Odds and Ends

I will be traveling for a week and won't be able to post, alas.

Here are a few worthy articles:

In the "American Conservative," Divided & Conquered: A visit to Syria, Israel, and Palestine reveals the barriers—physical as well as political—to Mideast peace: By Scott McConnell, July 3, 2006.

Syria cracks down on dissent by Anoushka Marashlian, for "Open Democracy," 19 - 6 - 2006.
The domestic, regional and exile pressures on Bashar al-Assad's regime are still a long way from threatening regime change in Damascus, says Anoushka Marashlian.

Compare the al-Hayat story by Walid Choucair to Slackman's
Syria is Not Iran - Jun 24, 2006: It is natural for Syria to want to open up to the influential Arab states at this stage. The question that is mostly raised in the ...

Wary of U.S., Syria and Iran Strengthen Ties
Michael Slackman and Katherine Zoepf in the NYTimes June 25, 2006

SAYEDA ZEINAB, Syria, June 24 — For a long time, the top-selling poster in Hassan al-Sheikh's gift shop here showed President Bashar al-Assad of Syria seated beside the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon. A few weeks ago a slightly different poster overtook it, this one with the Syrian president, the Hezbollah leader and Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Mr. Sheikh's shop is on a bustling street in Sayeda Zeinab beside the entrance to a Shiite shrine that shares a name with the town, and both have been packed with Iranian pilgrims, many more than in years past.

Those changes illustrate what may well be a worrying phenomenon for Washington as it seeks to contain Iran and isolate Syria: the two governments, and their people, are tightening relations on several fronts as power in the region shifts away from the once dominant Sunni to Shiites, led by Iran.

This is, in part, the result of the American installation of a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his Sunni-led government. But it is also spurred by the growing belief in Arab capitals that the Bush administration may soon negotiate a deal with Tehran over Iraq and nuclear weapons.

Arab governments once hostile to Iran have begun to soften their public posture after decades of animosity toward Tehran. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt met Iran's national security chief, Ali Larijani, in Cairo recently, and Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, visited Tehran this month and declared the two nations to be good friends. In addition, Iranian officials recently sent messages of friendship to every Persian Gulf state.

Amid all that activity, Syria has managed to inflate its power in the region by playing a subtle double game and setting itself up as a possible go-between.

On one hand, it is offering Iran the chance to develop a strong and unified crescent of influence extending from Syria to the Palestinian territories, now led by Hamas, a Syrian and Iranian ally. On the other, Syria, which has a secular-oriented government but is made up of different religious sects and ethnic groups, has held itself out as an important player in the Sunni effort to limit the spread of Shiite influence. That has helped it with Arab countries and has attracted investment from the around the gulf, diplomats and political analysts in Syria said.

"Syria will work to use its role as a pivotal point to get the most from both the Arabs and Iranians," said Ayman Abdel Nour, a political analyst and Baath Party member who works for more political freedoms.

Syria's strategy has helped it win crucial support at a time when it is cut off from the United States and Europe. But political analysts and government officials say it is also a risky strategy, one that could weaken Syria if Iran cuts a deal with the West over its nuclear program — and abandons its ally in Damascus.

"Syrian officials are worried about America making a deal with Iran," said Marwan Kabalan, a political science professor at Damascus University. "Syrians fear that Iranians will use them as a card to buy something from America."

At the same time, Iran's efforts to bolster Shiism in parts of Syria come as the government here is confronted by the rise of radical Islamic ideas that many say are being exported from the gulf region. Though relations with Iran are widely perceived as a political alliance rather than a religious one, the confluence of the two forces could aggravate sectarian rivalries. Tensions among Syria's many religious and ethic groups burn so hot beneath the surface of the society that newspapers are forbidden from identifying sects even when reporting on Iraq.

Syria and Iran began establishing closer ties decades ago, but the real strides have been recent.

Syria has signed expanded military and economic agreements with Tehran covering everything from telecommunications projects to higher education. Syria will buy missiles from Iran. Iran will build cement and car plants in Syria.

At the same time, Arab nations that have been cool to Syria are now reaching out to it. Syria received the king of Bahrain this month, he met Thursday with Mr. Mubarak, and this week President Assad held a telephone conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan. Relations between Amman and Damascus became strained when Jordanian officials accused Syria of allowing Hamas to smuggle weapons across Syrian territory and into Jordan — charges Syria has denied.

"Iran injected Syria with a lot of confidence: stand up, show defiance," said Sami Moubayed, a political analyst and writer in Damascus. "Iran is giving them advice. This is certain."

European diplomats here said that Syria's turn away from the West — and toward Iran and other Eastern countries — had also been part of a domestic power struggle between two forces within the government. Those who favored at least trying to keep a foot in the door with Europe have been silenced, and those seeking to shift Syria toward the East have been empowered, said the diplomats who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid aggravating tensions between their governments and Damascus.........

Damascus (AsiaNews) Syria Poses Conditions for Dialogue With Beirut

The Syrian Information Minister Mohsin Bilal, said that first "we have to wait until internal Lebanese dialogue is concluded" (started in Beirut in March and going on intermittently since). He told a delegation of Lebanese journalists, including the AsiaNews correspondent: "When you have finished your meetings, you will be welcome in Syria".

Bilal emphasized the availability of his government to start sincere dialogue, without mediation, between the two countries before dealing with practical issues. "Don't expect Syria to ask anyone to mediate between us and Lebanon," he warned, underlining the importance of existing agreements "which must be respected." This was a response to calls by the anti-Syrian coalition in Lebanon, which is demanding a review of all agreements Lebanon signed with Syria in the past.

The minister clearly said Damascus will receive anyone who wants to go to Syria, "on condition they don't pass through Washington or Paris." Lebanon has asked for a meeting with Syrian officials, but Damascus has been reluctant to invite Prime Minister Fuad Siniora for talks. In a wider context, the reference here is to international pressure exerted by the United States, France and Great Britain, which have promoted a series of UN resolutions regarding Lebanon. The most unpalatable for Damascus is Resolution 1559 of the Security Council that calls on Syria to end its interference in Lebanese affairs, to define its borders and to establish diplomatic ties with Beirut. Bilal called on the French government "to play its historic role", distancing itself from the USA, which is only following "its self-interest" in the region.

Today, the Syrian press reported government sources saying that yesterday's meeting between the Syrian President, Bashar Assad and his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, mediator in the Lebanese-Syrian conflict, "did not yield any positive outcome". Damascus even took the opportunity to reiterate that "for the moment, the issues of the border and diplomatic ties will be not discussed."

Already at the beginning of the week, the Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Walid Muallem had said that "this is not the right time to establish diplomatic ties" between Syria and Lebanon. However the Lebanese MP, Saad Hariri was more optimistic. Yesterday, in Paris, where he met President Chirac, the son of the ex-Premier Rafic Hariri, killed last year, said diplomatic ties with Syria "are possible".

Exiled leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Syria ready to hold peace ...

"The Truth about Islamic Extremist Groups in Syria" by Abdullah T.

THE TRUTH ABOUT ISLAMIC EXTREMIST GROUPS IN SYRIA
By Abdullah T.
June 20, 2006
For "Syria Comment"

Before the war in Iraq, Syria was largely abscent of Islamic extremists. It was one of the most stable and safest countries in the Middle East. But the war in Iraq and the opening of the Iraqi arena for extremist groups changed the security situation in Syria. Syria has become a gateway for volunteer Pan-Arabists and Mujahideen. As a result, the border regions of Syria (Abu Kamal, specifically) have witnessed gatherings of people bent on joining the Jihad in Iraq, especially during the opening day of the war when the republic’s Mufti, Ahmad Kaftaro, declared, “Jihad in Iraq is a duty for all Muslims.” However, after the first year of the Iraqi occupation, small terrorist incidents carried out by Salafists began to be recorded. On 6 May 2004, three Syrian youths with religious backgrounds attacked an uninhabited house previously owned by Rifa’at Al Asad (the president’s uncle). On 6 May 2005, Syrian security forces raided a house that was inhabited by a fundamentalist group and stumbled upon a “variety of weapons.” And in the beginning of 2006, violent clashes occurred in remote parts of the Damascene countryside between Salafis and Syrian security forces.

It is hard to deny the existence of Islamic extremist groups in Syria, however, one must ask why these groups are targeting Syria? Why do Syrian security forces always seem to find these groups in the countryside and behind closed doors? And why do these groups always seem to target insignificant targets? They have never targeted important political, military or tourist sites as is the case in other countries.

Security and intelligence sources in Syria have publicly announced that Syria has arrested between 1200 to 1800 Jihadi extremists of various sorts, some from the Jund Ash Sham (The Army of Sham). But one informant within Syrian Intelligence puts the number of arrests closer to 4000.

What is more, it was explained to me that Syrian Intelligence uses members of Jund Ash Sham from time to time for its own purposes. Syrian Intelligence deceives members of Jund Ash Sham into believing that Syrian Intelligence will assist them in carrying out terrorist acts in Iraq. Syrian Intelligence leads would be fighters into believing that the state authorities will help them to carry out martyrdom operations in Iraq. The authorities set up the unwitting Jihadists in houses far the city center in remote areas and supply them with weapons ostensibly for secret operations. Then the Syrian security forces surround the Jihadists swoop into the house and kill them. The security forces in triumph then trot journalists out to report on their success and the looming danger of terrorism in Syria.

I have been informed that the victims are indeed authentic Jihadists and Salafists, who hope to fight in Iraq. But the Syrian regime turns them to their own purposes to achieve two goals: first, they eliminate dangerous radical fundamentalists; second, they demonstrate to the world and especially to the United States that Syria is afflicted by terrorism just as America is. The implication is that Syria and the West must find common ground in the war on terrorism.

HOW TO STOP THESE GROUPS

After Syria opened its borders to volunteer Mujahideen, many Syrians and Arabs went to Iraq across the border and after the fall of Baghdad many volunteers escaped to Syria and this is something I witnessed with my own eyes in Abu Kamal. Abu Kamal was the site of many arrests of Arab volunteers because it was the main transit point between Iraq and Syria. In the course of my interview with a returning volunteer from Iraq, he told me that “in the beginning, the Syrian Mukhabarat (Syrian Intelligence) allowed them to go to Iraq.” But, when he returned to Syria the Mukhabarat arrested him and accused him of being a prominent member of Al Qaeda and added his name to the International Office of Terrorism in Damascus. In spite of the fact that American security forces arrested him for three months and then released him when it became clear that he was not associated to any armed group or organization. There are many people returning from Iraq that are arrested by Syrian Intelligence and accused of being terrorists while only a small minority actually are. This is, in actual fact, the way the Syrian Intelligence deals with people returning from Iraq. The Syrian Administration is using the International Office of Terrorism and its “list of names” as a negotiating card for every foreign policy crisis.

Syria has been the most successful Arab regime in combating terrorist cells. There have been no successful terrorist strikes within Syria. Its record compared to Jordan, Egypt or Saudi Arabia is good.

But why have fundamentalist groups not targeted Syria for a serious strike? Is it because they view Syria as a strategic ally in their war on the West, even if Syria is playing a double game in order to protect itself? Perhaps they have tried but have been thwarted by Syria’s intelligence apparatus, which has clearly penetrated various Jihadist cells? It is hard to answer such questions definitively. Perhaps there is no unified strategy among the various branches of Syria’s security machine.

One must conclude, however, that up to this point, Syria has finessed the terrorist upsurge spreading through the region with cunning effectiveness, even as it has stumbled in its relations with the West. Like so many states in the region, Syria initially sought to export its fundamentalists to Iraq in the hope that they would meet their end in the Mesopotamian struggle. Those who have returned are promptly arrested and interrogated.

An Opposition Member Gives His Analysis

These two notes were sent to me by an important freethinking intellectual in Damascus. He asked that I not use his name at this time.

Like Father like Son: The myth of the Old Guard

I am not upset anymore of the Syrian opposition failure; it is something that I have become accustomed to. For example, I did not sign the "Damascus – Beirut" declaration - not because I do not agree with it, but because its timing was wrong, according to my point of view. In the matter of fact, I think that this declaration should have been announced directly after the assassination of Mr. Rafiq Hariri and not almost a year later. Due to the huge external pressures then, the Syrian regime was not able to react the way it has done so far. In brief, I think that the Syrian opposition missed the right moment to hit.

However, I am really annoyed about the way that President Bashar is assuming more and more power: it reflects the same old manners of his father, President Hafez. It is the same gradual, relentless, and determined approach. After all, President Hafez did not change into a dictator, just like that, in a moment of time.

Regardless of the great differences in conditions surrounding their assumption of power (i.e. the Father and the Son) on the international and regional levels, there are also a number of pointes of resemblance, to the astonishment of all of us:

• Both of them started their rule with a promise of change. It was the "Tashih – correction" for the father, and the "Islah - reform" for the son;

• Both of them inspired first (by accident??) the widespread idea that they were good persons in their hearts, but they were helpless toward the corrupt team surrounding them (the "Old Guard", during the early days of President Bashar's rule). In my opinion, this idea is crucial for the appearance of a new dictator, or even it is a real call for this appearance. For when people start to believe in it, they start also to accept the assuming of more and more power by this "good-heated" man;

• Both of them capitalized on their "victories" in their confrontations with the "outside" to achieve a complete win in their struggle for power. It was the "War of October" for the father, and the confrontation with the US and especially with the Mehlis investigation for the son;

• Both of them resorted to assassinate their external enemies: politicians and journalists in Lebanon (Kamal Junblat / Rafiq Hariri; Saleem Al-Louzy / Jubran Twaini, to mention only a few);

• During his first years of rule, and before the confrontation with Muslim Brotherhood, President Hafez never resorted to wide arrests among the Syrian opposition. Arrests were always limited; however they were used to spread fear on a wide-scale, and they were intensified in the mid 1970's by resorting to firing state-employees through what is known as "abusive end of service measures". It seems that President Bashar is using the same old "toolkit". Limited arrests can be easily forgotten, they think, but serve the same purpose as wide-scale arrests: they instill pervasive fear.

Is Syria on its way toward a more generalized oppression of freedoms, the way it used to be in the 1980's? Unfortunately, the answer seems to be: yes.
[end]

He also sent me this response to my Lebanon article:

Dear Josh,
Your article, Why Lebanon is Not Likely to Win Full Sovereignty Soon, is simply fantastic, congratulations…

However, I would like to make the following comments:

"In an ideal moral universe, the answer to the question of which country – Lebanon or Syria – is responsible for improving relations between the two is simple. It is Syria’s duty. Syria must satisfy a long checklist before having restored full sovereignty to Lebanon. 1) It must clarify ownership of Shabaa farms, 2) stop arms transfers to Palestinian militias and Hizbullah, 3) stop threatening Lebanese politicians, 4) account for missing and imprisoned Lebanese, and 5) establish an embassy in Beirut", you wrote.

I think the word "responsible" in the original question is tricky. I think the question should be rephrased to become: “Improving Syrian Lebanese relations ... whose interest is it?”

I think that the massage expressed by Syrian intellectuals who signed the "Damascus – Beirut Declaration" was clear: improving Syrian Lebanese relations is one of Syria's highest national interests. While this is clear for most Syrian's, the Syrian regime was very aware of the implication, i.e. that it is responsible for endangering Syria's highest national interests, and hence its violent reaction toward these intellectuals.

The other massage, of which the regime was aware, also, is that Syria's foreign policy is a failure. Here we have real sphinxes in the ministry of foreign affaires, who refuse to react under pressure (since this hurts "Syrians national pride"!!) and do not move when those pressures calm down. To my best knowledge, the last sphinx, Mr. Waleed Mua'llem is still "looking east", or may be just staring. It will be fun to explain this "looking east" strategy as either looking to Americans in Iraq, or looking to Washington via the Pacific Ocean. I think that the 5 points you mentioned above can really provide basis for a Syrian initiative to be marketed, and negotiated, by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the light of Syria's highest national interests. However, it seems that language of the successive sphinxes lacks the word "initiative". Moreover, the regime has always thought of its foreign policy as a red line, and this explains another side of its reaction against the intellectuals.

Back to your article and to options you suggested on "How will Lebanon win full sovereignty. I think that option 3, "The United States makes a deal with Syria on Lebanon’s behalf to buy Lebanese sovereignty from Syria…" is the most important option, given:

• The lack of a Syrian initiative;

• The willingness of the Syrian regime to make a deal with the US. In the matter of fact, President Bachar referred to this in one of his speeches, when he said that he asked the American: "what is the deal "Safqa" you are offering?" In this context, one might observe a tendency. The regimes of Syria, Iran, and North Korea, all ask to deal directly with the US. I know only a little about Iran and North Korea, but in the Syrian case I think that the reason is clear. It relates not only to the "US acceptance of the Asad regime’s legitimacy", as you have rightly noticed, but also to fears of Syria's policy makers to negotiate things with other parties, such as the EU, and reach an agreement that might fail to win US appreciation. Since they know that their negotiation capacity is very limited, they prefer to negotiate directly with the US to know exactly what the American interests are.

• Since points 1 and 2 above (i.e. clarify ownership of Shabaa farms, stop arms transfers to Palestinian militias and Hizbullah) relate also the Syrian-Israeli conflict, Syrian policy makers will be reluctant to find solutions these issues without US. direct involvement.

The CIA's View of Syria

In the recent Front Line documentary, "The Dark Side," shown on PBS, Michael Scheuer explains the CIA view of Syria: This is what he said:

Syria is a perfect example. Syria, in my adult life, has always been tagged as an enemy of the United States and as a threat, but once you get inside the intelligence community, you find out that the Syrians are bankrupt, a police state that's riven with factions and couldn't threaten the United States in 100 years.

Michael Scheuer was chief of the CIA's Bin Laden Desk from 1995 to 1999 and headed an internal CIA investigation into the allegations of a link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda -- an allegation his team found to be false. He is the author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror.

The whole part of the interview on Syria reads:

Question: At the moment of 9/11, give me a report card on the status of the CIA, vis-à-vis the new White House: their attitude, orientation, hopes, fears.

Michael Scheuer: There was a sort of euphoria that the Bush administration was going to be a strong backer of the CIA,... although it was clear that some members of that administration, particularly [then-Deputy Secretary of Defense] Mr. [Paul] Wolfowitz and [Secretary of Defense] Mr. [Donald] Rumsfeld, really had very little use for the intelligence community as a whole.

Question: Why, do you think?

Michael Scheuer: I think we weren't giving them the answers over the years that they wanted to hear. Syria is a perfect example. Syria, in my adult life, has always been tagged as an enemy of the United States and as a threat, but once you get inside the intelligence community, you find out that the Syrians are bankrupt, a police state that's riven with factions and couldn't threaten the United States in 100 years.

But because Rumsfeld and [then-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas] Feith and Wolfowitz are so pro-Israeli, the answer needs to come back, "Yes, Syria is a threat." Over the course of a decade and longer, even back into the first Bush administration and into Mr. Reagan's administration, the enemies of Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Feith, Mr. Wolfowitz were not necessarily the enemies that you could derive from the intelligence material.

Arab Nationalism, Secure Borders, and Democracy

Some Thoughts on Arab Nationalism, Secure Borders, and Democracy: a Response to Readers

A number of readers criticized my previous article: “Why Lebanon is Not Likely to Win Full Sovereignty Soon.”

Here is my response: (I have moved it from the comment section and given it a separate post because it is long and hopefully worthy of discussion.)

Mounif complains about artificial borders. He writes:

Sir:
Please tell me why do you advocate the strengthening of the artificial borders and barriers that were established by the colonialist French and British. This is at a time when the European Union is abolishing them, the Latin Americans have Mercosur, the East Asian have the Shanghai cooperation council, and the Americans have NAFTA and Cafta and the like. My own family is divided between Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria by arbitrary borders. If you were to take a poll you would find the vast majority of the people want to abolish separations and divisions. Lebanon and Syria are NOT countries, please remember this. They are clans and families masquerading as countries.

Mounif

This gets to the heart of the question raised by many of the comments. Why are borders important? Isn't Arab nationalism the answer to the woes of the Middle East?

I am in sympathy with those idealists who want an EU for the Arab world and some kind of practicable unity.

I would argue, however, that before any successful measure of unity or real cooperation on the scale of the EU can succeed in the Middle East, clear and respected borders will be a prerequisite.

Why? First, this was necessary in Europe as a forerunner of the EU. So long as Pan-German, Pan Slavic, and Pan Whathaveyou ideologies dominated, there was no possibility for cooperation and every incentive for war and mistrust among the peoples of Europe. The second 30-year war - 1914-1945 - was fought in Europe over border issues and questions of national dominance. Pan-national ideologies brought war not cooperation.

The same has been true in the Middle East. The rejection of the foreign imposed borders in the Middle East has led to a terrible and largely destructive identity crisis and jockeying for primacy and unity schemes. These have all caused distrust and enmity, rather than promoting fraternity and cooperation.

Only when national borders are internalized, accepted, and respected, will each Middle Eastern country be in a position to begin compromising on its sovereignty, as was the case in Europe.

Only by accepting borders will unity be possible. This will take lots of time and hard work. The Middle East is far from that point. Iraqi borders and national identity may be redrawn and shaped. Israel and several of its neighbors have yet to settle on their borders - Palestine, Syria, Lebanon. There are other nasty border disputes, one doesn't have to list, including the Lebanon-Syria dispute, which is our concern here.

That is how I see the future of Arabism. It can help with establishing an EU-like confederation, but only once each state fully recognizes the sovereignty of the other. Only then, will the shared history, language, and culture of the peoples of the region be able to work its magic in dismantling the barriers of tariffs, travel, bigotry, and work restrictions.
---

Did Syria go into Lebanon for the Golan? Or, as Nafdik put it: "Dr Landis' thesis that Syria's entry into Lebanon is motivated by the desire to increase its chances of getting back the Golan Heights is hilarious."

I did not argue that Syria entered Lebanon to get back the Golan. It entered to keep the "Leftist-Muslim" forces from wiping out Christian power, which, it was feared, would result in Israeli intervention into Lebanon. (This was not a stupid concern. Israel did intervene in Lebanon in 1982 with an American green light for this very reason. It hoped to shut down the PLO, secure its border, and reestablish a Maronite leadership that could police its interests. On the way, it hoped to wipe out Syrian missiles, reduce the size of the Syrian air force and military capacity (which it did) and isolate it so Israel could sign peace agreements with Lebanon and Jordan and lock in control of Golan and Occupied territories (which it failed to do at that time).

What I do argue, however, is that once Syria was in Lebanon and had mastered it, the Golan became the major bargaining chip for reaching understanding. Hizbullah was used as Syria's proxy army to keep pricking Israel. Why does Syria keep pricking Israel? To get back occupied land. Yes, there is also an ideological element - Pan Arabism, Pan Syrianism, help the brother Palestinians, you name it - but these are lesser goals and might be sacrificed for land. The 1973 war was fought for the return of the Golan, not to liberate the Palestinians. The Syrian-Israeli peace talks were about the Golan.

Would Syria like to get back the Golan and keep Lebanon too? You bet. This is natural. But the nature of politics is the trade. I think Syria knows a lot about trading and deal making. This was Hafiz al-Asad's hallmark. It is what kept him in power for 30 years. I think Bashar is not immune to deal making. His problem is that everyone thought he was an easy mark, when he first came to power. No one feared him or thought much of the "blind eye doctor's" political skills. He has had to win respect the hard way. He may have his daddy's name, but the respect couldn't be inherited.

He had to learn to be a dictator and brute in a world where power gets you respect. (Let me indulge in a few "Orientalist" generalizations.)

Syria is beset with factionalism, identity confusion, contradictions, and fuzzy thinking - all of which militates against deal making and clarity in its bargaining. All the same, it does have one leader and one state. At the end of the day, this makes deal making possible. Bashar will use Arabism, Syrianism, Godism, and whatever works to keep the Syrian people behind him as he navigates the difficult market place of Middle East politics. He is learning to be an accomplished demagogue.

OK - With that said, I do think that pan-Arab and Syrian ideologies make it very difficult to sign peace with Israel or quit Lebanon, as many have argued. I also think that Asad's being an Alawite, and thus vulnerable, makes it more difficult to compromise than if he were a Sunni.

All the same, I think these fears, so often put forward as fact by parties that do not want to give up the Golan or who urge regime-change in Syria, are not convincing.

Asad, the father, was a realist above everything else. He was certainly constrained by ideology, which he understood was important to his survival and legitimacy, but he wasn't ruled by it.

Perhaps the most revealing proof of this was given in a long al-Arabiyya interview with George Hawi, the leader of Lebanon's Communist Party, just before his murder last year. Hawi explained how he and a number of fellow leftist leaders from Lebanon had come over to Damascus during the later years of the civil war to ask Hafiz to unite the two countries and hold one set of elections in both "brotherly" states.

Of course, Hawi and his friends may have just been suggesting this as a form of madiih and mujammila for the big man in Sham, but Hawi didn't laugh when he explained this to the al-Arabiyya interviewer.

Asad answered him something like this: "No, Lebanon is its own entity (kiyan). We cannot do this. It would not work." This is how Hawi reported Asad's words. Hawi was explaining to his Arab viewers that not even Asad believed that Lebanon and Syria could be united or were psychologically prepared to be one country. Each had its own identity and set of problems.

Asad did not say that Lebanon was a different nation or had the right to full sovereignty - but he did recognize that he could only push the Lebanese so far or there would be revolt. We have seen that revolt most recently.

All of this is to say that - Yes, Arabism and Syrianism are still important ideologies which constrain Syrian deal making over Lebanon and with Israel. Much as the ideology of "democracy promotion" constrains how the US does politics in the Middle east. But I do not believe it is the only, or has to be the major factor in guiding those relations.

Just as Bush made peace with Libya, I think Asad could make peace with Lebanon or Israel, if the price were right. So long as the price is not right, Asad will sing Arabism, Palestinian rights, one people in two countries, and all the other slogans that have meaning, but are not the only meaning.

I do not think peace is a lost cause, in theory. In fact, I think it is the only way forward. I do not understand why the United States is not pushing border consolidation, harder. It is pushing it for its friends, but not for its enemies. This is a mistake justified by faulty ideology. The democracy ideology is getting in the way of clarifying borders. As things stand, only pro-American democracies have the right to US support in claiming that their borders be respected. If the US would help its enemies - Syria and the Palestinians - secure internationally recognized borders, Washington would undo one big source of the ill will directed against it. Most important, however, it would set the stage for the Middle East to transcend its fixation with nationalist mistrust and recrimination. Middle Eastern states might actually be able to find the wherewithal to move forward and concentrate on internal reform, development, and other good things that the people of the region demand. Nothing would help break the cycle of violence and justification for thuggery more than recognized and secure borders. Rather than arguing that democracy is a prerequisite for American assistance, Washington should promote respect for international borders in the hope this will promote democratization. Secure and recognized borders are not the only prerequisite for democratization, but they are one thing that Washington can actually help establish and which will help facilitate the transition to democracy.

Why Lebanon is Not Likely to Win Full Sovereignty Soon

Creative Syria, run by Kamil-Alexandre, asks several Syrianists to answer the question: “Improving Syrian Lebanese relations ... whose responsibility is it?”
Here is my answer:

Why Lebanon is Not Likely to Win Full Sovereignty Soon
By Joshua Landis
Published by The Syrian Think Tank
June 21, 2006

In an ideal moral universe, the answer to the question of which country – Lebanon or Syria – is responsible for improving relations between the two is simple. It is Syria’s duty. Syria must satisfy a long checklist before having restored full sovereignty to Lebanon. It must clarify ownership of Shabaa farms, stop arms transfers to Palestinian militias and Hizbullah, stop threatening Lebanese politicians, account for missing and imprisoned Lebanese, and establish an embassy in Beirut.

But we do not live in an ideal universe, much as we would like to. International relations are contingent. It is unproductive to consider Syro-Lebanese relations in isolation from those of the greater Middle East, as we are now doing. Most important are Syria and Lebanon’s relations with Israel and Iraq. Because Lebano-Syrian relations are part of an international relations subsystem, it is necessary to review how Lebanon became entangled in this system as an adjunct of Syria in order to figure out how to disentangle it and build an independent status for it.

Lebanon first became hostage to the greater Arab-Israeli conflict when it entered the 1948 war as an adjunct to Syria and the Arab League. This was largely the doing of the Sunni elite that was pan-Arab and led by Riad al-Solh. The arming of the PLO in the camps and collapse of Lebanese national consensus led to the Civil War. Syria was forced to intervene in order to stop the sectarian bloodbath which threatened Syrian unity, but most importantly, Syria had to keep Israel from intervening and establishing hegemony over Lebanon. Had Israel filled the Lebanese vacuum and installed a friendly Maronite government, Lebanon would have become a launching pad to destabilize Syria. The Golan would have been lost forever. Syria had to protect its flank and Lebanon lost its independence.

Iraq became entangled in Lebanon in a serious way at the very end of the civil war, when General Aoun substituted Israeli support with Saddam Hussein’s. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US finally gave Asad the green light to end the Lebanese civil war and wipe out Aoun’s forces in exchange for Syrian backing in the Gulf War. US recognition of a Pax-Syriana in Lebanon was traded for Syrian recognition of a Pax Americana in the Gulf. It was not a perfect world, but everyone got more or less what they wanted save for the Aounists and Saddam Hussein.

Syrian suzerainty in Lebanon afforded it augmented leverage in its relations with Israel and the US. The emergence of Hizbullah in response to Israel’s occupation of the South of Lebanon was a Godsend to Syria. By harnessing Hizbullah to its campaign to pressure Israel for a return of the Golan, Syria finally achieved the firepower needed to get Tel Aviv’s respect and attention, something it had never been able to do. By mastering Lebanon, Syria achieved what Sadat accomplished with the crossing of Suez in 1973. Prime Minister Rabin began negotiations for Golan. Not only were the Heights back in play, but Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon and backing for Hizbullah were also on the bargaining table.

I do not know which country is most responsible for the failure of the Golan talks, but Prime Minister Barak made the determination that Syria was asking more than Israel would give. Instead he unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in the hope that Hizbullah would wither away, for the lack of an enemy. The Shabaa Farms pretext was hurriedly establish to provide a continuing rational for preserving the lines of battle and pressure on Israel. Although Israel’s hand was somewhat strengthened by its withdrawal, the borders remained disputed and the circle of enmity continued.

This brings us to the new world of George Bush, the status quo crusher, and the war on Iraq. President Bush, by destroying Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime, dreamed of completely reversing the regional status quo and building a new subsystem of international relations in the region. In one blow, he hoped to destroy Arab nationalism as an ideology and roll back the power of anti-American and Israeli states such as Syria, if not change their regimes.

He was able to get Syria to withdraw its remaining forces from Lebanon and was instrumental in shifting Sunni ideological allegiance away from Syria and Arabism toward Lebanonism. All the same, the Bush revolution has largely foundered and may be in retreat.

Arabism did not die and the Syrian regime has survived. On the contrary, Bashar has consolidated his power and his regime is strengthened since the initial report on the Hariri killing. Hizbullah assumed the mantle of Arab nationalism in Lebanon and won new recruits, namely General Aoun and his followers. Lebanon remains deeply divided. One must speculate that it can only give Washington minimal help in any continuing efforts to role back Syria and Arabism.

For its part, President Asad realized that Syria was being directly targeted by Bush’s long-term plans for the region. He extended Lahoud’s term to put someone “strong” and dependable in the presidency. This forced Hariri to choose sides in a war he had hoped to avoid. His decision to join the Syrian opposition is widely believed to be the reason he was killed. This did not stop the Lebanese Sunnis from abandoning Syria and leading the Cedar revolution against Syria, but it did leave Lebanon leaderless and divided. Siniora, for all his excellent qualities, has not been able to command the same loyalty among Lebanese or unite the different communities as Hariri did. The Cedar revolution has collapsed and Lebanon finds itself only half liberated, with many unresolved problems.

How will Lebanon win full sovereignty? There are only a few options.

1) The United States continues to press forward with its revolution and finishes off the Asad regime, thereby throwing Syria into confusion and forcing a successor regime to renounce Asad’s foreign policy of using Lebanon as a card in its struggle to retrieve the Golan and promote its regional power. This is very unlikely.

2) The UN will prove that Syria assassinated Hariri and, based on this, the Security Council will win international and region support to sanction Syria so severely that it has the same result as option 1 and leads to Syria renouncing Hizbullah, Shabaa Farms, and its influence in Lebanon. Also, not likely.

3) The United States makes a deal with Syria on Lebanon’s behalf to buy Lebanese sovereignty from Syria. This would have to include successful peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, which would bring a definitive end to the region’s border disputes and would serve to extinguish some of the principle demands of Arabism with the return of the Golan.

a. Another element the US would have to bring to the table is Iraqi relations with Syria. Right now, the US is using Iraq to pressure Syria – the Kirkuk oil pipeline is cut, trade is discouraged, and normal diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Damascus have been placed on hold.

b. Finally, the US would have to recognize the Asad regime and bring it back in from the cold, allowing it to trade freely with Europe and the West in general.

In order to cut a deal for Lebanese sovereignty, not all these things would have to be traded at once and unconditionally, but they would have to be on the table. US acceptance of the Asad regime’s legitimacy would have to be the starting point.

This option is also unlikely to happen. The Hariri murder investigation is on-going. Bush’s stated goal of advancing democracy in the region hinges on the Syrian example, as does his stated objective of reforming the Greater Middle East and putting Hizbullah and armed Palestinian militias out of business. Most difficult for Washington, however, is to put the Golan back in play. It is not clear at all that Washington has the capacity or political will to pressure Israel to give up Golan. Sharon said it was not worth giving up the Golan for peace with Syria. Other Israelis have suggested that Syria must have free elections before Israel can reenter peace talks. The balance of power between Israel and Syria is so tipped in Israel’s favor these days that Israel will continue to find a reason to put off talks. It is very difficult to envisage why Tel Aviv would want to give away the Golan.

4) There is a forth option. It is for Lebanon to go it alone, cut its ties to the US, and accept Egyptian and Saudi efforts to mediate between Syria and Lebanon. This solution is fraught with dangers for Lebanon. Hariri, Siniora, and the various groups allied with the Future Movement would not accept such a deal. Their government would not survive such an about face. They would be punished by the US. Hizbullah and Aoun would come out winners. Even if Saudi offered to promote and underwrite Lebanon’s loan rescheduling, the US would likely put Lebanon back on the terrorist list, proscribe trade, and prevent the World Bank, IMF and other international agencies from assisting Lebanon. There are no guarantees that Syria would actually offer Lebanon full sovereignty without the Golan back and US backing – two things that Beirut and Riyadh have no influence over. Syria might hand over the Shabaa Farms and sacrifice support for the Palestinian militias, but it would not help to disarm Hizbullah and cease to have an influence over Lebanese affairs through its Lebanese supporters.

For these reasons, it is hard to see how Lebanon is going to solve the long checklist of problems it has with Syria. The deep ideological and sectarian divisions in Lebanon will continue to frustrate government efforts to build a successful policy for sovereignty and will continue to leave the country vulnerable to outside manipulation.

The United States has done what heavy lifting it can, but its moral and military force in the region is largely spent. It will continue to use Lebanon as a card against Syria, but will be unable to deliver much of added worth to the Lebanese.

Syria will continue to hang on to its Lebanon card; Lebanon remains its most important asset in negotiating with Israel and the United States. It may make some minor concessions on Lebanese sovereignty in side deals with Europe, but it will not help disarm Hizbullah or fully recognize Lebanese sovereignty until there is broader regional peace and its interests have been taken into account. In the mean time, we can dream about an ideal moral universe.

A Word On The Syrian Economy And The IMF Report, By EHSANI2

A word on the Syrian Economy and the IMF report
By EHSANI2
June 20, 2006

(Also see addendum at bottom by Steven Heydemann)

Dr. Landis earlier posted a story entitled “Former Chancellor Schroeder puffs Syrian Economy: So does IMF”. One of commentators in the previous post (Nafdik) asked if I had a comment on the report. Even though this subject has been discussed repeatedly on this forum, I decided to post this comment at the expense of repeating myself.

First, I would encourage everyone to read the full IMF report rather than depending on Mr. Dardari’s summary of it.

These are some of the things that you will learn if you took the time to read the fine document:

Though non-oil growth was 5.5%, overall growth was limited to 3%, given the decline in oil production. The main reasons behind the economic growth are thought to be:

-Higher private investments from the Gulf region.
-Expansion of domestic credit as ceilings on maximum lending were raised
-Continued effects of the already announced public sector wage increases.
-Lower tariffs on imports, which has resulted in increased private sector investments.
-Low real interest rates because inflation has risen to 7%.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Dardari chose to highlight the 5.5% number out of the entire document as a proof that the country’s economy is on a strong path to growth and prosperity. He correctly assumed that most people will not read the report in its entirety. Those who do will notice that enormous challenges lie ahead. Indeed, the report opens up with this statement:

“The Syrian economy is facing daunting challenges”.

It ends with this:

“We wish the authorities success in pursuing the demanding agenda of reform ahead”.

My own observations follow:

Syria’s GDP is estimated to be $22 billion. 5.5% GDP growth translates into $ 1.2 billion in extra income/production per year. Dividing this increased income by the size of the population yields a per capita increased income of $61. In other words, if Syria’s per capita GDP started from a base of $1100, last year’s 5.5% growth has raised this number by $61 to $1161. In reality, the actual total GDP growth was 3% according to the report. This means that the actual increase in per capita GDP (income) was $33.

What the above numerical example highlights is that this economy needs a sustained and long period of above average growth before the low per capita GDP level is substantially affected. Mr. Dardari would like to see the economy create 1.2 million jobs in the next four years. This is going to be the minimum required to absorb the new entrants in the ever-expanding labor force. Without this level of job creation, the unemployment rate is likely to keep going higher. If you read between the lines of what Mr. Dardari says, you will conclude the following:

200,000 jobs were created as a result of 5.5% non-oil GDP growth rate. Since the country needs to create 300,000 jobs, it stands that the non-oil economy needs to grow by as much as 8.25% to achieve this goal (5.5*300)/(200)- not the 7% that Dardari targets in the five-year plan.

With all due respect, this is a monumental task.

While certain reforms are being implemented, the report makes it clear that the country continues to rank as one of the worst in the world for ease of doing business. Syria’s rank of 135 out of 155 countries in the world highlights the heavy burden imposed by outmoded or ill-conceived regulation. In enforcing contracts, the country ranked 149 out of 155. It takes 47 procedures and an average of 672 days to enforce contracts. On trading across borders, it ranked 146 in the world. In order to complete an export transaction, a business needs 12 documents and 19 signatures. Those who want to import goods must negotiate an even worse obstacle course - 18 different documents and 47 signatures are required from start to finish. In an OECD country, you need an average of 3 signatures by contrast.

This is shameful. After six years in office, there is no excuse for continuing to keep these outmoded regulatory burdens on businesses. The President’s economic team needs to reform these laws immediately and without hesitation.

As for foreign investments, there is no question that this has been part of a clear upward trend recently. With close to 20 million people and being the fifth most populated country in the region, Syria has tremendous potential. Gulf investors saw an opportunity to buy into that potential on the cheap, and they did. Buying real estate for the long haul in a country like Syria is a sound strategy. The Syrian coast boasts less than 850 beds in 5-star establishments (I personally would not rate them 5-star). This is amazingly low for a country of this size. It is inevitable that the country will need new residential buildings, hotels and resorts. In Beirut for example, one is hard pressed to find even a handful of empty lots suited for such developments. They have been bought already. Now, these same large investors and others see Syria as the next opportunity judging by the low price entry point. Such investors will likely enjoy handsome price appreciation on their investments.

Anyone who feels the urge to rush to the Syrian coast looking for land, however, is likely to be disappointed. The usual suspects have already snapped up most, if not all, of the land suited for such developments. Indeed, in the case of Syria, most new laws are usually drafted to custom fit investments that have already taken place. Happily for them, and sadly for the rest of us, this trend is likely to continue.
[end]

Addendum: Steven Heydemann of Georgetown University wrote me this important observation:

Joshua,
The link between comments promoting investment and comments noting what needs to be changed to improve the investment climate are clear, intentional, and important. They are not afterthoughts, as your column suggests. European incentives via negotiations over the association agreement (now shut down) are seen in Syria as having been a source of positive pressure for economic policy change. What these European leaders are trying to do is to maintain those incentives in the absence of the formal association agreement framework. So they do the old two-step: promote investment, but link it to the need for change.

No one imagines this as a major or powerful source of pressure, but the focus should be as much on what these politicians are saying needs to be changed as on their "puffs" for the economy.

Steven's remarks about my "Puff" post are important. European powers have been skeptical of Washington's "democratize-or-else" policy from the beginning. They have maintained that it is important not to cut off relations Syria, but to pursue a policy of positive engagement. This was centered on the Madrid process or association agreement, as Steven maintains.

Because that was taken off the table after the Hariri murder, European powers have been at sixes and sevens to preserve their policy of positive engagement without stepping on Washington's and France's toes.

With the publication of the lack-luster Brammertz report, which gives Syria a further reprieve and which holds out the distinct possibility that evidence of authorship of the Hariri murder may never be sufficient to convict, Europe is looking to ease its way back into its old policy of constructive engagement.

Recent pronouncements by the French foreign minister suggest France is reaching a hand out to Damascus much as Germany is by OK-ing Schroeder's recent visit to Syria to fluff the economy.

What we have here is a return to the established routine of Washington playing the bad cop and Europe playing the good cop, offering a fistful of carrots. Steven Heydemann wants people to understand this and suggests that Damascus take the carrots, move ahead with reforms, and patch up its relations with Europe. The promise - I guess - is that Washington can be brought around, if Damascus takes the right steps in correcting its relationship with Lebanon. France has made it crystal clear that the only agenda it has is Syria's relationship with Lebanon. There are real policy differences between Europe and the US. France and Germany are offering Syria a chance to move back into the comfort zone.

If not - Washington is sitting there with the hammer. Here is a bit of George Bush's most recent speech (Merchant Marine Academy June 19):

U.S. President George Bush has said that the United States and Europe will continue working for Lebanon's independence and stressed the need to spread democracy in the Middle East.

"We've worked with the United Nations to end the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and we will not rest until the Lebanese people enjoy full independence," Bush said Monday in a speech to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, New York.

The World Cup of Dissent Decimation

Arab states are in competition with one another to see who can smack down their opposition the hardest. It is the World Cup of dissent decimation. This free for all is taking place as a direct result of the decline in US authority brought on by events in Iraq and Iran. Washington must husband its remaining political capital to spend on its upcoming struggle with Iran. It cannot afford to alienate Arab governments when it may well need their support in the UN and in the court of international opinion. During 2005, when Washington power was still reverberating and Bush was in the blush of his new term, Arab governments did the liberalization hokey pokey to placate Washington's transformation-of-the-Middle-East chest thumping. Now that the Bush administration is a lame duck, the mice have come out to play and the heroes of the Karaguz shadow play are being whacked right and left.

Syria continues to intimidate its opposition. Prime Minister Otri fired 17 state employees for signing a petition calling for the release of the 10 human rights activists who were arrested last month.

Just to make it clear to all government employees that they had better watch their step, he issued a circular explaining that the 17 state employees from various ministries (electricity, health, oil, information and agriculture) "have been dismissed from their posts," the Association of Human Rights in Syria said in a statement.

But don't get your hopes up for Syria to make the World Cup play offs. Egypt and Jordan are playing for keeps and sport excellent opposition repression teams. They are determined not to let Syria squash decent alone. Jordan has slapped five of its most prominent journalists in jail for reporting on things the government disapproves of. Several parliamentary members have also been jailed. You can read about it on Sasa's informative"Syria News Wire."

Egypt has also been sweeping the boards. Let's not talk about the opposition arrests or beating up judges.

Mona Eltahawy” - one of my favorite Arab journalists, who writes for As-Sharq al-Awsat, has been fired. Yes, fired, because she criticized her very own Egyptian government over its crackdown of the opposition. The Egyptian government lobbied the Saudi Gov. to squeeze Asharq al-Awsat, the London-based, Saudi-owned newspaper, to dump her. It worked. She was dismissed. Mona has an excellent article in the Herald Tribune today explaining just how easy it is to get fired from "independent" Arab papers. She explains how the "red lines" work for the different papers and for writing in Arabic versus English.

But let's not talk about Jordan and Egypt's bad behavior. This is "Syria Comment."
Kamal Lubwani, the opposition leader arrested at the beginning of the year after a visit to the US where he met with high officials in the White House, is in court. He is being charged with establishing contacts with a foreign country with the aim of instigating an attack against Syria, a crime punishable by death.

The public prosecutor claims Labwani's call for increasing pressure on Syria is tantamount to contacts with a hostile state and instigation of attack against Damascus, which are punishable under articles 264 and 287 of the penal code.

Abdelhalim Khaddam, the ex-VP and leader of the National Salvation Front, is also having trouble with the Syrian courts, which are gunning to separate him from his considerable assets. The following message was sent around by Khaddam's lawyer about his unjust treatment in Syria: (Thank you Sophia Hoffmann)

The lawyer Farid Al-Dib declares to the whole world and to all the organizations concerned the following facts:

The Prime Minister and the Minister for Finance of Syria deposited a civil complaint against Mr. Abdelhalim Khaddam and his family, that consist, of 24 people (his wife, his sons and their wives, his daughter and her husband, and all his descendants) in order to confiscate their assets.

The first meeting of the court was held on Monday April 24, 2006. The Khaddam family was asked to appear before the magistrates' court in Banias. Nevertheless, Mr. Khaddam and his family did not receive any convocation to attend the court. They were informed by the press (Techrine newspaper) 20 the Mars 2006. Following this complaint, Mr. Abdelhalim Khaddam and his family have asked various Syrian lawyers for their defense. The latter received pressures and threats in order to refuse such nomination. Consequently, the plenary meeting thus was deferred to Monday June 12, 2006.

Consequently, I was named as a defense lawyer by Mr. Khaddam to defend his rights and his family rights and I accepted. The Khaddam family forwarded to me of the official procreations in order to be able to officially represent them in front of the Syrian courts. Decree 10 of the law concerning the order of Syrian lawyers gives all Arab lawyers the authorization to defend the interests of the individuals in front of the Syrian courts provided that they receive the preliminary authorization on behalf of the president of Syrian lawyers. I addressed a letter on June 6,
2006 to Mr. President of Egyptian lawyers and to Mr. President of the union of Arab lawyers asking them to inform the President of Syrian lawyers so that I can defend my customers Mr. Khaddam and his family. The president of Egyptian lawyers addressed this same day (June 6, 2006) a letter to Mr. President of Syrian lawyers (Walid Altech). A colleague who works in my office personally carried this letter to Mr. Wealid Altech.

In spite of the awareness by Mr. Altech of the procreations of my customers and the reception of the copies of those, he did not give an authorization and posed impossible conditions such as for example obliging me to appear in person in his office and the need for appointing a Syrian lawyer to assist me with the defense of the Khaddam family. He added that even if these conditions are carried out, the authorization will not be guaranteed. Consequently my colleague returned from Damas empty handed.

In light off the preceding facts, Mr. Khaddam were denied of his rights to obtain a lawyer; which is against the International Conventions, and against the Syrian constitution and the Syrian laws. That means that the complaints emitted against Mr. Khaddam and his family is null and without any avenue. Consequently, I ask all the organizations concerned throughout the world to intervene to protect the right to defend Mr. Khaddam and his family.

It should be noted that Khaddam vigorously denies that he engaged in corrupt practice. In the BBC Hardtalk interview with Khaddam last week, he explains that he worked as a lawyer to buy his lovely house on Rue Foche.

STEPHEN SACKUR - You want to be the leader of this opposition movement. So the people of Syria have the right to know where you got your wealth from if not from Mr Hariri.

ABDUL HALIM KHADDAM - I have no fortune. I have four sons. The youngest started working 20 years ago. I started in 1958. I worked as a lawyer for a long time. I come from a family that owns land and assets. My sons are in employment. Some are in the Gulf States, others in Syria.

The youngest has worked for 20 years and the eldest for half a century. Obviously they are able to enjoy a comfortable and honourable life. Their economic involvement is not what others imagine it to be. One is in a partnership running a canned meat factory. The other owns a shop...

Former Chancellor Schroeder Puffs Syrian Economy: So Does IMF

The Syrian economy is being fluffed by former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. He is calling for greater investment from both the Arab world and the West in Syria. After attending last week’s second Syrian-Emirati economic forum, the Schroeder has been hot on the Syrian economy. "Arabian Business," an Emirati magazine which boasts Massoud Derhally as a correspondent, has two stories talking up economic growth and investment in Syria. Here is one, "Syrian Dream." Here is another, "Syria moves forward." It comes as no surprise that Emaar Properties, one of the world's largest real estate developers and an Emirate firm, has just signed a major contract in Damascus. A few typical paragraphs, quoting Schroeder reads:

“I am confident that with the Syrian course of modernization gathering momentum, European investors will become more courageous.”

The change in the Syrian economy is already visible in terms of the numbers: whereas in 2000 the growth rate was negative at minus 1%, today it stands at 4.5%. In the non-oil sectors it is as high as 5.5%. Significantly, private investment in the country has soared by 25% over the past twelve months.

Schroeder says: “The economic data is very positive and foreign investors especially from the Arabic region are very active here.

“I think that if the economic reform process, which the government has started is continued, there will also be more investors from Europe.

The IMF is also rather upbeat, suggesting Syria is on the right track for growth. The Syria Report leads its issue this month with

The IMF estimates that non-oil GDP grew 5.5 percent last year (hence the declarations of Abdallah Dardari in that sense in the last few weeks –Read Economy shows signs of robust growth in spite of doubts over government statistics) and expects it to grow by slightly more than this figure in 2006. Overall, the report is positive towards the Syrian Government’s economic policy and admits that “there has been a momentum for reform to improve the overall business climate, including through a noteworthy simplification of the tax system and substantial improvement in the regulatory framework for the tourism sector. Outdated business laws and commercial codes are being revised, and the legal and regulatory framework to launch a securities market is being laid out. Overall, government interference is declining and private entrepreneurship is on the rise.”

Of course, after giving these rosy forecasts for the economy, each commentator lists the things that must be changed before really healthy growth can be achieved, such as releasing civil society from its straight jacket, creating an independent judiciary, combating corruption, etc.

Syria Comment in the News: NYTimes - The Nation

Robert Worth of the New York Times, mentions "Syria Comment" in his Week in Review article, "Mideast Analysis, Fast and Furious." He writes:

Another influential Middle East blog, Syria Comment, has drawn similar criticism from bloggers who claim that its author, Joshua Landis, is too soft on the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Mr. Badran now writes a blog, Syria Monitor, that highlights the Syrian opposition and portrays Mr. Assad as a cruel autocrat.

Fun. Thanks for the push Robert. Thank you too, Tony. While we are trading barbs, everyone will get a good "Oh-my-God" or "jeepers-creepers" when they read this article in the "The American Conservative" about the new outfit Tony Badran has chosen to work for: The Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, or FDD. (Hat tip Syriana) Here is a taste:

In early 2001, a tightly knit group of billionaire philanthropists conceived of a plan to win American sympathy for Israel’s response to the Palestinian intifada. They believed that the Palestinian cause was finding too much support within crucial segments of the American public, particularly within the media and on college campuses, so they set up an organization, Emet, [which means ‘truth,’ in Hebrew]: An Educational Initiative, Inc., to offer Israel the kind of PR that the Israeli government seemed unable to provide itself.

At first, Emet floundered, without an executive director or a well-defined mission. But that changed after Sept. 11, and Emet changed too, into what is now the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. The name is different, but the goal of influencing America’s opinion-forming classes remains.

What makes all of this possible is the support the foundation receives from its billionaire backers. Its nearly $3 million annual budget comes from 27 major donors, most of whom are members of “the Study Group”—also sometimes called the “Mega Group” because of their sizeable contributions—a semi-formal organization of major Jewish philanthropists who meet twice a year to discuss joint projects.

The group’s membership includes, among others, U.S. Healthcare founder Leonard Abramson, New York financier Michael Steinhardt, Seagrams patriarch and Jewish World Congress president Edgar S. Bronfman Sr. and his brother Charles, and Lynn Schusterman, widow of Oklahoma oilman Charles Schusterman. Some of the group’s projects have been establishing and funding Birthright Israel, which provides Jewish youths with free travel to the Holy Land; a synagogue restoration program called STAR (Synagogue Transformation and Renewal); and the renovation and re-invigoration of Hillel, the Jewish campus chaplaincy. More than a few of these projects have generated controversy among some American Jews, who see this small group of mega-donors exercising considerable influence over Jewish-American affairs. But for all the debate that has attended some of these projects, none before has been as overtly political as Emet or FDD.

Leonard Abramson was the point man for establishing Emet. He, Michael Steinhardt, and Edgar Bronfman were the foundation’s board of directors at the time of its incorporation in the spring of 2001. Their original plan called for Emet to have centers in both the U.S. and Israel, with the Israeli branch to be located at Tel Aviv University under its president, the former Israeli ambassador to Washington Itamar Rabinovich. Emet was to have close ties to the Israeli government as well—so close, in fact, that there was some dispute between the mega-donors and the Israeli Foreign Ministry over just whose project this was. [Continue...]

Philip Weiss writing in The Nation has a great article, entitled, Burning Cole, about how Juan Cole was shot down for a job at Yale University by neocons angry over his influential blog. The best they could do was to call him an anti-Semite for his criticism of Israel and anti-American for his criticism of the way the war in Iraq has progressed. Weiss quoted my defense of Cole: "Joshua Landis, a professor at University of Oklahoma, describes Cole as "top notch."

"He was the wunderkind of Middle East Studies in the 1980s and 1990s," Landis says. "He can be strident on his blog, which is one reason it is the premier Middle East blog.... [But] Juan Cole has done something that no other Middle East academic has done since Bernard Lewis, who is 90 years old: He has become a household word. He has educated a nation. For the last thirty years every academic search for a professor of Middle East history at an Ivy League university has elicited the same complaint: 'There are no longer any Bernard Lewises. Where do you find someone really big with expertise on many subjects who is at home in both the ivory tower and inside the Beltway?' Today, Juan Cole is that academic."

Ahmed Abu Adas, Jund al-Sham and Mossad? (by t_desco)

The recent discovery of several Israeli spy networks in Lebanon could have some surprising implications either for the Hariri case or at least for the case of the 14 bombings, killings and assassination attemps which are also being investigated by Serge Brammertz.

In a bizarre twist, Hussein Khattab, a Palestinian member of the spy ring, who is still at large, is the brother of Sheikh Jamal Khattab, an Islamic cleric who has allegedly recruited Arab fighters for al-Qaeda in Iraq.
(Lebanon exposes deadly Israeli spy ring,The Times, June 15, 2006)

The list of persons connecting Hussein Khattab to Ahmed Abu Adas is remarkably short: Hussein is the brother of Sheikh Jamal Khattab who works closely with Sheikh Abu Obeida who allegedly met with Abu Adas in Ain al-Hilweh.

Of course, this is not evidence of any link, but it's certainly something worth looking into.

There are two quotes in the first Mehlis report which link Abu Adas to Sheikh Abu Obeida. Mehlis dismissed the first (§80 and §197) as being little reliable (the Al-Ahbash Security Service had reported that Adas "often went to Ein al Helwa" and that he visited Abu Obeida who is described both as "deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham" and as "deputy leader of the terrorist group Asbat al Ansar"), but the German prosecutor never addressed (or explained) the second:

81. ... The Lebanese investigation further revealed that Mr. Abu Adass had been employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which was owned in part by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed Miqati and Ismaíl Al-Khatib network.

Ahmed Salim Mikati was a member of the Dinniyeh group headed by Bassam Ahmad al-Kanj who was killed in an uprising in the mountains of Dinniyeh in January 2000. The surviving fighters found shelter in Ain al-Hilweh. The group is said to have merged into Jund al-Sham. According to Bernard Rougier's excellent study on Salafi extremism in Palestinian refugee camps, al-Kanj was a religious teacher of Abu Obeida (also called Jihad Mustapha) (Bernard Rougier, "Le jihad au quotidien", Paris 2004, p.213).

While Sheikh Jamal Khattab is imam of the al-Nour Mosque in Ain al-Hilweh and an Islamist leader in the camp, Hussein Khattab belonged to the PFLP-GC:

According to Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, Khattab was a member of the Palestinian Popular Committees and was the public relations' official in South Lebanon.
(Israel keeps silent over the capture of a Mossad network in Lebanon, Al-Manar, June 14, 2006)

His brother seems to have intervened when Hussein was detained on suspicion of being involved in the killing of Jihad Ahmad Jibril in 2002:

L’un des individus toujours en liberté est un réfugié palestinien, Hussein Kh. (Khattab), âgé de quarante ans et né dans le camp de Aïn el-Héloué. Il avait été arrêté et libéré à deux reprises par les autorités libanaises et syriennes, notamment dans l’affaire de Jihad Jibril mais l’intervention d’un cheikh de Aïn el-Héloué auprès d’un homme de religion libanais a pu le libérer des prisons syriennes.
(La porte piégée du véhicule ayant servi à l’attentat de Saïda a été préparée en Israël, L'Orient-Le Jour, 14 Juin 2006)

According to Defense Minister Elias Murr, "the investigation has yet to find any link between suspect Mahmoud Rafeh, the alleged leader of the network, and a string of assassinations in and around Beirut since October 2005".

However, Khattab is "believed to have commanded a separate Israeli network in Lebanon", and Rafeh has confessed to transporting bombs across Lebanon since the Spring of 2005. It is unclear so far what has happened to (or what was done with) these bombs:

Security sources quoted by As-Safir newspaper Thursday said Rafeh confessed to transporting explosives across Lebanon in briefcases since early 2005, but were unable to determine the end result of the explosives as Rafeh was allegedly tied to more than one Israeli network.
(Murr gives army full credit for cracking terror network, The Daily Star, June 16, 2006)

Al-Manar provides a more detailed account:

Investigations with Lebanese Mossad agent, Mahmoud Rafea continued, and revealed that Rafea had since the Spring of 2005, delivered bombs in black suitcases, to several locations in Beirut, its eastern suburbs, Mount Lebanon and the South. Meanwhile, security forces are still after Palestinian Mossad agent, Hussein Khattab, who is now suspected of leading a Mossad network of his own.
...
Rafea admitted he had delivered, since the Spring of 2005, bombs in black suitcases to different locations, in eastern Beirut, Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon. Security Forces however did not yet determine how these bombs were used.
...
Apparently the operations of Rafea and his network intersected with the operations of other Israeli Mossad networks. Security Forces are focusing on this new information, while seeking to capture Rafea's partners, on top of which is Palestinian Mossad agent, Hussein Khattab.

According to reports, Khattab might be leading a Mossad network of his own, that carried out a series of assassinations and bombings, other than those committed by Rafea's network.

According to Assafir daily, the Israelis might have unclosed Rafea and Khattab's networks to each other, to carry out the assassination of Jihad Ahmad Jibril, of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command in 2002. Previous Israeli assassination attempts failed to harm Jibril, and therefore efforts of more than one network had to be combined to kill the man.

(Lebanese authorities still searching for the rest of Mossad network, Al-Manar, June 15, 2006)

So far Al-Manar is also the only source mentioning Ghaleb Awali as one of the persons killed by the network:

Beside the Majzoub brothers assassination, Rafea and his Mossad network assassinated Hezbollah officials, Ali Saleh and Ghaleb Awali, Jihad Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command and Abu Hasan Salameh, as well as other security operations which will be revealed for the first time.
(Lebanese Army to release a detailed statement on capturing an Israeli Mossad network, Al-Manar, June 13, 2006)

This is interesting because at the time a statement in the name of Jund al-Sham had been issued claiming responsibility for the killing.

The then leader of Jund al-Sham, Abu Youssef Sharkiah, denied the claim. (Lahoud blames Israel for assassination, The Daily Star, July 20, 2004)

He has since relinquished his authority over the group as "disputes" emerged "between its members over plans for bombings and assassinations". (Jund al-Sham collapsing under Fatah and state pressure, The Daily Star, January 05, 2005)

Other statements by Jund al-Sham "criticized Shiites and Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as "unbelievers." " (Group vows to avenge anti-Islamic attacks, The Daily Star, June 30, 2004)

In July 2005, Jund al-Sham faxed a threat to assassinate several prominent Hizballah allies and leaders, including former spiritual leader Sayyed Hussein Fadlallah, to the Shiite Fatwa Center in Tyre. (Can al-Qaeda’s Lebanese Expansion Be Stopped?, Emily Hunt, February 6, 2006)

This raises the question if Jund al-Sham may have been manipulated by Israeli intelligence and their Lebanese agents (or, alternatively, if the group may have been used as a cover for their operations).

In October 04, 2005, As'ad AbuKhalil was left bewildered (and supposedly angry...) by "an alleged threatening flyer by Jund Ash-Sham": "I read that flyer, and it does not sound like Jund Ash-Sham at all. ... The flyer does not contain any of the religious language that one usually finds here. This flyer was written by a secular Arabic speaker."

Regarding the 14 bombings which are being investigated by Brammertz, in particular the eight explosions in public places, Jund al-Sham has claimed three of them:

In their sixth statement, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Levant) claims responsibility for the three bombings in Lebanon, “challenging the crusaders once more.” ...
The three explosions Jund al-Sham references seem to be those that occurred in the Christian sections of Lebanon during the past week. Three people have been killed, and three more injured.

(Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Levant) Claims Resonsibility For the Three Bombings in Lebanon, SITE Institute, March 29, 2005)

Finally, Jund al-Sham also famously issued a threat to assassinate Detlev Mehlis while he was working on his final report:

Akkar, Lebanon- A group calling itself Jund El Sham, threatened to slaughter German Prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, who is heading a U.N. team investigating Rafik Hariri's assassination. The group also threatened to slaughter members of the reigning Lebanese authorities.

(Jund El Sham Threatens to kill Mehlis, 6 October, 2005)

Some remarks on the second Brammertz Report


In my opinion, Brammertz does not exclude the possibility that an Islamist group was responsible for the bomb that killed Rafik Hariri. This isn't the main focus of his investigation, but he does not discard the possibility, e.g.:

40. On the other hand, one single team alone might have conceived of the idea to kill former Prime Minister Hariri, conducted the reconnaissance and surveillance, prepared the claim-of-responsibility video, acquired the explosives, acquired and prepared the Mitsubishi truck, used an individual as the trigger mechanism, and executed the operation. Based on this hypothesis, the number of participants may have been relatively small.

§47 calls for "intricate knowledge of the motives, means and methods of "suicide bombing" in the region".

§50 makes clear that, "pending final DNA results from recently collected evidence at the crime scene", Ahmed Abu Adas wasn't "the individual who initiated the detonation of the IED, as stated in his claim of responsibility" and that he also wasn't present at the crime scene".
However, in an intriguing passage Brammertz states that:

The Commission does not exclude the possibility that he was involved in other aspects of the operation beyond his participation in the making of the claim-of-responsibility video message.

This could mean that was an active participant in the crime and not a passive victim of kidnapping. It also raises the possibility, however faint, that he is still alive.

§54 features "extremist ideologies" as being among the "possible motives of those who commissioned the crime".

Finally, there is also a (possible) allusion to Jund al-Sham, or rather, to the alleged terrorist cell consisting of 13 members detained in January 2006:

57. The Commission is further examining the possibility of one single group, with a singular intent and capacity, having committed the crime. For example, the Commission continues to develop its knowledge concerning individuals who are, or who have been, in the custody of the Lebanese authorities, allegedly as members of terrorist groups. This area of its investigations remains ongoing, and focuses on the links, intent, capacity and motivations of these individuals.

Some of the 13 suspects have claimed to be members of Jund al-Sham. (Lebanese authorities arrest 13 Al-Qaeda suspects, The Daily Star, January 14, 2006)

Is the Regime weaker or stronger following the crack down of on the internal opposition?

Burhan Ghalioun, one of Syria's sharpest analysts and opposition voices, answers this question in his article on aljazeera.net, "The Arrests and the Deepening of the Syrian Crisis," in the affirmative.

He argues that with their arrest, the thirteen opposition intellectuals are winning. Why? Because the regime has painted itself as the extremist, while the opposition has captured the middle gound of reasonableness and moderation.

Repression has worked in the past because the opposition was extremist (we can think of the Muslim Brothers) and the regime maintained the acquiescence of the masses because they did not see the extremist opposition as a solution.

Today this dynamic is reversed.

A Comparison Between The Christians Of Syria And Lebanon, By EHSANI2

A comparison Between The Christians of Syria and Lebanon

By EHSANI2,

June 14, 2006

Rather than sharing common goals like most other minorities in the region, Syrian and Lebanese Christians seem to be at odds with each other when it comes to assessing their political survival. Nowhere is this more apparent than the way each community supports or condemns the current regime in Damascus.

The difference in the two communities stems from the following fact:

While the Lebanese Christians have traditionally been politically engaged, Syrian Christians in contrast have chosen to stay on the fringes of their country’ political life. While the former group has resisted the various regional pressures to weaken their political influence, the latter has made the choice to play it safe and stay out of politics. While the former has largely called for outside help to ensure its survival, Syrian Christians have aligned their fortunes with the survival of their regime instead.

Let me now elaborate

Syrian Christians seem to overwhelmingly believe that in spite of all of their regime’s shortfalls, the alternative would most likely be far worse. More specifically, they seem convinced that a more Islamist leaning group will follow the downfall of this regime, an event that will inevitably end up destroying their coveted way of life. For the record, the size of this community has steadily fallen as a percentage of the total population. From a high of 25%, this percentage is estimated to have fallen to as low as 10%.

It is widely believed that the Syrian Sunni community is divided along lines of income and religious fervor. The Sunnis who have aligned their business interests to those of the regime may not be too keen to lose their immense advantages. They may, therefore, be inclined to support the status quo. But, this group does not represent the majority. The more likely profile of a Sunni Syrian is one that dreams of a day when one of their own is finally in charge. We are frequently told that Syrians are not very religious. A change in the regime, therefore, is unlikely to cause a major shift in the seemingly secular nature of this society.

It is my belief that the Syrian Christians do not share this view. Instead, they are more inclined to view their Sunni fellow countrymen as more devout and religious than the consensus opinion. Given the choice, the Sunni community is believed to be willing to accept being governed by a religious establishment. Left to their wishes, therefore, Syria’s majority will most likely accept a sharper tilt in the direction of religioun were this regime to fall. When this happens, Syria’s Christians fear that they will lose a list of social privileges that they currently hold so dear. This list includes the right to worship, dress, drink and party as they wish. It also includes of course internal law and order.

While the above list is important, political aspirations and active engagement in the country’s political future is critically missing from this list. Since the French departed the country after independence, Syrian Christians have suffered a steady loss in political activism. When their own country’s constitution stated that the President of Syria must be a Muslim, they quietly accepted being excluded from ever participating as equals. In effect, they failed to complain or resist being third class citizens in their own country. Presumably, they felt that it was best to carry on doing what they have done for decades-stay on the sidelines and play it safe. So long as they could go to church, avoid wearing a veil, drink their Scotch and dine outdoors, life was perfectly acceptable.

Given this regime’s non-Islamist tendencies, a soft marriage of convenience was born between the Alawi regime and the country’s Christian minority. Stated differently, the Christian community outsourced its own security and the protection of its way of life to this Alawi regime. Without any political or military aspirations that would act as a future threat, the regime was more than happy to implicitly agree to protect this less than powerful partner.

Lebanese Christians in contrast have worked hard to protect the huge privileges that they were afforded after independence. Camille Chamoun’s epic encounter with the powerful Nasser in 1958 was a case in point. With the help of American marines, he was able to defeat the Pan Arabists that were backed by Nasser. Since then, Lebanon’s history has been rife with examples where that country’s Christian community had to endure immense regional pressures to weaken its grip on power. While the Taef accords succeeded in taking away a significant number these privileges, the fact remains that the community has been steadfast in its resistance to the forces that are heavily stacked against it. This political activism stands in direct contrast with the apolitical Christians of Syria. It is worth reiterating that the Christians of Lebanon would not have been able to survive and maintain their influence had they not accepted the help of foreigners. This has included the French, Americans and even the state of Israel. Given the Syrian Christian community’s more Pan Arabist leanings, such foreign adventures by the Lebanese Christians have acted as a major contentious point between the two communities.

In conclusion, while the Syrian Christians have supported this regime for a list of valid reasons, the fact remains that they have effectively aligned their long-term survival to the survival of the regime itself. This is a highly dangerous and shortsighted strategy.

Were the Damascus regime to fall, the country’s Christian community will undoubtedly suffer immensely. Such fears explain the significant increase in the number of people that have decided to immigrate to the west when given the opportunity. Anyone with the economic means to do so has opted to deliver their new babies in countries like Canada or the U.S in the hope of gaining an alternative “safe” passport. This trend has been in force for decades and is likely to continue. The plight of Iraqi Christians since the fall of Saddam has reinforced such fears. Christian friends are often heard saying, “We have no future here. This country is not ours in the future”. By outsourcing their own security and the protection of their lifestyle to the regime rather than being politically active themselves, this country’s Christians may believe that they have been well served thus far. Their future prospects, however, are highly uncertain. Were the regime to fall, some will choose to stay and accept their different lifestyles. Others may decide to leave. One highly probable destination of course will be Lebanon. Odds are that the Christians of this country will survive longer in this region. Decades of political engagement, personal sacrifice, friendlier constitution, and alliances with outside forces may end up attracting those fleeing Christians next door.

The Syrian Opposition Beleaguered But Undaunted

The courage of the Syrian opposition within the country never ceases to amaze and inspire. Its leaders may be down due to the ongoing crackdown, but they remain undaunted.

Maamoun al-Homsi, one of the original leaders of the Damascus spring and a Syrian legislator who spent almost 5 years in prison, has moved to Jordan in order to carry on his opposition work. He called on European countries to put more pressure on the autocratic Syrian regime to free political prisoners, improve its human rights record and introduce democracy. He told Reuters:

"I left Syria 10 days ago and I am not going back. I left so I can deliver the message of the Damascus Spring to the world -- save the political prisoners of Syria. The Europeans should do more to press for these prisoners' release and withdraw their ambassadors from Syria if it does not respond to their calls. At least 13 were detained in this round but there are hundreds of political prisoners and we want them all freed as no one should be jailed for expressing his opinion. Some of these people are in their 60s and they are sharing cells with common criminals. They need doctors and human rights groups to visit them because they are being mistreated.”

Homsi's move to Jordan in order to speak out demonstrates how fearful opposition members and human rights workers have become in Syria. All the same, ten extremely brave human rights advocates have spoken out today. They issued what they called the "Syria Declaration." UPI writes that

Addendum: (June 15) The UPI made a mistake in translating the list of organizations which signed the Syria Declaration. It originally said that Anwar al-Bunni's and Maatouk's organization had signed it. This is not true. I heard from members of the Syrian opposition that the UPI author had mis-translated the name of the organization wrong and then supplied the wrong leadership. The original document, which I have now copied below in Arabic, makes no mention of Maatouk and Anwar al-Bunni and does not name their organization. Anwar is in prison and on trial. He cannot afford more trouble.

The "Syria Declaration," issued late Tuesday night, underscored the urgent and pressing need of the Syrian people for an all-out democratic change that will move Syria from being a security state to a civilian one with an effective parliament and institutions.

"The rotation of power ensures the participation of the Syrian people in running the affairs of their country whereby their vote will bestow legitimacy on the authority and its administration," the declaration said.

It stressed that placing Syria on the path to democracy requires major changes in all the state's institutions as well as amendments in the country's internal and foreign policies to suit the interests of the Syrian people.

The declaration also called for canceling the emergency laws which have been in force since 1963; increasing public freedoms, including liberties of expression, thin