number on the official RPS website.

I then requested to speak to a supervisor who could give an RPS statement on the "latest" in Lebanon. The supervisor declined, saying she didn’t know and that they were not authorized to speak to the press.

Thank you,
Trish Schuh

Sami Moubayed has written an important article, "Iran and the art of crisis management," in which he argues for the appeasement of Ahmadinejad. The crux of his argument is that there is a system of checks and balances in the Iranian government, unlike the often invoked but "false" historical analogies with Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. It is an intriguing argument. Moubayed believes Ahmadinejad's many Iranian enemies will depose him, if they are not silenced by American and Israeli saber rattling. It is a worthy argument, but one that, I fear, is already lost. Both Washington and Israel have their own elections to run and saber rattling serves too many important domestic purposes to be sheathed.

T_desco writes wrote in the comment section:

It turns out that Ibrahim Michel Jarjoura is indeed a new Hussam:

Another Witness Testifies with Perjury into Assassination of Hariri

The witness Ibrahim Michel Jarjoura said he was forced to offer a false and fabricated testimony against Syria at the international investigation committee into the assassination of former Lebanese Premier Rafik al-Hariri because he was under threats and pressures to do so.

Jarjoura told Lebanese satellite NEW TV channel in an interview overnight that some Lebanese figures, particularly Deputy and Minister Marwan Hamada, forced him, in return to some promises, to retell the fabricated story to the international probe and the Lebanese Attorney Said Mirza as well as Bahiya Hariri, sister of the slain Hariri. SANA

The U.S. Treasury Department just ordered U.S. banks to block any assets found in the U.S. belonging to Assef Shawkat. Americans are also barred from doing business with him. The department alleged that Shawkat has played a role in furthering Syria’s “support for terrorism and interference in the sovereignty of Lebanon”. (Thanks Ehsani)

Khaddam makes fresh accusations to Saudi-based newspaper Al Watan:

The former Syrian vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam said that some groups in Syria seized the money of the sons of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Uday and Qusay) after the Syrian authorities returned them back to Iraq.

Khaddam revealed that the sons of the former Iraqi president fled to Syria with their money and stayed there for one month until the Syrian authorities forced them to go back to Iraq without their money. Meanwhile, Khaddam denied the news, which claimed that he owns a fortune of about $2.1 billion, and accused the relatives of the Syrian president of corruption, specially Ramy Makhlouf, a close relative of the Syrian president who used to ask for 30 per cent from Gulf investors in return for any project in Syria.

Oxford Business Group just released this interesting article about the Arab Gas Pipeline:
Syria: Straight is the Gate
18 January 2006

Syria’s troubled relations with its western neighbour Lebanon have recently stood in contrast to its links with northern neighbour Turkey.

Events this month have driven home the point too, as a number of new link ups between Damascus and Ankara were announced. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, new steps are underway in an ambitious cross border energy project that could be set to bloom after the recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine.

Yet links between Damascus and Ankara have not all been on a positive note. While ordinarily encouraging cross border traffic, January has also seen Syria engaged in some frantic efforts to prevent one particular import from the north: bird flu.

By January 17, an outbreak of the virus in Turkey had killed four, with a fifth death suspected to have also been the result of the contagion. Some half million birds have so far been destroyed in Turkey’s efforts to contain and eliminate the virus, but despite this, the World Health Organisation and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation recommended neighbouring countries also take precautions.

Syria had already responded, testing some 18,000 birds along its 500-km northern frontier for the disease, while culling poultry and wild birds in towns within the same area. The Agriculture Ministry says that none of the tests proved positive.

The authorities also declared a state of emergency in the border region and in the northern cities of al-Qamishli and al-Hasaka. In the former, live poultry markets have been closed while municipal workers and health and agriculture ministry officials have handed out guidelines to all poultry sellers on how to prevent the spread of bird flu.

One great concern is migratory birds from Turkey, whose flight path brings them into Syria, may bring the deadly H5N1 strain of the disease with them.

On a more positive note, however, news of the bird flu measures came alongside news of a new road construction project that will likely greatly enhance trade between Turkey and Syria.

State news agency SANA reported on January 16 that 60 km of new highway would be built on the Turkish side of the border. The route will help trucks and other heavy vehicles crossing at the Kilis border town by creating a bypass around the southern Turkish city of Gaziantep. The road is set to shave some 50 km off the distance currently travelled by Syrian truckers heading for the Turkish Mediterranean ports of Mersin and Iskenderun.

At the same time, this year also saw a further easing of restrictions during Eid on Turkish and Syrian family members – separated by the border – meeting to exchange gifts and greetings.

SANA reported thousands of Turks had crossed into the Syrian northern governorate of Idelb during the religious holiday, with the Turkish governor of neighbouring Antakya province holding a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart.

Yet one more cross border link that could in future be not just regionally significant, but globally so, has also been back in the news lately.

This time, it concerns energy, with the recent dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas supplies causing many European countries to start a radical rethink of their energy strategies. In this reappraisal, alternative sources to Russian gas have been looked at once again – giving an added boost to plans for an ambitious Caspian/Middle Eastern-European pipeline, known as Nabucco.

This scheme aims to supply Europe with gas from a variety of origins. A series of sub pipelines would converge in Turkey, where the main artery would then flow across the Bosphorus into Europe, up through the Balkans and finally to a point just outside Vienna, where it would link into a variety of other European pipeline networks.

One of the original sub-pipelines – along with those from Iran and Caspian states such as Turkmenistan – may be the Arab Gas Pipeline. This finished its second phase mid-January, with a link from the Hussein power station in Aqaba, Jordan, to the city of Rehab near the Jordanian-Syrian border completed.

Test pumping has also started, the news agency ANI reported on January 14. Along the 393-km long pipeline, Egyptian gas will be supplied to a number of countries, including Jordan, Syria, Turkey and, via Nabucco, Europe.

The Arab Gas Pipeline can carry some 10bn cu metres of Egyptian gas per year, with this second phase alone costing some $300m.

In the third phase, the link will be continued across the frontier from Rehab to the Deir Ali power station in Syria, a further 342 km, and will then be routed to Rayan, near Homs, and from there to Turkey and onwards.

The third phase will be built by Russia’s Strointransgas, and is expected to cost around $400m.

Yet as far as the main artery, Nabucco, is concerned, no final decision has yet been taken on whether to take the scheme off the drawing board and actually start breaking ground.

“The formal decision to start building the pipeline has not been made yet,” a spokesman for OMV – the Austrian firm heavily involved in the project – said January 3. “You’ve got to check what the demand situation is before you make this decision. The joint venture is negotiating contracts with potential buyers right now.”

The Nabucco joint venture consists of OMV, Turkish company Botas, Hungarian fuels group MOL, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz and Romania’s Transgaz.

The companies involved are currently trying to attract new partners for the project, which could cost around 5bn euros.

Spreading the risk further may therefore be a wise move, particularly given the political instability of the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions from which Nabucco draws its gas, with Iran a particular worry for European investors and governments.

Yet as far as the Arab gas link up is concerned, the future is already arriving, with Syria a key transit country. Such link ups are also good for Syrian-Turkish relations, which are themselves widely recognised in Damascus for their growing importance.

“Turkey is considered Syria’s gate to Europe, while Syria poses as Turkey’s gate to the Arab world,” Information Minister Mehdi Dakhlallah told SANA in Washington on January 15.

This gate, it seems, is now opening ever wider.
[end]

Abdullah Ta'i on "How Syrians Responded to Khaddam" (in Arabic)

Syria After Khaddam
By Abdullah Ta'i
January 10, 2006

This article has been pulled at the request of the author. He believes it is too sharp to be released in Arabic and promises an English translation. (Joshua Landis)

Michel Kilo: Sharaa Subordinating Lebanese Sovereignty to Syria

MEMRI has translated Michel Kilo's powerful article:
"Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara' is Subordinating Lebanese Sovereignty to Syrian Interests"
January 17, 2006 No.1071

In an article published in the London Arabic-language daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Syrian intellectual Michel Kilo, who resides in Damascus, attacked the Syrian regime, comparing it to the Soviet regime, and hinted that it was responsible for the assassination of Lebanese public figures.

The following are excerpts: [1]

"In a Cairo [press conference], Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara' announced a new principle of modern Arab diplomacy, which might be called the 'Al-Shara' principle.' [This principle] limits Lebanese sovereignty, links this sovereignty to the Syrian regime, and states that a free and independent Lebanon is necessarily a center and a base for plots against Syria... [2]

"The Al-Shara' principle is reminiscent of the principle once [established] by [Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev, which stated that the various socialist states had [only] limited sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. [These states] could not act as they pleased, but had to give priority to the interests and security of the Soviet bloc in any measure they took and in any means they employed. This principle established the Soviets' right to take over the internal affairs of the socialist states, and legitimized Soviet military intervention against them...

"The Al-Shara' principle is reminiscent of the Brezhnev principle. [since the Syrian regime] - like [the Soviet regime] - thinks that Lebanon should formulate its policy according to Syrian interests. Moreover, the Syrian regime requires [Lebanon] to coordinate all matters, great or small, with Syria, since the minute Beirut becomes independent [of Damascus], the situation in Lebanon becomes an international affair. And in such a case, [Syria believes that it] has the right to intervene [in Lebanese matters] in order... to prevent Lebanon from becoming a center for conspiracies against it..."

Lebanon Must Keep in its Place... If it Forgets, There are a Thousand Ways to Remind it. "What is the meaning of the Al-Shara' principle, and where might its implementation lead the two countries?"

"First of all, Syria wishes to treat Lebanon as a marginal [party] while the Syrian regime [is perceived] as central. [This means] that the center will take the decisions and the periphery will obey, or else [pay the price].

"Secondly, the Syrian regime is determined to adopt the Soviet model,... [and] has taken military and political control of Lebanon. It tried to usurp the PLO's [authority] in taking decisions regarding Palestine, and wanted to control the PLO according to [its own] political guidelines and interests.

"In addition, it has forced Jordan to respect [Syrian] hegemony and control over the Arab East, and has compelled Saudi Arabia to accept a division of labor in which Saudi Arabia's role is to provide the funds and Syria's role is to call the shots, intimidate the neighboring countries, and keep them quiet. This comes in addition to a tragic series of oppressive actions against very large sectors of Syrian society.

"Lebanon, peripheral and marginal, is required to keep in its place even after the Syrian army has withdrawn from its territory, and if it forgets, there are a thousand ways to remind it - either through dialogue or through operations in the field.

"Another implication [of the Al-Shara' principle] is that nobody may reprimand Syria for performing (what is sees as) its national duty towards Lebanon... Syria has an obligation to liberate Lebanon from subordination to foreigners, which is very dangerous [for Syria, since] it is aimed against [Syria], and against its role as the last bastion standing fast against America and Israel."

Syria Leaves Lebanon With Only Two Options: To Accept the Return of the Syrian Forces, or to Risk Constant Escalation of the Situation
"According to Syrian propaganda, Lebanon is the arena of a struggle... to save Syria's brothers [i.e. the Lebanese] and to protect the Syrian regime. If [Lebanese] are hurt in the course of [Syria's struggle for their sake], this is [only] because their country has become a base for foreign [forces] that must be eliminated. [Moreover], as everyone knows, liberty comes at a price, and the price is sometimes paid by innocent people. But even if [these innocent people] are killed by their [Syrian] brothers, they are... victims [of the foreign interference in Lebanon],... [since] Syria has the right to defend itself in any way and by any means against the Lebanese leaders, who cannot be anything other than foreign agents.

"Another implication [of the Al-Shara' principle] is that it leaves the Lebanese with only two options: either to [accept] Syria's return to their land, or to be subjected to a variety of ever-escalating [measures], in which [Syria] is entitled to use any [available] means to achieve its goal of protecting itself against Lebanon. This will be achieved either by the return of the Syrian forces into Lebanon, or by bringing Lebanon to the point where it agrees to [Syrian] limitations on its sovereignty, and accepts [Syria's] right to determine [Lebanon's] policy and interests, and even to control [Lebanon].

"This is the Al-Shara' principle. Therefore, do not expect any breakthrough or improvement in Syrian-Lebanese relations unless the Arab [states] - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, etc. - invest tremendous efforts in modifying this principle and [Al-Shara's] mentality towards Lebanon. Moreover, the Al-Shara' principle will not be the last escalation, and the painful events recently experienced by the Lebanese [people] will not be the last [either]."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), December 24, 2005.

[2] On December 6, 2005, Al-Shara' met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, after which he told reporters: "The problem [with Syrian-Lebanese relations] is that there are parties inside and outside Lebanon which are trying to internationalize the Lebanese issue. To achieve this, they are making use of the investigation [of Al-Hariri's assassination], so that [its] goal will no longer be to expose the truth, but to generate a negative change in Lebanon and in the region by bringing pressure on Syria and Lebanon every day and by every [possible] means, legitimate or illegitimate." Al-Thawra (Syria), December 7, 2005.

In a press conference following Assad's December 20 meeting with Mubarak in Cairo, Al-Shara' said: "Most of the attacks on Syria come from [parties outside the country], and there are, of course, [elements] in Lebanon that lend themselves to be used for this purpose..." Al-Thawra (Syria), December 21, 2005.

Bremer and Khaddam: Is Something Happening in Syria? What will the Endgame be?

Paul Bremer's revelation that President Bashar al-Asad asked Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Iraq to "issue a fatwa calling for a jihad against the Coalition," in 2003 at the time of the American invasion has renewed the debate over regime-change in Syria. The Wall Street Journal published an editorial on January 12, 2006 claiming to be shocked by this revelation; it suggested that the US should "strike hard" at Syria (I copy the editorial below). Barry Rubin also believes "Something big is happening in Syria," the title of his most recent editorial. He bets Syria is going to blow.

Bremer's revelation is not new news, however. Syria was on record as opposing the American invasion of Iraq. The now deceased Grand Mufti of Syria, Sheikh Ahmed Kaftaru, issued a fatwa at the outset of the invasion declaring jihad an individual duty for every Muslim. Syria facilitated fighters from all over the Arab world to join the struggle in Iraq, offering them buses to the border and basic geographical guidance during the first months of the war. Abdullah Ta'i, who is from Bu Kamal, the main jumping off point on the Syrian-Iraqi border, has described this process in some detail for "Syria Comment." He interviewed people from Bu Kamal who witnessed the flow of insurgents as well as jihadists who joined the resistance. The fact that Syria went so far as to urge others, including the Shiites, in Iraq to fight against the Americans should not be surprising. On the contrary, we should be surprised if Syria had neglected to encourage Iraqis to join its efforts to repel the Americans.

Syria's strategy at the outset of the war was driven by the fear that the US would invade Syria. A number of influential US commentators were recommending this and according to news reports, Bush reject a proposal to allow US forces to continue across the border and on to Damascus in March.

Readers of SC have been engaging in a heated discussion of whether Syria's policy to actively encourage resistance to the American invasion was foolish. Some claim that Syria had little choice because of the anti-Syrian mood in the US and the gung-ho spirit that drove US ambitions to call for transforming the Middle East. Others argue that if Bashar had accommodated the US in Iraq, Syria might still have troops in Lebanon. At the very least, they maintain, Syria would not be isolated diplomatically, as it is today. They also suggest that Syria should have given up Lebanon gracefully when the US demanded free presidential elections.

This debate comes on the heals of the Tueni assassination and the demand by the UN investigation to interview President Asad about the Hariri assassination. Secretary Rice renewed threats recently to refer Syria to the Security Council should it stonewall. Washington believes that this time the international community will not be able to give Syria a pass, particularly after the damaging testimony of Vice President Khaddam.

Flynt Leverett is being lambasted by the right for having advocated positive engagement with Syria following the war. In his defense, Robert Dreyfuss takes up the engagement argument in his January 16 article, "Syria In Their Sights," published by "The American Conservative." He writes:

The Bush administration’s neocons wanted a showdown with Syria, while the realists at the CIA and the State Department sought a settlement. The prospects of a U.S.-Syria deal reached their high-water mark in September 2004. During that period, top U.S. officials, including William Burns of the State Department, visited Syria to talk about getting Syria’s help in shutting down the Syria-Iraq border, establishing joint U.S.-Syrian border patrols, and providing Syria with high-tech surveillance gear to help stop the infiltration of Islamist radicals into Iraq.

What went wrong? He generously argues that it was not the pig-headedness of Bashar. Rather he blames the disruption of these negotiations on the Israelis and neocons. He writes:

That all came to a crashing end a few days later after an assassination that stunned the world—no, not Hariri’s, but the murder of Izzedine Sheik Khalil, a top official of Hamas, apparently by Israel’s Mossad, in a huge car bomb in Damascus. It was the latest in a string of Israeli provocations against Syria, including the killing of a Hamas leader in Beirut, an Israeli air force strike at a Palestinian training camp outside Damascus, and Israeli overflights that buzzed the Assad family’s home in Latakia. Not without reason, Syria’s Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa charged that the Israeli assassination was meant specifically to disrupt the progress in U.S.-Syrian relations. And so it did.

Not coincidentally, the end of the thaw in relations between Washington and Damascus occurred as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559, aimed at putting pressure on Syria to end its presence in Lebanon. Along with SALSA, Resolution 1559—which followed a stupid and clumsy attempt by Assad to extend the presidency of the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud of Lebanon—set into motion the train of events that led to Hariri’s assassination on Valentine’s Day 2005. By October 2004, a full-blown crisis between the United States and Syria was underway. Even the Washington Post began calling for war.

But it is not just leftist commentators, such as Dreyfuss, who are decrying the way Syria-US relations have been handled.

Henry Kissinger, the ubber-realist, did the same in a Washington Post op-ed of the 18th of December 2005. He recommends that "The time has come not only to define the strategic future in Iraq but also to broaden the base of political consultation in the region at large." To do this he recommends setting up "A political contact group including key European allies, India (because of its Muslim population), Pakistan, Turkey and some neighbors of Iraq should be convoked after the Iraqi election. Political discussions between the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad and Iranian authorities regarding Iraq have already been approved."

Syria's membership in the contact group is not mentioned by Kissinger, but it is clear he intends Damascus to be brought in, for he warns that "these cannot be the sole contacts with Baghdad's neighbors." He goes on to explain why it is important to put stabilizing Iraq above Bush's "democracy" agenda. Kissinger argues, "The functions of the contact group would be to advise on the political evolution of Iraq, to broaden the basis of legitimacy of the government and to reflect a broad international interest in the stability and progress of the region."

Why does Kissinger argue that it is important to stabilize Iraq before pushing ahead with Greater Middle East Reform, i.e. democracy? I think it is clear. Without a stable Iraq, nothing good is going to happen in the Middle East. Progress toward democracy in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and elsewhere will be shelved. Dictators will point to Iraq and say to their people: "There for the grace of God go thou."

That is precisely what is happening in Syria, and it is working. Bashar has the Syrian people over a barrel. He has given them a choice of Iraqi style chaos or sticking with Asad stability and dictatorship. Syrians, I am willing to wager, will chose stability, despite Khaddam's and US efforts, because they don't see a third option. This conservatism on the part of Syrians will cost the Lebanese their chance of freeing themselves from Syrian intimidation. We have already seen US timidity in the face of Mubarak's challenge. He gave the US a whiff of Muslim Brother victory, and Washington has gone silent on its democracy agenda. America is spooked by the Islamic violence in Iraq.

Instead of changing its Iraq policy, America is going to go after Iran and Syria for being bad and mucking up their plans. This strategy will further exacerbate instability in Iraq, which will in turn require the use of more force and spook Middle Easterners away from democracy and any reliance the US. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are intervening on Syria's behalf, not because they like Asad, but because they fear Iraqi type chaos spreading into Syria. Asad has convinced them that he must stay. They fear that the US, left to its devices, will continue to do the wrong thing and stir up more trouble in the region. Of course, both Saudi and Egypt are insisting that Syria comply with the UN security council and cooperate with the Hariri investigation, but they are also searching for a way that this can be done without destabilizing Syria or overly taxing the regime. Taxing the Asad regime is precisely what Washington is trying to accomplish through the investigation, thus Riyadh and Washington are working at cross purposes. They don't agree on what price the Asad regime should pay for assassinating Hariri. Russia and China will both be happy to see the Saudis succeed in finessing Washington on the Syria situation, even if that means leaving the Lebanese to languish in their Syrian induced purgatory.

This brings us back to Iraq. Without some positive resolution to the Iraq situation, Washington will fail to promote democracy in the region, even in the most promising corners, such as Lebanon. It is failing in its attempts to discipline Asad.

Many readers have asked me if I believe Bashar can be successful in his strategy of confrontation. My hunch is that he can, at least in the short run - that is before the Syrian economy grinds down over the coming years, but by that time, Bush will be gone and who knows what US policy will be in the region or on what part of the globe Washington's attention will be focused. Bashar may also fumble through on the economy for longer than we think, just as his father did.

So far, Bashar is not as weak as some try to make us believe. There is no effective opposition, despite Khaddam's recent defection. His bluster about forming a unified opposition is just that, bluster. Who will give him leadership of their movement? He certainly won't join anyone as junior partner. Until there are signs of a real force on the ground that can push the Asads aside, I remain skeptical that the Asad regime will be dislodged.

As for the Khaddam notion that something big is brewing within Syria, I also don't buy it. I interpreted Ghazi Kanaan's demise to mean that the regime is being vigilant and not taking chances. It will purge anyone thinking of joining a coup. Also, Syria is not the Soviet Union, where Gorbachov led de-communization and cozied up to Reagan and the US. Bashar is not about to oversee de-Baathification. We now know that. Baathism still has a purchase on the Syrian imagination. Even if most Syrians know that the Baath is a corrupt organization, they still cling to many of its principles. Most importantly, they believe that the West is out to get them. Even those Syrians who are inclined to believe that the intentions of the US are pristine do not trust the US. They don't think it has the know how or competence to oversee regional change. Once again we return to the Iraq example.

This is why it is so important to get Iraq on the right path. If Bremer had one important message, it wasn't that Syria opposed America, it was that he and other US administrators were constantly asked to lie. He explained on TV this morning that he was given the choice between toeing Rumsfeld's line or resigning. He toed the line and said things were going fine in Iraq, when he knew they weren't. It was Vietnam all over again. Bush is still saying things are going fine and insisting that he can push ahead with plans to reform the Greater Middle East, challenge Iran, Syria and Hizbullah and fix Iraq to boot. He can't. Kissinger is insisting on a radical shift in policy because he doesn't believe Bush is winning. He believes Iraq is the key.

Syria as it is now ruled, will not last forever. It can't. The United States cannot make a deal with Syria now. The Hariri murder put an end to any deal making. Egypt's recent attempts to sound out the Lebanese on a deal demonstrated that the Lebanese are in no mood for such a thing. The Saudis proved the same in Jidda. Rice insists that the investigation must go to its end, which probably means that Bashar al-Asad is going to be named as a suspect at the end of the day. All the same, few countries want sanctions imposed on Syria. This makes it nearly impossible to envisage how the Syrian regime will be punished at the end of the day.

Because of the Hariri investigation, many analysts, such as my friend Tony Badran, are arguing that it is no longer about Iraq, but about Lebanon. They believe that the Saudis really want Asad to get nailed and that is why they are urging Syria's cooperation with the Hariri investigation. But it is also possible that the Saudis don't really know what they want. They may want to punish the Syrians, keep their Lebanese friends happy by pursuing the investigation, and keep France and the US happy by pursuing the investigation. And yet, at the same time, avoid any real confrontation that could bring down the Syrian regime or end in sanctions because they have been spooked by Iraq. I think most countries are caught in the same dilemma. They want to punish Syria, but they don't really want to punish Syria.

If this is the case, it means that the present impasse between Syria and the UN and between Lebanon and Syria could go on for a long time, grinding away without a clear resolution. There is no possibility of a detente between Washington and Syria. At the same time, it is very difficult to envisage how a change in Syria will occur. This forces me to conclude that we will see more of what we have been seeing. Syria will be condemned but not disciplined. The investigation will proceed from one report to another. Then there will have to be a trial, God knows how or where. The Lebanese will speak out, but not gain security. The Syrians will continue with their double track, cooperating and resisting. As of yet, I don't see an endgame.
[end]


Here is the Wall Street Journal editorial of January 12, 2006:

The former U.S. proconsul in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, is in the news this week for claiming in his new book that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ignored his requests for more troops. Mr. Bremer played down that point in a visit to our offices this week, insisting that Mr. Rumsfeld had immediately relayed those requests to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who ultimately turned them down.

But Mr. Bremer also called our attention to one very underplayed revelation that deserves wide notice.

He writes that in the fall of 2003 he was told about a secret attempt by Syrian President Bashar Assad to incite the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the pre-eminent Shiite cleric in Iraq, against Americans. Mr. Bremer was told by a messenger that the Ayatollah had received a secret communiqué from Mr. Assad urging him to "issue a fatwa calling for a jihad against the Coalition," similar to the one the Shia had called against British occupying forces in 1920.

"This was an act of extraordinary irresponsibility from Syria's president," Mr. Bremer writes. "We had good intelligence showing that many insurgents and terrorists were coming into Iraq through Syria. But the message from Assad essentially incited Shia rebellion. If [Assad] were to succeed, the Coalition would face an extremely bloody two-front uprising, costing thousands of lives, including Americans."

In the event, the Ayatollah turned the Syrians down, knowing as he did how the 1920 uprising proved to be disaster for Shiites that only perpetuated minority Sunni rule for the rest of the 20th century. But it's worth recalling that even in 2003 there were important voices in the U.S. foreign policy establishment urging President Bush to work with the Syrian dictator.

Thus former CIA and State Department analyst Flynt Leverett testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2003 that "Bashar could be a suitable subject for diplomatic engagement" provided the U.S. makes its policy expectations for him clear. "There is a lot of discussion in Washington right now about new sticks in our Syria policy," Mr. Leverett testified. "But I don't hear much discussion about carrots; indeed, the Bush Administration resists intensely any such discussion."

Now we know just why the Administration was so averse to Mr. Leverett's
prescriptions: Far from being cooperative, the Syrian regime was attempting to open a second-front rebellion that would have killed thousands of Americans and Iraqis. As for the U.S. laying down what Mr. Leverett called a "clear roadmap" for Mr. Assad, the State Department has been doing exactly that by insisting that Syria cooperate fully in the U.N.'s investigation into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. That cooperation has not been forthcoming -- not surprising since the Syrians are widely believed to be complicit in the deed.

Even now, Syrian political opponents in Lebanon regularly turn up dead, while the regime in Damascus takes only cosmetic steps to stem the flow of terrorists into Iraq. Tell us again why the U.S. hasn't struck hard at a country causing mayhem on both its eastern and western fronts?

Khaddam Claims Asad Will Fall Soon

Massoud Darhally points out that the al-Jazeera article about Khaddam being refused asylum in Saudi is wrong: He writes:

Josh:
Al Jazeera and others have not done their homework. Why would Khaddam who has Saudi citizenship and to my understanding even carries a Saudi diplomatic passport along with his children require asylum in Saudi Arabia? Its like an American living abroad asking for asylum in the US!

The UAE is a seperate story, but I doubt this is likely to materialize for a number of reasons I wish to keep to myself. And I have not heard anything along these lines up to now.
Regards,
Massoud

There are preliminary reports that Riad Saif and Ma'moun Homsi have been released from prison have been posted by Idaf Another indication of the release from AFP/Al-Arabiah:

Former Syrian VP Khaddam says forming exile government

14/01/2006 (Thanks to EngChange)
By Reuters

BERLIN - Former Syrian vice president Abdel-Halim Khaddam, a fierce critic of President Bashar al-Assad, told a German magazine he was forming a government in exile and believed Assad would be forced from power this year.

Khaddam, who now lives in Paris, told the weekly Der Spiegel on Saturday that Assad was facing growing pressure from economic problems at home and the international investigation into the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri.

"His fall has already begun. I don't think his regime will last out this year," Khaddam, who accuses Assad of ordering Hariri's murder, said.

The former vice president, for 30 years a confidant of Assad's late father, Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad, left the government in June.

He has been accused of treason and expelled from the ruling Baath Party after a series of verbal attacks on the president.

Khaddam told leading Arabic newspaper Asharq al-Awsat earlier this month that he wanted the Syrian government toppled.

Asked by Der Spiegel whether he was seeking to form a government-in-exile, he said: "That is correct".

He said he would be ready to work with both Islamist leaders, whom he called "part of the rich Islamic mosaic that defines the basic character of our country" and the Baath Party.

"I would not rule out any political group that sticks to the basic rules of democracy," he said.

"One should not make the mistake with the Syrian Baath Party that the Americans made with the Iraqi Baath Party," he said.

"The majority of Baathists in Syria have long ago turned against the regime. They see the government's mistakes every day," he said.

Khaddam also repeated the allegation he made earlier this week that Assad had ordered the murder of Hariri.

"I'm convinced: the order came from Assad. He is an extremely impulsive man, he is always losing his cool."

Syria has denied any role in the bomb blast that killed Hariri and 22 others in Beirut last year.

Sami Moubayed has an excellent article on Khaddam - "The Fox Speaks" - in al-Ahram which fills in much of his background and highlights his political career.

Khaddam Looks for a New Home

t_desco brought this article to our attention about Khaddam's attempt to find a new home. Khaddam has now openly said he believes Bashar al-Asad ordered Hariri's killing. Khaddam told Britain's Sky News on Thursday: "In my belief, yes, my personal belief is that he ordered it." Khaddam had implied this in earlier interviews, but had claimed he ultimately didn't know. It is worth noting that France and Saudi are reluctant to give him asylum.

France seeks Gulf asylum for Khaddam
Friday 13 January 2006,

The former Syrian Baath Party stalwart moved to Paris in June

Aljazeera's correspondent in Paris has learned that an official French delegation traveled to Saudi Arabia to discuss the possibility of Abdul Halim Khaddam, the former Syrian vice president, obtaining asylum in the kingdom.

Khaddam, who moved to Paris after resigning in June, has said in interviews since December that Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, had threatened al-Hariri shortly before he was killed in a car bombing on 14 February. Al-Assad has denied the allegation.

Sources told Aljazeera on Friday the Saudis rejected the idea of hosting Khaddam, upon which the French delegation left for the United Arab Emirates to discuss the asylum issue with government officials there.

The French team has yet to get a final word from the UAE, the sources said.

In December, Khaddam told Al Arabiya television that the killing of al-Hariri could not have been carried out by Syrian agents without al-Assad's involvement.

Asked if he thought that the Syrian president was directly responsible for al-Hariri's killing in Beirut last February, Khaddam told Britain's Sky News on Thursday: "In my belief, yes, my personal belief is that he ordered it. But at the end of the day there is an investigation. They must give the final decision."

Popular uprising

Khaddam has said he wants a popular uprising to overthrow the Syrian government, and Syrian officials call him a traitor. Asked if he would use the same word to describe al-Assad, he said: "Yes, I call him a traitor.

"Corruption in Syria is so widespread within the closed circle around the president. He's practiced corruption so much that you see that his cousins control everything. And as far as foreign policy is concerned, his policy is causing humiliation to Syria." (read more)

On the arrest of Jarjoura by Lebanese authorities for misleading the Hariri probe.

Lebanon nabs 11 Al-Qaida militants planning attacks
(Thanks T_desco)

A Lebanese newspaper reported Friday that Lebanese authorities arrested 11 Al-Qaida militants suspected of intentions to carry out terror attacks. ...

According to the reports, the continuing investigation will look into a possible connection between the suspects and a man named Khaled Tahak, whose name has been dropped in the ongoing probe into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Tahak is also suspected of enlisting Lebanese residents into Iraq-based terror organizations.

Are they referring to Khaled Midhat Taha, the friend of Abu Adass? Does this mean that there is an al-Qaeda link, after all?

MEMRI has a long and good report on the Syrian economy by Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli who paints a rather bleak picture of Syria's prospects under the present system. Fixing the economy will be the ultimate challenge for the Asad regime, which seems completely incapable of combating the mafia underpinnings of the state, as Khaddam has insisted. Although Bashar has taken some stabs at repairing the basic structures of the economy, he has become ever more beholden to the interest groups that profit from corruption, such as the security agencies and crony capitalists. Labor, as represented by the Baath Party, also stands in the way of reform. It is hard to see how Bashar can move against these interests without jeopardizing his remaining supporters within the country.

Asad is wavering over whether he will be interviewed by the investigators into the Hariri killing.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt work hard to soothe Syria in the Daily Star by Walid Choucair

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have tried to convince Assad that, if he cooperates with the committee, they will try to protect him from prosecution should he be found to have been involved in Hariri's murder.

The meetings were also aimed at convincing Damascus that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not working in cooperation with the international pressure to destabilize the Syrian regime.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia will ask all Saudi media institutions to refrain from broadcasting Khaddam interviews or statements in a bid to reassure Damascus of Riyadh's innocent intentions.

Egypt and Saudi seem to be helping Syria navigate the shoals of the investigation as they did in November when they helped Bashar dodge sactions by sending his 5 generals to Vienna.

Ghadri Denies Abramoff Connection

This was just released by Farid Ghadry's RPS

Statement by the Reform Party of Syria

-- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE --

Washington DC, January 13, 2006/RPS Press Release/ -- Quotes in some anti-democracy Syrian press and American pro-Ba'athist blogs have surfaced that the Reform Party of Syria rents space at the offices of Middle Gate Ventures associated with Jack Abramoff, the lobbyist accused of fraud and illegal contributions to the US Congress.

RPS denies any involvement with Jack Abramoff or the fact that we have a presence in his office. RPS heard of Abramoff the same time that everyone did and from the mainstream media.

Our offices are located at the Mills Building on 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue and we rent them from a company called OfficEscape (www.officescape.com), which runs shared offices around the country.

The spreading of these lies, once more, shows that those who do not want to see democracy in Syria flourish will go to any length to stretch the truth even to the extent of inventing stories for their own purposes. When they cannot find anything wrong with their enemies, they will invent that wrong.

RPS retains full rights to pursue legally anyone who has published these lies, including those who are leaving Syria and returning to the United States as well as the University that is sponsoring them and for which they are still associated with.

Copyrights © 2003-2006 - Reform Party of Syria (RPS) except where otherwise noted - all rights reserved.

Abramoff Supported Farid Ghadry as well as Militant Israeli Settlers

Condoleezza Rice has blasted Syria for obstructing the Hariri investigation. She also attacked Hizbullah and recommitted the US to the full implementation of resolution 1559 and the disarmament of Party. She assures the Lebanese that there will be no "deal" with Syria, something many Lebanese have been worrying about. This comes in conjunction with Washington's and Europe's decision to bring Iran before the Security Council.

Farid Ghadry, it turns out, is attached to Jack Abramoff. Quotes below.

Syria’s Continuing Refusal To Comply With Security Council Resolutions

Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Washington, DC
January 11, 2006

The United States has grave and continuing concerns about Syria’s destabilizing behavior and sponsorship of terrorism. The Syrian regime is obligated to implement UN Security Council resolutions 1546, 1559, 1595, 1636, and 1644. It has failed to do so.

Syria must cease obstructing the investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and instead cooperate fully and unconditionally, as required by UN Security Council resolutions. We call upon the Syrian regime to respond positively to the requests of UN Independent International Investigation (UNIIIC). We intend to refer this matter back to the Security Council if Syrian obstruction continues.

The United States stands firmly with the people of Lebanon in rejecting any deals or compromises that would undermine the UNIIC investigation, or relieve Syria of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. We are firmly committed to seeking justice and pursuing the investigation to its ultimate conclusion.

The United States also calls for the full implementation of all parts of UN Security Council resolution 1559, including the disarmament and disbanding of Hizballah and other militias. Syria’s continuing provision of arms and other support to Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups serves to destabilize Lebanon, makes possible terrorist attacks within Lebanon, from Lebanese territory, and impedes the full implementation of Security Council resolutions.

As Resolution 1559 demands, Syria must once and for all end its interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Continuing assassinations in Lebanon of opponents of Syrian domination, including most recently the murder of journalist and Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni on December 12, 2005, create an atmosphere of fear that Syria uses to intimidate Lebanon. Syria must cease this intimidation and immediately come into compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
[end]

Farid Ghadry and his Reform Party of Syria, it turns out, are connected at the hip to Jack Abramoff, the supper Israel Settler supporter who raised over $100,000 to buy sharpshooter equipment and night-vision goggles for militant settlers in the West Bank to shoot Palestinians. (Thanks to Michelle Zimney, who sent this to me.)

One investigator, eager to obtain information about the neocon-sponsored "Reform Party of Syria," led by Farid Ghadry, the Syrian version of Ahmed Chalabi, stumbled on the Abramoff connection:

"When repeated calls to [Ghadry's] organization went unanswered, I visited the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the RFP. Reform Party of Syria is [in] the office of 'super-Zionist' lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Middle Gate Ventures, Abramoff's political advisory company' partners with RFP."

The Reform Party of Syria is a front organization for Israeli interests in the Levant, and is supported by an impressive constellation of neoconservative stars. Regime change, effected by a U.S. invasion and occupation of Syria and Lebanon, is the one and only item at the top of this gang's agenda, and it comes as no surprise that Abramoff's ill-gotten gains went to funding it.

The Economy (January 11, 2006)

French proposal to bring calm and stability back to Lebanon:" Shebaa
(from mideastwire.com)

Al Manar, a weekly Palestinian newspaper, reported on January 9 that, “the French government has been making secret increased calls to several Arab countries and to Israel to discuss with them a plan Paris has set to bring back calm and stability to Lebanon. The plan includes Israel pulling out of the Shebaa Farms and a new international force spreading on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Also, according to prominent sources, the plan includes a specification of the way Hezbollah would work, and the organization of its armed members as a first step for Hezbollah to disarm.”

The sources also revealed that some of the Arab countries support and approve the French plan and will carry an active role to make this plan succeed. But, these countries informed France of the danger of intensifying blame and threats of a blockade and of pressures to be upheld against Syria, because this is what will make the situation worse in the region and threaten its stability as a whole. - Al Manar Palestine, Palestine
Click here for source

Report says Saudi officials are trying to stifle Khaddam's statements

The Palestinian owned daily Al Quds Al Arabi reported on January 7 that: "Saudi media sources have reported that the Saudi Information Ministry has issued instructions to the media organs it finances to stop focusing on the statements of former Syrian Vice-President Abd-al-Halim Khaddam who called for bringing down the regime in Damascus. The sources that refused to be identified said the Syrian regime expressed its discontent with and resentment of the Saudi media for starting and adopting Khaddam's campaign to distort the image of the regime and its President Bashar al-Asad.

"Saudi King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz made two telephone calls on Thursday to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during which they discussed the situation in Syria. The sources said the Syrian president reproached King Abdallah for what he called the Saudi media's adoption of Khaddam's position." - Al Quds Al Arabi, United Kingdom

The As-sharq al-Awsat interview with Khaddam is here thanks to Mideastwire.com

Syria: Investing Ahead
6 January 2006
By Oxford Business Group

As pressure mounted on Damascus over the continuing UN inquiry into the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister, this week saw the US renew its threats of sanctions against Syria.

Yet just what kind of an impact such steps might have has already been called into question - and by none other than the director of Syria's own investment authority. Dubbing 2005 the year of investment in his country, Mustafa al-Kafri recently cited bumper levels of foreign and local interest.

The US comments on the possibility of sanctions came in the wake of a UN request to interview President Bashar al-Assad in connection with the inquiry into the February 2005 slaying of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese premier.

The UN request followed allegations of Syrian threats against Hariri made by former Syrian Vice-President Abdelhalim Khaddam in a recent interview with al-Arabiya TV. The UN also wishes to interview Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa.

If Syria were to turn down the request, the US envoy to the UN, John Bolton, warned on January 3 that the Security Council has made it clear that it expects full and unconditional compliance and said expressly in its resolution that additional measures could be taken if need be.

Syria has been given until January 10 to comply with the UN request. On January 5, Damascus announced that it had agreed to let the UN investigators question al-Sharaa. However, no announcement has been made so far regarding any interview with Assad.

Meanwhile though, recent statements by al-Kafri seem to indicate that despite the enormous international pressure, the country's economy has not been doing too badly at all in recent months.

Speaking at a meeting of experts on foreign direct investment (FDI) at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in Beirut in late December, al-Kafri said that 2005 had in fact been an excellent year for FDI in Syria. He said that year-end figures were expected to show a 30% rise in FDI, year-on-year. There were $2bn of investments this year in Syria, which is an important figure, he told the assembled experts.

This represents a significant upward shift the historic level of FDI flow to the country. Financial expert Farhat Hourshani told the meeting that these flows had reached just $181.6m on average annually since 1999 and had been relatively weak and focused on excavation and oil production.

The main source for FDI, al-Kafri added, was Saudi Arabia - although there were also significant investments coming from the UAE, Turkey and other European countries, such as Germany.

At the same time, domestic investors had also been active. In September alone, he said, 70 projects, worth a total $1.6bn, had been presented to the Superior Investment Council by local investors and granted approval.

Al-Kafri also highlighted plans for a $15bn tourist resort to be built on the 2814-metre-high Mount Hermon, which overlooks the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and southern Lebanon.

Al-Kafri did not reveal many details of the project's backers, except to say that it would be developed by an unspecified group of Syrian, Kuwaiti and Saudi investors. He also added that Damascus had given its tentative backing to the project.

The scheme will include hotels, shopping centres, skiing and other sports facilities reachable by cable car, and is expected to be carried out over the next 15 years. Such projects - if carried through - would help Syria tackle a number of problems simultaneously. Providing jobs for a growing population is one of these, while FDI in tourism also stimulates a whole range of associated industries. This is key to achieving the kind of economic growth rates many see as necessary to keep the country developing. Economists estimate that $8bn to $9bn in investment is needed each year to produce a 7% GDP growth rate in Syria, compared with around 4% growth currently.

Yet if ever there was a good time to be looking for investment from the region - and the Gulf in particular - this must surely be it. With most economists predicting a fifth consecutive boom year, with high oil prices and bull markets up and down the Gulf, there is no shortage of liquidity within the Arab world for investments in schemes such as Mount Hermon. What effect UN sanctions might have in this regard is open to question, but clearly Damascus is putting a brave face on the prospect.

Pressure on Syria has had a weak impact on the economy this year, al-Kafri said. He will doubtless be hoping to be able to say the same thing at the end of 2006.
[end]

Syria's workforce grows amid woes

DAMASCUS, Syria, Jan. 10 (UPI) -- Syria's workforce has increased by a million to 5 million since 1994, as official capacity to create new jobs dropped, resulting in 70 percent unemployment among youth.

The official Tishreen newspaper Tuesday published a report on a study it prepared showing the rate of workforce growth exceeded the rate of population growth.

The paper said the workforce increased from 4 million in 1994 to 5 million in 2004.

It said the percentage of working women also increased during the same period from 12.8 percent to 17.3 percent.

The report said the main problem affecting the market was the low educational levels of workers as 68.3 percent of the workforce held only elementary studies certificates.

The study also indicated that overall unemployment increased from 2.8 percent in 1999 to 12.3 in 2004 and that unemployment among youth between 15 and 24 reached more than 70 percent.

Meanwhile, the government's capacity to create new jobs decreased. Some 200,000 jobs were created annually between 1990 and 1995 compared to 160,000 between 1999 and 2003.

Syria cleric urges Assad on reforms
United Press International - DAMASCUS, Syria, Jan. 10 (UPI)

A senior Syrian Muslim cleric has called on President Bashar Assad to take decisive measures to combat corruption and boost reformists.

Speaking on the first day of Eid al-Adha feast, which marks the end of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, Sheikh Haitham Adlabi told an audience of worshippers, including Assad, Tuesday, "The Syrian people await from the president ... necessary moves for deterring violators and the corrupt and boosting honest reformists."

Adlabi avoided in his feast sermon a direct reference to the international pressure on Syria to introduce reforms, stressing support to "the efforts for steadfastness and stability led by President Assad in defense of the nation."

But he called on Assad "to act in the interest of the nation and the people and to defeat its enemies."

Adlabi was apparently calling on Assad to introduce long-delayed political and economic reforms.

Khaddam Interviews and Syrian Views

I would like to thank the many people who have been commenting on SC since I left Damascus and who have kept the site up to date and provided many interesting links and good analysis. Forgive me for reposting some of the things they have brought to our attention in the main pages. Some readers don't dip into the comment section frequently and I thought it was important to copy some of the most pertinent material to the main page. I haven't always given credit where it is due, but I am grateful all the same. On that note, let me also say that many people in Washington do read the comment section regularly. I was just in DC to attend an on-going seminar on Syria that is being run by a think tank there, and a number of people at the table referred to observations made by people in the comment section. So keep on giving your two cents. It makes a difference.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are again trying to broker a way for Syria to avoid a direct confrontation with the UN and still cooperate with the UN.

Syria's Assad in Egypt After Saudi Visit
By REUTERS
Published: January 8, 2006

CAIRO (Reuters) - Syrian President Bashar al-Assad flew to Egypt and Saudi Arabia on Sunday for talks on Lebanon, a day after diplomats said Assad had rejected a U.N. request to interview him about a former Lebanese prime minister's murder.

``(The king) affirmed the kingdom's desire for stronger relations between Syria and Lebanon in all fields, so that the interests of both countries and security of the region are protected,'' said a statement on the Saudi state news agency SPA, after a meeting and banquet in Jeddah. It gave no more details.

Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally, said in November it had brokered a deal between Damascus and the United Nations to allow the questioning of five Syrian officials in Vienna.

Adel al-Harbi, political editor at the leading Saudi daily al-Riyadh, said Saudi Arabia wanted to find a way for Assad to meet the U.N. team without harming Syria's sovereignty.

``The anxiety here and in Arab countries is that Syria doesn't cooperate. Saudi Arabia is trying to get them to cooperate with the investigation to find the truth,'' he said. ``An interview which respects Syrian sovereignty does no harm in itself, as long as it is an interview and not questioning.''

Diplomats say Syria agreed to allow investigators to meet Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara, who accompanied Assad on his Saudi trip.

``It seems that there are Saudi and Egyptian efforts to find a comprehensive regional and international agreement regarding the U.N. request to meet President Assad,'' said Syrian political analyst Imad Shuaibi. ``The U.N. request violated (international) protocol by naming the witnesses whom the commission wanted to meet.''

Assad, in an interview with an Egyptian paper, said this week that as president he had international immunity, indicating that U.N. investigators could not insist on interviewing him.

Here are a few more links to Khaddam interviews and articles supplied by T_desco and Adonis among others in the comment section.

Hassan Fattah of the New York Times: "A Critic, in Exile, Aims More Barbs at the President of Syria." - January 6, 2006. Here is a quote:

Mr. Khaddam repeated his allegation that Mr. Assad had personally threatened Mr. Hariri. Although he again stopped short of directly implicating Mr. Assad in the assassination, Mr. Khaddam gave more details of Mr. Assad's interaction with Mr. Hariri, and he harshly criticized Mr. Assad's increasingly aggressive governing style.

"You could see that there was this disgust toward Hariri, and he was fearing his growing power in Lebanon and its implications for Lahoud," Mr. Khaddam said.

He said he had pondered resigning as far back as 2003, three years after Bashar al-Assad rose to power, but finally stepped down in June 2005, after his attempts at reform were rebuffed, he said.

"Things are dangerous now, but the biggest danger is that the regime cannot make a smart decision anymore," he said. And he added another personal criticism of Mr. Assad: "The size of the responsibility he faces is bigger than him. And the people around him only serve to pump his ego and lie to him."

Newsweek by Christopher Dickey.

Do you think you will ever be able to go back to Syria?

Yes, I will be back. And it’s not in the distant future that I’ll be back.

What is the actual picture you have of the way things will develop in the next few months.
When the scenario starts to materialize all the people are going to see it. [But] if there is a big political agenda it is not feasible to make it public in the press.

Does your vision of Syria include any members of the Assad family?
The Assad family is one family in Syria. Whoever rules Syria will be decided solely by voting and ballots. Whoever gets the ballots, he will make the decision along with the Syrian people in that regard.

You’re not afraid that the Muslim Brotherhood will get all the ballots?
No. In Syria, Christians and Muslims have a religious consciousness, but they are not fanatics. It’s a kind of mosaic of religions in equilibrium. And the Muslim Brothers now have enhanced their way of thinking, and they have come up with a new liberal agenda. And naturally when we talk about an open and democratic state, everyone is welcome to present his agenda.

David Ignatius writes in the Post of January 4, "Mob War In The Mideast."

In the gangster movies, you know all hell is about to break loose when one of the disgruntled old dons decides to switch sides and rat out the young Godfather. Something like that is now happening with Syria -- and it provides a new year's bombshell for an already turbulent Middle East.

Jumblatt says he hopes America will stand by the Cedar Revolution. "If Bush considers Lebanon one of his major achievements, now is the time to protect Lebanon," he told me. When I asked what he wanted from America, he answered: "You came to Iraq in the name of majority rule. You can do the same thing in Syria."

The Nouvel Observateur:

Interrogé dans la matinée sur une responsabilité du président syrien Bachar el-Assad dans cet attentat perpétré le 14 février 2005 à Beyrouth, il a répondu: "Je ne peux pas le nier, même si je ne peux pas affirmer qu'il soit responsable".

From interview with Asharq Al-Awsat as translated by al-Jazeera.net:

Khaddam said that he was rallying Syrian opposition parties to "create the right atmosphere for the Syrian people to topple the regime."

“This regime cannot be reformed. The only alternative is to overthrow it.”

Khaddam accuses shaleesh and Makhlouf of monpoly

RTL: as quoted in "Le Monde."

Syria-news has an article in Arabic which explains how Khaddam was the main opponent of the Damascus Spring movement in 2000. It quotes Khaddam's famous speech at the university of Damascus during the second half of 2000 in which he criticized the Damascus Spring movement for demanding the end of emergency law. He stated that Syria would not allow the "Algeriazation of Syria." In other words, he claimed that if Syria allowed democratic freedoms, the Islamists would win and the country would slip toward civil war.

Adonis points out that I am wrong about Mustafa Tlas. I wrote yesterday that he is a Damascene. He writes: "He is not damascene but from a Village near Homs, Rastan." I stand corrected, but let me add that whereas Khaddam and sons have built their mansions in Banyas, Tlas has greater aristocratic pretensions. He married Lamia Al-Jabiri in 1958, who is from the noted Aleppine family of Saadallah al-Jabiri, the leader of the Aleppo branch of the National Bloc during the French Mandate years and right hand man of Syria's first president, Shukri al-Quwatli. His son, Firas is also married to a Jabiri, if my memory serves me, making him more Jabiri than Tlas. By marrying well for two generations, the Tlases outrank the Khaddams in their social connections and pretensions. A very small point, but one worth making as Syrian society is very conscious of such things. Tlas is also responsible for rehabilitating the standing of the old Sunni notable class through his work as a publisher of history books and by supporting a new television series of biographies of the men and women who made Syria during the 20th century, which is now going into production and which will champion such notable families as his in-laws and the Quwatlis. Tlas is also responsible for having portraits of all past presidents and prime ministers of Syria hung on the walls of the People's Assembly. Indeed the Tlases have no equals within the Baath Party as champions of the old urban notables, who were so precipitously dismissed from the scene in the 1960s and shamelessly written out of Syrian history. It is such activities, not to mention horseback riding, gardening, etc. that have won the Tlases a firmer place in Damascene society than the Khaddams enjoy.

Majed khaldoon adds:

How could Mr. Landis make such mistake, Tlas is hated in Damascus. People say he loves women, money and he was a supporter of assad family, he is from a city north of Homs. The revolution in 1963 was anti Damascus revolution.

In closing, I will copy two emails that I received recently. Both are Syrians. The first is from a middle-aged man from an old notable Sunni family who presently lives in the US. He believes that the Asads will soon be out of power and that the transition will be non-violent. The second is by a young Syria, living in the Emirates, who argues that the president and Syria did not kill Hariri, a view, he insists that is still prevalent among his Syrian friends.

Dear Mr. Landis: Some thoughts about current events in Syria!?
As the regime of Al-Assad/Al-Baath is coming to a close soon I thought of two items worth keeping in mind for a post Assad regime.

1- I do sincerely believe that the transition of powers will be a peaceful one, despite a few incidents here and there. Why? The Syrian society is a mercantile society at heart (not an agrarian society nor a heavily industrialized society), has been and always will. A Mercantile society does not like violence. It is bad for business (Ask the Dutch). Syria through out its history has encountered a multitude of occupations and different kind of occupiers since the dawn of its history, and the people of that land remained resilient and capable of bypassing many agonies of tyrants that attempted to destroy the nature of that culture.

2- Many fears a form of sectarian violence in the aftermath of the toppling of the regime, these will not happen! Again, because the nature of the Syrian "mercantile" nature, and again, religion and open religious persuasions meaning the forced application of one religious view against another views is(are) very bad for business...always the case for Syria and will always be the case...Probably the Dutch learned from the Syrians on how to be tolerant in this scenario.

3- The other factor that will prevent a sectarian violence from taking place is the well integrated Syrian society especially in cities like Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. Most neighborhoods and especially the new sections of these cities are homes to a well integrated society. These voluntary integration and population movements have been taking place since independence. Remembering my neighborhood, it was loaded with all kinds and different sorts of Christian families, two Kurdish families, two Alawi families, Armenians, and one Jewish family for good measure and what not!!!??? We were all friends and neighbors and all shared the joy of festivities with each others and the sad ones when a someone get sick or die. Perhaps things have changed since my departure many moons ago as a young man, but that is how things were in that neighborhood...

That is why many people's concern about the future of violence in Syria is highly unfounded, yours included...
Later. E. J.

Here is the second.

What went through the mind of normal Syrians since Monday, February 14, 2005?
After reading, watching and listening to endless analysis (mostly presented by non-Syrians) for 328 days (according to Future TV's now sacred calendar!) all firmly claiming to represent the Syrian people's voice, I just can't take it anymore. I think that the final straw was Junblat's latest hysteric low, inviting the US to "invade Syria complying to public Syrian demands". How hypocritical and opportunistic can someone get? Away from Junblat's now non-stop insults to my intelligence as a Syrian, many non-Syrians have continuously asked: What went through your mind (as a normal politically-independent Syrian) when trying to make sense of "What the hell is happening" in the last 11 months? I just wanted to share this, and unlike Junblat, Khaddam, Sa'ad, Ghadry, Bush, many of the regime figures or the endless "analysts" and "experts" on the Syrian people's inner minds, I do claim to represent some majority of Syrian youth, mothers and fathers.

Until more credible data are presented, the following is how I (and the overwhelming majority of Syrians I've met) see the whole series of events and I argue that many many Lebanese share this view. I think that every Syrian during the last 11 months consciously or subconsciously went through the following analysis trying to make sense of who committed these crimes and why were they committed:

Isn't it possible that someone from the Syrian regime committed these crimes?
ABSOLUTELY... largely unlikely though.. Much analysis was printed and broadcasted since the crime took place on why the Syrians must have done it. Revenge, jealousy and preemptive attack on Hariri are just few of the proposed motives, but the funniest was the "they hated our freedom" Dubbia nonsense adopted by many analysts. The Syrian regime has all the capabilities needed to commit the crime, but it lacked a motive, will and even the guts to do it. If it was really done by someone in the Syrian regime (out of blind revenge presumably for 1559 or as a preemptive attack to eliminate Hariri before the elections) then the Syrian people should be ready to face internal struggles to pinpoint and isolate the people who did it from the country as a whole. This is an extremely complicated thing to do after 40 years of brutal grip on power by the regime PLUS the plethora of external parties itching to jump to the occasion and punish Syria the country, not just the regime, to fulfill their own agendas that is largely against the Syrian people's interests. I personally believe that the Syrian people are not ready to carry out this process in a radical manner, as this might lead to economic or security unrests or worse.. civil war (where external factors would be the main catalyst). Such a conflict if it took place, is something that would potentially create another ethnically-divided or sectarian-based entity in the ME to be added to Lebanon, Iraq and Israel. If the regime is found guilty (after a convincing trial) then the Syrian people (as I see it) would voluntarily do it in a way that guarantees Syria's interest first and not any other regional or international party's interest on Syria's expense (be it an "jasmine revolution" or some other way).

I'm not saying that the culprits should not face justice, I'm simply saying that, until now, we don't know for sure who exactly planned and committed it and until we become 100 percent sure it should be "BUSINESS AS USUAL" in Syria. External parties should not be allowed to harm Syrian interests, economy, dignity, rights and security in the process by exploiting the grievances of the victims of these crimes or the opportunistic politicians (such as Junblat inviting the US "to invade Syria" in the Washington Post or Khaddam proposing himself as "the alternative"!).
The logical question here would be: WHY IS SYRIA THEN STALLING THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION IF IT HAS NOTHING TO HIDE? My view is that there are multiple reasons: There is the somewhat justified "preserving Syrian dignity" excuse (unfortunately it is something becoming obsolete by the day!). The second reason for "not cooperating" is the justified fears of infiltration and spying (does the word UNSCOM ring a bell?). But the most important reason for the "slow" and "conflicting" Syrian cooperation would be because the Syrian regime does have a lot to hide, but it is not necessarily linked to the Hariri affaire. The Syrian regime (as almost every other political administration in the world) has a lot of "dirty laundry" that it does not want to be exposed. They are simply trying to hide stuff such as corruption, money laundering and other illegalities that were committed by the Syro-Lebanese mafias in Syria and Lebanon. Stuff that would definitely be exposed in any inquiry into Syrian Lebanese relations in the last 30 years. Any sane politician would want to hide such stuff from the public.

If it's not the Syrians then who was it and why?
The main suspects are: First.. Israel.
I know that many people don't want to hear its name in the Hariri issue (mainly because it was used as a scapegoat for too long by Arab dictatorships that even when it is a credible suspect, many people tend not to believe it no more!). Nonetheless, Israel had a strong motive, the capabilities and the political cover (just in case). Allow me to elaborate:

You have to admit that Israel was the main beneficiary of the whole thing.. Syria is in deep deep trouble, Lebanon is in deep deep chaos and ultimately -and most importantly- Hizballah is very very cornered and on the road do be dismantled (which would constitute the main motive).

Let's look at the facts.. we have fanatics in Washington stating publicly that they support "constructive chaos" in the middle east that would change things to "the better". We have a regional party (Israel) with strong will and motives (cornering Syria, destabilizing Lebanon and ultimately getting rid of Hizballah). It has a long experience in political assassinations (countless such surgically accurate car bombs over the last 25 years in Palestine and Lebanon at least!). Finally, it also possesses the capabilities from the technology to the required agents (hundreds of Israel's agents infiltrated within the Lebanese society.. the Lahdists and SLA members -with Lebanese blood on their hands- that were granted amnesty after 2000, among others).

Excuse me for putting the following analysis of the series of crimes so bluntly: The series of murders fits very well in the scenario of framing Syria. Think about the following: Hariri was killed in an extraordinary point of time when his relation with Syria is in one of its very few low points. A point of time when such a crime would easily be pinned on Syria (which was successfully achieved). Basel Fuleihan was a collateral damage. Hawi was killed to push the Lebanese left to an extreme anti-Syria position (to manipulate the parties that support Syria out of their hate for Israel) and to become more outspoken against Syria (which was successfully achieved too). Given the emotional nature of Arabs in general, Samir Kassir and May Chidiac were chosen very smartly to supply the Lebanese, Arabic and international media with a further negative emotional charge against Syria (which also was successfully achieved). Allow me to be more detailed here: Killing Kassir made Annahar and Al-Arabyia channel (that his wife work for as an anchor) explode emotionally against Syria which lead to further manipulation of Arab public opinion towards blaming Syria (which also was successfully achieved). May Chidiac was targeted to do the same with Al-Hayat and LBC. Jubran was killed on the eve of the security council meeting to guarantee that the harshest resolution possible would be passed and to give an extremely hard time to countries trying to make it softer (which also was relatively successfully achieved). Pushing Junblat to his seizure of hysteria against both Syria and Hizballah came as a bonus (or was it planned?!). If it really was Syria trying to take revenge and/or terrorize its Lebanese critics then wouldn't you say that any one of those idiots in the Syrian mukhabarat would have waited for two days so the Security Council would pass a softer resolution and then take revenge or terrorize by killing Jubran?!

IT'S A SIMPLE CALCULATION REALLY.. YOU KILL ONE OUTSPOKEN SYRIA CRITIC AND A THOUSAND IS INSTANTLY CREATED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LEBANON (you also get the media to emotionally lash out against Syria as a bonus!). If it was the Syrians doing it then they would have taken a lesson from the Marwan Hamade attempt that this is what is happening, wouldn't they? My mind refuses to accept the idea that the Syrians would intentionally alienate the Saudis and the French, give the neo-cons and Israelis a dream-come-true moment, extremely weaken Hizballah intentionally, shoot themselves in the foot and not learn the lesson then chose to shoot themselves in the leg and then in the stomach and so on and, moreover, keep doing the exact same mistake at the extremely precise timings that would do them the MOST harm possible!!!!!! The people in the Syrian regime are absolutely no angels, but I would give them a little more credit than this on the "common sense" front!

For Marwan Hamade, I think he was a "test balloon" (to probe the public and political reaction) by whoever did the whole series of crimes. I think that the criminal system (I'm convinced that it is an experienced and very capable system) had a theory on who the media and public fingers would be pointing at after attempting to kill Hamade (and it helped pointing them that way). They tested that theory and it worked out, therefore they continued to the REAL target. The hastily fabricated abu-Addas tape proves this theory as the Syrians and Lebanese security system were totally confused and not ready to deal with the aftermath of Hariri crime (otherwise if they managed to successfully plan to kill Hariri for a year avoiding the French, American and Saudi intelligence plus his own security detecting anything, then I'm sure they would have been better prepared with a stronger story than Abu Addas, wouldn't they?). If they were able to carry the politically and technically complex planning and execution of the crime then they might as well have been capable of providing a more credible alternative suspect. Furthermore, if they were really planning to do it for a year, then it's common sense to make friends with Hariri publicly after he was forced to leave office, just to have a good defense when they kill him.. "hey, don't accuse us we were his friends up to the last moment"!. These guys might (and might not) have threatened Hariri, but that does not necessarily mean that they killed him in my opinion. If they did threaten him, then it would be one of those ugly and stupid methods used by security-oriented regimes to achieve their political goals. It won't be the first time nor the last where a dominating political power threaten a personality -one way or another- in our world to achieve it's goals (I'm not condoning but listing facts). BUT I'm more interested in knowing who exactly knew that Hariri was threatened by the Syrians (if he really was threatened) and took advantage of this information in carrying out the whole thing and framing Syria (according to Khaddam, the criminals had enough time as the crime took place 8 months after the threat actually took place according to Khaddam.. if it really did)!

One more thing, my mind refuse to be convinced that the Syrians and Lebanese top security people (along with at least 20 people) were planning it for a year (according to Mehlis) and that Khaddam (the powerful ruler of Lebanon and well connected Syrian VP for 35 years) was not aware of anything! If they did it then he knew and kept it silent (which is unlikely given his strong business and family relation with the Hariris), otherwise they did not do it and therefore he did not know.

Oh and by the way, to all the political and media analysts who keep bombarding the Syrians with their analysis of how the Syrian regime thought that they would kill Hariri and the Lebanese would wake up the next day, go about taking care of their own businesses and overlook the crime! It is simply a very shallow analysis that any simple person who was reading news since resolution 1559 would not make. I remember my jaws dropping when I heard the news on February 14th last year saying to myself "Massive demonstrations in downtown Beirut coming up!". It also was the reaction of every Syrian and Lebanese I met that day. I received at least 20 phone calls from friends who all agreed that there would be huge shockwaves in Lebanon against Syria. Oh and the most important thing is, at that day I was invited to a Lebanese community meeting (outside Syria obviously!) where people were not radical in their reaction. The position of the majority of the people I asked that day was: "It could not be Syria, regardless, I think that Syria would take lot's of sh** for it". Two days later, after endless hours of emotionally-charged incitement on every news outlet on planet earth, I met with many of the same Lebanese persons who thought that "It simply couldn't be Syria" two days ago. The new reaction was.. you guessed it.. "&^%$#@! Syrian, why did you kill our Mr. Lebanon?". The moral of the story is: IT WAS CLEAR FOR EVERY IDIOT ON EARTH THAT SYRIA WOULD BE BLAMED, so you would think that the people who did it would have definitely thought that this would happen.. AND ACTUALLY COUNTED ON IT!. So to those Lebanese, Arab and international "experts" and "analysts" I say: Please please please spare us the "They though that it would be a crime that would pass like their other crimes in Lebanon" rhetoric!

Not Syria, Not Israel, who else then?
The other suspect would be someone from the Lebanese warlords who benefited from the crime. Some do have motives and capabilities to do it. I'll not continue in this route as it's largely unlikely (though the analysis took place subconsciously in my mind!). It's worth noting though that we are speaking about vicious warlords with Lebanese blood on their hands who were and still are capable of committing such a political crime (Ja'ja, Aoun, someone from the Phalange or the Lahdists to name a few Lebanese parties that gained huge political benefits from this horrendous murder). This is not an accusation as it is a list of few facts. Some of those also had killed a former Lebanese PM by blowing up his helicopter before, so it's not that unlikely!

On that note, I think it would be unreasonable to pick and chose from Khaddam's (now countless and increasingly-boring-and-disgusting) speeches and use double standards. If he is saying the truth then the Lebanese should consider all of what he offered.. and therefore not use double standards and celebrate and award the killer of a former Lebanese prime minister "Karami" (who if I may frankly add was a more patriotic and a less corrupt Lebanese than Hariri). Khaddam made it clear that Ja'ja killed Karami where there was no reason for him to lie on this now. In the other hand Khaddam had the many reasons mentioned in my earlier comment (http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2006/01/syrians-view-of-khaddam-patronage.htm) to lie in his remarks about "Assad threatening Hariri" (namely: vendettas, business deals and his ego and thirst for power). Again, I'm trying to list all of the possible suspects logically and am not accusing anyone here.

Who else? The other possibility is that the Hariri murder was a liquidation by a one of the competing mafias playing in the Syro-Lebanese arena. I won't go any further here too because it's highly unlikely.

Conclusion
Most Syrians I've met (inside and outside Syria) see the whole series of crimes as a plot that magnificently serves every single goal of Syria's enemies while extremely damaging to the Syrian regime internationally. Not to mention of course the disastrous effects of the aftermath of these crimes on the Syrian people's economy, security, dignity, their right in the Golan and their whole country's future. I'm not saying that the Syrian regime is not capable of carrying out such a crime, I'm simply saying that it is not that stupid or suicidal. You can't blame the Syrian people for questioning the motives for solely targeting their country as a suspect, the same way you can't blame many Lebanese for pointing their fingers at Syria 30 seconds after the crime took place (though I do blame the many Lebanese intellectuals and "free" media for their bias, lack of balance, investigative reporting and deep analysis). Take a look at what Mehlis said in his first report on that matter (the un-edited version where he mentioned Asef and Maher, as published by the Washington Post): "Certain Lebanese media had the unfortunate and constant tendency to spread rumors, nurture speculation, offer information as facts without prior checking and at times use materials obtained under dubious circumstances, from sources that had been briefed by the Commission, thereby creating distress and anxiety among the public at large and hindering the Commission’s work.." (Mehlis first report, page 3 paragraph 16 - unedited version). By the way, can anyone explain to me why such a statement was deleted from the final report? My view is that whoever pushed for its deletion does want the Lebanese media to continue on its route of emotionally-charged accusation against Syria that is "hindering the commission's work". This gives more credibility to my analysis about the murders of Samir Kassir, Jubran Twaini and targeting May Chidiac.. and may be more journalists to come as this tactic proves to be successful time after time in damning Syria.

When Syrians criticize Khaddam for what he is, this in no way imply that they blindly support his Syrian rivals and needless to say this does not mean that they don't want justice to be served. It simply means that we have all the reasons in the world to question his sudden change of heart and all the information he uttered. Unfortunately, when many Lebanese ask for justice, naming the Syrian regime as the one and only suspect (while granting absolute innocence to all the other beneficiaries), they are not doing "the truth" any justice and are not doing so from a well-thought and informed perspective. The accusation is mainly based on old (and mostly justified) grievances that are being exploited by the media and power thirsty politicians which does not help in thinking reasonably. Few Lebanese are also doing it from pure hatred (of sectarian or racist origin) towards Syria, that was there long before Hariri or even the Syrian troops going into Lebanon.

The basic line is whoever did it should be brought to justice, but Syria the country should not be damaged further in the process to the benefit of everyone but the Syrian and Lebanese people, especially when we are not 100 percent sure that someone from the Syrian regime actually did it. If someone in the Syrian regime did kill Hariri then justice SHOULD NOT BE SERVED ON THE EXPENSE OF 18 MILLION INNOCENT SYRIANS, nonetheless it should be served. Striking this balance is what should be sought by Syrians and Lebanese, not serving one goal on the expense of the other.

Idaf

Will Asad Fall?

The blog Hunna Syria remarks on how the Baath Party flag has been taken down in front of some ministries, leaving only the Syria flag flying. Flying the Syrian flag without other embellishments has become the norm during the past several months. Even posters and images of the President are surprisingly absent. In Hafiz's day, it would have been the "struggling leader" whose image would have been brandished and displayed throughout Syria in times of crisis. No longer. The Syrian flag is accompanied by the words: "God protect Syria." Bashar has decided to go with "God and Country," rather than the cult of personal or party leadership. Asadism is out. Patriotism is in.

In this time when the international community and Bashar's opponents, such as Khaddam and the Muslim Brotherhood, are trying to distinguish between the house of Asad and the nation, this is a smart move. By championing God and country Bashar trying to undercut this attempt to drive a wedge between him and the people. We will see if it works. All the same it is a welcome development, for Syria has too long suffered from a lack of "Syrianism" and too much "Arabism." Perhaps an unintended benefit of Syria's crisis will be to create a real debate about what is good for Syria and not the quasi-mythic Arab world or its leaders, who have for so long sought to confuse their own interests with those of the nation.

Asad has begun to denounce Khaddam personally. He denied once again that he had threatened Hariri before he was killed, saying":

"I wish to say here that no one joined us in the last meeting between me and Hariri, so where did these allegations come from?"

Assad accused Khaddam of scheming against Syria before resigning in June and also hinted that, as president of Syria, he would be immune from questioning by a team investigating Hariri's February assassination. Assad said Syria had previously voiced its readiness to cooperate with the probe if the request had a "legal basis". When the committee was first established, Asad said, Syria had invited the committee "to visit Damascus and to sign a protocol ... to outline the mechanism for dealing with Syria at all levels".

Meanwhile, Khaddam met with Mehlis' team in Paris to testify on the Hariri murder. That should be worrying to Asad. Khaddam will be able to air much of Asad's dirty laundry, even if he wasn't privy to the plotting against his friend Hariri.

The internal Syrian opposition, as opposed to the external opposition, is distancing itself from Khaddam. Michel Kilo, Yasin Hajj Salih and the director Omar Amiralay have all suggested that Khaddam has no place in a democratic Syria. Khaddam's credibility is zero as a democrat, reformer, or clean politician. That has not kept much of the external opposition from welcoming him to their company. Khaddam has announced that he welcomes the opposition to join him. The pissing match between Khaddam and the opposition has already begun, as Bashar's opponents jockey for position among themselves.

Michel Aoun questions Khaddam allegations. He said there were many things that needed explaining after Khaddam's recent allegations.

"In an interview with USA Today on February 16 of last year, two days after Hariri was assassinated, Khaddam said that Israel murdered Rafik Hariri," Aoun recalled. "But, either way, when Khaddam said this he was in Syria and now he is in France and many things have changed since then."

The FPM leader also commented on Khaddam's claim that Lebanon's intelligence apparatus supplied Syria with falsified reports about Hariri, which the Syrians believed. "The instigations against Lahoud started in 2000," Aoun said, "which was the same time when Khaddam left his post in the Syrian authority. Was he still able to monitor the reports coming from Beirut?"

In contrast to Aoun, I do not think we should doubt that Lahoud and Hariri were already locked in battle in June 2000 before Dr. Bashar came to power. I wrote earlier (see half-way down the post)that Lahoud reportedly told Bashar, shortly before Hafiz died, that Hariri, Junblat and possibly Khaddam were working to keep him from succeeding Hafiz al-Asad. This provoked Bashar to stimulate the three al-Hayat articles of mid-June 2000 that claimed that there was "an alliance of corruption" in Beirut. This article deeply worried Hariri and Khaddam, because they saw it as a clear indication that Bashar would champion Lahoud against them.

Here is what I wrote on January 1:

The power struggle between Khaddam and Bashar began before he became president. The first overt sign of the power struggle revealed itself before Hafiz al-Asad died. In the weeks leading up to Bashar's father's death, Hariri and Junblat working with Khaddam, Shihabi and possibly Kanaan seem to have been plotting to push Bashar aside and eliminate the house of Asad from power.

The specifics of this are not clear, but evidently this is what Bashar was told by Lahoud and others who visited him from Lebanon. This news convinced Bashar to attack Shihabi, who was the weak link among his opponents. Shihabi was accused of corruption in a story leaked to al-Hayat only a week or so before Hafiz's death on the 10th of June 2000. A few days later a follow-up story was printed in al-Hayat, claiming that an "alliance of corruption" had been detected in Lebanon. Hariri was implicated and so were others. It was impossible not to associate Khaddam and Kanaan with this alliance, for they had been the architects of Syria’s Lebanon policy. Shihabi, who was in AUB hospital at the time, fled to the United States as soon as he could. Following Khaddam's purge from the state, he moved to France. When his retirement was officially announced at the Bath Party conference of June 2005, he openly with Foreign Minister Sharaa about who had been responsible for losing Lebanon. Both Khaddam and Shihabi were rumored to be plotting against Bashar in Paris. Kanaan's suicide was announced shortly following the spread of these rumors making it hard not to link the three men in a possible conspiracy against the regime. The women at Kanaan’s funeral in his hometown of Bahamra chanted that they wanted the “truth.” Few believed his suicide was voluntary. Perhaps it was connected to Khaddam’s and Shihabi’s presence in Paris and the on-going Mehlis investigation, or it may simply have been a precautionary purge by a regime that felt it could take no chances, Kanaan being the last of the old guard in a position to organize from within the state system.

Bashar had been told by his father that in order to rule Syria, he had first to rule Lebanon. It would seem that Bashar took this fatherly advice to heart. Right from the beginning of his tenure, Bashar sought to cut the Gordian knot of money and personal connections that linked Riyadh, Beirut and Damascus together in a triangle of graft and influence. The old guard members who had overseen and nurtured the construction of this triangle over the 30 years of Syrian rule in Lebanon, believed they could direct affairs of state in Syria – preferably with Bashar in nominal power, but without him if necessary.

From 2000 on the main power-struggle in Syria was between the young president and his vice-president, Abdul Halim Khaddam. Bashar moved precipitously in 2000 to support Salim al-Hoss for Prime-Minister against Hariri. His effort failed because Khaddam and Kanaan outfoxed him and demonstrated their superior control of events. Hariri had become too important in Lebanon to be denied the position of Prime Minister. Bashar was forced to write off his failure to overthrow Hariri as an indication of his benevolence and intent not to interfere in Lebanese affairs. He claimed a new page had been turned in Syrian-Lebanese relations and that Syria would allow Lebanon more freedom. Bashar, however, was only biding his time. He needed to consolidate his position further inside Syria before he could move more forcefully against Kanaan and Khaddam, which would ease the way toward eventually pushing aside Hariri and Junblat. In his eyes, they were all of a piece. He moved Kanaan out of Lebanon in 2003 and whittled away at Khaddam’s authority little by little, moving his people out of ministries and, in particular, out of the relevant security agencies.

The Saudis are divided over how far to back Khaddam and whether to push for regime change in Syria. The word is that King Abdullah wants regime change, but he doesn’t want sanctions to be placed on Syria for fear that they will drive the people closer to Bashar. Amir Sultan does not want regime-change, but prefers gradual change so as not to create more instability in the region.

Robert Rabil, writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that Khaddam's defection is the sign of real troubles within the Asad regime, which may bring about eventual regime-change. He reads it as a sign that the Sunni - Alawi alliance, which has been the back bone of the regime, is breaking up and that Bashar is relying ever more exclusively one family and fellow Alawi associates.

I think this is wishful thinking, although the Muslim Brothers and other Sunni opponents of the regime have been quick to welcome Khaddam to their struggle. Yes, Khaddam is Sunni and influential. He certainly angled in the past to increase Sunni power in Damascus, both by developing the Riyadh - Beirut alliance that he so carefully cultivated by promoting Hariri, as well as by wooing the Sunni tribal members and ex-Baathists of Iraq. By promoting Sunni power and influence in neighboring governments, Khaddam believed he would promote Sunni power in Syria. This was a sound strategy, which has been dealt a big blow by his ouster.

But does Khaddam's defection also mean the destruction of Bashar's link to the Sunni community? I don't think so. Most Sunnis will wave good bye to Khaddam with few tears. He was from Banyas and not Damascus. He was not from an old Damascene family or "ibn A'iley" which for many Damascenes means he was never one of them. Yes, his son married an Atasi - good job. But that doesn't give Khaddam an immediate in.

Rabil suggests that the retirement of Mustafa Tlas, another ex-Defense Minister and old guard Sunni (He is Damascene), also riled Damascenes and undercut Sunni support for the regime. But Rabil doesn't mention that Tlas' two influential sons, Firas, the businessman, and Manaf, the military man, are both close to the President. Manaf is particularly close. President Asad has cultivated his own Sunni allies, who he is bringing up to replace the old-guard Sunnis that bunched around Khaddam and other old guard figures.

Bashar is well known among Alawi circles for being less "confessional" than his father was. This is undoubtedly a product of his having been brought up in Damascus rather than Latakia. As early as 2000, he drew up a list of 400 people who he believed could be brought into the ranks of the government to energize the regime and provide a new base for his rule. Many of them were Sunnis and not a few have been brought along.

We are seeing a contradiction in Bashar's methods, however. Unlike his father, who, early in his rule, established a small group of loyal allies to whom he remained faithful for 30 years, Bashar has circulated people at the top and in government with frequent cabinet changes and reshuffles of security personnel. Some of this has been done to ease out the old-guard without making it look like a purge, but mostly it is because Bashar is different from his father and did not come to power with a ready-made clique of fellow conspirators. Ironically, this may require him to rely ever more closely on his family ties to provide security during the present crisis and showdown with Khaddam. But it also means that he has been able to promote many outsiders into positions of authority without letting them own their offices. This may prove a security weakness, because it does not ensure absolute loyalty in the face of external pressure.

But it may also prove to be strength in the long run. By circulating more people in and out of power, he may broaden his alliance with the Sunnis and other groups in Syrian society because he will be able to give more people a chance at the top. It may also help prevent the development of encrusted, long-term graft and patronage, epitomized by Khaddam's thirty years at the top.

Khaddam to Form Government-in-Exile: Sharaa to Testify

Khaddam is moving to form a government-in-exile, as-Seyassah reports below. Asad and Sharaa have been asked to testify before the Hariri investigators. According to ABC news, Syria has agreed that Sharaa will testify. Anyone interested in what I had to say on the PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer can read the transcript of the show: SYRIA REFUTES INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM

Syria ready for UN team to meet minister
Syria has agreed to allow United Nations (UN) to interview its foreign minister over the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, diplomats say.

Syria is still considering a request by the UN team probing the February killing to meet President Bashar al-Assad, but an interview with Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara was acceptable, the diplomats say.

"The request is being considered while other capitals are in contact with Syria on the same subject," a diplomatic source said.

"As announced before there is no objection that the committee meets Mr Shara, that position did not change."

Asked to comment on the report, a Syrian Foreign Ministry official told Reuters in Damascus: "Syria has not informed the (UN) committee of any decision since the request has been made".

A senior Saudi official is expected to discuss in Damascus the issue of Syria's cooperation with the investigation. The leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt held talks on the matter in Saudi on Tuesday.

The United States has warned Syria that its top officials should submit to the interviews in line with a UN Security Council resolution that called for it to comply fully with the inquiry or face unspecified "further action".

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, on a visit to Lebanon, also urged Syria to cooperate with the inquiry and hinted at further action if it did not.

Interview with Syrian FM in Mehlis probe "a positive step" -- US Kuwait News Agency

U.N. Asks to Meet Syrian Leader in Inquiry on Beirut Killing
By HASSAN M. FATTAH
Published: January 3, 2006

LONDON, Jan. 2 - A United Nations team investigating the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri has asked to interview the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and the foreign minister, Farouk al-Sharaa, in the inquiry into the killing.

The request compounds pressure on the Syrian government just days after a stunning public attack on the president by his former vice president raised new questions about whether the government had been complicit in the assassination.

A spokesman for the United Nations investigation told The Associated Press on Monday that the commission had sent a request to interview Mr. Assad and Mr. Sharaa, among others, but would not specify when the request was made. It was not immediately clear whether the request had any connection to the allegation by former Vice President Abdul-Halim Khaddam on Friday that Mr. Assad threatened Mr. Hariri's life months before the assassination.

Mr. Khaddam will also be interviewed, the official said. The commission also requested an interview with Mr. Assad over the summer as the investigation got under way, but was rebuffed.

"This puts Bashar in a very embarrassing position because it means that he could actually become a suspect," said Joshua Landis, a historian at the University of Oklahoma and author of the Web site SyriaComment.com. "It comes down to this: will he accept to be questioned, or will he face sanctions? If he refuses now, it will be hard for Bashar's defenders to vote against any sanctions in the Security Council."

The investigation of the truck bombing that killed Mr. Hariri and 20 others concluded, in a preliminary report last month, that the attack on Feb. 14 was the work of high-ranking Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers. Syrian officials, including Mr. Assad, have repeatedly denied involvement and have recently gone on the offensive to discredit witnesses in the investigation and raise doubts about the validity of crucial evidence in the report.

But the latest disclosure by Mr. Khaddam, who has been in Paris since he resigned in the summer, adds a surprising twist. In an hourlong interview shown Friday on the pan-Arab satellite news channel Al Arabiya, Mr. Khaddam, who became vice president in 1984, said that Mr. Assad had threatened Mr. Hariri and that no Syrian authority could have made the decision to kill Mr. Hariri on its own.

The Syrian president warned Mr. Hariri "in extremely harsh words" not to interfere with Mr. Assad's plan to extend the term of his Lebanese ally, President Émile Lahoud, Mr. Khaddam said. He quoted the Syrian president as telling Mr. Hariri in 2004 that he would not allow a new president in Lebanon. "I will crush whoever attempts to overturn our decision," he quoted Mr. Assad as saying.

But he stopped short of specifically accusing Mr. Assad of making or participating in the decision to assassinate Mr. Hariri. "I have a lot to say, but Syria's interests require me to keep quiet for now," he added.

Mr. Landis said: "This may seem like the smoking gun some were hoping would come up, and it certainly puts the fear of God into the Syrians. Here's somebody from within the intimate palace grounds, who actually knows what was going on, speaking."

In recent days, Syria's governing Baath Party has stripped Mr. Khaddam of membership and joined a unanimous vote in Parliament calling on the government to try him for high treason as a result of his accusations. Syrian news broadcasts have continued to show tirades by Syrians against Mr. Khaddam, accusing him of treason and chastising him for trying to harm the country.

"Khaddam has joined the band of enemies who are targeting the country and its attitudes," the Baath Party said in a statement. "The National Leadership has decided to dismiss Khaddam from the party and put him on trial."
[end]

Khaddam Plans Government-in-Exile
Arab press roundup for Jan. 4:
AMMAN, Jordan, Jan. 4 (UPI) --

Kuwait's as-Seyassah daily reported Wednesday that former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam was working towards forming a government-in-exile after he spoke out against the Syrian regime in a televised interview from Paris. The pro-government paper quoted unidentified sources close to Khaddam as saying he has started consulting with former Syrian military officers who had defected to "end the bad situation, of which (President Bashar) Assad is responsible." It said the former officers accused Assad of having "abandoned them and took unilateral control of power along with his brother Maher and brother-in-law, Asef Shawkat." The sources told the Kuwaiti daily the government-in-exile would bring Khaddam to a leadership role in a transitional period in which "a democratic, pluralistic and modern system will be set up." They said this system would respect human rights and draw up a new constitution calling for free general elections "for a democratic parliament and government." They added that a new president will be elected by the people for a four or six-year term.

--

Syria's state-owned al-Thawra daily said in a commentary that Khaddam's statements in his lengthy interview with al-Arabiya channel at this time will have serious repercussions, but that they are also an opportunity to fight corruption. The paper said this provided a "golden opportunity" for President Assad to uproot corruption within Syria and in its relations with Lebanon. "It is an opportunity for the clean hands to wipe out the front and back lawn of the regime," the paper argued. It asked why the members of Syria's National Assembly and ruling Baath Party, who blasted Khaddam and accused him of treason and corruption following his televised statements, did not take into consideration that people in Syria and Lebanon "have been asking where these people were when Khaddam and his likes were shoveling money from the people, and then he talks about half the people looking for food in the garbage." It asked: "Where were their voices and stands from all this corruption?"
[end]

Firas Maksad or the Eurasia Group sent me this commentary:

Khaddam's high profile and strong ties to world leaders, particularly King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Chirac of France, may allow him to present himself as viable alternative to Assad rule, which has been unpopular with the US and EU but has remained for lack of alternative. Alongside his diplomatic ties, Khaddam can appeal to sectarian bases. As a Sunni in a country dominated by a Shia Alawite minority, Khaddam could reach out to the widely popular, but banned,
Muslim brotherhood. This group is considered to be the only real popular alternative to the Assad administration, but without Khaddam's secularizing face would be unacceptable to the US and EU.

Unconfirmed reports have also surfaced that former regime strongmen, including former Chief of Staff Lt. General Hikmat Chehabi and former Head of Military Intelligence Lt. General Ali Duba, are in close deliberations with Khaddam. Both men were associates of his under the administration of the late Hafez Al Assad, but had been swept aside since Bashar Assad's ascension to the Presidency. They are believed to still wield influence within Syria's armed forces, although the degree of their influence remains unclear.

While the U.S and France are not actively seeking regime change, the rise of a viable opposition could prove useful, providing them with much needed leverage at a time when diplomatic pressure is being exhausted. In light of Washington's failure to manufacture viable opposition for several years, Khaddam's defection will come as a welcome development.

The more immediate challenge facing Syria in the coming weeks will be the 2 January UN request to question President Assad about the Hariri assassination. While there has been no official response yet, vocal denunciations by parliament members associated with the administration foreshadow a likely rejection. A rejection will allow the special commission probing the killing to refer Syria to the Security Council, which could then institute punitive measures including targeted sanctions against administration officials. Although general sanctions are very unlikely, such actions may be enough to cause an already jittery Syrian public to flee the local currency and could force further devaluations. The pound has already lost more than 10% of its value since the Hariri assassination in February and unconfirmed reports of capital flight emerged in November.
[end]

Interview with Syrian FM in Mehlis probe "a positive step" -- US Kuwait News Agency

Syria's ruling Baath Party (A.P. Jan. 1) stripped the country's former vice president of membership and joined parliament in demanding his trial on a charge of high treason, the official news agency SANA reported Sunday.

The Daily Star reports:

President Chirac said: "Syria must answer the demands" of the international inquiry into Hariri's killing. He had talks with his visiting Egyptian counterpart Mubarak on Wednesday over the Syrian issue.

"Everything that destabilizes Lebanon will end up turning back against Syria," warned the president, who was a personal friend of the slain Hariri.

The French president also described Syria's situation as "very serious" while speaking on the sidelines of a New Year's press conference.

"The request for an interview [with Asad] is being considered while other capitals are in contact with Syria on the same subject," a diplomatic source said. "As announced before there is no objection that the committee meets Sharaa. That position did not change."

Mubarak met with the Saudi king on Tuesday over the Syrian crisis, whereby they urged Syria to act now "to prevent any harm" coming to Damascus, said Soleiman Awad, the Egyptian president's spokesperson .

The two leaders also underlined "the need to preserve the historic links between Lebanon and Syria."

The Khaddam Affaire as seen from Paris

This view of the Khaddam affaire as seen from Paris was posted by Nicholas in the comment section. I am posting it here, because it is interesting and gives us yet another perspective on the present predicament in Syria. Nicholas believes the French are in no position and have little inclination to push the Syria issue to a showdown. He suggests following the oil.

After a good week's vacation, people in Paris are back to town and back to work. The first question I was asked at the office this morning was not how was your break? Bur rather: “What is going on with your guys?” Even a Lebanese colleague was outraged at Khaddam and said that he and all his friends (Lebanese) believe he has been paid to do this. I didn’t get a chance to chat more but I think I’m going to hear some interesting opinions over here all day.

The newspapers and TV new bulletins here in Paris have put the Khaddam story front page over the weekend, again with translations of the Khaddam script that could least be described as “inaccurate” or only present half the sentence; just like the la takraboo el salat then period phrase. On the way to the office, radio news announced that the UN commission wants to interrogate Bashar Assad (front news). Yet, on this Monday morning things were different. Le Figaro (right wing leaning and close to the Chirac clan) included 5 articles on the subjects; this is a record quantity on Syria and all in the same issue. The first on the UN wanting to interrogate Bashar Assad, Farouk Shar’a and Khaddam. He second on the reactions in Lebanon (mostly based on article in An-Nahar). The third a description of Khaddam.

Then comes the interesting part: article 4 and 5. One is entitled: the Hidden Message of Abdel Halim Khaddam and this discusses the hypothesis of Khaddam presenting himself as potential candidate for the post-Bashar Assad era. The last, is a 2 sentence declaration by the Quai d’Orsay (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) declaring that it is not in contact with Khaddam who is in Paris for private reasons (bad translation of à “titre privé”). So is France keeping its options open (article 4) or assuring Bashar Assad that all is not over yet (article 5)?

In Champress this morning, an article also noted that Bashar Assad is going to go on a tour of capitals this year and that efforts are underway to organize a reconciliatory meeting with Chirac in Paris. (as far as I am concerned Champress is far from being your ultimate undisputable source of information). During the vacation, I met a friend who is in the oil business and he confirmed that a French oil company (not Total – this should be enough of a hint) is looking seriously into applying for a couple of the oil licenses that are to be put to tender in the first quarter of 2006. This company is highly politicized (yes, even more than Total) and would not have decided to go into such venture without some green light from “up there”. Earlier, I noted that Total has been in talks with the Syrian authorities about a refinery construction, this has been sited again from two different sources: Les Echos (the French version of the Financial Times) and from Zawya.com (a mideast business information site-serious and reliable news source). So it looks like its pretty serious.

Somewhere in the thread above someone noted that in the eyes of the West Syria is already guilty [of the Harriri murder] regardless what happens. This statement is very true and I think it would be wisest if the Syrians dealt with things based on this above assumption. Even the Lebanese over here, who have strong influence on events in Beirut as well as Foreign policy spheres in Paris, are somehow getting bored with this story and would like to move on; this point has been mentioned to me from different people with different political tendencies (pro- and against-Syria but all Lebanese). One of these friend suggested the following: “Let them stick it over Ghazali’s back and get over the entire thing. Even if not guilty himself, let this be the price to pay for his other misgivings. The Khaddam declaration against him can be used. Bashar can admit having been harsh with Harriri in the presence of Ghazali but he regrets it and that’s why he talked to Khaddam about it. Ghazali wanted to please his master so he did the assassination thinking this would win him favors with Bashar. Khaddam noted that Bashar is not really fond of Ghazali and knows that he is a “thief” (laugh laugh). Given the international mood, everyone would turn the page and move on to something else.” This fits neatly; notably when one notices the incredible US silence.

The French seem to have got this message and this would explain the oil deals on talk now and Champress’ story of a Chirac-Assad meeting in 2006. Chirac is in his last year as president (and very weakened), he is doing all he can to smooth the transition of the presidency (not to his son) but to the current Prime Minister (who is the only person willing to grant Chirac immunity from persecution for corruption). Cleaning up the foreign affairs file would be a major priority during the upcoming political battle. It is also worth noting that the current Foreign Minister is puppet/joke (no-one takes him seriously – not even in the EU).
Sorry to cut the discussion thread over whether Khaddam is fit or not to rule, but maybe the above thought from Paris could help the debate.

Apologies about pasting the 2 articles of Le Figaro below, but last I tried to include links, it did not work. Thank you all for your understanding.

Le message caché d'Abdel Halim Khaddam
En accusant un régime qu'il a toujours servi, l'ancien vice-président syrien cherche peut-être à se placer dans la course au pouvoir.
Pierre Prier
[02 janvier 2006]

ABDEL Halim Khaddam s'est-il placé, de Paris, dans la course au pouvoir pour l'après-Bachar ? Le contenu de l'entretien choisi pour le donner, et jusqu'au média qui le délivre semblent indiquer un positionnement politique de l'ancien vice-président, plus qu'une intervention décisive dans le dossier Hariri lui-même.
L'interview de Khaddam n'apporte en effet aucun élément concret à l'enquête de la commission de l'ONU sur l'assassinat de l'ancien premier ministre libanais. Abdel Halim Khaddam exprime surtout sa conviction personnelle que le sommet du pouvoir – il se garde bien de nommer le président Bachar el-Assad – est responsable du meurtre de Hariri.

Menaces directes contre Hariri
Detlev Melhis a lui aussi exprimé cette certitude avant de se faire remplacer le 15 décembre dernier. Mais il n'a pu en apporter la preuve, empêchant ainsi le Conseil de sécurité de voter des sanctions contre Damas. Dans l'un des passages les plus incriminants de son entretien, Khaddam confirme le récit contenu dans le premier rapport Mehlis : convoquant Hariri à Damas, Bachar el-Assad l'aurait très directement menacé.

Le vice-président cite trois sources, dont deux morts : Hariri lui-même et le ministre de l'Intérieur Ghazi Kanaan, «suicidé» en octobre dernier. La troisième source est le président Bachar. Un apport qui n'aidera en rien le successeur de Detlev Mehlis, sauf si Abdel Halim Khaddam a des éléments vraiment concrets à lui communiquer dans le cadre d'un interrogatoire.

Quant au moment choisi, on peut se demander pourquoi le vice-président, âgé de 73 ans et vieux compagnon de route de Hafez el-Assad, le père, a attendu trente-cinq ans pour dénoncer le régime syrien. Quand il démissionne du parti Baas en juin, Khaddam paraît surtout mû par le constat de sa marginalisation dans les instances du parti. L'ex-vice-président explique qu'il est parti pour protester contre l'absence de réformes politiques.

Une vue qui surprendra les lecteurs d'une interview récente donnée à la presse officielle, où il accusait les partisans du multipartisme de «servir les plans de l'étranger et d'Israël». Sur le plan politique, Khaddam n'a jamais fait figure de réformateur. Mais l'ancien dirigeant était considéré comme «souple» sur la question libanaise. Il entretenait d'ailleurs des liens d'amitié avec Rafic Hariri et fut le seul officiel syrien à assister à ses obsèques.

Comme Hariri, Khaddam était sunnite, et ce n'est pas un détail. Le vice-président démissionnaire n'appartenait pas à la minorité alaouite, dont est issu le clan Bachar, mais à l'écrasante majorité sunnite, au moins 70% des Syriens. En ces temps de repli sur l'identité confessionnelle, tout sunnite est plus ou moins en odeur de méfiance. L'amitié avec Rafic Hariri, qui pouvait servir de modèle à toute une bourgeoisie sunnite syrienne, ne donnait pas de bons points dans un CV. Surtout quand le pouvoir soupçonne l'Occident, les pays arabes sunnites et même certains membres des cercles dirigeants d'être à la recherche d'un sunnite présentable pour conduire le pays.

Intentions qui restent à décoder
On peut comprendre que Khaddam ait attendu de s'être installé à Paris pour donner son interview. Il l'a confié à al-Arabiya, chaîne à capitaux saoudiens proche de la famille royale, dont Rafic Hariri était l'ami. Un message de plus dans le message. Mais les intentions d'Abdel Halim Khaddam restent encore à décoder. Surtout dans la mesure où le régime de Damas, qui a gagné du temps et des alliés à l'ONU, est sorti consolidé, au moins pour un temps, de son dernier bras de fer avec l'ONU.
[end]

Khaddam est à Paris à titre privé
[02 janvier 2006]
Le ministère français des Affaires étrangères n'a aucun contact avec l'ancien vice-président syrien, Abdel Halim Khaddam, qui séjourne à titre privé à Paris, a assuré hier à l'AFP une source diplomatique. Le Quai d'Orsay s'en tient aux informations de la presse, selon lesquelles Abdel Halim Khaddam séjourne depuis juin à Paris.

Syria signs US$39 million contract to import Chinese buses Al-Bawaba, Jordan - Jan 1, 2006. Syria's Transport Ministry has signed a contract with the Chinese Zijan Timis Company whereby 600 buses will be imported to the country. ...

Russia to build oil refinery in Syria: The value of the project is 2.7 billion dollars, reliable business circles reported on Wednesday. The complex to be built near Deir az-Zor is planned to be put in operation in 2010.

This is not the first contract. On December 5, the Stroitransgaz Company signed a contract worth 200 million dollars with the state-owned Syrian Gas Company for the building of a gas-processing complex new Palmyra, which will include a factory, auxiliary production capacities and pipelines connecting the complex with gas fields.

Canadian Oil Companies Hunt for Oil in Syria

A Syrian's View of the Khaddam Patronage Network

A Syrian reader has just written me the most interesting analysis of the Khaddam affaire I have yet read. Many thanks to him for sending this along and giving me permission to publish it. Here it is:...

Josh,

Extremely interesting analysis on Khaddam! I totally agree. As a young Syrian who lived the last part of Khaddam era and the transition to Bashar, allow me to add the following to your excellent analysis:

I think that Khaddam's reasons for his precisely timed comeback on the Syrian regime was because of a mix of reasons, mainly:
1- personal vendettas
2- fresh business deals
3- an oversized ego.

Think about it: here is a man that was selling his services to bidders from outside Syria who wanted to influence Syria's political and major business decisions.

He sold his services to the Hariri senior and continued his alliance with the new Hariri. He is a major partner in most of Hariri's businesses in Syria, Lebanon, Saudi and France as was Hariri a partner in his business in Syria, whereas Rafiq Hariri's business competitors in Lebanon and Syria were having an extremely hard time finding any foothold in Syria . One major example: Prince Al-Walid Bin Talal who was unable to enter the Syrian market until Bashar came to power.. which by the way added to Khaddam's mafia grievances in the last 5 years. Until 2000, it was very well known that it would be extremely hard for any big player from outside or inside Syria to enter the Syrian market unless they made someone from Khaddam's mafia a partner (Coca-cola, Philip-Morris, Jaguar are just a few of Khaddam's businesses in Syria with partnerships with the Hariri and other Saudis, plus the countless local businesses and chains in Syria) not to mention his sons and wife illegal businesses of smuggling, trade in nuclear waste, etc. I was personally told in 1998 (by a son of ex-senior bathist from the old -and now expired- guards) of a very well-known meeting between Al-walid bin Talal and Assad senior in Damascus where the prince begged Hafez to keep Khaddam cronies away from him as he was being kept out of the Syrian market because he refused to pay "the partnership fees" to one of Khaddam sons. I personally think that it was not possible for Emaar (the Dubai based mega properties investment company) to come to Syria with its 5 Billions Dollars investment if Khaddam was not "gently" kicked out from power during the last 5 years. Oh and by the way, did anyone else notice how Future TV (owned by Hariri) does not play Syrian TV shows unless they were produced by the Al-Sham Int... you guessed it.. it is owned by Khaddam!

Unfortunately, Syria was and still is run by corrupted mafia-style businessmen/politicians for the last 30 years, where Lebanon has been run by a larger number of corrupted mafia-style businessmen/politicians/sectarian Za'ims since its creation. These Lebanese and Syrian mafias interchanging control turfs in both countries and many powerful partnerships were created over the years of Syria in Lebanon.. both sides are to blame.

The Personal Vendetta!
As for Khaddam's remarks on the foreign minister, it is a fact that Al-Sharaa lost a lot of the glamour he had in the nineties. He should be blamed for Syria's recent foreign policy missteps. But although this incompetence begs for change in the foreign ministry's head, it should be clearly stated that Farouk Al-Sharaa was and still is seen by the Syrian public as one of the few "clean hands" in the brutal and corrupted world of the Syrian regime. For more than 20 years, no one ever heard in Syria of any illegal activity by Al-Sharaa or any of his relatives (while it is a sad truth, it is something rare and admirable in the dirty world of Syrian regime). Given that Khaddam held, and obviously still holds, grudge for Al-Sharaa, this gives even more credibility to the rumors that prevailed in Syria during the last 5 years about tensions between Al-Sharaa and Khaddam, not always because of policy-related reasons! The rumors said that Al-Shara'a was critical of Khaddam wide-scale corruption and his sons imposed siege on investment in Syria.

As I see it, Khaddam has surely lost his mind. He lost control on Lebanon back in 1998 to Bashar, then lost leadership in Syria to Bashar again in 2000 and finally his corrupted empire is being continuously threatened by both legal businesses as well as other mafias (relatives of the president and others) who were finally permitted to enter the Syrian market since Bashar came to power. I think that sometime in the last 5 years he knew that sooner or later his turn will come in the list of the old-guards heads rolling out of office.. it was Zu'by (when Bashar was heading the anti-corruption campaign between 1998 and 2000 under Hafez), Tlass and other military and security chiefs heads rolled after that and Khaddam was being put out of duty gradually in a polite way for years, maybe as a "gratitude" for his services to Bashar's father and maybe because Bashar did not want to make an enemy out of him because of Khaddam's mafia connections inside Syria and personal political allies outside that may threaten Assad's regime. In his interview with the robotic and miserably-researched journalist, it was blatantly clear how Khaddam was more enraged because of slowly losing grip of political and business power on a the business/political level and more importantly of how Shara'a (his rival) becoming the only one from the old guards not put out of office!

For god's sake, the man was for a while the ruler of a country (Lebanon) and was preparing himself for taking Lebanon back plus having Syria after Hafez died, thinking that Bashar will be a stooge manipulated by him.. eventually, it seems that either Bashar was able to gently and smoothly replace the corrupted old guards with technocrats (Dardari being the most successful example) or that his new corrupted inner-circle was able to replace the old ones with new -but multiple and less brutal- mafias (or maybe both of these reasons are true)! Either case Khaddam was enraged and slowly planned his exit strategy for the last few years. The Hariri fiasco -regardless of who did it- was Khaddam's biggest chance and the most beneficial financially and politically in the long run in his view.

For people like Khaddam, who served in a dictatorship for so long, the Syrian people do not matter .. they simply are irrelevant in Khaddam's calculations. We have to admit that people in Syria are enraged and feel stabbed in the back. The possibility that the Syrian regime is involved in killing Hariri does not take away the fact that most Syrians (in and outside Syria) are seeing the whole Hariri and aftermath as a huge threat to their economy, their rights in the Golan, their security and their country as whole. The reason for the Syrian people view is because international and regional parties are itching to gain on Syria's expense in the current turmoil. I think that he really thought that he would be back with a vengeance when Bashar's regime would fall because of external pressures that he solely was able to revive (a new service sold by Khaddam to the highest bidder). With his speech he just made friends with the Saudis, the French, the Americans, the Syrian opposition (including the Muslim Brotherhood who was brutally crushed in Hama when he was its mayor!) and -strangely as it may seem- the Israelis (Didn't you notice how he did not utter a single bad word on Israel, not even when the interviewer included it in his examples of who might killed Hariri.. something very weird when considering his Bathist pan-Arabist Anti-Israeli ideology that he preached and ruled with for the last 35 years!). This gives more credibility to what Ma'arif published few days ago stating that Israeli officials visited Khaddam in Paris a lot during the last six months (and just recently published that its editor-in-chief was "scolded" by the Mosad for this scoop!).

One final note, if the Lebanese sectarian warlords now applauding Khaddam think that all of what he presented was credible, then they should take the whole package he offered and spare Syrians the decades long accusations.. Khaddam in his long speech (that was sometimes disgusting when he preached on freedom and corruption) cleared Syria's name from many of the major issues these same Lebanese warlords are currently utilizing in their political struggles for power. He cleared Syria's name from the blood of Moauadh (former Lebanese president), he made it clear that Samir Jaja' did kill Karami (former PM) and how it was not Syria that insisted for him to be jailed (contrary to what the Lebanese Maronite urban legend widely say), he also told the story of General Aoun and how Syria requested that he is brought to power as defense minister after kicking him from the presidency he held by force and many other issues!

What Bashar should do now?
The Khaddam empire he built on corruption in Syria/Lebanon/Saudi/France/..etc. was very well known to normal Syrians. Almost month ago (long before the interview) one independent MP requested that the government open Khaddam's corruption files. Knowing that Khaddam influence was very well established within the corrupted mafias inside Syria and other mafias outside such as the Hariri's (his biggest business partners) and some Saudi conglomerates, this was one of the bravest things done in the Syrian parliament last year (and when I say Mafia, I mean just that: a brutal business empire rotating around a family). On the last parliament session in 2005 many of the MPs were naming names in corruptions charges and threatening to open the corruption files of people still in power (including ministers) related to Khaddam's mafia.

The good thing that I see from the whole Khaddam fiasco is that more corruption charges would be openly thrown both ways now and that the Syrian parliament (or at least some of its members hopefully) would raise the demands of bringing people to justice openly. We saw a glimpse of this few days ago when one independent MP demanded the release of Dalila and Homsy because -as he put it- "they stood in the face of Khaddam's corruption". I think this is a golden opportunity for Bashar -if he is intelligent enough- to seize the moment and release the political prisoners (in the coming release expected on Eid Al-Adha in less than 10 days) who were jailed during Damascus spring and -to save face- blame Khaddam (rightly or wrongly) for "manipulating the authorities" and putting these brave men in jail for their stance on corruption back in 2001-2003. Better yet, imagine the reaction of the Syrian people if Bashar carried out the magnificent counter attack of installing some of Damascus spring prisoners as ministers in the upcoming government change!

My wish for 2006 after what I saw in the Syrian parliament in the last day in 2005, is for this parliament (the independent part of the MPs at least) to become more active, outspoken and brave in fighting corruption and naming names publicly (I also hope that some of the "installed" MPs that we painfully listed to last year would resign, drop dead or spontaneously combust!). This might solve the biggest part of Syria's problems.

Thank you Josh and please do keep posting more often.
Idaf
PS. if you think that my view is worth publishing in one of your posts (as representing a Syrian point of view) then it'll be an honor

Khaddam Damns Bashar al-Asad

Ex-Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who resigned at the Baath Party Conference in June of this year (2005) and moved to Paris, has officially announced his opposition to President Bashar al-Asad.

Al-Arabiyah on the 30th aired an interview with the former Syrian Vice-President in which he explained how President Asad had threatened Hariri shortly before his murder and that Syrian security could only have carried it out with the President's knowledge.

A must read is Tony Badran’s analysis at Beirut to Bayside, which I have just read after completing my analysis below. Naturally, Tony and I read the Khaddam story from different perspectives – Tony from the Beirut perspective and me from that of Damascus, but I don’t think we differ too much on the basic story. I agree with much of Tony’s analysis, but disagree on what the new year will hold for Bashar in Syria. Tony also has listed further valuable links, especially Kais' English summary of the Al-Arabiya interview here.

BBC reports that Syrian MPs demand Khaddam's trial. "Syrian MPs demand a treason trial for an exiled top politician who implicated President Assad in Rafik Hariri's death."

Former vice-president Abdel Halim Khaddam says Mr Assad threatened the then-Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri months before his murder in a bomb attack. His comments were repeatedly denounced by members of Syria's parliament before they voted for him to be put on trial.

A UN-led inquiry implicated Syria in the murder, but Damascus denies blame.

Mr Khaddam told al-Arabiya television: "Assad told me he had delivered some very, very harsh words to Hariri... something like 'I will crush anyone who tries to disobey us'."

In the interview, broadcast on Friday, Mr Khaddam also said the Syrian security services could not have taken a unilateral decision to kill Mr Hariri. But he insisted he did not want to accuse anyone of the murder, preferring to wait for the results of a UN probe into the assassination.

Mr Khaddam's comments drew a furious response from Syrian MPs in a session of parliament on Saturday. "What has been proved beyond doubt is that he has given victory to the enemies of the nation and cut off allegiance to the homeland, and this is the very definition of the cowardly act of treason," said one, Joseph Suwayyd.

Another MP, Umeima Khudur, told the session: "I demand... that Khaddam is judged because he has attacked the dignity of Syria and humiliated millions of Syrians."

'Syria's Judas'

As the session ended, speaker Mahmoud al-Abrash told parliament: "We call on the justice minister to try Abdel Halim Khaddam for high treason and to take the necessary measures."

Earlier, Syrian newspaper Ad-Diyar denounced Mr Khaddam as "Syria's Judas".

During the UN probe, witnesses told investigators that Mr Hariri was threatened by President Assad at a crunch meeting in August 2004.

Mr Hariri himself, in a taped account cited by the UN report, described the meeting as the "worst day of his life".

"When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my bodyguard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced," Mr Hariri recounted.

President Assad has previously denied any personal involvement in the murder.

BBC reported yesterday story:

Hariri 'threatened by Syria head'
BBC Dec 30, 2005

Mr Khaddam, 73, who resigned as vice-president in June, told al-Arabiya television he was formally cutting links with the president, whom he accused of authoritarianism.

He told al-Arabiya he was "convinced that the process of development and reforms, be they political, economic or administrative, will not succeed".

Mr Khaddam used to be in charge of Syria's Lebanon policy. Damascus was the effective power in Lebanon for many years, until it withdrew its troops under international pressure this year.

The BBC's Kim Ghattas in Beirut says Mr Khaddam's intervention would be seen as very significant, important, and potentially dangerous, and would attract the interest of UN investigators.

She said it was unclear why Mr Assad's former colleague, who is now living in Paris, had chosen to speak out now, but that he may be positioning himself as an alternative to the Syrian president.

Naharnet is reporting that

Khaddam said: Assad Felt Washington Could Not Care Less About Lebanon
Syrian President Bashar Assad was duped by his advisors into believing the United
States was indifferent about his grip on Lebanon and would 'come crawling on its knees" to win Damascus' support for its invasion of Iraq. According to Syrian ex-Vice ...more

Ammar Abdulhamid has a good assessment: "The Vice-Predator!". He writes:

The story of Mr. Khaddam’s disenchantment with the ruling clique dates back to the time before Bashar’s ascension to power. He was never in complete agreement with this move. Indeed, it seems clear considering that he was the VP at the time of Hafiz al-Assad as well, that he thought himself the more qualified person for the job. The rise of Bashar and the New Guard was problematic for him. The lot simply lacked the necessary experience and qualifications, and he obviously looked at them with much disdain.

Mr. Khaddam did not say this in a direct manner though. In fact, when he spoke in a direct manner about the President, he said that he was nice and polite and that their relations was cordial, and that the President had bid his farewell before his departure to Paris knowing that Khaddam will be there for a long time. But later, he also said that he was rash and easily influenced by the very narrow circle of people around him, and that he took matters his own hands. Indeed, he made him appear extremely foolish, rash, amateurish, dictatorial, and all but accused him of ordering the assassination of Hariri in some fit of anger...

There were reports in the Syrian press recently that reflected negatively on him, and reports that the remaining property that his family have in Syria was about to be confiscated. Indeed, the family of Mr. Khaddam had been busy liquidating their assets in the country for years now, so the family was for long preparing for such an eventuality. Their liquidation activities increased in the last few months.

(Read all of Ammar's post to get the specifics of how Khaddam claimed that Hariri could not have been killed without the president's knowledge. )

Before leaving Damascus on December 16th, several people had told me that Khaddam's sons' houses in Tartus had been police taped and were closed. Some said that the families businesses were being impounded. All this now seems to be true.

As Ammar has written the power struggle between Khaddam and Bashar began before he became president. The first overt signs of the power struggle revealed themselves before Hafiz al-Asad died. In the weeks leading up to Bashar's father's death, Hariri and Jumblat working with Khaddam, Shihabi and possibly Kanaan seem to have been plotting to push Bashar aside and eliminate the house of Asad from power.

The specifics of this are not clear, but evidently this is what Bashar was told by Lahoud and others who visited him from Lebanon. This news convinced Bashar to attack Shihabi, who was the weak link among his opponents. Shihabi was accused of corruption in a story leaked to al-Hayat only a week or so before Hafiz's death on the 10th of June 2000. A few days later a follow-up story was printed in al-Hayat, claiming that an "alliance of corruption" had been detected in Lebanon. Hariri was implicated and so were others. It was impossible not to associate Khaddam and Kanaan with this alliance, for they had been the architects of Syria’s Lebanon policy. Shihabi, who was in AUB hospital at the time, fled to the United States as soon as he could. Following his purge from the state, he moved to France. When his retirement was officially announced at the Bath Party conference of June 2005, he openly with Foreign Minister Sharaa about who had been responsible for losing Lebanon. Both Khaddam and Shihabi were rumored to be plotting against Bashar in Paris. Kanaan's suicide was announced shortly following the spread of these rumors making it hard not to link the three men in a possible conspiracy against the regime. The women at Kanaan’s funeral in his hometown of Bahamra chanted that they wanted the “truth.” Few believed his suicide was voluntary. Perhaps it was connected to Khaddam’s and Shihabi’s presence in Paris and the on-going Mehlis investigation, or it may simply have been a precautionary purge by a regime that felt it could take no chances, Kanaan being the last of the old guard in a position to organize from within the state system.

Bashar had been told by his father that in order to rule Syria, he had first to rule Lebanon. It would seem that Bashar took this fatherly advice to heart. Right from the beginning of his tenure, Bashar sought to cut the Gordian knot of money and personal connections that linked Riyadh, Beirut and Damascus together in a triangle of graft and influence. The old guard members who had overseen and nurtured the construction of this triangle over the 30 years of Syrian rule in Lebanon, believed they could direct affairs of state in Syria – preferably with Bashar in nominal power, but without him if necessary.

From 2000 on the main power-struggle in Syria was between the young president and his vice-president, Abdul Halim Khaddam. Bashar moved precipitously in 2000 to support Salim al-Hoss for Prime-Minister against Hariri. His effort failed because Khaddam and Kanaan outfoxed him and demonstrated their superior control of events. Hariri had become too important in Lebanon to be denied the position of Prime Minister. Bashar was forced to write off his failure to overthrow Hariri as an indication of his benevolence and intent not to interfere in Lebanese affairs. He claimed a new page had been turned in Syrian-Lebanese relations and that Syria would allow Lebanon more freedom. Bashar, however, was only biding his time. He needed to consolidate his position further inside Syria before he could move more forcefully against Kanaan and Khaddam, which would ease the way toward eventually pushing aside Hariri and Junblat. In his eyes, they were all of a piece. He moved Kanaan out of Lebanon in 2003 and whittled away at Khaddam’s authority little by little, moving his people out of ministries and, in particular, out of the relevant security agencies.

In this reading of events, Bashar’s burning of Franco-Syrian relations was only collateral damage in his effort to unseat Hariri – and ultimately Khaddam. In fact, he placed Syria’s foreign policy in the back seat as he tried to steer the affairs of state in such a way as to consolidate his hold on power in Damascus. He sacrificed good relations with his neighbors and with the great powers in order to get his hands firmly on the steering wheel and shove aside the old-guard.

Further evidence of the power struggle between Bashar and Khaddam is clear in the governments that were formed after the 2003 parliamentary elections and during 2004. The Utri cabinet is a case in point. Bashar tried to reduce the number of Baathists in the cabinet, but Khaddam eventually won out – or seemed to – with the appointment of 15 Baathist ministers.

The war in Iraq complicated Bashar’s efforts to consolidate his power. He was forced to bring Khaddam back in, when Sharaa’s policy of fighting America in Iraq proved a disaster. It is quite possible that Bashar chose to oppose the American invasion of Iraq so openly in order to contrary Khaddam, who claims he was in favor of a more pro-American policy. This may be another example of Bashar’s willingness to sacrifice relations with a great power in order to push aside the old guard and assert his independence from them. Bashar used the anti-American sentiment in the Arab street, and more importantly, in Syria in order to over-rule the pro-American policy that Khaddam was advocating. He gave Sharaa his head during the first months of the American invasion, when Syria’s Grand Mufti declared that it was an individual duty of all Muslims to go to Iraq to fight in the Jihad against America. This anti-American policy undermined Khaddam and was used to undermine his authority. When it proved too dangerous, Bashar brought Khaddam back into to the center of power, allowing him to win in the struggle for cabinets. He also let Khaddam try to recruit the Sunni tribal leaders of Iraq to Syria’s side. Khaddam organized at least 10 meetings of Iraqi tribal leaders at the Ebla Sham Hotel on the airport road during 2003 and 2004. This may have been Khaddam’s way of trying to make Syria useful to the Americans and to bring Syria into the center of the Iraq political drama. Khaddam’s policy of taming the Sunnis and delivering them to the Americans proved useless, however. Allawi lost out in the power struggle in Iraq. The Iraqi resistance grew at a dizzying pace and America moved ever closer to the Shiites and away from the Sunnis. Bremer dissolved the Army and moved forcefully against all the old Baathists in Iraq, which doomed Khaddam’s ability to organize and domesticate the Iraqi Sunnis, so he could deliver them to the Americans and show Syria’s utility and good intentions.

Khaddam’s strategy may have been doomed by Bashar, who was simplifying playing him, but it was also doomed by the ideological narrow-mindedness of the US administrators of Iraq and ultimately the Bush administration. Bashar allowed Khaddam to try out his Iraq policy, but when it failed, Khaddam also failed. This may have convinced him to move against Hariri in Lebanon at the time of the Lahoud extension. Washington would not cut Syria any slack on the Iraq front. Khaddam was wrong – or perhaps just too late. When the US began to demand greater independence for Lebanon as well, Khaddam could only propose to give it. Bashar over-ruled him at the last minute and extended Lahoud’s presidency and took Lebanon away from him and from Hariri, something he had been trying to do for years. In this interpretation, Bashar gambled on losing Lebanon definitively in order to gain power in Damascus.

Of course, he didn’t plan to lose Lebanon. He was hoping that the Lahoud gambit would work and that with Hariri pushed aside, the Lebanese would slip back into their back-biting confessional ways. Syria has always viewed Lebanon as a failed nation because it doesn’t embrace Arabism. Or rather as an ineffective state which contains four irreconcilable nations within it, each of which can be counted on to attack the others and undermine the integrity of the central government. What Bashar, and all the Syrians, failed to predict was the Cedar Revolution and the tremendous outpouring of national sentiment following the murder of their national hero, Hariri. But Bashar did not sack Foreign Minister Sharaa following the UN’s issuance of resolution 1559. It was widely rumored in Damascus that Sharaa should be sacked because he had assured Bashar that resolution 1559 would not pass the security council and that the world would not find unanimity following Syria’s tampering with the Lebanese constitution. Sharaa was wrong about that and Khaddam was right. Nevertheless, Sharaa’s mistake did not cost him his job. Most likely, this is because he was carrying out the president’s will. It was the President’s mistake. Or rather, one should say that Bashar was willing to take the gamble in Lebanon in order to destroy the triangle of money and influence upon which Khaddam had built reputation and power.

If I am correct in interpreting the main dynamic of Syrian politics over the last five years to be the internal power struggle in Damascus and not foreign policy, how does this color our interpretation of Bashar?

Tony Badran believes that Bashar is just a Baathist ideology, who is stupid, uneducated, and naïve. He has stumbled from one mistake to another. Most importantly he has pissed off the French and the Saudis, the two powers that could save him from Bush’s wrath. Tony believes that Bashar is doomed because the Saudis are backing Saad Hariri to the hilt and have moved fully into the Franco-US court. He focuses on King Abdullah’s short March visit to the Damascus airport in order to tell Bashar that the Saudis backed resolution 1559 and insisted that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon. Tony reads this frosty interchange to be the line drawn in the sand between Damascus and Riyadh.

I am not sure the Saudis have written Bashar off, despite their pique. Yes, they may not like him. They certainly do not trust him. After all, he took down Hariri, their ally and tangential family member. Bashar has undermined Saudi influence in Lebanon in a very direct and ham-fisted way, but I am not convinced, as Tony is, that the King will support any form of regime change as a result.

I would focus on the more recent Bandar visit to Damascus at the time of the President Bashar’s November 10 speech at the University of Damascus. The Saudis smoothed the way for the Vienna deal, which got Asef Shawkat off the hook and allowed for a compromise between Mehlis and the Syrians. King Abdullah quoted the Koran to the effect that “if one cannot do good, he should strive to do no harm.” I read this to mean that if Saudi Arabia cannot fix the Hariri murder, it should not try to help the US overturn the Syrian regime. King Abdullah was letting go of the Hariri affaire. It wanted Syria to be punished and held responsible by having the 5 generals sent to Vienna, but it didn’t want to bring further instability to the region.

In Saudi eyes, the biggest setback to its regional safety has been America’s misadventure in Iraq. The fragmentation of Iraq and the rise to power in the south of Shiite ideologues has seriously damaged Arabia’s interests. The damage done to Lebanon by Syria only comes second on its list. King Abdullah gave Bashar a pass on the Mehlis investigation. It did not support imposing any form of economic sanctions on Syria, even sanctions targeted against the President and his men.

Does this mean Syria is in the clear? No, it doesn’t. The Khaddam testimony will be very damaging to Bashar. It will revive the hopes of those who believe they can put together definitive proof of Bashar’s involvement in Hariri’s assassination, which could eventually result in real international sanctions being placed on Syria.

All the same, Khaddam no longer posses a real internal threat to Bashar. The only reason he testified on al-Arabiya is that he is completely washed up in Syria and has lost whatever influence he had to influence events there. Only when Bashar moved against his children and impounded his remaining assets in Syria did Khaddam come out openly against the president. My hunch is that Khaddam is no longer a real threat to Bashar internally. That explains why he is trying to present himself as an external threat. It is why Khaddam is throwing his lot in with Paris and Washington. He has no other choice. He can only pray that the Hariri investigation and the UN will somehow bring him and his children back to Damascus.

Can America help Khaddam? Time and again, we have seen the Syrian people support Bashar against American policy, which has become ship wrecked on the shoals of Palestine and now Iraq. Syrians have not seen a defection on the scale of Khaddam’s since Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din Bitar were pushed out by the neo-Baath in 1966. It is nerve wracking for most Syrians to have someone of Khaddam’s stature speak out against the Asad family. Since Hafiz came to power, the inner circle of the Syrian government has been very cohesive. Bashar’s consolidation of power has caused a number of defections. All the same, they are very few compared to previous changes of regime in 1966 or 1970. Khaddam was not loved. He may have been feared by many and respected by some, but he was admired by very few. In a few weeks, most Syrians will probably forget him.

America’s and the world’s attention is bolted on Iraq. Should the recent elections in Iraq somehow lead to the formation of an effective government there, the world may decide it is time to make Bashar pay for his transgressions and to punish him for snubbing just about every pro-Western government on the globe. Unlike Tony Badran and some others, however, I do not think Khaddam’s revelations will change the course of events in any major way. The world has already decided that Syria is guilty Hariri’s murder. The UN could have been much tougher than it was in December, when it decided not to impose sanctions on Syria and open the door to destabilizing the Asad regime. Saudi, Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Israel, Russia and China all rallied to Syria’s defense. I don’t believe they will change their policies based on Khaddam’s authority.

So long as the Shiites in Lebanon are willing to troubleshoot for Bashar, Lebanon will remain a bad bet in the eyes of most governments. How will the US make Lebanon safe for Saad Hariri’s return? How will it disarm Hizbullah? These things will require force over and above the Hariri investigation or the threat of sanctions.

Will Bashar al-Asad change his ways now that he has consolidated power in Damascus? The pessimists will say that the young man who spoke so convincingly about reform in 2005 has become part of the system. His long battle to gain power has proven to him how important the Baath Party and security apparatus really are. Although Bashar may have spoken at one time about distancing the state from the Baath and from the heavy hand and of the intelligence agencies, he has now become one with them and depends on them more than ever.

Some of the more optimistic readers of Syria Comment prose that we should give Bashar another chance because he has been distracted from reform by the need to battle the old titans of his father’s regime. They could argue that with Khaddam and his other enemies out of the way, Bashar will now be in a better position to begin focusing on building up new institutions in Syria. They may argue that he will be able to appoint the ministers of his choosing without bowing to his competitors or thinking about how he can outfox Khaddam by playing to the street’s anti-Americanism. He may now even have the freedom to begin looking for a rapprochement with the US and France.

It is hard to see how he can mend relations with either the US or France so long as Lebanon’s future is undecided. I cannot foresee a rapprochement with the Western powers, nor or do I see an end to the competition over authority in Lebanon. My hunch is that Syria will be further isolated by the West. It will seek ever more trade with the East. Bashar will hang on because Syrians have little choice but to go along with his decisions and to hope that he will do something positive for the country. So long as the situation in Iraq and Palestine remains so messy and unattractive, the stability the Asads provide in Syria will look very good, both to Syrians and to many others in the region and in the world.

[End of my analysis]

As Safir has published names of 20 Lebanese and Syrian nationals, who
it says are regarded as suspects by the UN commission investigating
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination.
The following is a list of Lebanese suspects as published in As Safir:

- Major General Ali Hajj
- Major General Jamil Sayyed
- Brigadier General Mustafa Hamdan
- Brigadier General Raymond Azar
- Ahmed Abdel Al
- Mahmoud Abel Al
- Raed Fakhreddine
- Former legislator Nasser Kandil
- Faysal al-Rasheed, a state security officer
- Colonel Ghassan Tufeili, former head of the Lebanese monitoring
services of military intelligence
- Majed Hamdan, brother of Brigadier General Hamdan

The following is a list of Syrian suspects as published in As Safir:

- Major General Assef Shawkat, Syria's intelligence chief
- Major General Bahjat Suleiman, former head of the internal security
- Major General Hassan Khalil, former head of military intelligence
- Brigadier General Rustom GHazaleh, Syria's former intelligence chief
in Lebanon
- Jameh Jameh, Ghazaleh's assistance
- Sameeh Qashaami, an officer
- Abdel Karim Abbas, an officer
- Nazem al-Yussef, an officer
- Mohammed Zuheir Siddiq, a witness-turned-suspect (held in France)