What Role Can Syria Play in Lebanon?

What role can Syria play in the resolution of this conflict?

Joshua Landis
Interviewed by John Dagge
Saturday, July 29, 2006

What role does Syria have to play in the resolution of this conflict?

Syria has a big role to play. Trying to shut it out of any agreement will only guarantee that future cease-fires are temporary and fragile.

The Lebanese root cause of this problem is that the Shi'ites are terribly under-represented in parliament. They have been kept at the bottom of the Lebanese political heap despite being the largest sectarian community in Lebanon. They accepted this position in the 1989 Taif Accords, largely because Syria allowed them to keep their weapons. Since Syria left Lebanon in 2005 the other Lebanese communities – Sunnis, Druze, and Christian - have been demanding that Hezbollah give up its military weapons. At the same time, they have refused to allow the Shiites their proper constitutional role in government. They can’t have it both ways. If a deal to disarm Hizbullah is to be made in Lebanon, the Shi'ites, who represent 40 per cent of the population, will have to get close to 40 percent representation in parliament. This is going to be a major headache.

America professes that it wants a democratic solution to the Middle East, but it is refusing to promote true democracy in Lebanon. This is an analogy to the Hamas problem in Palestine and it is one of the reasons why Hezbollah and Hamas find themselves on the same side and why Arabs throughout the Middle East are rooting for them. So long as there is no solution to this fundamental injustice, there will be no peace in the Middle East. American and Israeli military might is no replacement for equity, justice and democracy.

The way Hezbollah has justified maintaining its arms is by focusing on its resistance role. If you want to eliminate that role of resistance, Hezbollah is going to have to be brought into the political center of Lebanon’s government so it becomes an established power, not an outsider throwing stones at a government dominated by others.

Syria helped broker the Taif accord, along with Saudi Arabia and America. The Americans were interested in maintaining Christian power in Lebanon, which they succeeded in doing by making sure that the Christian seats in the Lebanese parliament were not reduced below 50 per cent even though they constitute roughly 40% of the Lebanese population. The Saudis were interested in maintaining Sunni power in Lebanon which they succeeded in doing by making the Sunnis the most over-represented community in Lebanon - they were allotted the same number of seats as the Shi’ites even though the Sunnis are half as numerous. So in effect, a Sunni Lebanese is worth two Shi’a Lebanese in political terms. The Syrians went along with the deal because they wanted to look like good actors and, most importantly, because they were going to disarm the Sunnis and Christians and allow the Shi’ites to maintain their military weapons to act as a resistance to Israel. This allows Syria to maintain pressure on Israel to give back the Golan Heights.

All the outside actors were happy and the Shi’ites were compensated for their under-representation in constitutional power by gaining extra-constitutional powers in the form of the right to bear arms. Now the international community, Saudi Arabia and the US most particularly, wants to disarm Hizbullah without compensating the Shi’ites. Syria is not going to stand by and watch this happen. This also means that the Taif Accord is now effectively dead.

Syria is important in Lebanon because most of the opposition political figures look to Syria for support and political backing and this holds true right across the political spectrum. It is not only Hezbollah, but also General Michael Aoun - a Maronite Christian - as well as opposition Sunni leaders in both Tripoli and Beirut who resent Hariri's dominance of their community and feal uneasy about Lebanon's radical turn away from Syria.

There are some Western analysts who claim Syria is irrelevant. This is nonsense so long as close to half of the Lebanese politicians look toward Syria for political backing. It has to be remembered also that the Lebanese trade with inland countries has to go though Syria, so Syria stands over Lebanon with a formidable economic hammer. What is more, Syria has the ability to funnel arms to Hezbollah and Palestinian groups as well as radical Sunni groups which allows it to destabilize Lebanon if its interests are ignored.

What do you think Hezbollah's reaction to the insertion of an international force into Southern Lebanon will be?

They will refuse this outright. I don’t think anyone believes that this international force is a solution in its own right. It's the lowest common denominator and it’s a way for the West to pretend that they are doing something while giving Israel time to pound the Shi’ites. No Western European government is going to allow its troops to be thrown into Lebanon without a political agreement. If the Shi’ites have demonstrated one thing of late, it is that they can kill people who are trying to hurt them.

America has tried to sideline Syria for some time now and many would argue with some success. In light of the present crisis, can this continue?

The United States has not successfully isolated Syria. They have made life miserable for the Syrians and they have succeeded in making sure Syrian diplomats can not talk to anyone in Washington, and that Bashar al-Asad finds it difficult to meet with world leaders. But the Syrian government has effectively dodged every meaningful American bullet.

The Americans have tried to strangle Syria economically and they have failed. They have tried to keep foreign countries from engaging in commerce with Syria or meeting with the Syrian president. This has been partically successful and a hinderance, but the Europeans have refused to place meaningful economic sanctions on Syria, much to Secretary Rice's dismay. Syria has turned to the East to fine trade. It has turned to rich Gulf countries to find investment. The days of American hegemony in the Middle East have gone. Bashar al-Asad has developed good relations with resurgent Russia and China. He has excellent relations with Turkey and Iran. The Saudis and Egyptians are at the very least polite to him, perhaps begrudgingly, but they don’t write him off as the Americans do.

Indeed, over the last year we have seen the Americans become more isolated in their attempt to shut out Syria. In the last several months more Europeans have been opening their doors to the Asad regime. The Spanish Prime Minister has been talking to Asad, the new Italian Prime Minister has been demanding that diplomatic lines again be opened with Syria. British papers, such as the Observer, are demanding that Britain open a dialogue with Asad even if Washington refuses such logic. The German government has also made noises about seeing what Syria wants. The US has lost the battle to isolate Syria. If the Lebanese crisis accomplishes anything for Syria, it will be to leave Washington's anti-Syria policy in tatters.

Is America likely to swallow its pride and re-engage Syria?

I have a hunch that it will not. It is going to try to deal with this crisis through the Lebanese government. We saw Secretary Rice in her first Middle East tour avoid Damascus. Instead she used the Shiite Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, to sound out Hizbullah. In the past, going to Damascus was always one of the first stops of US diplomacy. However, in avoiding Syria, Washington will complicate life for itself and give the Europeans a greater role in the region.

For me, however, the big question, as a ceasefire comes into place, is where are Lebanese sentiments headed– who are they going to support; who are they going to blame. The Christian right is claiming that there will be a day of reckoning before the dust settles and that Hezbollah will be punished by the rest of the sects. The pro-Hezbollah people are counting on the opposite. They believe that the Hariri government and others who punished Hezbollah by aligning themselves with Israel will bear the brunt of public dismay and anger. Nicholas Blanford (Christian Science Monitor) goes through pearly polling results, which suggest that across the sectarian communities, Lebanese are beginning to side with Hezbollah. While that may be a temporary phenomenon - a result of Israeli bombs - even anti-Syrian politicians such as Walid Jumblatt are beginning to suggest that Hizbullah will be the winner. America and the neo-cons are betting on the fact that Hezbollah is going to be punished by the rest of Lebanon and isolated. My hunch is that the opposite is going to be true and the neo-cons are painting themselves into an ever-smaller circle here.

Despite this, I think you will see them push ahead in an attempt to isolate Hezbollah and build up a Lebanese coalition against them. That has been the thrust of US policy over the past two-years and I expect it remains the present policy. George Bush is yet to blink in the face of failure and I don't see why he will star blinking now in Lebanon.

Are there parallels with the latest conflict and the War of 73 – the war that brought Arabs back to the negotiating table?

I’ve read the analogies but I would see this more in terms of 1982 than ‘73.

Sadat, who found himself politically irrelevant, decided to give the Israelis a bloody nose in order to be taken seriously. He succeeded in doing that and was offered the Sinai back and now Egypt is the strongest America ally in the region and is at peace in Israel. There is no reason to believe that the Syrians will not accept a similar outcome. The major problem with this, however, is that Egypt had the greatest army in the Arab world and was the most important power. Syria has always been considered irrelevant and Israel and the US have always preferred to isolate it rather than give back the Golan Heights. But this is a Pyrrhic victory. Syria will remain a spoiler to any peace plan in the region so as long as it is not dealt into the final outcome. It can be a stabilizing force in the region as many Israeli and American ex-diplomats and intelligence chiefs have claimed. Attempts to write it off as a rogue state or irrational actor are silly.

Are we seeing a new Middle East? Is a fundamental power restructuring taking place?

I think we are seeing a restructuring. This has to do with Iraq changing from a Sunni to a Shi'ite power - from a power that was aligned against Iran and promoted itself as a defender of the Gulf to a power that is looking towards Iran. Shi’ite success looks like it is going to realign Iraq with Iran and possibly Syria against the Gulf. This will fundamentally change the balance of power in the region.

America is resisting this change that it set in motion because it means oil and gas pipeslines will be running from Iran through Iraq and Syria up to Turkey and on through to the EU. Just as importantly, they will be running in the other direction to China, India and Russia. This will reorient world power towards the East. It’s going to pull Europe away from its dependence on the US security umbrella, which is under-girded by US domination of oil markets and oil producers. Europe will become more dependent on powers like Russia and Iran. The stakes are high for American as it loses control of oil. It will not be able to retain its status as the single great superpower; rather, it will become one among equals, which is precisely what Cheney and Rumsfeld are determined to prevent.

Iraqi technical committees have already been meeting with their Syrian and Iranian counterparts plan for these pipelines. This will allow them to challenge Saudi Arabian dominance in OPEC. It’s what you might call an axis of oil – or access of oil - and the Russians and Chinese are eager to connect to it. As I see it, this is the big battle. My hunch is that within five or six years, when Iraq beings to consolidate under a Shi’ite dictatorship, it will not ask American oil companies to run the show, but rather, Russian and Chinese oil companies. For political and economic reasons, Iraqis will want to move away from American domination. Economic imperatives make linking up to Iran and the East logical. Such a combination will be powerful.

What kind of resolution does Syria want to see in Lebanon?

Syria will throw its weight on the side of constraining Hezbollah and working out a political agreement, if its interests are advanced in the process. The most likely way this may happen is if new elections are called in Lebanon.

Many of the pro-Syrian politicians in Lebanon now believe that they will do well at the polls following this conflict. Early polling figures indicate that the Lebanese population is siding with Hizbullah and may be willing to punish the Hariri-led Future Movement that governs Lebanon today. It has been discredited by its American and Israeli allies. Opposition politicians have already begun to accuse the Future Movement of getting Lebanon into this mess and being responsible for the destruction of Lebanon.

Their logic goes along the following lines: by trying to marginalize the Shiites and disarm Hizbullah on orders from America, the Future Movement deserves the blame for dividing the Lebanese and paralyzing the government. Had the Future Bloc eschewed revenge against the Syrians and stuck to the middle road a government of national unity would have been possible. As it was, Hariri insisted on siding with the Americans and elevating Jeremy Feltman, the US ambassador to Lebanon, to the status of proconsul of Beirut. His dictates, whether they were to refuse a Hizbullah appointee the Foreign Ministry, to beat back attempts by the Lebanese government to officially complain to the UN about an Israeli spy ring accused of five political assassinations in Lebanon, or to drive forward the Future Movement’s anti-Syrian policy by repeating ad-nausea that Damascus was the culprit behind Hariri’s murder when the evidence was thin and scuttling Saudi and Egyptian attempts to mediate between Beirut and Damascus, Rafiq’s son traduced his father’s legacy of neutrality and genius for keeping Lebanon out of the region’s wars. Instead to of protecting Lebanon, Hariri made it an instrument of Washington’s war. And to what end? Having refused Hizbullah a real share in government and having failed to defeat them, he offered the country no way forward. The result was paralysis. In essence, he challenged Hizbullah to go off the reservation and provoke a confrontation.

Some Lebanese politicians have already begun to accuse Washington of unleashing Israeli military might on Lebanon because of the Future Bloc’s incompetence. Because the FB was too weak to carry out America’s plan to disarm Hizbullah, Washington turned to Israel to get the job done. The Hariri Bloc recklessly and foolishly put its trust in Washington only to have Lebanon dragged into a conflict he could not control and Lebanon could not win. The subtext to such accusations is that the Future Bloc conspired with Israel, if not explicitly, then tacitly. The silence of the Future Bloc during the first week of Israel’s bombing campaign gives ammunition to such broadsides. Saad Hariri kept insisting that Syria was to blame for the death and destruction rained down on Lebanon by American bombs and airplanes driven by Israeli pilots, even as the Prime Minister of Lebanon, his appointee, tacked in the opposite direction, blaming the US and accusing Israel of war crimes.

Prime Minister Siniora has spoken out strongly of late to condemn Israel and the US. His about-face reflects the mood in Lebanon. He is struggling to distance himself from the US and his political bloc’s destructive policies. No Lebanese politician can cling to Washington and hope for a national role. The US has isolated itself. The Future Bloc has dumped it.

For this reason, Damascus will join the demand for new elections in Lebanon as soon as the dust settles. It will claim to be on the side of democracy, knowing that pro-Syrian politicians, who were pushed from power last year, may well be swept back into office. The key will be the Maronite presidential candidate General Aoun. This will be his moment. He is strong, nationalistic, has a well organized party, and has good relations with Damascus, Hizbullah and the Shiites. He will woo the may Sunnis who are now having misgivings about the leadership of the young Hariri. He has long demanded that Lebanon follow a middle way in its foreign policy – depending excessively on neither the East nor West and maintaining constructive relations with both.

It will be interesting to see how the Aoun-Hizbullah alliance holds up should the Siniora government lose the confidence of parliament. Syria championed Aoun as a replacement for President Lahoud, when the Future Bloc insisted that the president resign. This led Hariri’s bloc to vote for retaining Lahoud, preferring a weak pro-Syrian president, rather than one that could challenge them.

Syria will be happy with a Lebanon that eschews its alliance with the West and enmity for Syria. It would like a Lebanon that is responsive to its security concerns and will refuse to be used as a launching pad for US and Israeli attempts to weaken the Asad government.

This is precisely the reason the US does not want to engage Syria.

Is it likely that from the rubble of Lebanon a wider peace process will emerge?

Nothing points to a happy solution on the immediate horizon, despite the present cease-fire. Neither Republicans nor Democrats in the US have a real understanding of the root problems that have animated the conflict. Washington continues to be enamored by the use of force. In Israel it is the same. Iran and Syria believe that time is on their hands, as do the radical Muslim forces, more generally. So long at the US is unwilling to engage them and seeks to undermine them, they will arm the West’s opponents.

Hizbullah is convinced that the future of Lebanon is in its hands. The Shiites of Lebanon, more generally, will not return to being dirt farmers, as they were in the past. They will insist on their fair share of Lebanon’s destiny – if not through parliament, then at the point of a gun. The big question will be whether the other Lebanese sects are willing to concede real political power to the Shiite community and continue their policy of drawing the Shiites into the center of Lebanese politics in order to domesticate them or whether they will arm themselves in an effort to continue the process Israel has started, which is to weaken them by military means.

The fact that the Europeans and pro-Western Arab regimes, such as Saudi, Egypt and Jordan, have forced the US to call a cease-fire, constrains Washington’s and Israeli’s ability to broaden the war. But as long as President Bush is convinced that Israeli methods are correct, there will be no real solution.

Some European powers have announced that they will contribute troops to a UN force. But they insist that a political solution precede any outside intervention into the south of Lebanon. This means that fighting will continue.

There are few signs that we are closer to a real understanding between the various protagonists. Grandiose military objectives on both sides have been somewhat reduced, but this has not been matched by a willingness of the US and Israel to make serious concessions.

"Root Causes" by Scowcroft

Brent Scowcroft sums up the wisdom of moderate republicans on how to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is the fundamental part of the present conflict. The troubles in Palestine set into motion many of the other regional problems that animate the Lebanon debacle we are presently dealing with. The Lebanese Civil war was provoked, in part, by armed Palestinian refugees, who had been expelled from Palestine. The Golan Heights were captured by Israel in 1967 because of the on-going conflict, making Syria an intractable part of the present conflict - so were the West Bank and Gaza. Hizbullah was created in response to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982, which in turn was an attempt to destroy the PLO. Scowcroft is courageous to bring us back to the fundamental cause of the regional mess that was left to fester after 1948. Too few in Washington are willing to address this issue, despite all the talk of "root causes." The neocon nostrum that the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad has proven to be utter nonsense. Scowcroft knows this. He is trying to put the horse before the cart in this opinion piece he wrote for the Washington Post this weekend.

Beyond Lebanon
This Is the Time for a U.S.-Led Comprehensive Settlement
By Brent Scowcroft
Sunday, July 30, 2006; B07

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stated that a simple cease-fire in Lebanon is not the solution to the current violence. She says it is necessary to deal with the roots of the problem. She is right on both counts. But Hezbollah is not the source of the problem; it is a derivative of the cause, which is the tragic conflict over Palestine that began in 1948.

The eastern shore of the Mediterranean is in turmoil from end to end, a repetition of continuing conflicts in one part or another since the abortive attempts of the United Nations to create separate Israeli and Palestinian states in 1948. The current conflagration has energized the world. Now, perhaps more than ever, we have an opportunity to harness that concern and energy to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the entire 58-year-old tragedy. Only the United States can lead the effort required to seize this opportunity.

The outlines of a comprehensive settlement have been apparent since President Bill Clinton's efforts collapsed in 2000. The major elements would include:

· A Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with minor rectifications agreed upon between Palestine and Israel.

· Palestinians giving up the right of return and Israel reciprocating by removing its settlements in the West Bank, again with rectifications as mutually agreed. Those displaced on both sides would receive compensation from the international community.

· King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia unambiguously reconfirming his 2002 pledge that the Arab world is prepared to enter into full normal relations with Israel upon its withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967.

· Egypt and Saudi Arabia working with the Palestinian Authority to put together a government along the lines of the 18-point agreement reached between Hamas and Fatah prisoners in Israeli jails in June. This government would negotiate for the Authority.

· Deployment, as part of a cease-fire, of a robust international force in southern Lebanon.

· Deployment of another international force to facilitate and supervise traffic to and from Gaza and the West Bank.

· Designation of Jerusalem as the shared capital of Israel and Palestine, with appropriate international guarantees of freedom of movement and civic life in the city.

These elements are well-known to people who live in the region and to those outside who have labored over the decades seeking to shape a lasting peace. What seems breathtakingly complicated, however, is how one mobilizes the necessary political will, in the region and beyond, to transform these principles into an agreement on a lasting accord.

The current crisis in Lebanon provides a historic opportunity to achieve what has seemed impossible. That said, it is too much to expect those most directly implicated -- Israeli and Palestinian leaders -- to lead the way. That responsibility falls to others, principally the United States, which alone can mobilize the international community and Israel and the Arab states for the task that has defeated so many previous efforts.

How would such a process be organized? The obvious vehicle to direct the process would be the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations), established in 2001 for just such a purpose. The Quartet, beginning at the foreign-minister level, would first organize the necessary international force for southern Lebanon and Gaza and then call for a cease-fire. The security force would have to have the mandate and capability to deal firmly with acts of violence. Ideally, this would be a NATO, or at least NATO-led, contingent. Recognizing the political obstacles, the fact is that direct U.S. participation in such a force would be highly desirable -- and perhaps even essential -- for persuading our friends and allies to contribute the capabilities required.

With a cease-fire and international security force in place, the Quartet would then construct a framework for negotiating the specific elements of a comprehensive settlement, after which Israel, the Palestinian Authority and appropriate Arab state representatives (e.g. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon) would be added to the process to complete the detailed negotiations.

The benefits of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the root cause of today's turmoil would likely ripple well beyond the Israelis and the Palestinians. A comprehensive peace settlement would not only defang the radicals in Lebanon and Palestine (and their supporters in other countries), it would also reduce the influence of Iran -- the country that, under its current ideology, poses the greatest potential threat to stability in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan.

A comprehensive settlement also would allow Arab leaders to focus on what most say is a primary concern: modernizing their countries to provide jobs and productive lives for their rapidly growing populations.

Removing the argument that nothing can be done because domestic constituencies are fixated on the "plight of the Palestinians" would allow creative energy, talent and money to be rechanneled into education, health, housing, etc. This would have the added benefit of addressing conditions that encourage far too many young Arabs to glorify terrorism as a legitimate means for dealing with the challenges of the modern world.

It is even possible that a comprehensive settlement might help stabilize Iraq. A chastened Iran, bereft of the "Israeli card," might be more willing to reach a modus vivendi with the Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq, and with the United States as well. All countries in the region -- not to mention Iraq itself -- need a stable, prosperous and peaceful Iraq. The road to achieving this may well lead eastward from a Jerusalem shared peacefully by Israelis and Palestinians.

This latest in a seemingly endless series of conflagrations in the region just may present a unique opportunity to change the situation in the Middle East for the better for all time. Let us not shrink from the task.

The writer was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. He is now president of the Forum for International Policy.

Warren Christopher Says "Syria is Critical Participant"

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under President Clinton, explains why: "Syria may well be a critical participant in any cease-fire arrangement, just as it was in 1993 and 1996."

A Time To Act
By Warren Christopher
Washington Post Friday, July 28, 2006; A25

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's just-concluded trip to Lebanon, Israel and Rome was an exercise in grace, bravery and, to my regret, wrongly focused diplomacy. Especially disappointing is the fact that she resisted all suggestions that the first order of business should be negotiation of an immediate cease-fire between the warring parties.

In the course of her trip, the secretary repeatedly insisted that any cease-fire be tied to a "permanent" and "sustainable" solution to the root causes of the conflict. Such a solution is achievable, if at all, only after protracted negotiations involving multiple parties. In the meantime, civilians will continue to die, precious infrastructure will continue to be destroyed and the fragile Lebanese democracy will continue to erode.

My own experience in the region underlies my belief that in the short term we should focus our efforts on stopping the killing. Twice during my four years as secretary of state we faced situations similar to the one that confronts us today. Twice, at the request of the Israelis, we helped bring the bloodshed to an end.

In June 1993, Israel responded to Hezbollah rocket attacks along its northern border by launching Operation Accountability, resulting in the expulsion of 250,000 civilians from the southern part of Lebanon.

After the Israeli bombardment had continued for several days, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asked me to use my contacts in Syria to seek their help in containing the hostilities. I contacted Foreign Minister Farouk Shara, who, of course, consulted with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. After several days of urgent negotiations, an agreement was reached committing the parties to stop targeting one another's civilian populations. We never knew exactly what the Syrians did, but clearly Hezbollah responded to their direction.

In April 1996, when Hezbollah again launched rocket attacks on Israel's northern border, the Israelis countered with Operation Grapes of Wrath, sending 400,000 Lebanese fleeing from southern Lebanon. Errant Israeli bombs hit a U.N. refugee camp at Cana in southern Lebanon, killing about 100 civilians and bringing the wrath of international public opinion down upon Israel.

This time Shimon Peres, who had become prime minister after the assassination of Rabin, sought our help. In response, we launched an eight-day shuttle to Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem that produced a written agreement bringing the hostilities to an end. Weeks later, the parties agreed to a border monitoring group consisting of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, France and the United States. Until three weeks ago, that agreement had succeeded for 10 years in preventing a wholesale resumption of hostilities.

What do these episodes teach us?

First, as in 1996, an immediate cease-fire must take priority, with negotiations on longer-term arrangements to follow. Achieving a cease-fire will be difficult enough without overloading the initial negotiations with a search for permanent solutions.

Second, if a cease-fire is the goal, the United States has an indispensable role to play. A succession of Israeli leaders has turned to us, and only us, when they have concluded that retaliation for Hezbollah attacks has become counterproductive. Israel plainly trusts no one else to negotiate on its behalf and will accept no settlement in which we are not deeply involved. Further, based upon my experience in helping bring an end to the fighting in the Balkans, the Europeans are unlikely to participate in a multinational enforcement action until the United States commits to putting its own troops on the ground.

Finally, Syria may well be a critical participant in any cease-fire arrangement, just as it was in 1993 and 1996. Although Syria no longer has troops in Lebanon, Hezbollah's supply routes pass through the heart of Syria, and some Hezbollah leaders may reside in Damascus, giving the Syrians more leverage over Hezbollah's actions than any other country save Iran. Syria has invited a direct dialogue with the United States, and although our relations with Syria have seriously deteriorated in recent years (we have not had an ambassador in Damascus for more than a year), we do not have the luxury of continuing to treat it with diplomatic disdain. As the situations with North Korea and Iran confirm, refusing to speak with those we dislike is a recipe for frustration and failure.

Because Hezbollah has positioned itself as the "David" in this war, every day that the killing continues burnishes its reputation within the Arab world. Every day that more of the Lebanese infrastructure is turned to dust, Beirut's fragile democracy becomes weaker, both in its ability to function and in the eyes of its people.

The impact is not limited to Lebanon or Israel. Every day America gives the green light to further Israeli violence, our already tattered reputation sinks even lower. The reluctance of our closest allies in the Middle East even to receive Secretary Rice this week in their capitals attests to this fact.

It is time for the United States to step forward with the authority and balance that this moment requires.

The writer was secretary of state from 1993 to 1997

An open letter published Friday in The Independent newspaper, signed by former British Cabinet ministers and ambassadors urging Tony Blair to help broker a swift cease-fire. It warned that any continuing support for Israel's military action could become as unpopular with the public as the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The letter was also signed by musicians Damon Albarn, Peter Gabriel and Brian Eno and writers Harold Pinter, Will Self and Gillian Slovo. A picture of the front page is attached. Also below is the lead article from The Independent today.

Friedman and Lesch Argue for US Engagement With Syria

Both Thomas Friedman and David Lesch explain why the US must talk to Syria and try to enlist it as a stabalizing force in the region, rather than as a provocateur. I have copied both opinion pieces in full. Many others have argued the same thing - including EDWARD N. LUTTWAK writing in the Wall Street Journal, "Come Back, Bashar." He concludes:

For France, the U.S. and the U.K., it would, of course, be tremendously embarrassing to recognize that they made a gigantic error in expelling Syria without having put anything its place, thus leaving a vacuum of power in Lebanon that Hezbollah has exploited. But unlike the military option, which is simply impossible, the diplomatic option is merely humiliating. Having massacred their own Islamists very efficiently, the Syrians can do the job again, if sufficiently rewarded.

“Talking Turkey With Syria”
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
New York Times, Op-Ed
Damascus, Syria

One wonders what planet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice landed from, thinking she can build an international force to take charge in south Lebanon without going to Damascus and trying to bring the Syrians on board.

Two Syrian officials made no bones about it when I asked their reaction to deploying such a force, without Syrian backing: Do you remember what happened in 1983, each asked, when the Reagan administration tried to impose an Israeli-designed treaty on Lebanon against Syria's will?

I was there, I remember quite well: Hezbollah, no doubt backed by Syria or Iran, debuted its skills for the world by blowing up the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine and French peacekeeping battalions. This is not a knitting circle here.

Can we get the Syrians on board? Can we split Damascus from Tehran? My
conversations here suggest it would be very hard, but worth a shot. It is the most important strategic play we could make, because Syria is the bridge between Iran and Hezbollah. But it would take a high-level, rational dialogue.

Dr. Rice says we can deal with Syria through normal diplomatic channels. Really?

We've withdrawn our ambassador from Damascus, and the U.S. diplomats left here are allowed to meet only the Foreign Ministry's director of protocol, whose main job is to ask how you like your Turkish coffee. Syria's ambassador in Washington is similarly isolated.

Is this Syrian regime brutal and ruthless? You bet it is. If the Bush team wants to go to war with Syria, I get that. But the U.S. boycott of Syria is not intimidating Damascus. (Its economy is still growing, thanks to high oil prices.) So we're left with the worst of all worlds ? a hostile Syria that is not afraid of us.

We need to get real on Lebanon. Hezbollah made a reckless mistake in
provoking Israel. Shame on Hezbollah for bringing this disaster upon Lebanon by embedding its "heroic" forces amid civilians. I understand Israel's vital need to degrade Hezbollah's rocket network. But Hezbollah's militia, which represents 40 percent of Lebanon, the Shiites, can't be wiped out at a price that Israel, or America's Arab allies, can sustain? if at all.

You can't go into an office in the Arab world today without finding an Arab TV station featuring the daily carnage in Lebanon. It's now the Muzak of the Arab world, and it is toxic for us and our Arab friends.

Despite Hezbollah's bravado, Israel has hurt it and its supporters badly, in a way they will never forget. Point made. It is now time to wind down this war and pull together a deal ? a cease-fire, a prisoner exchange, a resumption of the peace effort and an international force to help the Lebanese Army secure the border with Israel? before things spin out of control. Whoever goes for a knockout blow will knock themselves out instead.

Will Syria play? Syrians will tell you that their alliance with Tehran is "a marriage of convenience." Syria is a largely secular country, with a Sunni majority. Its leadership is not comfortable with Iranian Shiite ayatollahs.
The Iranians know that, which is why "they keep sending high officials here every few weeks to check on the relationship," a diplomat said.

So uncomfortable are many Syrian Sunnis with the Iran relationship that
President Bashar al-Assad has had to allow a surge of Sunni religiosity; last April, a bigger public display was made of Muhammad's birthday than the Syrian Baath Party's anniversary, which had never happened before.

Syrian officials stress that they formed their alliance with Iran because they felt they had no other option. One top Syrian official said the door with the U.S. was "not closed from Damascus. [But] when you have only one friend, you stay with him all the time. When you have 10 friends, you stay with each one of them."

What do the Syrians want? They say: respect for their security interests in Lebanon and a resumption of negotiations over the Golan. Syria is also providing support for the Sunni Baathists in Iraq. Much as the Bush team wants to, it can't fight everyone at once and get where it needs to go. There will not be a peace force in south Lebanon unless it's backed by Syria. No one will send troops.

I repeat: I don't know if Syria can be brought around, and we certainly can't do it at Lebanon's expense. But you have to try, with real sticks and real carrots. Syria is not going to calm things in Lebanon, or Iraq, just so the Bush team can then focus on regime change in Damascus.

As one diplomat here put it to me, "Turkeys don't vote for Thanksgiving."

Try Talking With Syria
Assad Isn't Going Away
By David W. Lesch
Washington Post, Op-Ed
Thursday, July 27, 2006; Page A25

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has been a lonely man in international circles of late. Indeed, one of the few Americans with whom he has had contact in the past few years has been a professor (me) who wrote a book about him -- not exactly high-powered diplomacy.

Assad was a tremendous disappointment to many U.S. officials after a promising beginning when he came to power in 2000. Considering the dilapidated, broken-down country he inherited, however, the expectations were misplaced. And because they were so high, so was the level of disappointment.

Along with accusations of Syrian support for the insurgency in Iraq, Washington began to view Assad as being on the wrong side of the war on terrorism. Indeed, with Syria's neo-patrimonial structure staring down the Bush administration's attempt to spread democracy in the region, the regime was seen as being on the wrong side of history.

Thus the long-held disdain among American neoconservatives for the Assads (Bashar and his late father, Hafez) became Bush administration policy, along with the strategic goal of weakening Syria. The young Syrian leader was dismissed as an inept buffoon who wasn't really in control. Regime change in Damascus became U.S. policy in all but name, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in early 2005, in which Syria was seen as the culprit. The Syrian president couldn't even obtain a visa to attend a U.N. General Assembly summit meeting.

Assad has confounded the critics, though. He has survived, despite a few glaring missteps. And it has to be acknowledged by now that one doesn't last six years as president of Syria without being at least somewhat clever, politically skilled and strong-willed.

In fact, Assad is more securely in power and more confident in his leadership today than he has ever been -- although perhaps, as recent events have shown, maybe a bit overconfident. He has weeded out most of the "old guard" from his father's reign, and he funneled the international pressure related to the Hariri assassination and subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon into a nationalistic response that has coalesced in support of the regime.

From Assad's point of view, the United States is stuck in a quagmire in Iraq. It is also deeply concerned about Iran. Meanwhile, President Bush's democracy promotion has hit a brick wall. But Assad continues to talk to practically no one from a Western government.

There are many reasons for the current crisis in the Middle East. It is largely the result of American weakness and perceived illegitimacy, stemming from U.S. folly in Iraq, which has allowed state and sub-state actors to assert themselves.

From Syria's perspective, the crisis is seen as a search for relevance. Damascus needs at least a few arrows in what has been an empty quiver of diplomatic leverage. Assad wants to be taken seriously. He believes the sincere overtures he made to the United States and even Israel in his first few years in power were categorically rebuffed -- and in fact they were. After all, he was seen as being on the wrong side of history.

Once before, an Arab leader felt rebuffed in much the same way. That was in 1973, and the leader was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He launched an Arab-Israeli war to reactivate diplomacy and improve his bargaining position with regard to return of the Sinai Peninsula. The United States was smart enough to recognize these motives at the time, and it engaged in a diplomatic process that led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Leaders reach out in interesting, and occasionally lethal, ways. The Bush administration should not, however, react to the current situation by continuing to isolate and threaten Syria. Recognize the situation for what it is, because, like it or not, Bashar al-Assad is sticking around. Just because diplomacy is what he is ultimately searching for should not obviate the possibility of diplomacy.

In coming weeks, one hopes, the Syrian president will be talking with someone from the United States other than a professor who wrote a book about him.

The writer is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio and author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria."

Friedman and Lesch Argue for US Engagement With Syria

Both Thomas Friedman and David Lesch explain why the US must talk to Syria and try to enlist it as a stabalizing force in the region, rather than as a provocateur. I have copied both opinion pieces in full. Many others have argued the same thing - including EDWARD N. LUTTWAK writing in the Wall Street Journal, "Come Back, Bashar." He concludes:

For France, the U.S. and the U.K., it would, of course, be tremendously embarrassing to recognize that they made a gigantic error in expelling Syria without having put anything its place, thus leaving a vacuum of power in Lebanon that Hezbollah has exploited. But unlike the military option, which is simply impossible, the diplomatic option is merely humiliating. Having massacred their own Islamists very efficiently, the Syrians can do the job again, if sufficiently rewarded.

“Talking Turkey With Syria”
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
New York Times, Op-Ed
Damascus, Syria

One wonders what planet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice landed from, thinking she can build an international force to take charge in south Lebanon without going to Damascus and trying to bring the Syrians on board.

Two Syrian officials made no bones about it when I asked their reaction to deploying such a force, without Syrian backing: Do you remember what happened in 1983, each asked, when the Reagan administration tried to impose an Israeli-designed treaty on Lebanon against Syria's will?

I was there, I remember quite well: Hezbollah, no doubt backed by Syria or Iran, debuted its skills for the world by blowing up the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine and French peacekeeping battalions. This is not a knitting circle here.

Can we get the Syrians on board? Can we split Damascus from Tehran? My
conversations here suggest it would be very hard, but worth a shot. It is the most important strategic play we could make, because Syria is the bridge between Iran and Hezbollah. But it would take a high-level, rational dialogue.

Dr. Rice says we can deal with Syria through normal diplomatic channels. Really?

We've withdrawn our ambassador from Damascus, and the U.S. diplomats left here are allowed to meet only the Foreign Ministry's director of protocol, whose main job is to ask how you like your Turkish coffee. Syria's ambassador in Washington is similarly isolated.

Is this Syrian regime brutal and ruthless? You bet it is. If the Bush team wants to go to war with Syria, I get that. But the U.S. boycott of Syria is not intimidating Damascus. (Its economy is still growing, thanks to high oil prices.) So we're left with the worst of all worlds ? a hostile Syria that is not afraid of us.

We need to get real on Lebanon. Hezbollah made a reckless mistake in
provoking Israel. Shame on Hezbollah for bringing this disaster upon Lebanon by embedding its "heroic" forces amid civilians. I understand Israel's vital need to degrade Hezbollah's rocket network. But Hezbollah's militia, which represents 40 percent of Lebanon, the Shiites, can't be wiped out at a price that Israel, or America's Arab allies, can sustain? if at all.

You can't go into an office in the Arab world today without finding an Arab TV station featuring the daily carnage in Lebanon. It's now the Muzak of the Arab world, and it is toxic for us and our Arab friends.

Despite Hezbollah's bravado, Israel has hurt it and its supporters badly, in a way they will never forget. Point made. It is now time to wind down this war and pull together a deal ? a cease-fire, a prisoner exchange, a resumption of the peace effort and an international force to help the Lebanese Army secure the border with Israel? before things spin out of control. Whoever goes for a knockout blow will knock themselves out instead.

Will Syria play? Syrians will tell you that their alliance with Tehran is "a marriage of convenience." Syria is a largely secular country, with a Sunni majority. Its leadership is not comfortable with Iranian Shiite ayatollahs.
The Iranians know that, which is why "they keep sending high officials here every few weeks to check on the relationship," a diplomat said.

So uncomfortable are many Syrian Sunnis with the Iran relationship that
President Bashar al-Assad has had to allow a surge of Sunni religiosity; last April, a bigger public display was made of Muhammad's birthday than the Syrian Baath Party's anniversary, which had never happened before.

Syrian officials stress that they formed their alliance with Iran because they felt they had no other option. One top Syrian official said the door with the U.S. was "not closed from Damascus. [But] when you have only one friend, you stay with him all the time. When you have 10 friends, you stay with each one of them."

What do the Syrians want? They say: respect for their security interests in Lebanon and a resumption of negotiations over the Golan. Syria is also providing support for the Sunni Baathists in Iraq. Much as the Bush team wants to, it can't fight everyone at once and get where it needs to go. There will not be a peace force in south Lebanon unless it's backed by Syria. No one will send troops.

I repeat: I don't know if Syria can be brought around, and we certainly can't do it at Lebanon's expense. But you have to try, with real sticks and real carrots. Syria is not going to calm things in Lebanon, or Iraq, just so the Bush team can then focus on regime change in Damascus.

As one diplomat here put it to me, "Turkeys don't vote for Thanksgiving."

Try Talking With Syria
Assad Isn't Going Away
By David W. Lesch
Washington Post, Op-Ed
Thursday, July 27, 2006; Page A25

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has been a lonely man in international circles of late. Indeed, one of the few Americans with whom he has had contact in the past few years has been a professor (me) who wrote a book about him -- not exactly high-powered diplomacy.

Assad was a tremendous disappointment to many U.S. officials after a promising beginning when he came to power in 2000. Considering the dilapidated, broken-down country he inherited, however, the expectations were misplaced. And because they were so high, so was the level of disappointment.

Along with accusations of Syrian support for the insurgency in Iraq, Washington began to view Assad as being on the wrong side of the war on terrorism. Indeed, with Syria's neo-patrimonial structure staring down the Bush administration's attempt to spread democracy in the region, the regime was seen as being on the wrong side of history.

Thus the long-held disdain among American neoconservatives for the Assads (Bashar and his late father, Hafez) became Bush administration policy, along with the strategic goal of weakening Syria. The young Syrian leader was dismissed as an inept buffoon who wasn't really in control. Regime change in Damascus became U.S. policy in all but name, especially after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in early 2005, in which Syria was seen as the culprit. The Syrian president couldn't even obtain a visa to attend a U.N. General Assembly summit meeting.

Assad has confounded the critics, though. He has survived, despite a few glaring missteps. And it has to be acknowledged by now that one doesn't last six years as president of Syria without being at least somewhat clever, politically skilled and strong-willed.

In fact, Assad is more securely in power and more confident in his leadership today than he has ever been -- although perhaps, as recent events have shown, maybe a bit overconfident. He has weeded out most of the "old guard" from his father's reign, and he funneled the international pressure related to the Hariri assassination and subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon into a nationalistic response that has coalesced in support of the regime.

From Assad's point of view, the United States is stuck in a quagmire in Iraq. It is also deeply concerned about Iran. Meanwhile, President Bush's democracy promotion has hit a brick wall. But Assad continues to talk to practically no one from a Western government.

There are many reasons for the current crisis in the Middle East. It is largely the result of American weakness and perceived illegitimacy, stemming from U.S. folly in Iraq, which has allowed state and sub-state actors to assert themselves.

From Syria's perspective, the crisis is seen as a search for relevance. Damascus needs at least a few arrows in what has been an empty quiver of diplomatic leverage. Assad wants to be taken seriously. He believes the sincere overtures he made to the United States and even Israel in his first few years in power were categorically rebuffed -- and in fact they were. After all, he was seen as being on the wrong side of history.

Once before, an Arab leader felt rebuffed in much the same way. That was in 1973, and the leader was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He launched an Arab-Israeli war to reactivate diplomacy and improve his bargaining position with regard to return of the Sinai Peninsula. The United States was smart enough to recognize these motives at the time, and it engaged in a diplomatic process that led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Leaders reach out in interesting, and occasionally lethal, ways. The Bush administration should not, however, react to the current situation by continuing to isolate and threaten Syria. Recognize the situation for what it is, because, like it or not, Bashar al-Assad is sticking around. Just because diplomacy is what he is ultimately searching for should not obviate the possibility of diplomacy.

In coming weeks, one hopes, the Syrian president will be talking with someone from the United States other than a professor who wrote a book about him.

The writer is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio and author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria."

Syria will Emerge Stronger from the Lebanon Debacle

Syria will Emerge Stronger from the Lebanon Debacle
Joshua Landis
July 26, 2006
Syria Comment

The present Israeli campaign in Lebanon will strengthen the Syrian regime. Many analysts are beginning to come to this conclusion. Why?

1. The three states in which the US has promised to create democracy and a better future – Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon – have experienced chaos, growing radicalism and a decline in their economies. Syrians see this and will cling tighter to their regime, whether they like it or not.

2. Democracy, the American export, has been further discredited in the eyes of Middle Easterners. The US promised Lebanon’s new anti-Syrian democratic coalition that it would be protected and backed by Washington in its struggle with Damascus. This turns out to have been a false promise. Democracy led to weakness and division in the Lebanese government. Washington and Israel lost patience with the Lebanese government after little more than a year and chose to punish it for not showing the characteristics of a powerful dictatorship that can destroy opposition groups. Washington has turned against its own democratic experiment. The lesson is that Washington cannot be trusted, is not sincere about democracy, and will not back its Arab allies against Israel.

3. Authoritarianism as a model of government in the Middle East and Bashar al-Asad’s interpretation of events over the last three years will be strengthened by the fighting in Lebanon and weakening of Lebanon’s democratic government.

a. Iraq: Asad opposed the Iraq intervention, making him an enemy of the US. President Bush explained this was because Asad was evil, did not care about his people, and feared freedom and democracy. President Asad responded to this attack by proclaiming that President Bush did not know what he was doing in Iraq and would bring death, not freedom, to Iraq. Not only would the US fail to bring democracy to Iraq, Asad insisted, but it would cause the breakup of Iraq and civil strife.

b. Syria: Bashar also offered a very un-Baathist interpretation of Syrian society. He argued, in essence, that Syria was too backward to sustain Western-style democracy. He claimed that “tribalism” had haunted Syria for 2000 years and that sectarianism was too deeply rooted and too close to the surface of society to permit Western–style freedoms. If unleashed, these ancient loyalties would cause civil war and chaos. In short, he argued, in contrast to Bush, authoritarianism is necessary in the Middle East, where national consciousness remains weak. Asad’s analysis proved correct for Iraq. Many Syrians, unsure of their ability to live together civilly, believe he may be correct. The failure of America’s Iraq experiment has legitimized and strengthened Asad’s form of government rather than weaken it. The domino theory has redounded in Asad’s favor, re-legitimizing authoritarianism, rather than undermining it.

b. Palestine: The unwillingness of the West to countenance or negotiate with the freely elected Hamas government in Palestine, which has been backed and supported by Syria, strengthens Asad’s stand. It puts him on the side of popular sentiment and America on the side of stifling it. It has increased Asad’s popularity inside Syria and on the Arab street.

c. Lebanon: Asad told Syrians that following Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the country would return to sectarian in-fighting and civil war because it was not a nation, but four battling sects. He justified Syria’s occupation of Lebanon by arguing that Syria was the key to stability there and offered Lebanese protection from themselves. It turned out that Asad was wrong about Lebanese society, but not wrong about the war and the benefits of Syria’s defense umbrella. Although the Lebanese factions and sects were not able to agree about most policy decisions or the future direction of the country, they did agree not to return to civil war. The economy continued to grow, foreigners continued to return, and investments in Lebanon grew. The promise was that Hizbullah, although it retained its arms, would be integrated within the Lebanese system and slowly be drawn into the project of rebuilding Lebanon.

When Hizbullah went off the reservation to kidnap two Israeli soldiers, the West abandoned its faith in Lebanon and decided war was a better solution for Lebanon’s problems than nurturing democracy and economic growth. Hizbullah had to be destroyed, not coddled. “The cancer,” as Israel’s chief of staff put it, had to be “spit out” as a malignant, foreign body, not integrated as a part of the nation. In embracing this policy, Washington ironically, also embraced Asad’s interpretation of Lebanon – that it is not a nation and democracy offers no solution to sectarian communalism.

Asad’s prediction that Lebanon would regret abandoning Syria’s defense umbrella for America’s defense umbrella may be correct. Syrians already believe this and now believe that Asad’s prediction was correct. If Lebanon is pushed back into civil war by Israeli and US demands that it disarm Hizbullah, Asad’s prediction that Lebanon is not a nation and will slip back into civil war will turn out to be correct. Many Lebanese had said that Asad would “break Lebanon” in order to make his predictions come true. Ironically, Israel and Washington have broken Lebanon to make Asad’s predictions come true. So far Bashar al-Asad has proven to be a better judge of regional character and politics than President Bush.

4. The Syrian opposition will be silenced by growing dislike of the United States. The Syrian opposition needs America to be an exemplar for democracy just as it needs US moral and political support. Today, US support for the opposition discredits it. As a result, Syrians are less likely to trust the proposals for democratic or pro-Western change being put forward by the opposition. A month ago there was considerable attention being paid to Asad’s crackdown on the opposition. Not today.

5. The further erosion of US popularity and legitimacy will increase regional indulgence of the Asad regime. The use of force by Washington as a first resort for solving regional problems make’s Asad’s justification for using force all the more normal and acceptable.

6. The Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments have been seriously embarrassed by Washington in Lebanon and will be less able to pressure Syria on America’s behalf in the future.

7. European support for the Bush regime’s policies in the region has been further eroded by the Lebanon fiasco.

8. Lebanon was the major pro-American source for applying moral and political pressure on the Asad regime. It will no longer play that role.

a. The UN investigation into Hariri’s murder, which terrified the Asad regime over the last year and held out the promise that the UN would place economic or political sanctions on Syria, is effectively dead. Not only will it be impossible for the investigative team to make further headway in a country torn by war, but Lebanese politicians will have less interest in antagonizing Syria to further American goals in the region.

b. Lebanon needs Syria more than ever. It needs Syria to be kind to the many refugees who have found protection and safety in Syria. The Lebanese economy will be increasingly vulnerable to Syrian pressure, as will Syrian politicians as they try to restrain Hizbullah’s radicalism and military wing.

c. The weaker the Lebanese government, the more subject it is to Syrian pressure.

d. Morally, the Lebanese will have a harder time accusing Syria of being a failed state and presiding over a failed economy, as they did previously. After all, what is the alternative? Lebanon?

9. Hizbullah’s relative success in blunting Israel’s incursion into Lebanon also blunts America’s threat of force. Its ability to persist in its missile launchings has seriously undermined Israel’s defense posture. It proves that determined non-state actors and “Arab resistance” can alter the balance of power in the region. This will make Syria and Iran all the more confident in challenging the West and Israel, just as it will make them less likely to cower in the face of Washington’s threats.

10. Bashar al-Asad will be seen as the come back kid following this episode. Already many diplomats are calling on Washington to pick up the phone to Asad in order to see what the Syrians can do to help arrange an end to the Lebanon debacle.

But even if President Bush decides not to call Asad, Syria’s young president has proven that he is skilled at dodging American bullets. Washington has tried to bring down his economy through sanctions, twist his arm with UN investigations, and isolate him or make Syria irrelevant in regional politics. So far President Asad has been able to outfox Washington. He has refused to accept the “Qaddhafi-like deal” John Bolton demanded of him last year without paying a price. He has weathered American military threats, economic sanctions, multilateral diplomacy, and now the unleashing of Israeli military might. Washington hasn’t much else to throw at him. If Bush doesn’t pick up the phone to Asad, it is quite likely the next administration will have to.

Damascus Moves Back into the Center as Lebanon is Turned into a Failed State

If the US should have learnt one thing over the last several years, it is that failed and weak states cannot halt militias and "terrorists" from filling the vacuum of absent state authority. They become breading grounds for the widespread anger that has taken root in Middle Eastern societies. Afghanistan and Iraq are the two obvious examples of this.

Lebanon may well join this category. The weak state could not close down Hizbullah. The national dialogue of March and April failed to place the state on the firm footing needed to guarantee that Hizbullah would not provoke the conflict we are seeing today. In fact it did the reverse. It angered Hizbullah and Syria's allies by excluding them from Lebanon's future, without taking any steps to weaken them. This was the worst of all worlds, because it angered the government's enemies without rendering them incapable of taking their anger out on Lebanon's Future Movement.

The other choice for the Future Movement would have been to accept Aoun as the future president of Lebanon, even though he is now slightly pro-Syrian. This would have brought the broad coalition of pro-Syrian and pro-Hizbullah forces into the center of the government and given them a stake in peace and quite. Had Siniora, Hariri and the pro-American forces in Lebanon been able to bridge the terrible divide in Lebanon's political geography, Israel would not be on the march today.

The US must bear some of the blame for Hariri's unwillingness to compromise with the other half of Lebanon, the pro-Hizbullah half. Hariri was being told by the US not to accept efforts by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to patch up relations between Syria and Lebanon. Hariri was being promised US aid and eventual victory over Hizbullah, if he stood fast in opposing Syria. Now look where he stands. The US has abandoned him for an Israeli solution to its problems. One that is surely to fail. And one that will bring the Syrians back into Lebanon - not as a military force, but as a political force. Many Lebanese will forget their anger at Syria in their anger at Israel and America. They will forget the UN investigation into Rafiq Hariri's murder. They will ask themselves if they weren't better off under Syria's protective umbrella, which they exchanged for a US umbrella only to bombed into backwardness by Israel.

The US promised democracy and security, but has delivered death and ruin. This will not be easily forgiven. The Hariri-Siniora government has failed horribly. There will be a reckoning. Many Lebanese will look back at the old sour embrace of Damascus as a better and safer state than the one the US has given them. Bashar al-Asad told Lebanon that it would regret leaving its alliance with Syria for a future with Washington. Most Lebanese believed that Asad would break Lebanon for its betrayal. The Irony is that Syria is not breaking Lebanon. Israel and the US are.
---


The Israeli bombardment is not only destroying Lebanon's economy, it could also have a huge impact on the whole region, writes Massoud A. Derhally in his article The sound of war in Arabian Business, 23 July 2006. He explains how Lebanon is likely to become a failed state and how the present government will be even more incapable of taking control of the country than it was before Israel's intervention.

But for Lebanon, whether Hezbollah succeeds or fails, the government of Fouad Siniora has been proven to be impotent, and is likely to be dissolved at the end of the crisis.

"The weakness of this government has been exposed flagrantly to the entire world. Not only is it weak, its main patron the United States has clearly turned its back on it. The US democracy promotion agenda is false and inconsistent," says Ghorayeb.

"What kind of democracy are they trying to build when they don't give a damn about how our economy in a matter of days has been destroyed? By refusing to call a ceasefire they are not bolstering the Siniora government. It's very much an apocalyptic war, because of the profound impact it's going to have on many levels."

Rami Khouri, editor at large of Lebanon's Daily Star believes Israeli policies are inherently flawed. "If there is a Nobel Prize for promoting terrorism it should be given for the last quarter century to the Israelis. They are the masters at implementing policies that generate a counter policy of increasingly militant resistance, and hard-line Islamist politics," says Khouri.

"We are such a divided and polarised society that it is virtually impossible for any group in Lebanon in such a sectarian society to really cater to all the different sects," points out Ghorayeb. "There is no public in Lebanon. When you talk about a public opinion in Lebanon you presuppose a unified nation. We don't have a nation. We have many publics and Hezbollah has support of its public.

On July 20, the U.S. House of Representatives, by an overwhelming 410-8 margin, voted to unconditionally endorse Israel's ongoing attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The Senate passed a similar resolution defending the Israeli attack earlier in the week by a voice vote.

Condoleezza Rice has described the plight of Lebanon as a part of the "birth pangs of a new Middle East" and said that Israel should ignore calls for a ceasefire.

Robin Wright in the Post explains that the Saudi ambassador threw a wrench into Washington's go-slow-on-diplomacy tactics and attempt to use the pro-American Arab states against Iran and Syria.

Although the Saudis had initially criticized Hezbollah's actions in triggering the new violence, diplomats say the kingdom's leaders have become increasingly distressed about the growing humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, where Israeli airstrikes have produced numerous civilian casualties and vast devastation.

One senior European diplomat said the Saudis were also concerned that the package they expect the United States to present to European and Arab allies in Rome later this week will be too heavily anti-Iran and anti-Syria.

At a dinner last week, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter administration, derided Rice's trip as "sitting in front of a mirror, talking to herself" if she does not deal diplomatically with the major players.

On CBS's "Face the Nation," Syria's ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, said his country is open to a new dialogue with the United States. "What we are calling for is de-escalation, diplomatic engagement and for the United States to restart playing the role it used to play in the past, the role of the broker of peace," he said.

But that idea was shot down by Bolten, who said the administration had close, direct contacts with Syria in Bush's first term, to little effect. "They continued to allow terrorism to flourish," Bolten said. "They supported Hezbollah."

Meanwhile Syria is moving to center stage as the bombing phase comes closer to an end and the diplomacy stage begins.

Syrian Information Minister Mohsen Bilal warns Israel that a major ground incursion into Lebanon would draw his country into the conflict.

Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said Syria is ready to open a "dialogue" with the United States to resolve the crisis in Lebanon.

July 24, 2006 NEW YORK TIMES
Diplomacy
U.S. Must Deal With Damascus and Hezbollah to Ease Mideast Crisis, Syrian Says
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

DAMASCUS, Syria, July 23 — The Bush administration's approach of indirectly pressuring Syria to end its support for Hezbollah is doomed to failure, a top Syrian minister said Thursday.

Buthaina Shaaban, the minister of expatriates and a close adviser to President Bashar al-Assad, said the chaos engulfing the region could be reduced only if Damascus and Hezbollah were directly involved in any negotiations. Washington has a policy of isolating Syria.

Further, she said, Washington is ignoring reality if it thinks groups like Hezbollah and Hamas can be purged by allowing Israel to bomb at will, or that extremism can be curbed in any way besides solving the Arab-Israeli dispute.

"The United States has to get realistic about addressing issues in the region instead of taking steps that only make things worse," Mrs. Shaaban said in an interview. "They don't have a vision about what is happening in the Middle East. They don't have a plan for the region. They are losing credibility."

Both President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have warned Syria that it must rein in Hezbollah, not least by cutting the supply line for the missiles the organization fires into Israel, which they say Iran ships through Syria.

"Do you want to step on the supply line or do you want to solve the big problem in the Middle East?" Mrs. Shaaban said. "That is the main issue. Do they want to end the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, that is the question."

One Syrian official issued a strong warning against a proposal that was gaining momentum on Sunday for an international force to guard the Lebanon-Israel border. Deploying such a force without the cooperation of Syrian and Hezbollah, the official said, will risk repeating 1983. That was a pointed reference to the 241 United States service members and 58 French soldiers killed in attacks on military installations by suicide bombers. It has long been considered likely that the bombers were dispatched by Hezbollah with Syria's blessing.

Support for Hezbollah is clearly swelling across the Arab world, with many people enraptured that the militant organization can still launch missiles across the border nearly two weeks after Israel unleashed some of its fearsome military muscle. Syria evidently feels the tide is running in its favor, particularly since crucial American allies like the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are noticeably edgy about how, in contrast, much of the public in their own countries has scorned them for supporting Washington and criticizing Hezbollah.

The region is drifting away from the Americans and moderate Arab states and toward those supporting Hezbollah, Syrians say, because the United States has showed callousness toward civilian deaths in Iraq, and now in Lebanon.

"It is unbelievable that the U.S. will say to Israel you have one more week to wipe out Hezbollah — can you imagine someone saying you have one more week to kill Americans?" the official asked. "You can't imagine the impact of this on the region."

STEVEN ERLANGER in the NY Times writes that Israelis are beginning to see Syria as a key in the diplomacy that must end this in his article: "Weighing Foreign Forces: Sea Change for Israel." (July 24, 2006)

"The current crisis will create a new situation between Israel and the Arabs," said Yoram Meital, chairman of the Herzog Center for Middle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University. "Most Arabs and Israelis agree that the previous status quo, including the so-called peace process and Israeli unilateralism, is a failure. The challenge today is how to form a new environment."

Like Mr. Alpher, he said he thought this might be a good moment for Israel to respond favorably to regular calls from Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, for peace talks that could include the Lebanese dispute.

Syria, with a secular government and a Sunni majority, "is the weak link in the Iranian Shia arc," Mr. Alpher said.

Israel’s defense minister says he supports the deployment of an international force sponsored by NATO on the Lebanese side of the border

Israeli airstrikes on Saturday blasted communications and television transmission towers in the central and northern Lebanese mountains, knocking the LBCI off the air and killing one person at the station. "The Israelis are looking to destroy sound and image in Lebanon -- the last weapons this country has -- after bombarding infrastructure," said Minister for telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh.

President Bush said in his weekly radio address that his administration's diplomatic efforts would focus on finding a strategy for confronting Hizbullah and its Syrian and Iranian backers.

Alistair Lyon, Special Correspondent

BEIRUT, July 23 (Reuters) - U.S. President George W. Bush may have to set aside his hostility to Syria if he wants its help in ending the war between Israel and Hizbollah in Lebanon.

Here is a smart Israeli analyst on Syria.
SYRIA’S ROLE IN THE ISRAEL-HIZBULLAH CONFRONTATION

Aiman Mansour
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
July 23, 2006

The confrontation between Israel and Hizbullah that has unfolded since the abduction of two soldiers on July 12 has prompted considerable speculation about future Syrian policy. One school of thought argues that Syria under President Bashar al-Asad will not stop at the brink and will actively support Hizbullah. However, the regime’s behavior in this confrontation suggests that a rational calculation of vital interests will prompt Asad to adopt a pragmatic stance.

In contrast to the recklessness sometimes attributed to him in Israel and elsewhere, Asad has thus far managed to stop at the brink. Hizbullah has certainly tried to implicate Syria in the conflict by circulating reports that Israel has bombed targets deep inside Syria, by firing rockets at the Golan Heights, and by using Syrian-supplied missiles (Ra’ad 1) against Haifa. But those efforts have failed to achieve the desired result. Determined to avoid a confrontation with Israel, Syria immediately denied that it had been bombed and it has refrained from any direct intervention. Moreover, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal al-Mikdad has strenuously refuted charges that Syria was the source of trucks carrying supplies of ammunition for Hizbullah that were attacked by the Israeli Air Force, and the Syrian regime has even asked that the U.S. and the international community involve it any negotiations to end the fighting. Finally, the political support Syria has given Hizbullah has been relatively restrained and, as Syria’s behavior at the Arab Summit Conference suggests, whatever support is does provide stems largely from the regime’s desire to preserve its ties with a leading element in domestic Lebanese politics. Maintaining a link with Hizbullah allows Syria to remain a relevant actor in the Lebanese system.

Syrian behavior points to two main conclusions. The first is that the regime is determined to continue playing a major role in domestic Lebanese affairs, consistent with the Syrian belief that developments in Lebanon are critical to Syrian national security as well as the historical conviction that Lebanon is actually part of Syria. The second is that Syria wants to show a pragmatic face that could help extricate it from the international isolation it is currently experiencing and eventually even from the Iranian bear-hug. It is possible that Iran, through its commitment to come to Syria’s aid in the event of an Israeli attack, was trying to prompt Asad’s regime to intervene more actively to defend Hizbullah, lest its missile capabilities be destroyed (according to some analysts, Hizbullah missiles are a component of Iran’s deterrent against an Israeli or western attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure). If so, Syria’s refusal to become actively involved in hostilities indicates that the regime is not prepared to sacrifice itself for the sake of either Hizbullah or Iran.

Notwithstanding the criticism leveled by Israel and the west at Asad’s leadership and decision-making, the very fact that he heads a secular and minority regime under domestic threat forces him to behave with a certain degree of restraint and to confront domestic extremists who aspire to replace his regime with an Islamic republic, and in this he shares a common interest with Israel. If the regime were overthrown, its successor would not be led by enlightened liberal democrats. Any political vacuum would almost surely be filled by the same sort of extreme Islamists now embittering the lives of Iraqis. And even if this scenario does not oblige others to come to terms with the regime’s support for Palestinian and Hizbullah terror, the current Syrian reality nevertheless appears preferable to the reality of Iraq or Afghanistan.

The Alawi-controlled regime in Syria is in a very delicate position. On one hand, the Alawis are widely perceived as heretics among the Sunni majority, which would like to replace them with a Sunni-dominated regime. At the same time, the regime is very sensitive to regional developments, and especially to the Lebanon issue. There is a basic understanding in Syria that if the regime becomes too closely aligned with one faction in Lebanon, it will invite more vigorous opposition from the other factions (and their external backers). Various considerations do not permit the regime to cut Syria off completely from Hizbullah; that explains the expressions of verbal encouragement and the organization of public demonstrations of sympathy. But even if Syria has sent some weapons to Hizbullah, that falls far short of the openly-declared and uncompromising assistance one might expect for a real strategic ally. At the same time, moreover, Syria refuses to sever links with all other factions and confessional groups in Lebanon.

Israel will find it difficult to completely disarm Hizbullah through its own military means. Accomplishing that objective will require a determined effort by the Lebanese army, and the chances of that happening are minimal. Furthermore, the mere introduction into Lebanon of another multi-national force is unlikely to persuade Hizbullah to voluntarily give up whatever weapons it retains, and the attempt to do so may well stimulate Hizbullah to step up terrorist attacks against western targets in Lebanon and abroad.

The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon led Hizbullah to build up its forces and, at the ideological level, to stress the Islamist character of its activities, and the idea of exporting the Islamic revolution to Lebanon will not fade away if Hizbullah, as seems likely, survives the current Israeli military campaign. Consequently, there is not a high probability that Hizbullah can be disarmed without active Syrian intervention. What could prompt Syria to undertake such an intervention is a package of incentives, of which the most appealing would be the reassertion of Syrian political hegemony in Lebanon, while preserving the domestic balance as outlined in the Ta’ef Agreement (although those who agree to such a “carrot” might well demand that Syria disarm the Palestinian militias along with Hizbullah). However, the moment for a Syrian intervention of this sort may be “ripe” only if the domestic Lebanese contest between the Christian-Druze-Sunni coalition and Hizbullah turns violent.

Rice continues to insist that Syria is the problem and not the solution

With Israel and the United States saying a real cease-fire is not possible until Hizbullah is reined in, Arab heavyweights Egypt and Saudi Arabia were pushing Syria to end its support for the guerrillas, Arab diplomats in Cairo said. Israel signaled a policy shift, saying it would accept an international force -- preferably from NATO -- on its border to ensure the peace in southern Lebanon.

On route to the region, Rice discussed the possibility of working with Syria on a solution. In recent weeks, the Bush administration has blamed Syria, along with Iran, for stoking the recent violence by encouraging Hizbullah to attack northern Israel.

"The problem isn't that people haven't talked to the Syrians. It's that the Syrians haven't acted," she said.

"It's not as if we don't have diplomatic relations," she said. "We do."

Rice has tried to walk delicately between supporting the Lebanese government, while also not dictating to its ally Israel how it should handle its own security. Her posture has frustrated numerous allies.

"We all want to urgently end the fighting. We have absolutely the same goal," Rice said. But she added that if the violence ends only to restart within weeks, "then all of the carnage that Hizbullah launched by its illegal activities -- abducting the soldiers and then launching rocket attacks -- we will have gotten nothing from that."

U.S. Plan Seeks to Wedge Syria From Iran

The NY Times claims that the US seeks to wedge Syria from Iran. It is difficult to see how Syria will be able to abandon the allies it has cultivated for 20 years. The first two questions Syrians may well ask themselves is: What is in it for us? and What convinces us to trust the US?

Washington has just let down the Lebanese. Moreover, both Clinton and Uri Sagi, the head of Israeli intelligence for the IDF in the 1990s, have said that the US let Syria down during the Golan dealings. Uri Sagi, as quoted a few days ago on these pages, said: "The United States did not stand by its word to Assad and Barak got cold feet at the last minute." Finally, the US promised it would bring democracy and prosperity to Iraq. It did not. Why should Asad believe that Bush can deliver?

What would Syria need Bush to deliver? Syria would have to be promised a healthy economic package for abandoning its allies and supporters. It would need assurances that all efforts to isolate it will be stopped. It would need to have guarantees that Israel will return the Golan. The US cannot make such promises. President Bush will not reward Syria for good behavior. He has made this clear for years. It has been a cardinal principle of his policy.

It is hard to see how the plan in the following New York Times article, which mentions no quid pro quo, will convince Syria to split from its traditional allies and set out on an adventure of such risk. The Syrian regime is extremely conservative.

U.S. Plan Seeks to Wedge Syria From Iran

By HELENE COOPER and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: July 23, 2006

WASHINGTON, July 22 — As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice heads to Israel on Sunday, Bush administration officials say they recognize Syria is central to any plans to resolve the crisis in the Middle East, and they are seeking ways to peel Syria away from its alliance of convenience with Iran.

Turmoil in the Mideast
Go to Complete Coverage » In interviews, senior administration officials said they had no plans right now to resume direct talks with the Syrian government. President Bush recalled his ambassador to Syria, Margaret Scobey, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, in February 2005. Since then, America’s contacts with Damascus have been few, and the administration has imposed an array of sanctions on Syria’s government and banks, and frozen the assets of Syrian officials implicated in Mr. Hariri’s killing.

But officials said this week that they were at the beginning stages of a plan to encourage Saudi Arabia and Egypt to make the case to the Syrians that they must turn against Hezbollah. With the crisis at such a pivotal stage, officials who are involved in the delicate negotiations to end it agreed to speak candidly about their expectations only if they were not quoted by name.

“We think that the Syrians will listen to their Arab neighbors on this rather than us,’’ said one senior official, “so it’s all a question of how well that can be orchestrated.’’

There are several substantial hurdles to success. The effort risks allowing Syria to regain a foothold inside Lebanon, after its troops were forced to withdraw last year. It is not clear how forcefully Arab countries would push a cause seen to benefit the United States and Israel. And many Middle Eastern analysts are skeptical that a lasting settlement can be achieved without direct talks between Syria and the United States.

The effort begins Sunday afternoon in the Oval Office, where President Bush is scheduled to meet the Saudi foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, and the chief of the Saudi national security council, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Prince Bandar was the Saudi ambassador to Washington until late last year and often speaks of his deep connections to both the Bush family and Vice President Dick Cheney.

Ms. Rice is delaying her departure to the Middle East until after the meeting, which she is also expected to attend, along with Mr. Cheney and Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser. The session was requested by the Saudis, American officials said.

The expected outcome of the session is unclear. “We don’t know how patient the Saudis will be with the Israeli military action,’’ said one senior official. “They want to see Hezbollah wiped out, and they’d like to set back the Iranians.”

But in the Arab world, the official added, “they can’t been seen to be doing that too enthusiastically.’’

Several of Mr. Bush’s top aides said the plan is for Mr. Bush and other senior officials to press both Saudi Arabia and Egypt to prod Syria into giving up its links with Hezbollah, and with Iran. The administration, aside from its differences with Iran over nuclear programs and with Syria over its role in Lebanon, also has objected to both nations’ behavior toward their common neighbor, Iraq.

“They have to make the point to them that if things go bad in the Mideast, the Iranians are not going to be a reliable lifeline,’’ one of the administration officials said.

Another said, “There is a presumption that the Syrians have more at stake here than the Iranians, and they are more exposed.”

The American officials are calculating that pressure from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan may help to get Syria on board.

But so far, there appears to be little discussion of offering American incentives to the Syrians to abandon Hezbollah, or even to stop arming it. The Bush administration has been deeply reluctant to make such offers, whether it is negotiating with Damascus or with the governments of Iran or North Korea.

Nor did President Bush sound any conciliatory notes in his radio address on Saturday. “For many years, Syria has been a primary sponsor of Hezbollah and it has helped provide Hezbollah with shipments of Iranian-made weapons,’’ he said. “Iran’s regime has also repeatedly defied the international community with its ambition for nuclear weapons and aid to terrorist groups. Their actions threaten the entire Middle East and stand in the way of resolving the current crisis and bringing lasting peace to this troubled region.”

The State Department lists Syria as a country that sends money to terrorist organizations. Syria’s ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, has spent a lot of time on television in recent days, but he is often described as one of the loneliest ambassadors in Washington.

In the months after 9/11, Syria provided important assistance in the campaign against al Qaeda. But relations soured as American officials complained that Syria did little to crack down on associates of Saddam Hussein who funneled money to the insurgency in Iraq through Syrian banks, or to stop the flow of insurgents across its border to Iraq. The United States imposed sanctions on Syria in 2004, and took further measures after Syrian officials were accused of involvement in Mr. Hariri’s assassination.

The idea is to try to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, who have recently been drawn closer together by standoffs with Washington. Syria and Iran have been formally allied since the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, but historically they were suspicious of each other.

“Historically and strategically, they are on opposing sides — the Arabs and the Persians,” Daniel Ayalon, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, said in an interview on Thursday. Now, he added, “the only Arab country to ally with Iran is Syria,” a position that has angered Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Syria, along with most of the Arab world, is largely Sunni. Iran and Iraq are largely Shiite.

One Western diplomat said Arab leaders had had trouble getting President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to come to the phone when they called to express concern about Hezbollah’s actions.

In 1996, when Israel and Hezbollah were fighting each other and bombs rained down on civilian populations, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spent 10 days shuttling around Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem before brokering a cease-fire that got Israel and Hezbollah to agree to leave civilians out of the fighting.

Ms. Rice has said she has no intention of duplicating Mr. Christopher’s approach. “I could have gotten on a plane and rushed over and started shuttling and it wouldn’t have been clear what I was shuttling to do,” she said Friday. “I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon and Israel to the status quo ante.”

Rather, the administration’s declared aim is the implementation of United Nations resolution 1559, which calls for the disarming of Hezbollah and the deployment of the Lebanese army to southern Lebanon. Syria, which was forced to withdraw its troops from Lebanon last year, may well balk at efforts to enforce it.

But while analysts say it is possible for the Bush administration and Israel to work out a solution without including Syria in the diplomatic wrangling, it would be difficult to do. Some Bush administration officials, particularly at the State Department, are pushing to find a way to start talking to Syria again.

Here is an anonymous note I received from a reader explaining why he believes the Lebanon-Israel confrontation may spin into a regional war

Josh,

I do not pretend to be an expert, but as a casual observer, and frequent reader of your column, I have the feeling that what we are witnessing today in the middle-east, is a gathering storm. The climax of which, is a perfect storm.

In order for a perfect storm to happen, a lot of factors have to be in the right place, and at the right time.

I am arguing here that all the regional actors, as well as the international actors, that can have an impact on where things are heading, no longer can accept or afford the status quo, and they believe that escalation and confrontation is the way to change the status quo.

1. America:

1.1. American plans for the middle-east, and the war on terror are not going according to the administration's plan. The war in Iraq, and to some extent Afghanistan, are not going very well, and therefore the American public support for wars is declining, and the window of opportunity for any military adventurism, is closing rapidly. Therefore, if anything needs to be done, it needs to be done now.

1.2. Bush ratings are at their lowest, and the odds are that the democrats will come to power. It could be as early as this fall by capturing the congress, House or Senate, or both. Or it could be in two years by capturing the white house. Another reason why the neocons need to push their agenda now, or never.

1.3. Even if Republicans maintain control on congress and Whitehouse, the Neocon faction of the republican party are losing their grip due to the performance in the first term. Yet another reason for the urgency to do something now.

1.4. There are currently 130,000 US troops in Iraq. That number will certainly go down over the next 12 months, and the next 2 years, as we come closer to US elections. Therefore the time for any military adventurism is now.

2. Israel:

2.1. The failure of the peace plan, prompted Israel to come out with its own unilateral disengagement plan, similar to what happened in Lebanon in 2000. However, the whole plan falls apart when the opposing party continues to lob rockets even after the disengagement. Furthermore, we are seeing that these rockets are becoming more lethal, and can attain increasing distances. Therefore, the status quo needs to change before it is too late.

2.2. There is an administration in Washington that can only be described as the most friendly administration to Israel ever. A big part of this very close relationship, is the president own religious beliefs, and we know that is going to change in 2 years. Thus the urgency to do something.

2.3. Iran is gaining more strength due in large part to the Iraq war, and the removal of the Iraqi thereat, as well as the rise to power for the Shiites. Its own nuclear program is progressing at a worrying pace. Another reason why something needs to be done before Iran goes Nuclear.

2.4. Forces hostile to Israel are on the rise in the region. Hamas won elections in the Palestinian territory. Hezbollah won more seats in the Lebanese parliament, than ever before, an indication of a growing popularity among Shiites. Muslim brotherhood party won seats in the Egyptian parliament. All these Islamic forces, although they were present 10 and 20 years ago, have never been as popular as they are today. The trends indicate that fundamentalist Islam is on the rise everywhere. Therefore something needs to be done now, before the opposing force gather too much steam.

2.5. There is a new leadership in Israel that is not proven. Both the Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister do not come from a military background, and therefore they have to cede the decision making to the military, which is why this war is called the "generals wars".

3. Syria:
3.1. Economically Syria, is isolated, and under siege, regionally and Internationally. The economy is suffering as more and more suffocating measures are enacted by the US and its allies. Syria cannot withstand the impact of all these measures, as it is not rich in petroleum, like Iraq or Iran. The decision makers in Syria do not want to repeat the Iraq experience, where 12 years of sanctions, reduced Iraq's economy to tatters, despite its vast petroleum resources.

3.2. Politically Syria has never been as isolated as it is today. Not only it is isolated internationally, but also regionally, as evidenced by the Arab league meeting last Saturday.

3.3. The impact of Lebanon debacle, and the Hariri investigation that ensued, have still to play out completely. There is the economic impact of all these Syrians losing their jobs. There are strong indications that the Hariri investigations will end up with indictments of high level Syrian officers.

3.4. Syria has reached the conclusion that it cannot reach out to the US, even if it closes the borders, and pull out of Lebanon, and stop fermenting problems in Lebanon, because the US is not interested in reaching an accommodation with Syria.

4. Iran:
4.1. Iran is facing a major showdown with the west over its nuclear program. The Security Council is moving towards imposing sanctions on Iran.

4.2. Iran wants to engage Israel and America, in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, rather than Iran.

4.3. Iran is fighting for the leadership of the whole Moslem word. If it was to back down now, it will loose all credibility in the Moslem world.

4.4. Hezbollah is an extension of Iran. Hezbollah, although a totally Lebanese party, was in fact supported and started by Iran. Hezbollah is in fact the only triumph of the Iranian revolution, in its quest to export the revolution. Furthermore, Iran is counting on Hezbollah to create trouble for Israel, when the showdown over its nuclear weapons comes to a boil. Therefore, Iran will not let Hezbollah lose, in this showdown with Israel.

5. Hamas:

5.1. Clearly with the isolation and economic siege that they were under, they could not go any more. Something needed to happen, to break with the status quo, and produce a new reality.

5.2. Even though Hamas was not a party to the peace process, they were sitting back and waiting to see if Mahmoud Abbas can deliver. If he can they were ready to jump on board. However, the peace process died, and was buried, and there is no alternatives.

6. Lebanon:

6.1. The dialog was going nowhere. They could only agree on things that are controlled by others, such as for Palestinians to disarm, and Syria to exchange embassies, and mark the border. There was a deadlock, and an external event was needed to break the deadlock.

6.2. Hezbollah needs to prove that they are relevant in the new Lebanon.

For all the above reasons, I see this confrontation evolving, albeit slowly, into a major regional war.

Israel military encouraged by the neocons in the US administration may attack Syria, thinking that Syria is too afraid or too weak to respond, and that the outcome would be to bring Syria to heel.

Syria will respond as the regime cannot sit idly by, and retain any semblance of legitimacy.

Iran will get involved, and, we have a regional war.

I do hope I am wrong, and that this whole issue will get resolved diplomatically very soon.

I just wanted to know your opinions.

How Far Will the War be Broadened? Will the Lebanese Side with HA

Israel readying major ground offensive in Lebanon CTV.ca Top Israeli officials met Thursday night to decide how big a force to send in, according to senior military officials. They said Israel won't stop its offensive until Hizbullah is forced behind the Litani River, 30 kilometers north of the border – carving out a new buffer zone.

The Lebanese Defence Minister has said the country's army will join the battle, if Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon as part of its massive offensive against Hezbollah, according to ABC news.

An Israeli Defence Force spokesman, Brigadier Ido Nehushtan, says the military operation will continue until Hezbollah is destroyed.

IDO NEHUSHTAN: We have all forces - air, sea and ground, and our ground forces are ready and prepared. And as we speak, by the way, ground operations take place. On the borderline, we have no intention of occupying Lebanon. We left Lebanon six years ago, nevertheless the ground forces are ready and prepared to do whatever it takes.

BARNEY PORTER: The Lebanese Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, has now accused the United States of encouraging Israel's offensive on Lebanon.

Israeli forces have also resumed shelling the southern suburbs of Beirut after nightfall, local time.

And it seems there'll be no immediate let-up in the violence.

Today, the Hezbollah chief, Hassan Nasrallah, emerged from hiding to declare the two Israeli soldiers captured last week will only be freed in a prisoner-swap.

Earlier this week, Israeli warplanes dropped more than 20 tonnes of explosives on a suspected Hezbollah bunker in southern Beirut, believing